Much has happened in sociology and in the other social sciences since Power and Privilege was written twenty years ago. Mountains of new data have been assembled and analyzed, more sophisticated techniques of quantitative analysis have been introduced, and theoretical perspectives have changed. Because of these and other developments, it is only fitting on the occasion of the publication of this new paperback edition to ask how the theory presented in Power and Privilege has fared in the light of the changes that have occurred.

As author of the volume, I cannot claim to be an unbiased observer. Nor can I claim to be familiar with all of the relevant work of the last two decades. So far as I can judge, however, both the general theory presented in chapters 2, 3, 4, and 13 and the various special theories presented in chapters 5 through 12 have stood the test of time well up to this point. While there are materials I would add and details I would alter if I were starting afresh today, I have not seen anything that persuades me that the basic theory is unsound. The model of relations among constants and variables shown on page 439 still seems to me to be essentially correct, and the same is true of the special theories derived from this more general theory.

Although this may seem an act of self-congratulation, I believe it is rather a consequence of the synthesizing methodology that I employed in
the development of the theory (see pages 17 to 22). By building on a foundation laid by others, and by combining inductive and deductive logic in the construction of the theory, I minimized the risks and avoided many of the usual hazards.

Concerning the central question that confronts every theory of social stratification (i.e., who gets what and why?), the most important development of the last twenty years has been the greatly increased accessibility of data on the socialist societies of eastern Europe. These societies are singularly important because they have been the testing ground for many of the important ideas developed by Karl Marx and his followers. For more than half a century, a Marxist elite has enjoyed unchallenged control of the institutional structures of Soviet society and has carried out a series of massive social experiments designed to destroy historic patterns of social inequality and to build in their stead a more egalitarian, socialist society. Similar experiments have been conducted in the satellite societies of eastern Europe that came under Soviet control following World War II. No serious student of social stratification can afford to ignore these experiments or fail to ponder their results.

Unfortunately, Marxist elites were highly secretive about such matters for many years and made it almost impossible to obtain even the most basic kinds of information about life in their societies. Soon after the Revolution, the teaching of sociology and the conduct of sociological research were outlawed. During the long period of Stalin's reign, the situation steadily deteriorated and reliable information became increasingly difficult to obtain (Inkeles, 1950). As late as the 1950s, the best source of information on daily life in Soviet society was the reports of escapees who had fled (cf., Inkeles and Bauer, 1959).

Following Stalin's death in 1953, the situation slowly began to improve. Restraints on novelists were gradually relaxed, and by 1956 sociologists in Poland, such as Stanislaw Ossowski, who had been under house arrest, were again allowed to teach, write, and do research. By the time I was writing *Power and Privilege* in the years from 1962 to 1965, the flow of relevant materials had begun to quicken. Novels, such as Vladimir Dudintsev, *Not By Bread Alone* (1957), Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* (1963), and Fedor Abramov, *The New Life* (1963), were providing far more intimate details on Soviet life than had previously been available, and books and articles by Polish sociologists (e.g., Stephan Nowak, Michal Pohoski, Adam Sarapata, and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski) were providing the first systematic, quantitative data on stratification in a Soviet-style society.

Since the early 1960s, the trickle of information on stratification in the socialist societies of eastern Europe has turned into a flood. During the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, Polish sociology enjoyed a period of increasing freedom, and Polish sociologists used this opportunity well. In countless surveys and other studies, they explored mobility patterns, atti-
tudes toward social inequality, attitudes toward elites, beliefs concerning social equity, and dozens of other subjects. During this period they were joined in these endeavors by Yugoslav and Hungarian sociologists, and, for a brief period, by Czech sociologists as well.

Thanks to their efforts, and those of journalists and novelists, we know far more today about the outcome of the great social experiments undertaken by Marxist elites than was known twenty years ago. More than that, the passage of another twenty years since the establishment of Marxist control in these societies has provided us with a far better opportunity to judge the effects of Marxist innovations on a population whose earliest socialization was in societies free from the influences of the older capitalist and/or feudal order.

