CHAPTER II

STATE AND MUNICIPAL POLITICS

Four gentlemen sat at dinner in the Montauk Club, Brooklyn. One was a State Supreme Court Justice, two were State Senators, the fourth was a wholesale merchant.

"I venture to believe," said the Justice, "that the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Insurance at the Capitol at Albany secretly receives from the insurance companies, in addition to his public salary, approximately $25,000 a year."

The Senators dissented. "He receives a large sum, but not as large as that," said one.

"No," said the other Senator, "the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Railroads gets fully that much from the railroads of the State, but the insurance companies don't pay so well."

The first Senator agreed with this and probably the matter stands so. Of all our Aristocracy of Privilege our Railroad Princes are most in evidence as the corrupters of State politics. "These railway kings," says Mr. Bryce, "are among the greatest men, perhaps I may say are the greatest men in America... They have power, more power — that is, more opportunity of making their personal will prevail — than perhaps any one in political life except the President and the Speaker, who after all hold theirs only for four years and two years, while the railroad monarch may keep his for life."1

The Menace of Privilege

And then as to the railroad king's part in political affairs, Mr. Bryce continues: "He must know the Governors and watch the Legislatures of the States or Territories through which his line runs; must have adroit agents at the State capitol well supplied with the sinews of war, ready to 'see' leading legislators and to defeat any legislative attacks that may be made by blackmailers or the tools of rival presidents."

Look in any direction and find evidence of the truth of this statement, especially that part of it touching railroad money in politics. "The testimony of several witnesses was taken on the subject" of payment of money to influence legislation, said the committee of the Legislature of New York State in 1873 in its report on the Erie Railroad scandals, "and although the information acquired was not as specific as could be asked, enough was obtained to show that the railroad companies have been in the habit of spending large sums from year to year either to procure or reject the passage of bills. . . . It appears conclusive that a large amount — reported by one witness at $100,000 — was appropriated for legislative purposes by the railroad interests in 1872," and the Erie's proportion of it was $30,000.

Testimony showed that the Erie management had yearly been accustomed to spend large sums of money to control elections and influence legislation. In 1868 more than $1,000,000 was disbursed from the treasury for "extra and legal services." Jay Gould testified that during three years prior to 1872 the Erie paid considerable amounts to A. D. Barber and William M. Tweed. These amounts were charged on the Erie books to "The india-rubber account." "The memory of this witness," said the report, "was very defective as to details, and he could only remember large transactions; but he could distinctly recall that he had been in the habit of sending money into the numerous districts all over the State, either to control nominations or elections for Senators and members of
the Assembly. He considered that, as a rule [think of
the cynicism of this from a legislative committee], such
investments paid better than to wait until the men got to
Albany, and added the significant remark, in reply to a
question, that it would be as impossible to specify the
numerous instances as it would be to call to mind the
number of freight cars sent over the Erie road from day
to day."

Mr. Gould said his "india-rubber" dealings were con-
ducted in four States through which the Erie road ran,
and it was his custom to influence both nominations and
elections. His third sphere of influence was the Legislature
itself. "When the Legislature is Republican," said he
with a boldness that showed his contempt for both the
legislative committee and the general public, "I am a Re-
publican. When it is Democratic, I am a Democrat;
but I am always an Erie man." ¹

Which meant, in other words, that Mr. Gould "saw"
whichever party acquired the ascendancy in the Legisla-
ture. Probably it was in that way, too, that the life
insurance trinity — the Equitable, New York and Mutual
companies — jointly sustained lobbies to "watch legisla-
tion" in most, if not all, of the State capitolis. President
McCall of the New York Life testified before the legisla-
tive investigating committee that his company alone paid
one Andrew Hamilton nearly $800,000 within a period of
five years, mostly for "watching." For no part of this
large sum does a receipt seem to have been asked or given.
Mr. Hamilton was merely looked to for "results." That
this "watching" takes an active as well as a passive form
is evident from the shaping of life insurance legislation.
Such a policy of "watching" and "shaping" is of long
standing. Mr. Henry B. Hyde, founder of the Equitable
company, for instance, as early as 1867, secured an
amendment to the insurance law of the State of New

York striking out the requirement that insurance companies must pay dividends to their policy holders every five years, and provided instead that they may declare dividends "from time to time." This "from time to time" clause has ever since remained the language of the New York law, with the result that dividends of the insurance companies incorporated under it are as elusive as the jam that Alice in Wonderland complained of—"jam yesterday and to-morrow, but never to-day."

