The Correspondence of Thomas Jefferson
By Subject
CONSTITUTION / UNITED STATES / BILL OF RIGHTS
I like much the general idea of framing a government, which should go
on of itself, peaceably, without needing continual recurrence to the
State legislatures. I like the organization of the government into
legislative, judiciary and executive. I like the power given the
legislature to levy taxes, and for that reason solely, I approve of
the greater House being chosen by the people directly. For though I
think a House so chosen, will be very far inferior to the present
Congress, will be very lily qualified to legislate for the Union, for
foreign nations, etc., yet this evil does not weigh against the good,
of preserving inviolate the fundamental principle, that the people are
not to be taxed but by representatives chosen immediately by
themselves. I am captivated by the compromise of the opposite claims
of the great and little States, of the latter to equal, and the former
to proportional influence. I am much pleased, too, with the
substitution of the method of voting by person, instead of that of
voting by States; and I like the negative given to the Executive,
conjointly with a third of either House; though I should have liked it
better, had the judiciary been associated for that put-pose, or
invested separately with a similar power. There are other good things
of less moment I will now tell you what I do not like. First, the
omission of a bill of rights, providing clearly, and without the aid
of sophism, for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection
against standing armies, restriction of monopolies, the eternal and
unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury in all
matters of fact triable by the laws of the land, and not by the laws
of nations.
The second feature I dislike, and strongly dislike, is the
abandonment, in every instance, of the principle of rotation in
office, and most particularly in the case of the President. Reason and
experience tell us, that the first magistrate will always be
re-elected if he may be re-elected. He is then an officer for life.
This once observed, it becomes of so much consequence to certain
nations, to have a friend or a foe at the head of our affairs, that
they will interfere with money and with arms. A Galloman, or an
Anglo-man, will be supported by the nation he befriends. If once
elected, and at a second or third election outvoted by one or two
votes, he will pretend false votes, foul play, hold possession of the
reins of government, be sup ported by the States voting for him,
especially if they be the central ones, lying in a compact body
themselves, and separating their opponents; and they will be aided by
one nation in Europe, while the majority are aided by another. The
election of a President of America, some years hence, will be much
more interesting to certain nations of Europe, than ever the election
of a King of Poland was. . . . Smaller objections are, the appeals on
matters of fact as well as laws; and the binding all persons,
legislative, executive, and judiciary by oath, to maintain that
constitution. I do not pretend to decide, what would be the best
method of procuring the establishment of the manifold good things in
this constitution, and of getting rid of the bad. Whether by adopting
it, in hopes of future amendment; or after it shall have been duly
weighed and canvassed by the people, after seeing the parts they
generally dislike, and those they generally approve, to say to them, "We
see now what you wish. You are willing to give to your federal
government such and such powers; but you wish, at the same time, to
have such and such fundamental rights secured to you, and certain
sources of convulsion taken away. Be it so. Send together deputies
again. Let them establish your fundamental rights by a sacrosanct
declaration, and let them pass the parts of the Constitution you have
approved. These will give powers to your federal government sufficient
for your happiness."
This is what might be said, and would probably produce a speedy, more
perfect and more permanent form of government. At all events, I hope
you will not be discouraged from making other trials, if the present
one should fail. We are never permitted to despair of the
commonwealth. I have thus told you freely what I like, and what I
dislike, merely as a matter of curiosity; for I know it is not in my
power to offer matter of information to your judgment, which has been
formed after hearing and weighing everything which the wisdom of man
could offer on these subjects. I own, I am not a friend to a very
energetic government. It is always oppressive. It places the governors
indeed more at their ease, at the expense of the people. The late
rebellion in Massachusetts has given more alarm, than I think it
should have done. Calculate that one rebellion in thirteen States in
the course of eleven years, is but one for each State in a century and
a half. No country should be so long without one. Nor will any degree
of power in the hands of government, prevent insurrections. . . . And
say, finally, whether peace is best preserved by giving energy to the
government, or information to the people. This last is the most
certain, and the most legitimate engine of government Educate and
inform the whole mass of the people. Enable them to see that it is
their interest to preserve peace and order, and they will preserve
them. And it requires no very high degree of education to convince
them of this. They are the only sure reliance for the preservation of
our liberty. After all, it is my principle that the will of the
majority should prevail. If they approve the proposed constitution in
all its parts, I shall concur in it cheerfully, in hopes they will
amend it, whenever they shall find it works wrong. This reliance
cannot deceive us, as long as we remain virtuous; and I think we shall
be so, as long as agriculture is our principal object, which will be
the case, while there remain vacant lands in any part of America. When
we get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, we shall
become corrupt as in Europe, and go to eating one another as they do
there.
to James Madison, 20 December 1787
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