Duty to Civilization

I

"I received your letter in regard to the endowment fund for Unity. You could hardly expect me to contribute to such a fund as long as Unity devotes itself as tirelessly as it has done of late to apologizing for Germany, discrediting Great Britain and identifying free speech with attacks upon people who believe that duty to civilization demanded the defeat of German arms.

"Nevertheless I think that even views which I detest ought to have free expression and so I am sending my subscription to Unity for the current year."

The quotation is taken from a letter received by a member of the Unity Endowment Fund Committee, which comes from an American leader of thought, a man of high integrity, one who holds a distinguished position in the sphere of intellectual achievement. He is broad enough in his Liberalism to read views he detests, tolerant to the point of subscribing to a paper which contains articles he dislikes. Such a critic is rare in these days; but, refreshing as it is to meet such a man, the charges he brings against Unity must be answered, for they are serious.

In the first place let me repudiate all three allegations contained in this letter, and then proceed to examine each one separately. As I am responsible for most of the editorials dealing with foreign affairs I consider that my facts are challenged by the writer of the letter, that he accuses me of showing bias in
my treatment of European affairs. Taking up the first allegation, “apologizing for Germany,” I am puzzled to know what is meant by this charge. No apology has ever come from me, not for the old government or the new, not for the old rulers or for their diplomatists. I know not any statesman monarchial or republican, in Europe who has my sympathy; and, for the past twenty-five years, I have been remarkably consistent in my impartiality in this matter: I have found but one, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who was worth saying a good word for. As for European governments, it is not likely that I, knowing their secret policies so well, should apologize for anything they have done.

My record is perfectly clear and regular. When Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, the maker of the Boer War, and Britain's most unscrupulous imperialist, began his campaign in 1903 to convert the British masses to Colonial Preference (protective duties), I was the first candidate in the constituencies to raise my voice against the scheme because it was “German.” Mr. Chamberlain said: “Germany is so satisfactory a place to live in for its inhabitants and for its working class people that less and less are they leaving it even for America, Canada, or any of our great Colonies.” This from the British statesman who advocated the Anglo-Saxon Alliance: Great Britain, Germany and the United States of America. Every bureaucratic measure taken from Imperial Germany by British statesmen met with my opposition. To my mind, protection and militarism have always gone hand in hand: France, Russia, and Germany, in this respect, were always anathema to every liberal-minded Englishman. The great Lord Salisbury himself was in agreement with his political opponents on this matter. He said: “The real cause of the increase of protective duties is the establishment of those gigantic military forces
which constitute a permanent drain on the resources of industry, a permanent danger to the interests of commerce.” For ten years I wrote, week in and week out, against German, French and Russian militarism, because it was speedily militarizing England. In 1909 I said the military expenditure of the powers would lead to war; then the active partners to the two military groups on the Continent spent the following enormous sums: France and Russia, £82,411,963, and Germany and Austria, £54,562,094. In that year Great Britain spent £27,760,000 on her army alone.

There was nothing in the form of the government of Imperial Germany that I favored, and there is nothing in the form of the government of Socialist Germany that I approve of. Administratively there is little to choose between them. How then the writer of the letter has been able to construe any statement of mine as an apology for Germany is a mystery to me. Now I should like to be perfectly frank about this and ask: Where were all the devout Americans, who, since 1914 or 1917, sought the overthrow of German arms, when the British radicals were fighting militarism and navalism in every shape and form? What were they doing to help to destroy militarism when Britain crushed the Boer Republics, when France bombarded Casablanca, when Italy went into Tripoli? I do not remember a single American leader of thought raising his voice in behalf of the efforts of British radicals put forth since 1904 against secret diplomacy and militarism. Most of the indignation here against “German arms” is of recent growth; it took root sometime between August 4th, 1914, and the end of April, 1917. For at least ten years before Russia invaded Germany and Germany invaded Belgium the small group of British radicals, of which I was a member, fought alone the battle against secret diplomacy militarism, and the German theory of the State.
We saw our government adopting every German bureaucratic device, going to work sedulously to Prussianize England, and we knew, indeed we said, our rulers would try to put us in Prussian chains as soon as war broke out. It seems to me rather late in the day for anyone here to get indignant about a system which afflicted the whole of Europe for so long. When I revert to the works, written prior to the outbreak of the war, by European and American authors on Imperial Germany, and read their fulsome encomiums lavished on her military and civil efficiency, I feel a kind of contempt for that class of scribe that can unsay its say so easily. The opinion of British radicals, on the other hand, never changed; what they were before the war, they were during it, and remain the same.

What then can be meant by the phrase “apologizing for Germany” when it is flung at a British radical? Why this and this only: that the radical will not agree with those whose reason has been deceived and debauched by allied war-propagandists. What else can it mean? If the phrase have reference to German militarism, I should like to know why any industrious American citizen wastes his time worrying about that which no longer exists, and does not use his intellectual energy denouncing French militarism and British militarism; or is it to be imagined that these are beneficent systems devoted to the spread of Christian doctrine and essential to the maintenance of civilization? Surely militarism is militarism, no matter by whom it be practiced. To illustrate the extraordinary situation created in Europe by military alliances before the war began, permit me to quote from a French work as well-known to European militarists as Bernhardi’s work was to British and American civilians? Colonel Arthur Boucher was the most popular military writer in France. Early in 1914 he pub-
lished "L'Allemagne en Péril." He dreaded the future and hoped for a triple alliance, France, Russia, and Germany, "forming a group so strong that no country, no coalition, could think of struggling against it," but so long as Germany held Alsace-Lorraine, France was "unalterably determined to wrest the people of these provinces from the yoke of their invaders and to see the French flag floating once more from the summit of their public buildings." He appreciated the geographical position of Germany and said: "Germany is threatened today on all her frontiers, and finds herself in such a position that she can only insure her future and face all her foes by seeking first of all to eliminate us from their number by concentrating, from the beginning, all her forces against us." Here he indicated how thoroughly in agreement he was with Lloyd George, who described Germany's position in similar terms in his speeches in 1908, and again in his interview in the London Daily Chronicle, January 1st, 1914. Furthermore, Colonel Boucher said: "To be in a position to resist attacks which menace her on all sides Germany is compelled to develop her military powers to the same degree," and he adds "it was to guard against the Russian danger that Germany made her (Military) law of 1913." Then, with a candor not sufficiently appreciated by pacifists, he dealt with things as he saw them, and with ruthless military sagacity, he said: "Thus we see, when the time comes, and it may come soon, when Slavism desires to make an end of Germanism, the friendship of Russia can serve us if we are fully decided to fulfil all our duties towards her. Germany does not doubt that France, remaining immutably attached to her treaties, would support her ally with all her strength, choosing, however, the most favorable moment for an intervention. If Russia attacks Germany, France becomes mistress of the situation. It
will be sufficient for France to draw her sword at the opportune moment to make it impossible for Germany to defend the provinces she took from us." Colonel Boucher knew what was the real position of the military powers in Europe, and he knew the terms of their secret alliances. He said, "From whatever aspect Germany's position is studied it will be realized that her future is of the darkest, and that she has placed herself in a most perilous position. Now, of all the factors which contribute towards compromising the destinies of this great Power, the chief factor is certainly the hostility of France." Colonel Boucher is, however, only one of many military authors who wrote in the same way. Lieutenant-Colonel Grouard, in his book, "The Ultimate War," published in 1913, said, "In no army has greater work been accomplished during the last thirty years than in the French army. Both as regards the improvement of our armament and in studying the best conditions for its usage, daily and incessant progress has been made in every branch of the military art."