President McCall has declared that three fourths of the bills relating to insurance introduced into the Legislature are "strikes" and "hold-ups." But if that proves anything it is only the openness of such companies to attack—a dependence upon privileges which prevent them from making open resistance. But whether to buy legislation or protection from assault, the effect on bribery has been all one—to stimulate it.

Since the days of the intrepid Gould there has been so much trafficking in legislative votes in behalf of privilege that prices appear at times to have mounted to extraordinary figures. Mr. Thomas W. Lawson publicly charged Senator Patrick Henry McCarren of New York City with being on the legislative pay-roll of the Standard Oil Company, formerly at $10,000 a year and latterly at $20,000. No denial of the charge was ever made by the Senator. In another instance a Senator was covertly charged with receiving $40,000 for his single vote, which was all that was needed to beat a bill to compel the gas monopoly in New York City to reduce its charge for the illuminant twenty per cent. Senator Stevens, father of the bill, when asked if he regarded this as the probable price of the vote, replied: "I very much fear, and I am ashamed to make the confession, that the largest amount paid for a single vote was very much in excess of the sum you mentioned."

Indeed, if only a few of the stories flying about were true, the Albany legislative session of 1904—1905 was a
carnival of corruption. Those who profess to watch and understand assert that during that brief period the gas monopoly must have spent in round figures $500,000 in fighting legislation adverse to its privileges; that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company must have paid out as much to effect legislation relative to its new underground terminal in New York City; that the other steam railroads must have spent at least half that amount in buying favors for themselves; that the Interborough Company (elevated and subway in New York City) must have spent a quarter of a million for legislative favors and protection; that the Bell telephone spent at least $150,000 to head off public investigation and a forced wholesale reduction of its extortionate tariff rates; that the great insurance companies, because of the astounding state of things revealed by the Equitable Society scandal, were forced to spend half a million to kill investigating bills; and that other miscellaneous privileged interests were compelled to put up perhaps another $500,000 either to promote desired or to kill objectionable legislation. This would make an aggregate of $2,650,000, three quarters of which, it is computed, went to the Republican party organization, that being the majority party in the Legislature; and the other quarter paid out to individual members.

These figures may be, perhaps are, grossly exaggerated; but that public privileges of enormous value were at stake before the Legislature is clear. That those who seek and manage privileges use money to talk for them in legislative halls needs no proof. Indeed, common wonder now-

1 The barefaced condition of bribery and graft was indicated by the prayer of Rev. C. H. McDonald, a colored preacher who chanced to be called upon to deliver the invocation at the opening of the day's session of the Assembly at the State capitol at Albany, April 28, 1909. In the course of the prayer he said: "Oh, thou merciful God, we thank thee this morning for the realization that thou art the Supreme Legislator of the universe. Bless the members of this distinguished body, and when life's journey is at an end, we ask Thee to bring us to that General Assembly where Jesus Christ will be the Speaker, and business shall be transacted without graft or the dictation of lobbyists."
adays is, not when a legislator is caught in bribery, but rather when circumstances reveal a member who withstands the ordeal of temptation and refuses a bribe.

And what is true of passing bills or refusing to pass bills is true of the election of United States Senators by the Legislatures. During the Senatorial election at the New York State capitol recently, one candidate was openly spoken of as “the most successful lobbyist of his day.” According to common newspaper report, he had a fund of $478,000 to support his Senatorial aspirations. Such an argument proved irresistible. He was triumphantly chosen. He was at that time director in more than fifty different railroad corporations, mostly in New York State, besides being director in a number of banks and other fiduciary companies.

Of course party leaders and party machines may get much bribe money to the exclusion of legislative members. In such cases the latter are driven under the party lash to vote in conformity to such purchasing. But generally the buying transactions are conducted with the individual members themselves and, in the New York Legislature at least, is often carried on with a cynical disregard for even the superficial proprieties. Men known to be lobbyists by all who are in the least familiar with affairs consort freely with the members. Indeed, certain members are recognized as the “financial agents” in the Legislature of, say, the Gas Monopoly, the Bell Telephone Company, or the Sugar Trust. And these agents “see” certain members when anything is “doing” touching on their respective interests. A State Senator told me of how in one instance he voted on a bill according to his convictions, and then chanced to leave the chamber. On returning he found on his desk an unaddressed envelope in which was a new crisp $1000 note. A member sitting near suggested that the money was in acknowledgment of the vote. When it was returned to another member, who took no pains to conceal the fact that he had left it, he said
"Keep it. Every one voting that way got a piece of the green like that. If you will be a fool and won't use it for yourself, then give the money to some charity; but don't bring it back to me." The member who was not to be paid for doing what he had considered to be his duty threw the money down in disgust and walked away.