Probably the most important lesson to be learned from these experiments is that human nature is not nearly as malleable, nor as free from inherent tendencies to promote self-interest, as Marx and many other social theorists since the Enlightenment have imagined. Efforts to create "the new socialist man," who puts the needs of society ahead of his own personal needs and desires, have been singularly disappointing. Moral incentives have proven no match for material incentives, and Marxist elites have been compelled—or have chosen—to create an occupational system of stratification that is remarkably similar in many ways to that found in non-Marxist industrial societies.

This is a system in which, as in other systems, the holders of power enjoy innumerable privileges denied to others (Matthews, 1975). It is also a system in which, as one of Poland's leading sociologists has put it,

the workers are still hired labor. The socialist revolution does not change the relation of the worker to the machine, nor does it change his position within the factory. . . . His relation to the machine and to the organizational system of work requires his subordination to the foreman and the management of the factory. He receives wages according to the quantity and quality of work performed, and he must obey the principles and regulations of work discipline. (Szczepanski, 1970, p. 125)

According to one recent study of occupational prestige, there is a correlation of 0.79 between the Soviet and American systems (Treiman, 1977, table 4.1). Ironically, this is a slightly stronger correlation than that observed between the Soviet and Polish systems.

These are not isolated examples. Other work by Polish sociologists tells of the existence of a dual labor market system that is remarkably similar to one that American sociologists have recently found in this country. As one of Poland's leading students of stratification explains it,

The development of new, productive, and important sectors of the economy (e.g., heavy and chemical industries) is usually linked to higher wages in these sectors. Therefore, the electrician employed in a textile or foodstuffs factory will earn even less than the electrician employed in a foundry or refinery, even
though their qualifications, as well as the complexity of their work, are identical. (Wesolowski, 1979, p. 126)

Or, finally, it might be noted that a recent study of the causes of income variations in Polish society indicated that the variance was better explained by the sex of workers than by any other single factor (Pohoski, 1978; see also Swafford, 1978, on women’s earnings in Soviet society). Little wonder, then, that specialists on the socialist societies of eastern Europe are increasingly coming to the conclusion that these societies are best understood as a variant form of industrial society rather than as some new and unique form in their own right (Jones, 1983).

All this is not to suggest that the massive social experiments undertaken by Marxist elites in eastern Europe have accomplished nothing. As I have written elsewhere (Lenski, 1978), Marxist elites appear to have succeeded in reducing the level of economic inequality below that found in non-Marxist industrial societies. But the price they have paid for this appears to have been a much greater degree of political inequality. It seems as though substantial limitations on economic inequality can only be achieved and sustained by politically repressive means. Looking back at both the discussion of socialist societies in chapters 10 through 12 and the statement of the general theory in chapters 2, 3, 4, and 13, I find little that I would change on the basis of what has been learned since the mid-1960s concerning the revolutionary socialist societies of eastern Europe.

The one change of theoretical importance that I would make would be the addition of a discussion of the ways in which capitalism, socialism, and communism coexist in modern industrial societies and how variations in the mix of these three elements account for many of the differences among industrial societies. As I have argued elsewhere (Lenski, 1984), the guiding principle in capitalist subsystems is “to each according to his property.” In socialist subsystems, the principle is “to each according to his work,” and in communist subsystems, “to each according to his need.” All three of these principles are operative in American society today. Capital gains, dividends, rents, interest, and entrepreneurial profits are distributed on the basis of ownership of property. Wages, salaries, and commissions are distributed as rewards for work performed. Welfare payments, food stamps, home heating payments, unemployment compensation, disability payments, medicaid, and the income transfer components of social security and medicare, as well as free public education, access to public parks, museums, and other public facilities are provided on the basis of need. Judging from recent governmental data, it appears that approximately 20 percent of the national income in the United States is distributed as rewards for ownership of property, 70 percent as rewards for work, and 10 percent in response to need.

