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The Emergence of Political Unionism in Economies of British Colonial Origin:

The Cases of Jamaica and Trinidad

By CASWELL L. JOHNSON *

ABSTRACT. What were the circumstances under which *political unionism* has emerged in *economies of British colonial origin*, such as *Jamaica* and *Trinidad*? The hypothesis tested is that the political activities of *trade unions* in such economies played a role in the process of *economic development*, helping to achieve *political independence* and then *economic growth*. But at that stage political unionism is found to be incompatible with needed acceleration of growth rates. A significant deterioration in *economic and social conditions* produced a crisis and the unions traded support for the parties for some control over economic and social *policy*. This gave the political leaders the power they needed to negotiate for independence but, in Jamaica, it changed the focus and character of the *labor movement*.

I

INTRODUCTION

THE PURPOSE of this investigation is to determine the circumstances under which political unionism emerged in economies of British colonial origin such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (1). The main point of view of the paper is that the political activities of trade unions in such economies serve a very effective role in inducing or winning political independence as the first step in a two-stage process of economic development involving political independence (first stage) and economic growth (second stage).

If political unionism is retained during the second stage of the development process, however, it creates an uncertain and unstable social and economic environment that is incompatible with the primary goals and policies of the collective objective (2). If accelerated growth rates are so important but incompatible with the political in-

* [Caswell L. Johnson, Ph.D., is assistant professor of economics, Carleton University, Ottawa.] This paper continues a report of my investigation of political unionism as a factor in economic development of developing countries. The first report was my paper, "Political Unionism and the Collective Objective in Economies of British Colonial Origin," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (October, 1975), pp. 365-80. The report is concluded with "Political Unionism and Autonomy in Economies of British Colonial Origin," forthcoming in this *Journal*.

dustrial relations framework, why then did these countries 'choose' to have political unionism? This study is also addressed to that question.

II

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICAL UNIONISM

THE WELL-KNOWN LEWIS MODEL of economic development advanced a passive view and a positive role for the labor component (3). Under the assumption of a perfectly elastic labor supply, the model predicted that increases in the size of the capital stock and improvements in productivity, which are the fundamental ingredients of economic growth, would take place without causing a rise in the real wage level. Thus, Professor Lewis "discovered" the neoclassical key to rapid and sustained rates of economic growth in economies of British colonial origin. If entrepreneurs (and the planners) are not forced by market conditions to pay high wage rates as the pace of economic growth (and the level of aggregate demand for labor) expands, a surplus is generated. This surplus provides the (self-generating) resources for re-investment in further capital development; involving capital widening and possibly capital deepening at a later stage of the development process. Unfortunately, the model is applicable only to the experience of developed economies, particularly those with business union industrial relations systems, which allowed trade unions to develop bargaining power at the different (more judicious) point in historical time (4). Under political unionism, a major function of unions is to capture value added increments by forcing the entrepreneurs (and the planners) to pay wage increases that would at least cannibalize the value added increments from economic growth. Consequently, the Lewis model predicts badly the economic growth record of underdeveloped economies. To the contrary, the labor component exerts strong downward pressures on growth of the capital stock.

We have advanced a radically different view of the labor component in underdeveloped countries of British colonial origin (5). Union behavior in these economies creates an unbridgeable gap between the neoclassical labor adjustment mechanisms and the process of capital regeneration. Given the intense preoccupation with economic development, it is difficult to see why these countries allowed trade unions with "a contradictory role" to emerge and develop. In general, political unionism tends to emerge in underdeveloped countries with large alienated and underdeveloped labor forces. Workers are individualistic in their employment relation with management, fearful of

change and unemployment, and lacking in initiative and capacity to organize for purposes of collective bargaining. For example, it has been noted that before 1938, workers in the dominant sugar industry in Jamaica and Trinidad accepted their unorganized fate *vis-à-vis* management with an air of 'abased submission' (6). This is the passive neoclassical role. It is also generally true that persistent and systematic organizing help from middleclass intellectuals and independent political parties is required for the ultimate transformation of the working class in these situations into an active and organized movement (7). This is the dynamic neo-Marxian role.