What was the military strength of the Powers in 1913? The British Minister of War, Colonel Seely, in reply to a question, issued the following statement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Additions made</th>
<th>Present Peace Establishment</th>
<th>Future: not ascertained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>1,284,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>183,000</td>
<td>741,572</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>38,373</td>
<td>821,964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>58,505</td>
<td>473,643</td>
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Referring to the strength of the British Expedition-
ary Force, Colonel Seely, in the House of Commons, March 10th, 1914, said: "We stand well for the purposes of immediate war on any basis which you may consider."

Is one guilty of "apologizing for Germany" when one records facts concerning the origin of the war? Is one guilty of "apologizing for Germany" when one examines the charges and allegations of war-propagandists? It may be that some people believe all the evidence in the case was presented by the carefully selected bands of scribes and orators who made public opinion between August, 1914, and October, 1918, while censors and publicity departments kept the field clear for them. If that be so, what then is to be said of Mr. Sidney B. Fay's contributions on the subject in "The American Historical Review," which completely invalidate the findings of the war-propagandists? Is Mr. Fay guilty of "apologizing for Germany"? By what stretch of the imagination can it be conceived that Lord Fisher, Lord French, Lord Loreborn, Marshal Joffre, M. Georges Demartial, and numbers of other writers, in their several ways, are guilty of "apologizing for Germany"? And what is to be said of Colonel Repington, who, in 1911, told us that "the possibility of a war on two fronts is the nightmare of German strategists, and, considering the pace at which Russia has been building up her field armies since 1905, the nightmare is not likely to be soon conjured away." Was he, the "Military Correspondent" of the London Times, guilty of "apologizing for Germany" when he stated that fact? A glance at the first two chapters of Colonel Repington's book, "The Great World War," will be sufficient to convince anyone that he knew what he was writing about.

Our war-time prejudices seem to be a long time a-dying. Why? That is difficult to tell, for there have been published during the past two years any num-
ber of works on pre-war diplomacy and the military and naval preparation of the Powers—enough indeed to enlighten any intelligent citizen who desires to know the truth. There can be no excuse for any person lingering another hour in the foggy atmosphere created by the Gilbert Parkers, the James Becks, the Gilbert Murrays, the André Tardieus, the Dr. Dernburgs. These people were concerned only in putting the best face possible on the work of their governments; they were special pleaders, and wholly unfitted for the task of enlightening mankind as to the real causes of the war. The war itself, the conduct of it, is another matter, and no man of sense and understanding would attempt to justify what happened after the beginning of August, 1914, by anything that was done by statesmen and diplomatists before that date. Why, even Lloyd George himself has said: “The more one reads memoirs and books written in the various countries, of what happened before August 1, 1914, the more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly; and a discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it.” Surely, no one would accuse Lloyd George of “apologizing for Germany,” though his statement disposes effectively of the myth that the German Government was wholly responsible for the war.

It seems to me the matter of supreme importance for mankind is of far higher consideration than that of making out a case for any set of ministers or diplomatists; it is to go down deep into the workings of the European system and strive to find out what is wrong, that makes it possible for ministers and diplomatists to wreck a continent and destroy its youth.
II.

It is not so difficult, after all, to understand what is really meant by the phrase “apologizing for Germany,” when it comes from one whose mind was made up for him by war-propagandists; it is, however, exceedingly difficult to understand why a man of the intellectual standing of my critic should have been taken in so easily by the stupid persons who placed their patriotic pens at the service of the war-makers at Whitehall. One would expect a professor of political science to have a mind proof against the partisan nonsense poured daily into a paid press, a press specially organized (see the Congressional Record, February 9th, 1917) for the purpose of deluding the public not versed in foreign affairs, the public utterly ignorant of the workings of the European System. A professor of political science should have known as early as August 4th, 1914, that the figures for the military and naval expenditures of the Powers clearly revealed the peace strength and war-like intentions of the two groups of belligerents. Anyway, any intelligent English schoolboy knew that Great Britain always spent more on her army and navy than Germany did on hers, and only a very ignorant Tory working-man would have thought Germany spent more per head of the population on her army and navy than did France. The combined cost of the armies and navies of the five principal Powers for 1914 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>£80,430,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>£59,034,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>105,955,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austro-Hungary</td>
<td>24,992,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>81,065,967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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£267,451,947

£84,026,770

A month before the Archduke was shot the situation was so satisfactory to the mind of Sazonov, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he told the
Duma, "the establishment of a sound friendship between France and Great Britain and also between Great Britain and Russia had brought Great Britain within the sphere of political communion previously existing between Russia and France."

Is one guilty of "discrediting Great Britain" when such facts as these are published? Perhaps I may seem rather dense when I admit I cannot understand what my critic refers to when he accuses me of "discrediting Great Britain." Does he mean I have been guilty of discrediting the British statesmen who made secret military and naval alliances with France, Belgium, and Russia, the men who plunged the nation into war, blundered through it, and made a peace far worse than war? If that be the case, then how on earth can one discredit what is utterly discredited? That would be a work of supererogation; anyway, I am not particularly interested in discrediting any European statesman; all I wish to do is to get at the truth of the terrible matter and if the truth strikes an idol of the war-propagandists, it cannot be helped. Why I, of all people engaged in the work of discovering the origins of the war, should at so late a day be accused of "apologizing for Germany" and "discrediting Great Britain" is a mystery. My position was made perfectly clear to the American public in November, 1915, when my book "How Diplomats Make War" was published; moreover, I have spoken on this subject at hundreds of meetings during the past five years. I have never suppressed my convictions.

If I am guilty of "discrediting Great Britain" what must be said of dozens of British authors who have "apologized for Great Britain" and discredited every British statesman who had anything to do with the war? Some of the statesmen have gone to the trouble of discrediting themselves, just as if they were laboring under the delusion that others would not do
it. Lord Haldane and Mr. Asquith are instances of this procedure. Haldane was privy to the secret understanding with France, and he organized the British Expeditionary Force, the finest army that ever left the shores of Britain to fight another people's battles. In his book, "Before the War," Haldane says: "The reason why the war came appears to have been that at some period in the year 1913 the German Government finally laid the reins on the necks of men whom up to then it had held in restraint; the decision appears to have been allowed at this point to pass from civilians to soldiers. I do not believe that even then the German Government as a whole intended deliberately to invoke the frightful consequences of actual war, even if it seemed likely to be victorious." (Italics mine.)

That from the British Minister for War, gives the lie direct to the popular notion that Germany planned for forty years for this war and deliberately plunged Europe into blood. In 1912, Lord Haldane visited Berlin, and of that visit Mr. Asquith, in the House of Commons on July 25th, said: "Our relations with the great German Empire are, I am glad to say, at this moment, and I feel sure, are likely to remain, relations of amity and good-will." Such was the Prime Minister's version of the Haldane mission to Berlin, but in October, 1914, two months after the war began, Asquith invented another version, and said: "They (the German Government) wanted us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war." It is quite plain both versions could not be correct. Nevertheless, Lord Haldane on January 15, 1914, six months before Europe was engulfed in the horror of the centuries said:

"During the eight years in which the Government had been in office, the peace of Europe had been preserved. The Great Powers had grouped
themselves; the piling up of armaments had gone on; we had increased our armaments and Europe was an armed camp, but an armed camp in which peace not only prevailed but in which the indications were that there was a far greater prospect of peace than there ever was before. No one wanted war. If armaments were piled up it was not for aggression but for fear. . . . It was with pleasure that he (Haldane) thought of the great power for good of the two statesmen in Europe, Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg and Sir Edward Grey. These two had worked for all they were worth, and we had seen the fruits of it during a period of great anxiety and crisis, when probably without the group system we might have had a conflagration in Europe."