In most of the socialist societies of eastern Europe, there is very little private ownership of the means of production, but a small minority of the population exercises effective control of such property and often uses that
control for its own private benefit. In fact, some western Marxist critics of these societies have accused them of practicing "state capitalism" (Cliff, 1974; Sweezy and Bettelheim, 1971). In any case, this is one of the reasons why the systems of stratification in the societies of eastern Europe do not differ more than they do from those in the so-called "capitalist" societies of the West. By acknowledging explicitly the coexistence of these several principles of distribution in all modern industrial societies, I believe we would come closer to explaining the seeming paradox posed by the similarities between the two subsets of industrial societies.

Variations among industrial societies, with respect to the relative strength of the capitalist, socialist, and communist subsystems, are comparable in many ways to the variations among agrarian societies with respect to the relative strength of rulers and governing classes (see pages 231 to 242 below). In both instances, the variations define what appears to be the most important variable dimension of the distributive systems in an important set of societies.

For those who desire a more detailed and current view of stratification in the eastern European societies, there are now a number of excellent books on the subject. These include Mervyn Matthews, Class and Society in Soviet Russia (1972), and Privilege in the Soviet Union: A Study of Elite Life-Styles Under Communism (1978); Walter Connors, Socialism, Politics, and Equality: Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe and the USSR (1979); and David Lane, The End of Social Inequality?: Class, Status and Power Under State Socialism (1982). In a more popular vein, there is Hedrick Smith, The Russians (1976). For the perspectives and insights of eastern Europeans themselves, there are such varied sources as Andrei Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia (1970); Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (1972); and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, Classes, Strata and Power (1979).

If I were rewriting Power and Privilege today, I would add a chapter on the less developed countries of the Third World. This chapter would have two foci: (1) the place of these societies in the global system of stratification, and (2) the system of inequality within the societies themselves.

One of the more important developments in sociological theory in the last twenty years has been the formulation of world-system theory by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1980). Building on foundations laid by Marx, Lenin, and various Latin American proponents of dependency theory, Wallerstein has formulated a theory of societal development that sees the underdevelopment and poverty of the Third World as a necessary consequence of the development and wealth of the First World. In effect, he sees the various nations of the world as participants in a global system of stratification.

According to Wallerstein, a Euro-centered world economy began to take shape in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and over the
years it has gradually spread until the entire world is now caught up in a single economic system that is governed by the competitive principles of capitalism. In this system, a minority of nations in Europe, North America, Japan, and Australia control most of the critical resources and therefore enjoy most of the benefits. At the opposite extreme, there is a larger number of nations in Africa, Latin America, and much of Asia that control few resources and are exploited by the first set of nations. Between these extremes, there is a third set of nations, especially in east Asia, but in other areas as well, that are more favorably situated than the second set, but much less favorably situated than the first. These three sets of societies are referred to by Wallerstein and others as the core, the periphery, and the semiperiphery, respectively. Their roles and statuses in the world system of stratification correspond to the roles and statuses of the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the petite bourgeoisie or new middle class in societal systems of stratification.

No observer of the modern world can fail to acknowledge the existence of the modern world economy and the system of stratification to which it has given rise. On the other hand, as Wallerstein himself has noted, the Euro-centered world economy of the last 500 years is not the first in human history. However, he argues (Wallerstein, 1974, p. 16) that it is the first world economy that has not evolved into a political empire.

While not denying the unique qualities of the modern world system, I would stress, more than Wallerstein does, the fact that inequality among societies has been a basic fact of human life for more than five thousand years. Ever since the first societies made the shift from hunting and gathering to horticulture as their primary means of subsistence, the potential for societal inequality has been present. Moreover, it did not take long before the possibility was transformed into a reality and some societies began to embark on military, political, and economic programs that advanced their own interests at the expense of their neighbors. In short, it seems to me that the ultimate source of the inequality among societies has been technological advance rather than the relatively recent capitalist mode of production.