The rise of independent party organization in either the Jamaican or Trinidadian case was associated with labor movement activities that long antedated formal independent political organizations. It is observed that:

The more intimate relationship between unions and political movements or governments in newly-independent countries is partially the result of earlier identification of unions with movements for independence from colonial power, and partly the result of pressures (economic development plans, communist threats, etc.) which cause governments to control labor movements more than we have today in the West (8).

In general, political unionism tends to emerge in economies that have: (a) a few industrial (capital intensive) processes among a relatively uneducated and unskilled population that is mostly unemployed all the time; (b) a few well-educated and politically conscious persons who view political independence and a development plan as a necessary condition for solving economic backwardness and recurrent cycles of unbearable poverty and (c) where the working class is susceptible to be used and regarded as a means towards that solution. It tends to be consolidated and perpetuated in economies that have updated or modernized the mechanical and technological aspects of industrial organization without undertaking a similar set of reforms (or investments) to upgrade concurrently the social and psychological status of labor and to integrate labor market policy into national economic and social policy.

III

TRADE UNIONS AND COLONIAL EXPLOITATION

THE BASIC FORM of the trade union in economies of British colonial origin comes from Britain. An important distinction between the

political industrial relations system in Britain and these economies, however, lies in the fact that in Britain, trade union affiliation was never purposefully allocated among competing political parties, whereas in the typical economy of British colonial origin it was. Secondly, trade unions were not publicly allowed to develop until a much later point in historical time, after the accumulation of a viable capital stock. Whereas in Britain the working class or 'people'-oriented party *emerged to change the normative system* under the existing ruling class parties and to replace these parties as spokesman for all social groups or the collectivity, the 'people'-oriented party or parties in countries of British colonial origin *emerged to change the political system* from a 'foreign' administration to indigenous political parties and governments. These parties competed for trade union-related votes as they presented their respective programs for political and economic development. Equipped with the organizational frame of British industrial relations, industrial relations in the underdeveloped economies still looked to Britain for leadership in the area of industrial reforms, thereby foregoing the option of imitating other systems such as that of the American (9).

Trade union organization and behavior in the traditional colonial society were largely determined under conditions of economic backwardness, combined with the reactionary elements of early British industrial relations (10). There is abundant evidence of the fact that the powerful managers of the colonial economy practised "avaricious commercial exploitation" of power-weak native labor (11). Indeed, the subsequent course of labor relations in these countries was significantly affected by the history of "commercial exploitation."

Token unionism emerged in token craft industries mainly in the building trades, in printing, in shoemaking and industries characterized by unsuitable technologies and small scale employment. The extent and character of trade unionism were restricted by the limited practice of manufacturing and repair and the extent of imports from metropolitan Britain (12). These unions lacked the collective bargaining power normally associated with craft unions regarding wage rates, hours of work and other conditions of their employment. Lacking in status and impact, they failed to serve as models in the subsequent development of trade unions.

The absence of employment opportunities and the widespread "failure" of the labor market mechanism to develop (and work efficiently)

encouraged extensive hidden and involuntary unemployment. Non-market activities and intra-family income transfers constituted the major sources of income and the few “successful” and predominantly foreign-controlled firms were expected to make up for the general deficiency in labor market sources of income. Two interesting aspects of the social and economic characteristics of this economy for political unionism are: first, its overall inefficiencies and low productivity characteristics were incompatible with sharp increases in the expectations and economic demands of the unions; and, second, a lack of market-oriented schooling and skills discourage market-oriented activities and the growth of independent business-oriented trade union leaders. When Professor T. S. Simey investigated the phenomenon of development and economic welfare in the West Indies, he was alarmed by the lack of planning and the extent to which the native population indulged in non-market activities (13).