Think of it! No one wanted war on January 15, 1914, and according to Lloyd George no one wanted war on August 1, 1914. What really happened in 1912 is revealed in Sazonov's letters to the Czar. He reported that Sir Edward Grey had told him that, in the event of Germany aiding Austria, Russia could rely on Great Britain to "stake everything in order to inflict the most serious blow to German power." In this report Sazonov told the Czar that "England promised to support France on land by sending an expedition of 100,000 to the Belgian border to repel the invasion of France by the German army through Belgium, expected by the French General Staff." As early as 1908, Lord Fisher wrote to King Edward saying: "Russia and Turkey are the two Powers, and the only two Powers that matter to us as against Germany, and that we have eventually to fight Germany is just as sure as anything can be." Fisher described the situation in 1908: "The concentration of our whole naval strength in the decisive theatre of the war, in northern waters, was so unostentatiously
carried on that it was only Admiral Mahan's article in *The Scientific American* that drew attention to the fact when he said that 88 percent of England's guns were pointed at Germany.

So the matter of discrediting British statesmen may be left to themselves; both Lloyd George and Churchill being quite competent for any business of that kind. Small wonder the head of the British Treasury, Lord Welby, declared, "We are in the hands of an organization of crooks. They are politicians, generals, manufacturers of armaments, and journalists."

Taking a backward glance over the literature published in England during the war, I see many tributes paid to and diatribes showered on British statesmen for the parts they played in the catastrophe. As early as May, 1915, *The Candid Quarterly* said:

"The story in brief is one of action—hidden from all and especially from the Cabinet, secretly taken by the three (Asquith, Grey, and Haldane), from 1906 to 1911 and bringing England to an unavoidable war in 1914. The Three had all the time been preparing for the war, which they believed was so probable that it needed a detailed plan of operations beforehand, yet all the time concealing all from their confidential colleagues in the Cabinet. The point and the appalling significance of the story lie in the proof it affords that we live under a political system which leaves the greatest of all issues in the absolutely uncontrolled hands of one, or two, or three, acting secretly and without the knowledge of what they are doing being shared by any of those on whom the real burden must fall, or even by their own most confidential and trusting colleagues. For the Wisdom of the many we have substituted the Conspiracy of the few."

This is to the point. But what are the devout
Americans who have been educated by war-propagandists doing to help England to restore the wisdom of the many and put an end, once for all, to the conspiracies of the few? Another specimen of British candor, but of quite a different brand, is from The Referee of Sunday, August 9, 1914:

"A fortnight before the Servian coup . . . Italy was told there was going to be a storm . . . The English ambassador got the tip. Hence the assembly of the whole Fleet for inspection by the King . . . England, thanks to Mr. Churchill, begins the war at her selected moment, not at the chosen moment of the Mad Dog of Europe."

This statement made by Mr. Arnold White, an exceedingly well-informed naval correspondent, is corroborated by Sir Henry Lucy, who cabled to the New York Evening Sun saying: "Mobilization of the fleet before the war upon the innocent pretext of an expected visit from the King was a clever strategy that found the grand fleet opportunely in the North Sea when a few days later war was declared, with the result of bottling up the German fleet in the helpless condition in which it remains to this day." Furthermore, the statement is substantiated by Mr. F. S. Oliver, the author of "The Mirrors of Downing Street," who describes the scene which took place between Lord Fisher and Churchill when the former had his way in starting the war he had planned, according to his prediction in 1905, to take place in August, 1914. "Thus was England saved, and Germany doomed," says the author of "The Mirrors of Downing Street." "Before war was declared the British fleet held the seas and in command of that fleet was the quickest working brain in the navy."

Perhaps no set of people has been so guilty of "discrediting Great Britain" as those American sentimentalists who underrate the war genius and capacity of
British statesmen and militarists, by insisting that, in the political and diplomatic game of making war, the Germans outwitted the Allies. It has always been an affront to those Britishers who are skilled in the workings of the European system to hear Americans attribute to Germans high political and diplomatic qualities of which the Anglo-Saxon rulers in “the tight little isle” claim a monopoly.

III.

Dr. Charles W. Eliot’s article on the probable causes of the European War, written for the *New York Times* and reproduced in the *London Chronicle*, was the only pronouncement from an American that British radicals found worthy of consideration. He summed up the matter in these words:

“When one begins to reflect on the probable causes of the sudden lapse of the most civilized parts of Europe into worse than primitive savagery, he comes at once on two old and widespread evils in Europe from which America has been exempt for at least 150 years. The first is secret diplomacy with power to make issues and determine events, and the second is autocratic national executives who can swing the whole physical force of the nation to this side or that without consulting the people or their representatives. Some of the underlying causes of the horrible catastrophe the American people are now watching from afar are commercial and economic. One of the most interesting and far-reaching effects of the present outbreak of savagery is likely to be the conviction it carries to the minds of thinking people that the whole process of competitive armaments, the enlistment of the entire male population in national armies, and the incessant planning of campaigns against neighbors, is not a
trustworthy method for preserving peace. It now appears that the military preparations of the last fifty years in Europe have resulted in the most terrific war of all time, and that a fierce ultimate outbreak is the only probable result of the system."

Dr. Eliot sized up the situation without the inside knowledge of secret diplomacy British radicals had gathered over a period of ten years. Mr. Theodore Roosevelt was, perhaps, the only other distinguished American who, in the early weeks of the war, seemed to be conscious of the dangers of the European system. He said:

"I am not passing judgment on Germany's action. . . . I admire and respect the German people. I am proud of the German blood in my veins. When a nation feels that the issue of a contest in which, from whatever reason, it finds itself engaged will be national life or death, it is inevitable that it should act so as to save itself from death and to perpetuate its life. . . . What has been done in Belgium has been done in accordance with what the Germans unquestionably sincerely believed to be the course of conduct necessitated by Germany's struggle for life."

With little or no knowledge of the European System, the vast majority of the American people remained neutral, and indeed the press generally seemed to favor a policy of open-minded inquiry. In looking over the press reports and editorials published in the early weeks of the war, I find them singularly fair to both groups of belligerents.

What then brought about the great change of front as to the cause of the war? Some people say the atrocity stories, others say the sinking of the Lusitania. No one has, however, presumed to give a good reason why anyone should change his opinions about the origin of the war because of anything that hap-
pened after it began. I lost a sister on the Lusitania, but the bereavement did not in any way change my opinion as to the origin of the war. The real fact of the matter seems to me to be this: that it was neither the story of atrocity in itself, nor the horror of the sinking of the Lusitania in itself, that brought about the extraordinary change of mind in the American people. It was something more potent because it was so subtle, and that was the many-sided work of the war-propagandists, the constant hammering day in and day out on one point—the alleged guilt of Germany for planning the war, beginning the war, and fighting it with every barbarous device. This was the method by which the Americans permitted themselves to be deluded. Knowing a good deal of the inside of the business of setting up an official propaganda department, knowing the men who organized it, and knowing the class of person that was called upon to do the work of "conversion," I feel sure every intelligent American who was caught in this snare would hang his head in shame, if he really knew the methods that were put into practice to hide the truth from him.

