Now Will The Economists and Politicians
Get the Monearist Message?
Norman K. Gardner
[Reprinted from Land & Liberty, March,
1969]
AT THE END of his main work, The General Theory, Keynes
complained that: "Practical men, who believe themselves to be
quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves
of some defunct economist." There is a rich irony in the
reflection that the truth of this is more apparent today than ever it
was, and the defunct economist to whom the practical men in the
Treasury are enslaved is none other than John Maynard Keynes.
It will be a relief to those readers who never got round to
understanding what Keynes had to say about the money supply that now
they need not bother. Hardly any modern economist would now regard it
as having more than historical interest. The importance of Prof.
Walter's new paper*, lies not so much in its contribution to economic
theory, therefore, as in the hope that it may lead to the final
liberation of those practical men who are in control of the money
supply in the United Kingdom. A recent speech by Lord Cromer may be
taken as an indication that Britain's bankers are already shaking
themselves free.
Until the early 1950s it was thought by most economists that Keynes'
analysis of "liquidity preference" in the effect of monetary
policy on the economy had disposed of the quantity theory of money,
which had indicated that the quantity of money was a decisive
influence on the level of prices. The quantity theory had indicated
that increases in the money supply, whether by the printing press or
by the open market purchase of securities, would lead inevitably
(other things being equal) to all round price increases. The followers
of Keynes had been saying that since, in practice, other things are
not equal, one cannot be sure what would be the effect upon prices of
an increase in money supply. Government policy should therefore (they
argued) be to use the money supply purely to regulate interest rates,
and should use budgetary weapons to control inflation. The "reinstatement"
of the quantity theory into respectable economic thought by Prof.
Milton Friedman of Chicago in the early 1950s went unnoticed by
Treasury economists, and in 1959 the Radcliffe Committee re-asserted
the "money does not matter" attitude to inflation.
In 1968 a study by the Brookings Institute showed just how disastrous
had been the enslavement to Keynes. Their now-famous conclusion was
that the effect of the efforts of post-war British governments lo "stabilise"
the economy by means of fiscal policy had on balance been
de-stabilising. One has only to compare the slate of the British
economy with those of countries whose governments appreciated the
importance of controlling the money supply (as West Germany and Japan)
to appreciate what this has cost Britain.
Against this background we now have a statistical study by Prof.
Walters and his colleagues which demonstrates that over most of the
period between 1881 and 1968 the effect of the supply of money on
prices has been significant, and that is was in the direction
predicted by the quantity theory. Particularly interesting is their
study of the years 1967 and 1968 during which the economy experienced
"a dramatic increase in the quantity of money" together with
"a policy of tight budgetary constraints." The author
concludes (somewhat mildly, I thought) that "the monetary
stimulant was more powerful than the budgetary depressant." The
main recommendation of the paper is, unsurprisingly, "that the
government should stabilise the quantity of money."
I doubt whether many readers of LAND & LIBERTY will wish to pay
seven and sixpence for an authoritative statistical demonstration that
an increase in the money supply leads to inflation! Some might perhaps
wish to keep a copy to show to their grandchildren so that they can
say, "I remember the days when the British Government pursued a
Keynesian monetary policy."
It is fairly certain, I think, that we shall be able to look back on
1969 as the year of the emancipation of Britain from the tyranny of
Keynesian monetary policy. If I am right, then Prof. Walters will be
entitled to a modest share of the credit.
NOTES
*
Money in Boom and Slump, by A.A. Walters. Hobart Paper 44,
Institute of Economic Affairs, 7s, 6d.
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