Professor Simey did not offer a plausible explanation of the revealed “choices” he observed. His thesis seemed to be either that the lack of craft and manufacturing opportunities was due mostly to the indigenous population’s greater taste for leisure and other non-pecuniary goods than for wages or market goods, or that their marked hedonistic pursuit of non-market goods and distaste for disutility of work explained the observed market non-market goods trade-off (14). A more perceptive investigation would reveal that leisure was a discommodity waiting to be unloaded with the gains of economic opportunities which never came under the British economic strategy. Employment performance in the miniscule but well-regulated craft sectors was always satisfactory and potentially comparable to corresponding performance in the more developed economies. In fact, with increasing employment opportunities and wages in the post-independence postwar era, these economies demonstrated exceptionally large positive elasticities of labor supply. This supply characteristic is demonstrated, for example, in large migrations to the towns and to urban employment centers abroad (England, Africa, United States and Canada) in search of employment opportunities. Many Jamaican workers went to work in industries in the United States during World War II. All the available evidence indicates that these workers performed satisfactorily after appropriate preparation and training, notwithstanding the fact that they lacked “the minimum amount of skills and knowledge for modern industry owing to their lack of training and industrial experi-

ence" (in Jamaica) (15). Gradually, the feeling surfaced among native politicians that what the economy needed was "job opportunities" and this condition could come only with political independence.

The kind of labor force that the colonial economic environment produced was too lacking in skills and employment opportunities to engage in genuine economic bargaining and business unionism. There were individual unions prior to the 1930s, but there was no combination among unions and no industrial relations system. The master/servant relationship and fear of unemployment and of poverty dominated labor management relations. Indeed, the trade union movement, as such, and collective bargaining in economies of British colonial origin are recent phenomena (though too early along their historical time path), coinciding with the institution of political unionism:

Trade unionism in the colonial empire is a very modern development. While the colonies were relatively prosperous and employment, where it existed, fairly regular, there was no incentive to form trade unions. But with the great depression in which many of the colonies were plunged in the 'thirties', there was a move towards industrial organisation. This was particularly true of the West Indies, partly because they have suffered such a prolonged decline in prices and markets for most of their products, and partly because in the islands production is carried on by capital and labor—unlike West Africa, where agriculture is worked by peasant owners (16).

The system of labor management relations in the traditional economy was marked by managerial authoritarianism and paternalism, rather than by constitutional management (17). The regulatory system or normative framework was designed by the ruling authorities to suit management and was imposed unilaterally upon the working people. The social relationship between trade unions, management and the metropolitan center functioned without manifest conflict as long as the working class did not develop aspirations for a higher level of living and acquire power to convert such aspirations into effective demands. As aspirations expanded and priorities diverged drastically from those of the ruling authorities, latent conflict manifested itself (18). It is within this context that the need arose for political unionism as a source of power to bargain for changes in the normative order and for substantive income increases. In this regard, the social and political infrastructure of the colonial economy functioned to deflect the trade unions method of collective action from the predominantly economic to the predominantly political.

The original goals of trade unions in economies of British colonial origin concerned the expansion of employment opportunities and the achievement of economic rewards that were at least sufficient to finance what was perceived by them to be a "rock-bottom" standard of living. The subservience of the craft unions was rational and their behavior, in relation to their limited bargaining power, was essentially economic. Over the entire period of subservience, the extent of benefits demanded was congruent and modest (19). It is reasonable to assume that these unions were allowed in countries such as Jamaica and Trinidad to bargain freely with employers for improvement in their wages and other conditions of employment (20). This objective, however, could not be realized because the unions possessed no economic power of consequence with which they could either restrict entry and secure "satisfactory" wages or limit the managerial imposition of unfavorable labor relations norms (21). The ruling authorities denied the working class the prerequisites of economic power and business unionism.

Smallness and non-collective benefits can probably explain the emergence of the exceptional craft unions. Non-collective benefits, however, could not bring in many members and the craft unions were not able to draw a great deal of strength from a few members (22). If "compulsory membership and the coercive picket line" is regarded as the index of economic power and the source of membership, then these unions were lacking in power and the emergence of political and social conflict between workers and employers in these economies did not arise out of "excessive" economic demands of the unions (23). Contrarily, these economies experienced a long history of management-orchestrated downward pressure on labor market income. The lack of economic power among the working class was a consequence as well as a cause of their "pitifully low living" conditions. For example, in the Trinidadian case, it is noted that "the causes (of riots) were the pitifully low living standards of the native proletariat attached to the oil wells and sugar plantations—standards that had been further depressed by a sharp rise in the cost of living—and the complete absence of machinery for collective bargaining." Parallel labor relations obstructions in the major sugar companies in Jamaica led in 1938 to the spontaneous Frome Estate riots in place of hard collective bargaining (24). In consequence, workers and their families were bayoneted and shot to death by "agents of the British governor," involving both the police and the army.