To some, this may seem an unimportant distinction, but I disagree. It suggests that even if the modern capitalist world economy were destroyed through a global socialist revolution, as Wallerstein hopes will happen, it would be too much to expect that this would bring to an end the era of societal inequality. As we have already seen in the struggles between Russia and China, China and Vietnam, Vietnam and Kampuchea, and in the relations of dominance between Russia and its satellites or Vietnam and its satellites, there is no reason to expect that equality and justice will prevail in relations among socialist societies any more than it prevails within them. Thus, a successful global socialist revolution would change the nature of the system of intersocietal inequality that now exists, but we should not expect that it would bring intersocietal inequality to an end.

If I were analyzing the global system of inequality, I would also want to shift the emphasis in the explanation of the current system. If I understand
Wallerstein and his followers (e.g., Chase-Dunn, 1975; Rubinson, 1976) correctly, they suppose that the status of nations in the modern world system is determined entirely, or at least primarily, by the operation of the capitalist world economy. I would argue that other factors are also involved and are even more important. Recent research (Lenski and Nolan, 1984) has shown, for example, that the technological and economic heritage of modern societies explains more of the variance in societal development and in recent rates of economic growth than is explained by the status of societies in the world economy. Third World nations that practiced plow agriculture prior to contact with modern industrial societies have been far more successful developmentally than societies that practiced hoe and digging-stick horticulture prior to contact.

This is hardly surprising in the light of the theory developed in Power and Privilege and expanded later in various editions of Human Societies (1970, 1974, 1978, 1982). Plow agriculture is far more productive than horticulture. This has made possible a much larger economic surplus in agrarian societies, and this, in turn, made possible a greatly increased division of labor, greater dependence on monetary systems and a cash economy, greater development of literacy, the growth of the state and state bureaucracies, and other developments well before the first contact with industrial societies. Consequently, modern Third World societies with a tradition of plow agriculture have brought far greater social and cultural resources into the twentieth century than have Third World societies with a horticultural tradition.

It is also no coincidence that these two sets of societies are geographically differentiated (Lenski and Nolan, 1984). In the temperate regions of the world, most horticultural societies were replaced by agrarian societies long ago. In most tropical and semitropical areas, however, this change was not possible prior to the development of modern industrial technology. As William McNeill (1976) has shown, societies in tropical and semitropical areas have been severely handicapped by unusually large and diverse populations of micropredators (i.e., bacteria and viruses) that sap the vitality of human populations and kill off horses and oxen, on which the practice of plow agriculture depends. In addition, tropical and semitropical societies have been handicapped by poorer soils and more serious problems of weed control (Farmer, 1968; Meggers, 1954; Watters, 1960) and in much of the Old World by the absence of navigable rivers and larger waterways, such as the Mediterranean and North seas, that so facilitated the growth of international trade and commerce prior to the invention of modern means of transportation.

Recent research (Nolan, 1983) also indicates that variations in demographic patterns also contribute enormously to variations in rates of societal economic growth—a principle that the post-Maoist leadership of China has also come to recognize in recent years. In brief, it seems to me that Immanuel Wallerstein and other advocates of world system theory have attempted to explain too much on the basis of the capitalist world economy.
Without minimizing its importance, one can see clearly the influence of other factors, several of which appear to be even more important than the modern world economy.

Turning to the systems of inequality that exist within Third World societies, there are a number of points that merit attention. To begin with, there is the coexistence of preindustrial and industrial systems of stratification: parts of the populations of these societies occupy statuses whose power, privilege, and prestige are based on resources of the older social order, while other parts occupy statuses whose value is determined by resources derived from the new, industrial order. This often leads to conflict within these societies as each segment of the population strives to protect or advance its own special interests.