Consider the case of the whitewashing of Sir Edward Grey. In December, 1905, Grey consented to the secret conversations between the French and British Military and Naval Staffs. The nature of these conversations has been fully dealt with by Fisher, French, Haldane and others.

In connection with these conversations, the French and British Staffs entered into a pact without official sanction with the Belgian Staff for action (official sanction in secret diplomacy not being necessary). That Belgium was engaged with Britain and France notwithstanding the denials of Sir Edward Grey and Lord Haldane, is now accepted as a fact. Marshal Joffre himself, on the witness stand before the Metal-
lurgic Committee in Paris, 1919, confessed as much. Yet both Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith said, in the House of Commons, several times before the war began, that Great Britain was under no obligation to send an Expeditionary Force to the Continent and that Great Britain had no secret naval alliance with Russia.

If it were only for the purpose of revealing to the people one of the most pernicious aspects of the European system, that of the military and naval staffs entering into negotiations with one another without official sanction, and the danger lying in this procedure to the peace of the world, it would be important for all folk who desire to bring about a better state of affairs to enter heart and soul into this task. Now that the secret documents of Russia and Belgium have been published, and the story of the secret military and naval preparations of Great Britain and France have been dealt with in the works of so many Admirals and Generals, there is not the slightest excuse for anyone being ignorant of the terrible work carried on under the cloak of secret diplomacy. The fact that the peoples' representatives can be lied to by Cabinet ministers should be enough to convince anybody of the necessity of exposing the system.

Lord Loreburn, who was Lord Chancellor in the Cabinet of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, has flatly repudiated the assumption that Grey and Haldane consulted the Prime Minister in 1906 about the secret conversations. One has only to examine the statements of Sir Edward Grey and Lord Haldane to see how contradictory they are. In his statement to the House of Commons, August 3rd, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said that he was approached by the French Government in January, 1906. Lord Haldane in his book also says that it was in January, 1906, when the British General Staff consulted with the French
Military Attaché, Colonel Huguet. It is now known pretty generally that negotiations between the British and French military authorities had been in progress for some time before 1906, and that a pact had been made by the leaders of the opposition party. Indeed, it was the uncompromising attitude of the new Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, on the question of the reduction of armaments, that forced the British militarists of both parties to enter secretly into negotiations with Colonel Huguet. It was December 26th, when Mr. Balfour, replying to Sir Henry's statement on the reduction of the expenditure on armaments, said:

"I noticed with amazement that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, at the Albert Hall, in the speech to which I have just referred, announced to his audience that he meant to cut down the cost, and as I understood him, with the cost the number and magnitude of the defensive forces of the Crown Army and Navy, as the case may be. I wonder whether he consulted the present Secretary of State for War (Haldane) before giving that pledge. I doubt whether he did. . . . His pledge to reduce the cost of our armaments and the magnitude of our armaments is a pledge not given with knowledge, nor given after study, not given in consequence of our Imperial responsibilities."

What else can this mean than that Grey and Haldane took over the treaty obligations of the outgoing Ministry without acquainting their chief of the nature and scope of the military and naval commitments? Let us consider two of the many versions now published of what took place. Haldane, in his book, "Before the War," says:

"Sir Edward Grey consulted the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Asquith, and myself as War Minister, and I was instructed, in January, 1906, a month after assuming office, to take the examination of the question in hand. This occurred in the middle of the General Election which was then in progress. I went at once to London and summoned the heads of the British General Staff and saw the French Military Attaché, Colonel Huguet."

This must refer to January 12th, when Grey and Haldane together were at Berwick, on the Scottish border. Neither the Prime Minister nor Mr. Asquith was in the neighborhood of Berwick that day, and it should be noted that Haldane went to London to see the military authorities, not the Prime Minister.

Colonel Repington's version, in his work, "The First World War," is quite different. He says:

"Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Haldane had news of what was going on, and determined to meet in spite of their electioneering. They did so, at the greatest personal inconvenience," (they were within thirty miles of each other on January 10th) "and to their everlasting credit agreed to take upon themselves the responsibility for continuing the conversations in a semi-official manner. They met at Berwick."

"Mr. Haldane then came on to London to see Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman during the weekend of Sunday, January 14th. He obtained the new Prime Minister's approval and then gave Sir Neville Lyttleton and General Grierson permission to carry on."

This is very strange, for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman spoke at Meigle on the borders of Perthshire and Forfarshire in Scotland on Saturday, January 13th, and at Glasgow on Monday, January 15th. Haldane was with Grey at Berwick on January 12th, and
Grey spoke at Bamburgh, January 13th. Why the Prime Minister should take a journey that week end, occupying at least sixteen hours, to meet Haldane in London, when they were quite near each other in Scotland, is a mystery. An easy motor car ride on the 11th, or 12th, would have taken the Prime Minister, Grey, Asquith and Haldane to a center in Scotland where they could have held a meeting.

Was Campbell-Bannerman consulted? On December 30th, 1905, Repington saw Admiral Fisher, who told him:

"That he (Fisher) had seen on paper Lord Lansdowne's assurances to M. Cambon, and that they were quite distinct in their tenor. He (Fisher) had shown them to Sir Edward Grey, and declared that they were part of the engagements taken over from the last Government, and would hold good until denounced."

That must have been on or about December 11th, when Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman announced the completion of his cabinet. Meanwhile, Colonel Repington and Colonel Huguet discussed the situation, and Repington "communicated the purport of the conversation on the morning of the 29th, by express letter to Sir Edward Grey," who was at his country residence, Fallodon, Northumberland. It is pretty clear from Repington's story that neither Grey nor Haldane consulted the Prime Minister, for Repington says:

"On Monday, January 1st, 1906, came Sir Edward Grey's reply from Fallodon, dated December 30th. He said: 'I am interested to hear of your conversation with the French Military Attache. I can only say that I have not receded from anything which Lord Lansdowne said to the French, and I have no hesitation in affirming it.'"
The Prime Minister had not, according to the versions of Haldane and Grey, been consulted in December, 1905. In Repington's version of what took place Cambon saw Grey on January 10th:

"M. Cambon had then suggested official intercommunications by the respective staffs, but Sir E. Grey had said that they were impracticable at present, and that we must wait until the elections were over and the Government installed. M. Cambon had judged that Grey was privy to the private and unofficial conversations in progress."

This statement points clearly to the negotiations having taken place before Christmas, 1905, and that Haldane, who was the Minister for War, could not have informed his chief of what had taken place. Lord Loreburn has said that Sir Edward Grey's statement to the House of Commons, August 3rd, 1914, "was the first recorded communication pointing to our making war on behalf of France if she should come to blows with Germany." Then he adds:

"The thing of which Sir Edward Grey made light proved to be the parting of the ways in our relations with France. Enmity had already given place to good will, but we had not yet espoused the quarrel of France or held out the prospect of fighting by her side. In the beginning of 1906 her statesmen learned that even this was possible. This concealment from the cabinet was protractive and must have been deliberate. Parliament knew nothing of it until August 3rd, 1914, nor anything of the change of policy which the suppressed communications denoted."