And in the municipal aldermanic or councilmanic bodies congressional and legislative rottenness is repeated. The corporations dependent there for their privileges buy ordinances or immunities. Poor men are, in consequence, made rich. A New York City Borough President is in point. On an official salary of $5,000, he supports a $10,000 steam yacht, a $12,000 automobile, a $15,000 Rockaway villa and a $27,000 California stock farm.

But now and again it happens that the price demanded is too high. This seems to have been so in the case of a franchise for a short connecting railroad for which the Pennsylvania Company asked relative to its new terminal in New York City. As a result the railroad managers went to Albany and procured from an obliging Legislature an amendment of the city charter taking all franchise-granting power from the Board of Aldermen. All power was concentrated in the Board of Estimate and Apportionment, composed of the elective administrative heads of the City Government. That board had from the beginning favored what the railroad corporation desired. Better by far a rotten Board of Aldermen, subject to popular control, at least when the body of the people get roused to a crisis, than charter-amending by an enormously powerful railroad corporation in its own behalf. Yet so outrageous had the franchise dealings of the Aldermen become, and so accustomed were the people to accept domination by privileged corporations, that small outcry was raised against this bold assumption of power.

But all this belongs to the vulgar cash-in-hand kind of bribery. There are other ways of securing venal legisla-
itors, more refined and quite as effective. The *Wall Street Journal* puts in words what is of common knowledge:—

Is it desired to secure some franchise or other municipal privilege? Put the boss in some speculative deal, the success of which depends upon the attaining of this privilege. Surely there is no reason why a boss may not "invest in stocks," and there is nothing to show the corrupt connection between his "investment" and the corporation desiring something which it can obtain in no other way than by the short cut of corruption. A whole Legislature could be let into a "good thing" in the stock market in the same way. A number of legislators would thus be made richer and certain financial interests benefited, and at the same time the public, however suspicious it might be, would be none the wiser. Even an inquisitive and honest district attorney would find it difficult to trace the connecting link of corruption. This kind of commercialism in politics is the most dangerous of all.

It is indeed certainly one of the most dangerous of all the kinds of commercialism in politics, and perhaps explains the mysterious way in which small salaries have made public office-holders rich. United States Senators and Congressmen, for instance, may be let in on a sugar or steel speculation, members of the State Legislature on gas, Aldermen on traction — as the price of their official service for Privilege. This undoubtedly is true of municipal bribery. It is just as profitable and very much safer than the cash-down methods pursued by the "Forty Thieves," which the New York City Council and Aldermen were popularly called in the middle fifties; or by Boss Tweed and his associates in the latter sixties and early seventies; or by the "Boo! Aldermen" in 1884, each of whom, according to sworn testimony afterward, received $22,000 for his vote for the Broadway street railroad franchise.

And just as the seekers for or holders of legislative privileges practice the corruption of legislative bodies, from those in Congress down, so are they the main contributors to the corruption funds of the party machines, national, State and municipal. Corrupting the servants of the
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...ple, they corrupt the people too. In testifying before United States Senate committee in 1894, Mr. H. O. Havemeyer, president of the American Sugar Refining company (Sugar Trust), spoke with entire frankness on is point:—

**Senator Allen.** Therefore you feel at liberty to contribute to both parties?

**Mr. Havemeyer.** It depends. In the State of New York, where Democratic majority is between 40,000 and 50,000, we throw their way. In the State of Massachusetts, where the Republican ty is not doubtful, they probably have the call.

**Senator Allen.** In the State of Massachusetts, do you contribute thing?

**Mr. Havemeyer.** Very likely.

**Senator Allen.** What is your best recollection as to contributions de by your company in the State of Massachusetts?

**Mr. Havemeyer.** I could not name the amount.

**Senator Allen.** However, in the State of New York you contribute to the Democratic party, and in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts you contribute to the Republican party?

**Mr. Havemeyer.** It is my impression that wherever there is a minority party, wherever the majority is very large, that is the party gets the contribution, because that is the party which controls local matters.