IV

RISING ASPIRATIONS AND CHANGING TRADE UNION STRATEGY

REQUESTS FROM THE RANKS of labor for more wages and a higher standard of living would normally be perceived by management and the ruling authorities as a demand for wealth redistribution from the ruling class to the working class and the agrarian population. The tendency to view such demands as excessive is stronger, the slower the rate of growth of income and employment opportunities and the greater the degree of "commercial exploitation." It is noted elsewhere that the economic backwardness of these economies coexisted with and probably, in turn, induced a markedly skewed income distribution whose role in the development process has been of considerable theoretical and political significance (25). Regarding the size distribution of income, as late as 1958, for example, the top 10 percent of Jamaican households accounted for over 43 percent of total income (26). The increasing political awareness of the unions gradually pointed to a positive and a direct relationship between the "commercial exploiters" and this markedly skewed distribution of income. Any tendency towards the adoption of income redistribution as a goal of the unions, however, was strongly resisted by the managerial (and ruling) class. On the other hand, the trade union organization was by itself too fragmentary, haphazard and weak to attack the prevailing normative system and obtain its objectives (27).

At this stage, the indigenous politicians emerge and form political parties, or local political organizations mushroom into national political parties. Such parties are usually ignored (or endorsed) by the metropolitan authorities as long as (a) their platforms reflect or imitate the corresponding ideologies of the dominant metropolitan parties; and (b) their economic programs and aspirations reflect the constraints of a mixed free enterprise economy and respect the existing set of economic ties to the metropolitan economy. There is a strong tendency for a two-party British-type political system to emerge at later stages of the development process. Whereas overt indigenous political organizations might have been construed by the British authorities as incompatible and be prohibited, the institution of trade unions is generally accepted as an integral part of the colonial heritage. Where overt political organizations are not tolerated, because of their radical political objectives, trade union organizations will camouflage political activities. Many a political leader has disguised himself in the garb

of a legitimate trade union organizer. The post-independence political entrepreneurs of Jamaica, for example, are the pre-independence (and post-independence) trade union organizers. In the case of Trinidad, some of the early parliamentarians were also pre-independence trade union organizers.

The objectives of these organizations are to achieve political autonomy and to raise the standard of living of the working class through the mechanism of an indigenous program of social and economic development. To this end, political parties tend to be alike and differ mostly in the extent of their commitment to 'voluntarism' and the role of government in development. These political organizations cannot by themselves, however, persuade the ruling authorities to concede these objectives. They lack the power to coerce. They must, therefore, align themselves with the existing trade union organizations in order to produce power. Such an outcome is significant because it involves a conflict-oriented strategy.

How is the process of alignment consummated? The existing trade union organization provides a link between the working (and agrarian) class and native political entrepreneurs. The social and economic environment, however, encourages rational apathy among the working class (28). The latent mass of workers has to be roused into action by the group of "outside" political entrepreneurs. The critical turning point comes with an economic crisis.

Political activities expand during a grave economic crisis such as a marked decline in the external demand for (or price of) a key staple product and a consequent sudden drop in welfare below subsistence standards or the level that the population has been accustomed to bear (29). The political entrepreneurs must succeed in 'educating' the working class that the collective benefits to be had from organized trade unions under political leadership are much larger than the traditional non-collective benefits under the old colonial and master/servant, worker-employer relations. The winning of complete political independence would provide the colonial economy with the opportunity to adopt a broad program of social and economic reform. The extent of the repatriation of earnings and the transfer of wealth to the metropolitan center would be reduced. For Britain, such outcomes would, however, be seen as a malign move or, at best, a conflict 'move' that would make them (the British) 'worse-off.' That is, the situation involves latent conflict. Power would be required by the colonies to

transform it into one of manifest conflict. Such power could only come from a merger of political and trade union forces. Manifest conflict in these circumstances is not used as an input to produce changes in the political system (output) as it has been described by some eminent scholars (30). Conflict is the manifestation of an underlying incompatibility between the preferences of the political entrepreneurs, their goals or objective functions which they seek to maximize and the corresponding preferences and maximizing behavior of the ruling authorities with respect to the economic and political resources of the colonial economy.