How complete the plans were can be understood by a perusal of Lord French's work, "1914." French says:

"The British and French general staffs had for
some years been in close secret consultation with one another on this subject. The German menace necessitated some preliminary understanding in the event of a sudden attack. The area of concentration for the British forces had been fixed on the left flank of the French, and the actual detraining stations of the various units were all laid down in terrain lying between Maubeuge and La Cateau. The headquarters of the army were fixed at the latter place. In the ten years previous to the war I had constantly envisaged the probable course of events leading up to the outbreak of this world war, as well as the manner of the outbreak itself. Lord Haldane was himself alive to the possibility of war; but, while he hoped to ward it off by diplomacy and negotiation, he fully acquiesced in the desirability of making every preparation which could be carried out in complete secrecy. He told me that were he in power, if and when the event occurred, he would designate me to command the Expeditionary Force, and requested me to study the problem carefully and do all I could to be ready. It thus fell out that in August, 1914, the many possibilities and alternatives of action were quite familiar to my mind. It is not within the knowledge of all that the general staffs of Great Britain and France had, for a long time, held conferences, and that a complete mutual understanding as to combined action in certain eventualities existed."

Dr. Eliot was perfectly right when he named secret diplomacy and the process of competitive armaments as "the probable causes of the sudden lapse of the most civilized parts of Europe into worse than primitive savagery."

The question whether it is wise for a people to
permit secret negotiations of this kind deserves more consideration than it has received from American leaders of thought since the Armistice. Somehow it seems to have dropped out of discussion altogether. If it were but for the purpose of proving how utterly unreliable military and naval experts are in making preparation for action, it would be worth while Americans taking up this question. Consider the preposterous ideas held by the European military and naval staffs. Colonel Repington has told us "It was supposed by certain soldiers that the war against Germany would be decided by the fighting of some seven great battles en rase campagne where heavies would be a positive encumbrance." Then, from so great an authority as Lord Esher, of the Committee of Imperial Defense, we learn that the war was to be over in from three to nine months. In August, 1915, he wrote to the Glasgow Herald as follows:

"From the outset of the war I have been thrown into the company of practically every one of our leading statesmen, and I have found them all wrong in their forecasts without exception. They genuinely believed in a short war. They prophesied its conclusion in anything from three to nine months. They jeered at a less optimistic view, and hardly one of them but held that before now (August, 1915) the British Army, accompanied by political plenipotentiaries, would be marching through Berlin."

The war had not been in progress a month when I was told by a personage high in authority that the Russian steam-roller would be at work in Berlin before Christmas. Perhaps no war ever began with staffs so sanguine of victory in a short time as this one; and if long and careful preparation for war can be accepted as an indication of success, the Allied staffs had good reason to expect a speedy triumph
The organizer of victory, Lord Haldane, says:

"During the whole of the period between the commencement of 1906 and the autumn of 1914, I sat on the Committee of Imperial Defense and took an active part in its deliberations. For over six of these eight years I was Minister for War, and I was in continuous co-operation with the colleagues who were, like myself, engaged in carrying into execution the methods which we had gradually worked out. Such as the plans were, the preparations which they required were completed before the war."

"We knew how high a level of military organization had been attained in France. She had a large army, an army not so large as that of Germany, but comparable with it in quality. Her ally, Russia, also had a large army on the other side of Germany, although one not so perfectly organized as that of France. By adding to the French military defensive forces a comparatively small British Expeditionary Force of very high quality, organized as far as possible on the principle about which von der Gouz in the introduction of his famous book, 'The Nation in Arms,' had written, we could provide what that eminent writer had suggested would be formidable, could it be properly organized, even against the German masses of troops."

"A careful study had made us think that the addition of even a small force of such quality to those of France and Russia would provide the combined armies with a good chance of defeating any German attempt at the invasion and dismemberment of France."

Nowhere does Lord Haldane say that the British authorities considered that they owed a duty to civilization in making their preparations for the over-
throw of German arms. On the contrary, he gloried in the work of making the British Expeditionary Force, in combination with the armies of France, Russia, and Belgium, a fighting machine which would surpass anything Germany might raise. He did not hesitate to go to German military authorities for his inspiration. He had undertaken the job a few days after he became Minister for War in December, 1905, and left nothing undone in the work of surmounting the difficulties of the business. He knew the secret provisions of the Franco-Russian alliance. And he admits that Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey were fully informed of every step that was taken by his Department. So complete indeed were the arrangements made by Lord Haldane and his French and Russian colleagues that he is moved to go into the minutest detail of the work of preparation:

"I should like to say how much the Committee of Imperial Defense, which was originally a very valuable contribution made by Mr. Balfour, when Prime Minister, to the organization of our preparedness for war, owed to its secretaries. To such men as Admiral Sir Charles Ottley and, after his time, to Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, the nation is under a great debt, and it was the least that could be done to include the latter in the thanks of Parliament to the sailors and soldiers to whom our actual success was due. It was he who, assisted by a brilliant staff on which the late Colonel Grant Duff was prominent, planned and prepared that remarkable War Book, which was completed in excellent time before the outbreak of hostilities, and which contained full instructions for every department of Government which could be called on to assist if war broke out. Not only the drafts of the necessary orders, but those of the necessary tele-
grams, were written out in advance under Sir Maurice Hankey’s instructions. He and Sir Charles Ottley, themselves sailors, formed real links between the navy and army, and did an enormous amount of work in co-ordinating war objectives.”

So much for the nonsense written and spoken by war-propagandists about the Allies being caught unprepared and that Germany was wholly responsible for the war.

Sir Edward Grey told the House of Commons on August 3rd, 1914, that he agreed to the proposals of the military and naval experts and authorized the conversations to take place, “but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military and naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.” What that statement was worth can be guessed by considering the work of preparation revealed by Lords Haldane and French, the two men at the head of affairs. Some years before the outbreak of the war, Lord Haldane had dubbed the Foreign Secretary “Commander of the Forces,” and at that time he told the country that “strategy depends on policy, the policy of the Foreign Office.” So sure was Haldane of the military and naval position when he returned from Berlin after his famous mission, that, at a meeting in London, he exclaimed: “At no distant time we ought to be the most powerful military and naval nation combined which the world has ever seen.”

The coating of whitewash given to Sir Edward Grey by war-propagandists cracked a long time ago, and the last brushful of it peeled off when French published his work, “1914.” The best that can be said of him is that he struggled mightily, when the
crisis came in the last week of July, 1914, to wriggle out of the position in which his diplomacy had placed him. There is no doubt that he suffered keenly in those terrible days, but he had no one to blame but himself for the policy of secret diplomacy he pursued from the time he took office under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in 1905.

IV.

In 1906 there was great rejoicing in the British constituencies when the result of the general election indicated in an unmistakable manner that "jingo imperialism had received its death blow." The British taxpayers had good reason for overthrowing the Balfour administration; it had been responsible for fourteen wars in a period of ten years, and had saddled the country with an enormous debt. The incoming government had pledged itself to the electors to maintain free trade, to break land monopoly, to reduce the enormous expenditure on armaments, and to foster peace and good will among the nations. So far as Grey, Haldane and the other liberal imperialists were concerned, it was impossible for them to abide by the policy. Not to mince matters, the liberal imperialists sold the vast majority of the electors, for when Grey and Haldane took office about a month before the election, they took over an anti-liberal policy from the outgoing ministry, the very one that was utterly repudiated at the general election. Grey's foreign policy never varied. He never faltered in his imperialistic designs. In Europe, Africa and Asia he pursued the path taken by his predecessor. From the first he was false to every liberal tradition.