**Senator Allen.** Then the Sugar Trust is a Democrat in a Demo- tic State and a Republican in a Republican State?

**Mr. Havemeyer.** As far as local matters are concerned, I think it is about it.

**Senator Allen.** In the State of your nativity, or the nativity of your corporation, New Jersey, where do your contributions go?

**Mr. Havemeyer.** I will have to look that up.

**Senator Allen.** I understand New Jersey is invariably a Demo- tic State. It would naturally go to the Democratic party?

**Mr. Havemeyer.** Under the theory I have suggested, if they were re, it would naturally go to them.¹

The contributions to either or both of the party organizations by the privilege-owning corporations are in the aggregate very great. The Philadelphia Record editorially made the charge that in the fight against the Weaver action in the Republican party, the Durham-McNichol action, during the campaign of 1905, spent $220,000

¹ U. S. Senate Report 606, Fifty-third Congress, second session.
simply for bill board and newspaper advertising and hall hire. Nothing was more patent to the world than that the only persons to whom it could be worth while to spend such an amount of money in such a way were either the owners of privileges who looked for protection and extensions from the Durham-McNichol faction in the event of victory, or that faction itself which expected to "bleed" such owners of privileges. Privilege in either event was expected to pay the bill.

In urging the passage through the New York Legislature of corrupt practice bills, Mr. William Church Osborn declared that "the best informed believe that in this State the Democrats used about $700,000 on election day last year [1904] and the Republicans about $1,250,000, a total of about $2,000,000, for 1,250,000 voters." Half a century ago De Tocqueville wrote that he "never heard of any one accused of spending his wealth in buying votes," 1 and up to a short time ago there was little bribery among our farmers and in our smaller villages. The corruption at elections was in our towns and cities. But now the corruption of the farmers and villagers is general. They expect to be paid by the party to which they belong for their time and the time of their teams. If their party does not make this payment, they will refuse to vote, or else will accept payment from the other party and vote for its candidate.

As for vote-buying in the cities and towns: it cannot be done with such certainty since the adaptation of the Australian ballot system, which an awakened public compelled. Despite this, it is generally possible to get the "goods delivered" by employing party "workers." They wear the party badges, help to get out the voters, and make a demonstration of party strength by collecting near the polling places.

Who pays these workers? The party, or rather the

party boss and manager. Whence comes the means? Whence, indeed, but, in the main, from the public franchise-owning corporations and others having or hoping for public privileges. Yet there are collateral sources of corruption. "The amount annually paid to the police force of New York City in tribute," announces former District Attorney Eugene A. Philbin, "is $1,000,000. I am aware that in the tenderloin precinct alone it amounts to $20,000 per month. Gambling houses there pay $500 a month to run, and other houses pay $500 to open and $50 each month to run."¹ If we are to credit general gossip, many police officials have grown rich while in office. The newspapers set the wealth of one at $2,000,000, one at $1,500,000, one at $1,250,000, three at $1,000,000, one at $800,000, one at $500,000, one at $300,000 and two at $250,000. All these men are now off the force — retired, dismissed or legislated out. They joined the force poor. Their official salaries ranged from $2,500 to $5,000 a year. How did they get rich? From gambling and disorderly house blackmail is the common belief. But it is probable that if their fortunes began in this way the largest acquisitions were subsequently made through stock and land speculation.

A weather-beaten New York politician describes the hierarchy of corrupt municipal party managers: (1) those who will take from the great privilege-owning corporations and from no one else; (2) those who will take only from the public contractors; (3) those who will take from none below the larger gamblers and liquors dealers; (4) those who will exact tribute from brothels; (5) those lowest of all who will accept the miserable little offerings of threecard monte men.

Here are the five chief sources of political loot. The first yields many times that of the other four taken to

¹ Address at Cornell University, May 23, 1904. Mr. Philbin afterward publicly stated that he spoke of conditions preceding the Police Commissionership of William McAdoo, commencing January, 1904.
gether. Indeed, it may truly be said that Privilege is responsible for it all, since Privilege robs the masses of the people into poverty, which causes many to neglect and others to sell their suffrages.

These things are not true of New York State alone. They are true of all the States. As Gould and Havemeyer said, the great privileged corporations conduct debauching operations wherever it suits their interests. Colonel Alexander K. McClure, chairman of the Pennsylvania State Committee in 1860, stated that the Lincoln managers had but $12,000 to spend in the presidential campaign in Pennsylvania that year, whereas the late United States Senator Quay, the servant of railroad, steel and coal interests, is believed to have spent $200,000 simply to have himself reflected State chairman; and Philadelphia, as all the world knows, has been until quite recently, in the words of Rev. Dr. Parkhurst, "comfortably rotten."