Because I have discussed this subject elsewhere (Lenski, 1970; Lenski and Lenski, 1982), there is no need to repeat the details here. Suffice it to say that there are a number of important differences between the systems of stratification in industrializing horticultural and industrializing agrarian societies, reflections of their differing histories. For example, the tribal mode of social organization has survived to the present day in most industrializing horticultural societies. In these societies, tribal membership is still an important social resource and, therefore, the basis of major political struggles. In fact, tribal groups are often the primary basis of party divisions in these societies and their struggles for control of the machinery of government, and the resources it controls are often the central fact of political life (see, for example, the recent histories of Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, among others). In contrast, tribal groups are either nonexistent in industrializing agrarian societies or are marginal in their political life (see, for example, China, Iran, Vietnam, or Mexico).

Revolutionary movements led by Marxist elites have enjoyed considerable success in most Third World societies, despite the fact that this is not at all what Marx anticipated in his analysis of the trends of history in the nineteenth century. According to the conventional wisdom of our own day, these movements are the responses of oppressed peasant masses to the exploitation of tiny privileged minorities. Although it is obvious that this motivation has been crucial to the success of these movements, at least in industrializing agrarian societies, there is much more to the story. For example, there is nothing new about exploitation in these societies, especially in those with an agrarian past. Nor is there anything new about peasant revolts. This will be clear to anyone who reads chapters 8 and 9 of this volume. The problem, therefore, needs to be restated: it is not enough to ask why there is unrest and revolutionary ferment in so many of these societies. We need, instead, to ask why these revolutionary movements are so much more successful today than in the past.

By rephrasing the question in this way, we gain a number of important insights into the current situation. We discover, for example, that much of the success of these revolutionary movements has been due to their ability
to mobilize individuals who are making, or have made, the transition from the older social order to the newer. Much of the leadership of these movements has come from university students and university-educated professionals whose education has sensitized them to the trends of the modern world, its values, and the opportunities it affords. They have become critical of the older elites and impatient with their reluctance to yield control, even when these older elites are their fathers and kinsmen. Thus, what seems to many First World observers to be a simple struggle between a wealthy and oppressive elite and the impoverished masses is usually more complex. Usually, much of the revolutionary elite is recruited from among the sons and daughters of the old elite, and, above all, from the new educational elite. Thus, the struggle is also a contest between generations and between individuals dependent on an older, traditional social order and its resources and other individuals dependent on a newer, industrial-based social order and its resources. For highly educated members of the younger generation, especially those whose prospects through the usual channels seem unpromising, revolutionary movements offer the tantalizing promise of a shortcut to power. To ignore these aspects of the dynamics of stratification in Third World nations is to oversimplify an extraordinarily complex and interesting process that could teach us much about the forces that are ultimately responsible for systems of social inequality.

One of the more striking developments of interest to students of stratification in the last twenty years has been the rise of the new women’s movement and its spread from this country to others. The current phase of the movement seems to have gotten its start in 1963 with the publication of Betty Friedan’s book, *The Feminine Mystique*. This book set in motion for the first time in nearly half a century a sustained process of agitation for greater rights for women. Three years after the publication of Friedan’s book, in 1966, the National Organization for Women (NOW) was established.

Since then, the women’s movement has grown tremendously in numbers and influence, especially among the better educated. This growth has led, among other developments, to a tremendous increase in research and writing about women and their place in society. The writing includes a growing number of volumes that focus on the system of sexual stratification and examine it in the same kind of comparative and theoretical framework developed in *Power and Privilege*. Those who wish to explore this subject in greater depth than was possible in the present volume and to familiarize themselves with the findings of the new research on the subject have a number of resources to which they can turn. These include Rae Lesser Blumberg, *Stratification: Socioeconomic and Sexual Inequality* (1978) and Charlotte O’Kelley, *Women and Men in Society* (1980), both of which provide broad and comprehensive summaries of modern research on all of the major types of societies from hunting and gathering to industrial. They also provide valuable discussions of the system of sexual stratification in socialist societies.

