

gard conducted the battle effectively when he ultimately realized the situation. Again Beauregard was the key figure in the concentration of the scattered Confederate army at Shiloh, the retreat to and the defense of Corinth and the withdrawal to Tupelo, all of which revealed tactical and engineering skill. His defence of Charleston in 1863–1864 was a classic operation which convinced the Federals that Charleston could never be captured from the sea. It also revealed Beauregard's superior talents as an engineer and as an artilleryman. It further demonstrated that he was a first-class independent commander in a small theater over which he could exercise personal supervision. Again in the summer of 1864 the rapid concentration of his forces before Petersburg and the "bottling up" of Benjamin F. Butler, when he rather than Lee anticipated Grant's move on the Confederate railway center south of the James, saved Petersburg and probably Richmond for the next nine months.

The author's estimate of Beauregard as he actually developed during the Civil War—rather than what he might have been—was that he was an excellent, down-to-earth combat general, an excellent battlefield tactician; that, on the other hand, his strategic planning on which he so prided himself was unrealistic—the fanciful mental operation of an imaginative but inexperienced field general.

Within the compass of 329 pages of text, Mr. Williams has written a comprehensive, authoritative, and very interesting biography of the most unique and complex character of the Confederacy.

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FRANK L. OWSLEY

HENRY GEORGE. By *Charles Albro Barker*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. xvii, 696. \$9.50.)

THOROUGH in research and judicious in presentation, this long biography describes simultaneously the actions and the ideas of Henry George. It traces his life from birth in 1839 to death in 1897: young manhood in Philadelphia, twenty-one years in California as printer and prominent editor, the last eighteen years in New York as reformer of world reputation.

But these external events matter less than the ideas, and all of George's ideas stemmed from a dual source—the natural rights tradition which had come down from Jefferson, and the egalitarianism of Christianity. When he applied this moral code to his society George found specific evils. The tariff was wrong; he stood for free trade. Private monopolies were wrong; he advocated public ownership of natural monopolies like the telegraph and railroad. And rent on land was wrong, and it should be captured for public use. These three prescriptions, together with the Australian ballot, were the great reforms of Henry George.

Not until 1888, nine years after he published *Progress and Poverty*, did George explicitly advocate the single tax on land, excluding improvements. In 1873 he had coupled a tax on the value of land with an inheritance tax and license taxes

on liquor, gambling houses, and other activities requiring regulation. But by 1892 he had not only scrapped these suggestions, he also came out vehemently against the income tax which was then at issue.

Professor Barker traces these developments with an admirable sorting of the evidence. His account is full and accurate, and he does a fine job of integrating into the text his extended vivisections of George's books. The story is perhaps too full; it sometimes seems to lack emphasis and sharp climaxes. In a few places the reader needs more information to follow the argument (as, for example, the discussion of the Morrill Act, p. 96).

Henry George has often been regarded as an *economic* thinker. Professor Barker insists, with excellent evidence, that *Progress and Poverty* is a *moral* and economic book. This is true enough. But I think he may overestimate George's virtues as an economist. On free trade, George's argument is almost entirely a moral one. He does not say that free trade will promote prosperity nearly so strongly as he says that it is morally right. As to George's theory of depressions, it clearly is not a theory of business cycles. At best it is a theory of chronic unemployment, and even on that score it is not impressive. As to rent, Ricardo's analysis seems superior to George's, and George's refusal to concede that capital and labor as well as land can collect (or extort) rent is incomprehensible as a matter of economics.

Henry George's chief importance, and it seems to me substantial, was as a moral agitator against social evils. This is true of his books, and equally so of his magnificent campaign for mayor of New York in 1886.

But Professor Barker shows that George's economic ideas did exert a practical influence, perhaps more in England and Australia than in this country, where cities like New York, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh have adopted the principle of separate assessment of land and improvements, with higher taxes on the former than on the latter.

This biography is a first-rate addition to the studies dealing with various aspects of the antimonopoly tradition in the United States. With the number of monographs now available, some scholar should undertake a full-length interpretation of this tradition from Jefferson to the New Deal, with side glances at Garrison, George, and Altgeld.

New York, N. Y.

RAY GINGER

RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920. By *Robert K. Murray*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1955. Pp. xii, 337. \$4.75.)

AFTER the 1798 "Crisis in Freedom" had passed, Thomas Jefferson delineated the American program for dealing with peacetime dissentients. For over a century, malcontents were largely left to stand "as monuments of the safety with which