In Delaware Addicksism is a synonym for political putrefaction. A detailed charge made by Mr. Thomas W. Lawson of Boston that Mr. Henry H. Rogers, vice-president of the Standard Oil Company, paid in cash a quarter of a million dollars as a bribe for the vacation of a receivership of the Addicks Bay State Gas Company, has been confirmed by several, among them ex-United States Senator Anthony J. Higgins. Mr. Rogers has not taken the trouble even to deny the charge through the press.

New Jersey, once the peculiar province of the Camden and Amboy Railroad, is now the breeding-place of trusts. Her Legislature, under trust guidance, acts as if she had no fellowship with the other States of the Union.

Rule or ruin has long been the policy of the railroads in Illinois politics, while $1,000,000 was put in a safe deposit box, and the key given to Governor Altgeld’s nephew.


2 Interview in Philadelphia North American, Dec. 21, 1904. The magazine containing the Lawson charge was issued about the middle of December.
with the statement that the money was for the State's Executive if he would not veto a gas trust bill which had been passed by the Legislature. When told of this the Governor said to his nephew: "Guard that key as the most precious thing in your life. To-morrow I shall veto the bill." And the next day he did veto it.

The Baking Powder Trust in Missouri wanted a law to crush the Independents. Former Lieutenant-Governor John A. Lee undertook to procure its passage. He received, by his subsequent confession, $8500, from which he paid seven Senators $1000 a piece. Six of these Senators were members of the Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence. Bribers and bribed were taken in the net and scourged.

Tariff-protected sugar interests have for decades dominated Louisiana.

"The impudent railroad lobby," wrote Governor La Follette, in a recent special message to the Wisconsin Legislature, "has cost the State millions of dollars in the last six years, and has been a nuisance and disgrace in the legislative halls of the State." 1

In accepting a renomination, Governor Herrick of Ohio declared that "the professional lobby should go," it being "subversive of the basic principles upon which American institutions are founded to permit a few men to control legislation and to put their judgment as to what is best for the people against that of the representatives of the people, elected for the sole purpose of registering their will." 2

In Montana copper companies and not political parties bid for office, with the result that "corruption, bribery, and grafting" are rampant in Silverbow County.

General Sherman Bell, speaking for Colorado, says that water, electric light, telephone and street railroad corporations of Denver spent $190,000 corruptly in a recent city election and had 14,000 fraudulent votes cast

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1 Message to Legislature, May 25, 1905.
2 Speech before the Republican State Convention, May 25, 1905.
and counted.\footnote{1} Seventy thousand dollars is the amount commonly said to have been paid by the allied mining, smelting and steam railroad powers for fourteen votes in the Legislature in the recent gubernatorial struggle in that State.

A million-dollar timber scandal in Idaho threatens sooner or later to envelop many public officials there in its toils, and Oregon bows under the disgrace of having two of her representatives in Congress— one a member of the Senate, the other of the House— caught in similar frauds. Senator Mitchell had for two years been master of the Republican party of that State.

California and Nevada have long been as completely under the domination of the Pacific railroads as Alabama has been under that of the Louisville and Nashville, Ohio under the group headed by the Lake Shore and Big Four, and Florida under the Plant-Flagler interests.

The Consolidated Railroad regularly “opens the bag” in Connecticut, with a result, as related by Rev. Dr. Newman Smyth (The Outlook, March 11, 1905), that “in one hill town the amount of purchasable votes became so large that the town committee of both parties made a mutual bargain that year not to buy any votes.” The Aldrich-Perry-Brayton combination of steel railway, electric, gas and other franchise utilities, says the New York Evening Post, “finds its traffic in franchises and privileges relatively cheap and simple while it can make its bargains with the rotten boroughs.”