About two years before he became Foreign Secretary, the Tory party scrapped the old British policy of splendid isolation and joined the group system of Europe. The reasons for Lord Lansdowne's extraor-
ordinary deal with the French in April, 1904, were two-fold: (1) British Control in Egypt. (2) The settlement of European spheres of influence in Northern Africa. There were many subsidiary reasons for the alliance with the French: one was fear of the economic, financial and commercial growth of Germany, who had become Britain’s keenest competitor in the markets of the world: another was Germany’s interest in the Bagdad Railway, and her association with Turkey in developing the trade routes leading to the Persian Gulf. Not so immediate, but urgent nevertheless, were the far Eastern questions which had for many years disturbed the governments of Great Britain and Russia; moreover, the economic problem of the settlement of Persia bristled with difficulties.

Turning first to the question of Morocco, there had been nothing but friction between the French and British governments as to their policy in that state since 1891, and, during the last decade of the nineteenth century, the French Foreign Office stubbornly opposed every advance made by Great Britain to assist in “improving the government and administration of the country,” to use Lord Salisbury’s words. During that period both France and Great Britain repeatedly declared that they would maintain the independence and integrity of the Moroccan State. When, however, M. Delcasse, the jingo imperialist, rose in power in France, a policy of ruthless aggression was begun. How much Edward VII had to do with the schemes of M. Delcasse and his associates will not be determined yet awhile. Still, it is quite probable that the British “peace-making King” was connected as closely with the financial and commercial developments of Morocco as he was with King Leopold II of Belgium in the profits obtained from rubber taken from the Congo State. At any rate, it is perfectly clear that Edward VII was interested
in many French schemes of an imperialistic nature, and that he was largely instrumental in bringing about the Entente Cordiale, Britain's first step in the policy of encircling Germany. How the world was taken in by the ostensible purpose of the Entente is history now, but it is just as well to remember that the secret articles which accompanied the Anglo-French agreement of April, 1904, were not known until November, 1911. These articles for the partition of Morocco by Spain and France, with Britain's consent, were factors in creating the Entente, and such military and naval conversations which began between the British and French General Staffs at that time were aimed solely at Germany. There should be no doubt in anyone's mind now that a complete policy of encirclement was begun in the Spring of 1904, by Great Britain, France and Russia against Germany. Fisher's "Records" show that the policy of "smashing Germany" was initiated as early as 1902. Fisher's "professional career of crime," as he calls his work of preparation, was carried on by him and his colleagues continuously until the war broke out in August, 1914.

Delcassé's statement made shortly after the consummation of the Entente Cordiale, to the effect that if Germany and France quarreled, England was willing to mobilize her fleet, throw a force of 100,000 men into Schleswig-Holstein, and seize the Kiel Canal, was part of the Fisher scheme, but in Fisher's words, "it was not Schleswig-Holstein—that was only a feint to be turned into a reality against the Kiel Canal if things went well. No, the real spot was the Pomeranian Coast under 100 miles from Berlin, where the Russian Army landed in the time of Frederick the Great." Whatever desultory preparations had been undertaken before the signing of the Entente Cordiale, it certainly did not take very long after it was made public for the new allies to set to work with avidity
to complete the military, naval and diplomatic encirclement of Germany. In *Le Gaiolais*, July 12th, 1905, M. Delcassé, a short time after his downfall, said:

“Of what importance would the young navy of Germany be in the event of war in which England, I tell you, would assuredly be with us against Germany? What would become of Germany's ports or her trade, or her mercantile marine? They would be annihilated. That is what would be the significance of the visit, prepared and calculated, of the British squadron to Brest, while the return visit of the French squadron to Portsmouth will complete the demonstration. The entente between the two countries and the coalition of their navies, constitutes such a formidable machine of naval war that neither Germany, nor any other Power, would dare to face such an overwhelming force at sea.”

Briefly, that was the position of affairs when Sir Edward Grey took office. It was, however, impossible for Grey and Haldane to carry on their work in connection with the French, so long as the policy was not in keeping with the pledges made to the electors; therefore, a change in Parliamentary procedure was necessary, and that change was brought about by removing full and free discussion of foreign affairs from the House. It was not difficult for the inner ring of the Cabinet to set up an Aulic council to work secretly with the military and naval experts, for the vast majority of the people were interested chiefly in burning domestic questions, such as land, tariffs, and Ireland. Thence followed a reign of ministerial deception and chicanery. So far as foreign affairs were concerned, the Parliamentary debates reveal long sustained suppression and prevarication on the part of ministers. How could it be otherwise? They dared not let the liberal party know what they were doing
and dream of remaining in office. On the other hand, there was not one of the liberal imperialists that had the courage to tell the electors the truth. An instance or two taken from Hansard will show to what depths ministerial morality fell. On March 8th, 1911:

“Mr. Jowett asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if, during his term of office, any undertaking, promise or understanding had been given to France that, in certain eventualities, British troops would be sent to assist the operations of the French Army.

“Mr. McKinnon Wood (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs): ‘The answer is in the negative.’”

Later on, Mr. John Dillon said:

“I interjected an observation on Monday in the speech of one of the speakers who was talking about this question of building against the Triple Alliance, and who insisted for the safety of this Empire on building against the Triple Alliance. I said, What about France? I thought that one of the glories of the British Government had been that it had formed an Entente with France.

“Mr. Lee: ‘It is not the same thing as an alliance.’

“Mr. Dillon: ‘I should like to know what it is. Some of us have had very uneasy feelings since the other day we read that M. Pichon, the Foreign Minister for France, spoke of constant military conversations going on with England. I say that there is a very uncomfortable feeling among many honorable members that there is a secret alliance with France, or some understanding which is not known to the members of this House, and if we are to be told that that is the result of all these alliances and understandings, this country must be prepared to build not according to the

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two Power standard, but up to the three Power standard, which was put forward there tonight.’”

A fortnight later, Mr. Jowett, not satisfied with the answer to his question put to the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, sought information from the head of the Department:

“Mr. Jowett asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, if, when he came into office, there was in existence any understanding or undertaking, expressed or implied, in virtue of which Great Britain would be under obligations to France to send troops, in certain eventualities, to assist the operations of the French Army.

“Sir Edward Grey: ‘The extent of the obligations to which Great Britain was committed was that expressed or implied in the Anglo-French Convention laid before Parliament. There was no other engagement bearing on the subject.’”

Then, in connection with Morocco, the question was asked concerning the French Expedition to Fez:

“Mr. Dillon asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the British Government had been consulted by the French Government in reference to the proposed military operations against Fez; and whether the British Government had in any way approved or made itself responsible for this attack on the independence of the Empire of Morocco?

“The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey): ‘His Majesty’s Government have been informed by the French Government of the measures which are being adopted for the succor of Europeans in Fez, and they understand that information has also been given to other Governments. The action taken by France is not intended to alter the political status of Morocco,
and His Majesty’s Government cannot see why any objection should be taken to it.’”