The trade union movement becomes marked by less of an emphasis on immediate economic gains through the application of the method of collective bargaining and more on competitive striving for political independence and a broad program of social reform. The granting of partial independence by the metropolitan government is invariably used as a strong bargaining position by the political entrepreneurs and trade unionists for complete political independence. The rationale for seeking complete independence is derived from the urgency of the social and economic situation, measured in terms of the extent of unemployment and the lack of employment opportunities under the existing arrangement of foreign control. This urgency is invariably exacerbated by wild cat strikes and sporadic outbursts of violence (31).

V

POLITICAL UNIONISM EMERGES FOLLOWING CRISIS

MARKED DISCONTENT AND VIOLENCE in Jamaica (and Trinidad) were associated with a significant deterioration of economic and social conditions. Speaking in the British House of Commons about the political disturbances in Jamaica that preceded political independence, Lord Dufferin said that "while the economic problem in Jamaica was bound up with that of overpopulation, due to the high birth-rate and the closing of outlets for emigration, it fundamentally turned upon the price obtained for the colony's staple products." The root cause of discontent, he admitted, was "the low rate of wages paid, and wages could be raised only if the price of sugar was raised" (32). The political entrepreneurs and trade unionists countered that sugar was controlled by a British cartel and its price was administered from Britain, not by competitive local employers. They rejected any implication of economic determinism. They proclaimed that they could do better under political independence and self rule.

The power of the political entrepreneurs to elicit favorable responses from Britain, however, depended on the level of trade union membership and the extent of union support of the political movement. Only affiliation could provide the political entrepreneurs with the power that was necessary to win independence. It is not unusual, during this stage of development, for rival political parties to unite in a common front to obtain the undivided support of the trade union movement. After the winning of political independence, however, the usual pattern of division and confrontations is reestablished. In the Jamaican case, both groups (labor and political parties) "agreed" to pool their resources against the ruling authorities in a combined effort (political unionism) that is designed to attain jointly their respective and common objectives. The trade union movement was distributed between the (two) competitive political parties in pursuit of the common set of objectives. This was a critical, and somewhat irreversible stage in the development process. The trade unions, by entering into a far-reaching "social contract" with the political parties, declared a systematic commitment to allied political parties, to support them in exchange for some control over economic and social policy (33). The merger provided the political leaders with the power they needed to negotiate for independence but also changed the entire focus and character of organized labor in Jamaica (34).

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1. The range of underdeveloped countries under consideration and selected aspects of their underlying social and political infrastructures are discussed elsewhere. The economies of these countries are framed by institutions that have been imported from Britain, many of which have undergone only minor modifications to suit local conditions. For these reasons, and for want of a better term, these economies have been referred to rather ineptly as 'economies of British colonial origin.' See, C. L. Johnson, "Political Unionism and the Collective Objective in Economies of British Colonial Origin," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (October, 1975), pp. 365-80.

2. The collective objective of these countries has been defined to be that of sustained rapid rates of economic growth. It is a genuine collective objective for two reasons: (a) it is the main policy goal of varying competitive political parties and the majority governments they form; and (b) all social and economic groups accept what it represents, in principle, as a most desirable and laudable objective. There are serious inconsistencies between political unionism and governments concerning their demands on the resources of the country. See "Political Unionism and the Collective Objective, etc." *op. cit.*, for an examination of the collective objective and implications of union demands.

3. See W. A. Lewis, "Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour," *The Manchester School*, 22 (May, 1954), pp. 139-91.

4. See C. P. Kindleberger, *Europe's PostWar Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), for an analysis of the postwar experience of Western Europe, and Albert Rees, *Real Wages in Manufacturing: 1890-1914* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961) for a corresponding examination of the experience of the United States.