At the time when *Power and Privilege* was written, gender stratification was ignored by students of stratification. The prevailing view, as expressed by functionalist writers, asserted that the family was the basic unit in systems of stratification and the status of women was derived from the status of the male head of household on whom they were dependent (i.e., their father or husband). The chief alternative to this was Marxian theory, which focused on economically defined classes as the basic unit in systems of stratification. Like functionalist theory, it largely ignored the role of sexual inequality in the distribution of power, privilege, and prestige.

By shifting the focus of attention to the resources on which claims to rewards are based, *Power and Privilege* provided a theoretical framework that drew attention to gender distinctions (and also to age distinctions) as one of the bases of social inequality. Thus, the index contains such varied entries as "sex status and rewards," "sex-based class system," "women, occupational handicaps," "women, variations in status," and "women's status." In effect, the theory anticipated the newer mode of thinking about the relationship of sex differentiation to social stratification. More than that, it anticipated the current emphasis on variations in women's role in the economy as a (or the) major determinant of variations in their status in society (e.g., Friedl; Blumberg). It was not successful, however, in anticipating the subsequent revival of the women's movement and its varied achievements.

Another major development in the study of social stratification in the last twenty years has been a significant shift away from the study of social mobility to the study of the attainment process initiated by Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan (1967). During the 1970s, sociological journals were filled with studies that replicated and extended Blau and Duncan's original work. The aim of this research has been to measure the relative strength of the variables influencing the educational, occupational, and income statuses of individuals and groups of individuals.

Blau and Duncan's paradigm was responsible for a subtle, but important, shift in the formulation of the problem in this area of research. Where the older mobility studies focused primarily on societal rates of mobility and the reasons for variations and changes in these rates, the newer status attainment studies have focused on the achievements of individuals and sets of
individuals within societies and the factors responsible. Stimulated by the work of William Sewell and others at the University of Wisconsin (e.g., Sewell, Haller, and Portes, 1969; Sewell, Haller, and Ohlendorf, 1970), much of the research has focused on the social psychological processes involved in status attainment.

Although it is clear that our understanding of the social psychological processes that influence the attainments of individuals has been substantially advanced by this line of research and also that quantitative values can now be placed on many of the determinants of the attainments of various populations (e.g., American males, American females, British males, British females, etc.), it is less clear how this line of research has advanced our understanding of the societal processes that shape the social environments in which individuals and groups of individuals compete for resources and rewards. Probably the most important contribution of the status attainment studies to macrosociology has been their demonstration of the limited degree to which the status advantages of one generation are transmitted to the next in modern industrial societies. This is, of course, no small contribution, since it clarifies one of the important characteristics of these societies that stratification theory must explain.

More recently, because of concern with the limitations of the explanatory value of the attainment paradigm on the macrosocial level, a number of researchers have struck out in new directions. Drawing on the work of economists (e.g., Averitt, 1968), who developed the idea of a dual economy, some (e.g., Bibb and Form, 1977; Beck, Horan, and Tolbert, 1978) have shown that there are important differences in the earnings of workers depending on the industrial sector in which they are employed. Workers in heavy industries that are usually oligopolistic, because of the enormous capitalization required, tend to receive higher wages than similar workers in more highly competitive light industries.

Some of those engaged in this research (e.g., Beck, Horan, and Tolbert) have interpreted their findings as a response to the workings of a capitalist economy, but there is reason to question this conclusion. As noted previously, eastern European sociologists (e.g., Wesolowski, 1979) report remarkably similar patterns in socialist societies. The common denominator involved in the two societies seems, rather, to be the greater bargaining power of workers in the more productive and critical sectors of the economies of industrial societies. It stretches the limits of credulity to suggest that it is merely coincidence that so many of the same sectors tend to be advantaged (or disadvantaged) in both “capitalist” America and “socialist” Poland.