Any number of similar instances of suppression and prevarication could be given, but let these suffice as specimens of the kind of lying done by ministers in the House to shield the secret preparations taken in hand by the General Staffs. Yet there are intelligent Americans who seem to be offended when facts are stated that are not to the credit of British ministers. Take the question referring to Morocco put by Mr. Dillon to Grey, and the answer which he received. Grey knew perfectly well that France did intend to alter the political status of Morocco. Indeed he must have known of the secret articles which accompanied the Anglo-French Agreement in 1904, in which it was provided that France and Spain were to partition Morocco with the consent of Great Britain. He must have known when the French, Spanish and British Governments signed the Algeciras Act in 1906, pledging themselves to maintain the independence and integrity of the State of Morocco, that they were committing themselves to a lie, for these three countries were secretly engaged in the work of partitioning Morocco. Furthermore, Grey must have known of the Franco-German Convention of 1909, regarding Morocco, when France in the most barefaced manner solemnly subscribed to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Morocco, while plans were in operation for the military occupation of the country.

The answer to the French military occupation of Morocco was the appearance of the German gunboat “Panther” at Agadir. The Franco-German Convention of 1909, had been violated by the French, and naturally Germany wanted to know the reason why. Perhaps the clearest commentary on the situation in 1911 was that from the pen of W. T. Stead in The
Review of Reviews. No one will presume to say Stead was pro-German, or that in referring to the Agadir crisis he was “apologizing for Germany.” Stead was a Fisher man, Fisher thought the world of him, and there is no doubt that Stead was one of the best informed men in England on foreign affairs. This is what he had to say of the Moroccan crisis:

“We were nearly involved in the stupendous catastrophe of a gigantic war with the greatest of all the World Powers in order to enable France to tear up the Treaty of Algeciras by taking possession of the Empire of Morocco, whose independence and integrity we were pledged to defend. It is not to our interest to make over to France a vast domain in Northern Africa. . . . The fact remains that in order to put France in possession of Morocco, we all but went to war with Germany. We have escaped war, but we have not escaped the natural and abiding enmity of the German people. Is it possible to frame a heavier indictment of the foreign policy of any British Ministry? The secret, the open secret of this almost incredible crime against treaty faith, British interests, and the peace of the world, is the unfortunate fact that Sir Edward Grey has been dominated by men at the Foreign Office who believe all considerations must be subordinated to the one supreme duty of thwarting Germany at every turn, even if in so doing British interests, treaty faith, and the peace of the world are trampled underfoot. I speak that of which I know.”

After the Agadir crisis, there were few men interested in European affairs who believed war could be averted. Speedily things got worse, and the militarists in the House of Commons began to badger the Government. Mr. Amery, the spokesman in the House of Commons of the Military party, was the
first person to raise in a direct manner the question of the secret military obligations Britain was under to France. On July 4th, 1912, he moved to reduce the army estimates by £100, for the purpose of forcing the hand of the Government:

"My object is to draw the attention of the Committee to the gravity of the military situation as a whole and to the urgent necessity of bringing our military preparations into some sort of correspondence with our general national policy. The point I wish to insist upon to the Committee is that we should face the logical consequences of the policy to which this country already stands committed with the general approval of the great majority on both sides of the House, and that we should shape our military preparations by the same standard by which our naval preparations are invariably determined—the standard, I mean, of the force we may have to encounter in war. . . . It is also common ground that in certain eventualities, eventualities which seemed by no means remote less than a year ago, we should be prepared to send a military force to France to assist her. What ought also to be common ground, and no less common ground than those matters I have already mentioned, is that the force thus sent should be adequate to achieve its purpose. If we send a force at all, and it is agreed that we should send it—(Hon. Members: No.) It is by the great majority on both sides of this House, and if we send a force at all we should send it to make sure of victory and not to share a defeat. . . . Let me remind the Committee that since the crisis of last year Germany has added very considerably to her navy. Immediately, and with the assent of every one, we responded by a substantial increase of our navy. May I also
remind the Committee that since that same crisis
Germany has added 80,000 men to her army for
the express purpose of strengthening the force
that is to march through Belgium to crush the
French left. It is upon our Expeditionary Force
that the brunt of that march would fall.'

Every militarist in England knew after the Agadir
affair that war was inevitable. Lord Haldane knew
that Britain was bound to fight on the side of the
French, and though Mr. Asquith in 1912 had the
effrontery to declare in the House of Commons, "I
say, and I say this deliberately, we have no cause,
and so far as I know, no occasion for quarrel with
any country in any part of the world," he had a few
months before sent Mr. Winston Churchill to the
Admiralty for the express purpose of preparing the
fleet for war. At Dundee, June 15th, 1915, Mr.
Churchill confessed that he was sent to the Admiralty
in 1911: "After the Agadir crisis had nearly brought
us into war, I was sent with the express duty laid
upon me by the Prime Minister to put the fleet in a
state of instant and constant readiness for war in
case we were attacked by Germany." There was
scarcely a week in the year 1912 when the question
of war with Germany was left out of the speeches
of prominent statesmen, soldiers and sailors. Lord
Charles Beresford was particularly bitter against the
First Lord of the Admiralty for dragging Germany
into his speeches on naval affairs. Lord Roberts
went up and down the country making speeches against
Germany which offended even his own supporters.
The Evening Standard, by no means a pacifist or-
gan, said: "At a time when all prudent people on
both sides of the North Sea are endeavoring to es-

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must drive every German who reads them to exasperation.”

The hostility and bitterness which was fomented in the chief British, French, Russian and German papers during that year, amazed such men as Lord Bryce and Lord Morley, who commented with deep regret upon the way things were going. People “in the know” repeatedly referred to “the inevitable war.” Those who kept in close touch with foreign affairs knew events were taking shape that were beyond the control of Parliament. The policy inaugurated by Delcassé in Morocco, together with that of Isvolsky, in the Black Sea and Persia, committed Great Britain to military and naval action too terrible to contemplate. Grey’s policy was fast tending to an European catastrophe. The French occupation of Morocco in the summer of 1911, and the violation of the pledges given to Germany that Great Britain, France and Spain would maintain the independence and integrity of Morocco meant war, and nothing civilians in Europe could do could avert it. Every secret preparation made by military and naval authorities of the Entente Powers was consummated and ratified in 1912. In November of that year, the King of Belgium called the House of Parliament to a secret sitting to consider urgent military precautionary measures. The King had become possessed of facts of a threatening nature; these he disclosed to Parliament, who listened attentively to his warnings, and immediately adopted a drastic military program, which had been delayed for thirty years, one which King Leopold II had advocated in vain. The drastic program the Belgian Parliament adopted raised the war strength of the Belgian Army to 150,000 for the field army, 60,000 for auxiliary services, and 130,000 for garrisons; in all, a force of 340,000 men. The fortifications of the Meuse were strengthened, and neu-
tral Belgium, a country supposedly protected by five of the principal European Powers from war, got ready for the fray.

