INTRODUCTION

This book developed from the manuscript of three talks, on “The Foreign Policy of the United States,” given by the author at Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, under the Cornelius R. Berrien Lectureship, February 21-23, 1951.

With some revision and addition these lectures were printed, under the same title, in March, 1951, as one of the pamphlet series of the American Enterprise Association. The published studies of this educational and non-partisan body “are intended to place in perspective, and to analyze, matters of major importance that either are the subject of pending legislation or seem likely to become so in the near future.”

The interest evoked by a somewhat unconventional treatment of the subject of foreign policy, both among college students and in the wider audience reached by the pamphlet, encouraged the further development of the material into its present form. While the pamphlet presentation has been expanded throughout, and four wholly new chapters added, effort has been made to preserve the conciseness and simplicity of the original informal lectures.

The entire presentation is based upon two connected educational convictions applied by the author while
president and William Penn professor of government at Haverford College, 1940-1945. These convictions grew out of years of reportorial and editorial work in the field of international relations; were given laboratory tests in college seminars and in conversations with both academic and practical politicians; have received a stimulating reception which is largely responsible for the arrangement of this book.

It is the author's assumption, first that the subject of foreign policy actually has a scientific content, and that the inherent and enduring nature of foreign policy as such should therefore be impartially examined prior to any survey of hit-or-miss techniques adopted by any particular government at any particular time. Much fun has been poked at the Russian Communists for insisting that subjects like art and biology be compressed within the framework of Soviet ideology. It would seem that any attempt to examine American foreign policy without reference to the contributions of other governments, antedating our own, is equally malformed and restrictive.

The author's second and correlative conviction on this subject is that the whole theory of "bipartisan foreign policy", so widely advertised and promoted in recent years, is utterly fallacious, injurious to economy and efficiency, contrary to every basic principle of the American form of government, and directly responsible for all of our major blunders in the foreign policy field.

Of course in attacking the theory of bipartisanism, no partisan viewpoint is implied. The reasoning in this matter is equally valid whichever party is in power, and whichever one in opposition.
The American political system assumes, on the basis of overwhelming confirmatory historical and psychological evidence, that the concentration of power always tends towards the abuse of power, and that concentrated power most easily becomes arbitrary when criticism is suppressed.

Therefore, in the interest of the people as a whole, this Federal Republic maintains its Constitutional system of checks and balances, and in the Bill of Rights specifies the freedom of the citizen to criticize his government, within such bounds as good manners, and if need be the courts, determine to be appropriate.

Two-party organization, based respectively on support and on criticism of the administration provisionally in power, is the natural and indeed inevitable result of this political theory. And any attempt to muffle or suppress the critical judgment of the opposition party must be regarded as contrary to the spirit of the American Constitution. Since the President is the official head of the party in power, and is also the official ultimately responsible to the sovereign people in the field of foreign policy, the opposition cannot indorse "bipartisanship" in this field without betraying its vital political duty. Why condemn the one-party system of Soviet Russia if we seek to imitate it ourselves?

The saying that "politics stops at the water's edge" had validity as long as, but only as long as, policies also stopped at the water's edge. As policies became more and more international it also became not merely appropriate but imperative that foreign policy should be a partisan issue. To say otherwise is tantamount to saying that
democratic procedures are reasonable when it is a matter of choosing the village dogcatcher, but that autocracy is preferable when the issue is that of life or death.

Still another defect in the bipartisan attitude is that it tends to conceal the very large area of reasoned agreement on foreign policy that has always existed, and exists today, in the United States. This book endeavors to clarify and define that area.

Of course the people as a whole should be expected to rally behind any administration that has entered a war by constitutional methods, and at all times criticism of a purely captious, obstructive or negative nature should be discouraged. To admit this freely is far from saying that thoughtful, well-informed and dispassionate criticism of foreign policy should be abandoned by the people and their elected representatives in Congress. The advocates of bipartisanism, however, for a time went so far as to suggest that almost any adverse comment on Administration foreign policy was downright unpatriotic.

In the belief of the author this attitude is basically responsible for the grave errors which, by general admission, characterized the conduct of our foreign policy immediately after the Second World War. The suppression of the critical faculty, moreover, is hostile to any development of foreign policy in line with principles holding more promise than mere political opportunism for world peace.

Although these beliefs will seem to some what the Politburo would call "deviationist" they were not lightly reached, and are supported in the following pages by a substantial body of evidence.
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