5. "Political Unionism and the Collective Objective," *op. cit.*
6. Similar social and economic conditions in Italy during the late 19th and 20th centuries also encouraged rational apathy in the ranks of labor and the rise of leadership from the outside. Maurice F. Neufeld, "The Inevitability of Political Unionism in Underdeveloped Countries: Italy, The Exemplar," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 13(April, 1960), p. 365.
7. For a similar view concerning the organizing role and support of middle-class intellectuals in the British Labour movement, see K. W. Wedderburn, "Labour Law and Labour Relations in Britain," *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 7(March, 1969), pp. 272-73.
8. Charles A. Myers, "The American System of Industrial Relations: Is it Exportable?" *Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association* (December, 1962), p. 8. The pattern of events and institutional arrangements depicted by Professor Myers adequately describes the experience of underdeveloped economies of British colonial origin. Compare Neufeld, "The Inevitability of Political Unionism in Underdeveloped Countries," *op. cit.*
9. "Labour in the Colonies," *The Economist*, 140(January 4, 1941), p. 9.
10. Jamaica, Industrial Development Corporation, *A Review of Industrial Development in Jamaica* (Kingston: Jamaica Industrial Development Corporation, 1961); Great Britain, Barclays Bank, D.C.O. *An Economic Survey of Jamaica* (London, 1967); "The Economy: 100 Year Review," *The Gleaner*, Jamaica, Supplement, 1962, p. viii and "Trinidad Riots," *The Economist*, 130(February 5, 1938), p. 285.
11. "Trinidad Report Debated," *The Economist*, 130(February 26, 1938), p. 492.
12. For a discussion concerning the lack of craft and manufacturing opportunities in underdeveloped economies of British colonial origin, see Simon Rottenberg "Income and Leisure in an Underdeveloped Economy," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (April, 1952), pp. 95-101. Rottenberg's analysis refers to the experience of Antigua. During 1943, manufacturing and repair, in Jamaica for example, accounted for only 11.6 percent of the total gainfully occupied labor force. See, Jamaica, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Quarterly Digest of Statistics*, No. 11 (December, 1951), Table 4, p. 35.
13. T. S. Simey, *Welfare and Planning in the West Indies* (London, 1946). While nonmarket work yields utility, this was a case of an involuntary disenchantment with Gross National Product. For the opposite situation of a "myopic preoccupation with GNP" see J. Mincer, "Labour-Force Participation and Unemployment: A Review of the Evidence" in R. A. Gordon and M. S. Gordon, eds. *Prosperity and Unemployment* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 73-112.
14. This explanation is, of course, quite consistent with the racist position of some neo-classical economists that "experience seems to show that the more ignorant phlegmatic of races and of individuals, especially if they live in a southern clime, will exert themselves less while at it if the rate of pay rises to give them their accustomed enjoyments in return for less work than before . . ." Alfred Marshall, *Principles of Economics* (London: Macmillan, 8th ed., p. 439).
15. G. E. Sadler, "War Time Utilization of Jamaicans in the United States Industrial Establishments," *Monthly Labor Review*, 61(December, 1954), pp. 848-57.
16. "Labour in the Colonies," *The Economist*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
17. Urias Forbes, "Some Aspects of Industrial Relations in Trinidad and Tobago," unpublished M.A. Thesis (Carleton University: School of Public Administration, Ottawa, Canada, 1965). See also W. N. Leiverson "Constitutional Government in American Industries," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 12 (Supplement, 1922), p. 61. For a discussion on the nature and role of 'Constitu-

tional Management' see F. Harbison and C. Myers, *Management in the Industrial World: An International Analysis* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).

18. Such expansion could come about from travel and consequent neighbourhood effects upon the traditional distribution of tastes or from the 'shock effect' of a sudden drop of status and well-being below the subsistence level. See "Labour in the Colonies," *op. cit.*, p. 9. The nature of the relation between aspirations and power and the transformation of latent conflict into manifest conflict is discussed elsewhere. See Alan Fox and Allan Flanders, "The Reform of Collective Bargaining: From Donovan to Durkheim," *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. VII (March, 1969), pp. 181-230.

19. "Trinidad Riots," *op. cit.*, p. 285.

20. "Further Disturbances in Jamaica," *The Economist*, 121(May 28, 1939), p. 588.

21. "Trinidad Riots," *op. cit.*

22. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1965), p. 75. For the purposes of this paper, these non-collective benefits were the wage rates from individual and isolated trade union bargaining within the framework of the master/servant relationship. Collective benefits of subsequent developments are the 'wages and fringe benefits and political independence' from bargaining within the framework of a political industrial relations system.