No longer could such a keen and impartial observer as Mr. Bryce say, as he said fifteen years ago, that “the Legislatures of Massachusetts, Vermont and several of the northwestern States, such as Michigan, are pure, i.e. the members who would take a bribe are exceedingly few, and those who would push through a job for some other

\footnote{1} He told me this during an interview for publication, Colorado Springs, June, 1904.
sort of consideration a small fraction of the whole."¹ The Legislature of Michigan is now easily susceptible to the magnetic influences of the iron, copper, lumber and public franchise interests. The Legislature of Vermont quietly bows before the will of the marble and granite quarry interests, whose rule there is as complete, though without turbulence, as is the rule of the coal and metallurgic mine owners in Colorado. As to Massachusetts: Lomasney is to Boston much as Croker was to New York, Shepard to Washington and Buckley (the Chinese called him the "blind White Devil") to San Francisco. Indeed, Lomasney is greater than any of them, for he is in a sense non-partisan. Managers of both parties not only in Boston but in the State treat with him, since he can when he pleases prove his boast—"stand the House of Representatives [of which he is a member] on end." The Senate of the 1905 session was notorious. Of the forty members, twenty-five, who were purchasable, hung together and were known collectively as "the Syndicate." The remaining fifteen were called "Discards." Mr. Thomas W. Lawson has circumstantially charged the Standard Oil gas interests with buying up legislative votes like fish at the market.² That black indictment has stood unchallenged.

Thus might we go through the entire line of States. Everywhere Privilege, the offspring or the ward of Government, is active in politics. And it is there for itself, not for the general good; there to master, not to submit. Its influence may not always be dominant, but it strives for dominance, aided with money and corrupting methods. Too often the question at the polls or in legislative halls is not what the people in general will do, but what those possessing privileges will permit to be done. Tammany Boss Croker once amazed the public with his candor by

announcing that he was in politics for his pocket. Yet
why the surprise? To such as he politics is only a voca-
tion or business. His largest customer is he who will buy
his way to privilege and will expand large sums to keep
it. In local politics this causes such a rottenness as to
daunt so wise a man as Mr. Bryce and such a public-
spirited one as Mr. Goldwin Smith. They distinctly do not
follow Macaulay and say that “institutions purely demo-
cratic must, sooner or later, destroy liberty or civiliza-
or both.”¹ But they do speak of the government of
great cities as being a conspicuous failure in the United
States.²

Mr. Bryce would have the people more vigilant and fol-
low higher political standards. This is only another form
of the urging of the pulpit, “Be virtuous and then you will
be wise and strong.” The masses of men, except in times
of crisis, will be what their circumstances make them.
Grants of privilege by Government condemn the masses to
circumstances of brutalizing poverty and ignorance. This
is the fallowest ground for corrupt politics.

Mr. Smith distrusts “the blind chances of popular elec-
tions” and would have Government by Commission, the
Commission appointed by the Governor. But would ap-
pointed Commissioners be less the servants of Privilege
than officials elected directly by the people? Experience
says not. The power that corrupts local politics also elects
Governors, or at least has a potent influence over most of
them. This power would name the Commissioners. Bet-
ter a corrupt democracy, with freedom to correct its ways,
than a well-ordered paternal Government, which may with
a strong hand preserve the peace only to fasten permanently
upon the people devices for robbing them, all the more
effective because indirect and subtle.

¹ Letter of Thomas Babington Macaulay to Henry S. Randall, the
biographer of Thomas Jefferson.

“City Government,” by Goldwin Smith, in The Independent, March 30,
1905.
Others, like M. Ostrogorski in his work “Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties,” go farther and reach pessimistic conclusions as to the entire fabric of democratic Government, seeing deterioration at top and utter degradation at bottom; the whole in the hands of party machine, caucus and lobby, which are growing stronger and stronger, and correspondingly unaccountable. M. Ostrogorski treats this as revealing the innate weakness of a government by the masses, all unconscious of the existence of Privilege standing behind, pulling the wires — Privilege, concentrating in fewer and fewer hands and waxing great with power.

“The conditions of life in this Republic have wonderfully changed during the last century,” says Mr. Justice Brewer.1 “Formerly there were two parties: the individual and the Government. Now there are three: the individual, the corporation and the Government.” By the “corporation,” the justice obviously means the corporation possessing government-made or sanctioned privilege; for, continues he, in some respects the corporation “stands halfway between the individual and the Government, and at times antagonizes both the interests of the one and the power of the other.”

What is this but a conservative way of saying that Privilege robs the people and debauches their politics and their Government?

And how do those exponents as well as molders of public sentiment and opinion — the press, the university and the pulpit — act in respect to all these things? What is the attitude of Privilege toward each of them, and what is their bearing toward Privilege? We shall proceed to consider.

1 Address before the Albany Law School, June 1, 1904.