Looking back at the revised model of the general theory of stratification in the final chapter of Power and Privilege (see page 439) I find surprisingly little that I would change in the light of the research and theoretical discussions of the last twenty years. I would certainly retain the principle that the characteristics of distributive systems are shaped by the interaction of con-
stants with variables, and I find it disappointing that the role of constants is still generally ignored in sociology despite the tremendous advances that have been made in the field of genetics in particular and in the biological sciences in general. One would have supposed that the old eighteenth-century belief in the infinite malleability of human nature would be dead by now.

With respect to the variables, there are some minor changes I would make, but the basic structure of relationships shown in the figure on page 439 still seems sound. Above all, it still appears that the level of technology available to a society and the economic, political, and demographic consequences of the implementations of that technology is, by far, the most powerful single determinant, or set of determinants, of the characteristics of systems of stratification.

One change that I would make if I were redrawing the diagram today would be the addition of an arrow indicating the influence of environmental conditions on the level of technological development of societies. For reasons indicated earlier, it is now clear to me that Betty Meggers (1954), William McNeill (1976), and others have been correct in their assertions that environmental factors can constrain, and sometimes prevent altogether, indigenous technological advance beyond a certain point.

I would also want to add an arrow indicating the existence of feedback from political systems to economic systems. The experience of Soviet-style societies demonstrates clearly that this type of feedback not only exists, but is important.

Finally, if I were redrawing the figure on page 439, I would insert an arrow from societal type to ideology. The dominant ideologies in societies, as Marx and Engels recognized more than a century ago, are not accidents of history or cultural sports. They are, instead, products of the social system in which they emerge and, more especially, of the technoeconomic system. Capitalism and communism, in the forms we know them today, are products of technologically advanced societies and could never have become the dominant ideologies of simpler societies. Both address problems and respond to opportunities that only emerge in technologically advanced societies. In contrast, animism and ancestor worship are ideologies that reflect the limitations of the information available to members of simpler societies that lack the technology and technologically-based science of modern industrial societies.

At the same time, however, it should be noted that the influence of ideologies on the distributive process is usually more indirect than I have shown it in the figure on page 439. Variations in ideology are important primarily because of the influence they have on political elites. This, in turn, can have effects on the economies of societies, thanks to the feedback mechanisms noted above. In brief, ideologies are more closely linked to societal type than my model indicated.

Developments of the last twenty years leave me more convinced than ever of the need of macrosociologists to develop special theories that are
grounded in a more general theory, as I proposed in Power and Privilege. It is not satisfactory to move directly from general theory to analyses of individual societies and subsocietal systems as functionalists and others have attempted to do for many years. Nor is it satisfactory to employ a succession of ad hoc special theories (e.g., theories of totalitarian societies, Islamic societies, less developed societies, urban societies) that are not grounded in any general theory and that are constructed solely for the purpose of dealing with some limited problem. Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, and many other nineteenth-century scholars had a better grasp of the requirements of science in this regard than most contemporary theorists. One can only hope that in the years ahead, a growing number of macrosociologists will come to see that general theories are no substitute for specific theories, just as specific theories are no substitute for general theories.

Before concluding the preface to this new edition of Power and Privilege, I should mention that the work that went into the writing of this book led me to a growing and continuing interest in comparative and historical macrosociology. Any who are interested in where this interest led may examine the most recent edition of Human Societies (Lenski and Lenski, 1982) or other of my subsequent work. Currently, I am working on a monograph, tentatively entitled, “Ecological-Evolutionary Theory: Principles and Applications,” in which I attempt to spell out the principles of ecological-evolutionary theory in greater detail than has been possible in Human Societies and also to show how the theory can be applied to a highly diversified set of problems and made to yield insights that have not always been evident, even to specialists.

Gerhard Lenski
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References