23. Demands for money wages or equivalents are defined for the purposes of this paper to be objectively excessive, as contrasted with any subjective evaluations of management/or workers, if at given product prices they cannot be met out of the productivity relations of the firm without either being inflationary in effect, or redistributive in favor of the trade unions, and pushing real profits below its long-run competitive level.

24. "Trinidad Riots," *op. cit.*, p. 285. In Jamaica the police under the jurisdiction of the British Governor, Sir Edward Denham, intervened in the workers' dispute with the management of the British West Indian Sugar Company. They shot and bayoneted protesting workers. The events polarised the positions of the parties and made their differences irreconcilable. According to Professor Eaton, "... on the 20th. April 1938 events shifted dramatically to Frome when a gang of some 1,000 strong, equipped with the usual sticks and cutlasses (machetes), went on the war path and attacked the West Indian Sugar Company pay office protesting against arbitrary deductions ranging from 3d. to 6d. per day, and demanding removal of the pay clerk. Their demands extended to 'no more barracks, no sleeping under trees in hammocks, and a daily wage of 4/-(1.00)', which they claimed the company promised to pay. The situation quickly deteriorated and on the 2nd May, the police judged the situation sufficiently serious to open fire on 'a mob' estimated by them to be over 1,000 strong. Rifle volleys were fired, followed by bayonet charges; 4 died, one a pregnant woman; 13 were injured, including innocent bystanders; and more than 100 were arrested and charged with rioting." (George E. Eaton, *Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica*, Kingston and New York: Kingston Publishers Ltd. and McGraw-Hill, 1975, p. 40.) Bustamante (later Sir Alexander Bustamante) went immediately to the scene in his capacity as a trade union representative. He was arrested and accused by supporters of the colonial administration of being "a rabble rouser and a viper in the bosom of the Administration." For this and other reasons, he became the hero of Jamaican workers; it won him the vote winning slogan, "We will follow Bustamante till we die." It drove a lasting wedge between the Bustamante group and the Administration and solidified the crisis, investing in the same person the roles of political leader as well as trade union leader.

25. See "Political Unionism and the Collective Objective," *op. cit.*

26. See A. Ahrim, "Income Distribution in Jamaica," *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September, 1961), pp. 337-38.

27. "Labour in the Colonies," *op. cit.*, p. 9.

28. See "The Inevitability of Political Unionism," *op. cit.*
 29. See "Further Disturbances in Jamaica," *op. cit.*
 30. See "The Reform of Collective Bargaining," *op. cit.* See also Neufeld's description of the case of Italy, *op. cit.*
 31. Maurice Neufeld, *op. cit.*, p. 365.
 32. "Further Disturbances in Jamaica," *op. cit.*, p. 358.
 33. See "Political Unionism and the Collective Objective," *op. cit.*
 34. The role of the labor movement in helping to bring about political autonomy is described in my paper, "Political Unionism and Autonomy in Economies of British Colonial Origin," forthcoming in this *Journal*.

Land Supply Constraints in the United States

An excerpt from the Final Report of the Task Force on Housing Costs, William J. White, chairman, presented to Patricia Roberts Harris, U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, on May 25, 1978:

I

THE HIGH COST of housing is now a major problem for millions of American families. Costs of acquiring or occupying decent housing have increased dramatically in recent years. While it is true that many owners of existing homes have benefited from inflation and have moved on to improved housing without major financial strain, others have not been so fortunate. They include the young couple of limited means buying its first home, the lower-income family, the elderly on fixed incomes, and many Americans with special housing needs.

For these households the high cost of shelter is not merely serious, it is too often an insurmountable crisis.

The housing cost problem is nationwide. It is not limited to a few cities or regions. When so many families cannot afford to fulfill so basic a human need as shelter, it is clear that the country has failed them. All Americans are entitled to enjoy housing that is decent, sanitary, and safe—and affordable—as a matter of right.

Bluntly, the Nation is morally obliged to take concerted action to reduce housing costs for all of its citizens. This national imperative for action requires dynamic and cooperative leadership from all elements of government, the business community, and the general public. . . .

The underlying costs of producing, financing, and operating housing have all risen more rapidly in recent years than in the 1960s. Residential construction costs grew at a rate of 8 percent per year between