And all these terrible preparations were made against a country whose army in the year of the Agadir crisis was in a condition so unsatisfactory to the mind of militarists that Colonel Repington, the military correspondent of the London *Times*, October 28th, 1911, in his conclusions on the army manoeuvres, wrote the following:

"The writer has not formed a wholly favourable opinion of the German Army, which appears to him to be living on a glorious past and to be unequal to the repute in which it is commonly held. . . . There is insufficient test of the initiative of commanders of any units, large or small. . . . There was nothing in the higher leading at the manoeuvres of a distinguished character, and mistakes were committed which tended to shake the confidence of foreign spectators in the reputation of the command. The infantry lacked dash, displayed no knowledge of the use of ground, intrenched themselves badly, were extremely slow in their movements, offered vulnerable targets at medium ranges, ignored the service of security, performed the approach marches in an old-time manner, were not trained to understand the connection between fire and movement, and seemed totally unaware of the effect of modern fire. The cavalry drilled well and showed some beautifully trained horses, while the cavalry of the Guard was well handled from the Army point of view, but the arm was in many ways exceedingly old fashioned, the scouting was bad, and mistakes were made of which our Yeomanry would be ashamed. The artillery, with its out-of-date matériel and slow and ineffective
methods of fire, appeared so inferior that it can have no pretensions to measure itself against the French on anything approaching level terms. Finally, the dirigibles and aeroplanes presented the fourth arm in a relatively unfavorable light. The German Army, apart from its numbers, confidence in itself, and high state of organization, does not present any signs of superiority over the best foreign models, and in some ways does not rise above the level of the second rate. . . . It appears to the writer to have trained itself stale. Year in, year out, the same ceaseless round of intensive training has reduced the whole Army to a machine. Everybody does the same thing every hour of every day every year, and officers who have to wait sixteen or seventeen years for their companies are spent and tired long before they rise to high command. . . . Failing extreme measures, the best thing to restore new life to the Army would be to disband it for a year in order to give everybody, from top to bottom, a much needed rest. . . . The nation which, after all, gives up little more than half of its able-bodied sons to the Army, is becoming less militarist than formerly. The military spirit in the country is less predominant than of old and the race for wealth is the consuming passion of the day. . . . Although the physique is still good, there has been a steady deterioration for many years past in the physical qualifications of recruits. The German Army has seen less of modern war than any other which stands in the front rank. . . . The contempt which it displays for the effects of modern fire, and professes to hold for the armies of rival States with which it may come in conflict, can only be set down to ignorance.”

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Such evidence from so distinguished an authority on military questions makes one wonder why the Entente Powers were so mortally afraid of what they called "the German menace." Perhaps they thought it advisable that "the best foreign models" should make no mistake about the job. Be that as it may, the revelations in the French newspapers show to what extent the Entente prepared for the conflict against the Army that in 1911 Colonel Repington said should disband for a year for a much needed rest. A communication in *Gil Blas*, February 25th, 1913, said:

"A contemporary paper of Eastern France contains most remarkable disclosures. In Eastern military circles it is discussed that the fortress of Maubeuge, situated near the northeastern frontier of France, close to the railway line Paris-Cologne, receives, since several weeks, great quantities of English ammunition. Maubeuge is of the greatest military importance. In the plan of campaign of the French General Staff, it is the point of concentration of the allied Anglo-French troops, which in case of war will be commanded by the English General French, under the French Generalissimo Joffre. It is known that the English cannons do not use the same kind of projectiles as the French cannons. Therefore, both governments have agreed to lay in store, already in peace time, on French territory, such quantities of ammunition as will be necessary for the English artillery."

Whether those who prepared for the war thought it a duty to civilization to make Europe what it is, cannot be said, though it should have been patent to any but a military mind, that civilization would go down with Europe.
The new year, 1914, was ushered in with many pacific utterances from liberal statesmen in Great Britain. Lloyd George, in an interview with the London Daily Chronicle, gave some reasons for the growth of armaments and expressed himself freely as to the cause of Germany's nervousness. He said that she had not only to consider France in her military and naval policy, but that she had also "to reckon with Russia on her eastern frontier." The publication of the interview caused something of a sensation in military and naval circles of the Entente Powers. The chauvinists of Russia and France were particularly bitter against the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for his speech seemed to be an indication that the British Government was getting rather tired of the costly business of preparing for "the inevitable war." Numbers of speeches were made by members of the Government against the enormous expenditure on armaments; the leaders of the opposition, however, carried on the agitation against Germany undeterred.

The real fact of the matter was that the Government had become thoroughly alarmed at its own policy. Grey spoke at Manchester, February 3rd, on international affairs and armaments; in reviewing the naval position of the Powers, he said: "While British naval expenditure is a great factor in the naval expenditure of Europe, forces which are making that expenditure increase, generally are really beyond our control. I admit that we had some responsibility originally for building the first Dreadnought. No doubt we are open to the criticism that we set the example."

The liberal party in the country had become extremely anxious and on several occasions it had shown a spirit of revolt against the Government's foreign policy. When Parliament met February 10th, the
King's speech contained a striking reference to Anglo-German relations: "I am happy to say that my negotiations, both with the German Government and the Ottoman Government, as regards matters of importance to the commercial and industrial interests of this country and Mesopotamia, are rapidly approaching a satisfactory issue, while questions which have long been pending with the Turkish Empire in respect to regions bordering on the Persian Gulf, are in a fair way towards an amicable settlement." Perhaps no statement made by the Government on foreign affairs, since 1908, was received with so much satisfaction in Great Britain; the statement, however, was lamented bitterly in military and naval circles in Paris and St. Petersburg. The dispatches and letters of Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador at London, to the Foreign Minister at St. Petersburg, reveal the condition in Russian diplomatic circles, as something very like panic at what was taking place in London. The Entente for a while in the early spring of 1914 seemed to be in jeopardy; so to the Russian military party it was a case of "now or never." The Gols Moskvy, on March 12th, said:

"The hatred towards Austria which has accumulated in the hearts of the Russian nation has long been seeking an outlet in war, and is only being kept back within the limits of the last degree of patience by the Russian Government with the utmost difficulty. But there is an end to all things. A moment may arrive when even the Russian Government will prove impotent to fight down the hatred towards Austro-Hungary which fills the Russian people, and then the crossing of the Austrian frontiers by the Russian army will become an unavoidable decision."

The organ of the Pan-Slavists, Novoe Vremja, March 7th, said: "The hour is approaching. . . . It
is necessary to work on the Army from top to bottom, night and day." The London Times of March, 1914, contains in its dispatches from St. Petersburg enough journalistic dynamite relating to the war-like preparations of Russia to blow up the most pacific continent.

There were many reasons for the military parties of both France and Russia forcing the issue. Anglo-German oil interests had been at work for several years trying to draw the Governments together, so that they might seek the solution of the difficult problems connected with the Bagdad Railway and the oil areas of the Persian Gulf. Thanks to M. André Tardieu's statements, we now know that "a protocol was signed at the British Foreign Office in March, 1914, not only by the interested companies, but by Sir Eyre Crowe, representing the British Government, and Baron von Kühlmann, representing the German Government." Furthermore, we have M. Tardieu's statement that the British and German Governments strove until within five weeks of the outbreak of the war to settle their difficulties in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. He says:

"On June 26th, 1914, the British Government, after negotiations of several years, carried through by its ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Lucas Malet, had obtained from the Sultan, for the benefit of an English Company, the Turkish Petroleum Company founded in March, 1914, the exclusive concession for petroleum discovered, or thereafter to be discovered, in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad. The Company consisted of seventy-five per cent British capital (the National Bank of Turkey, the D'Arcy group, the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company) and twenty-five per cent German capital (the Deutsche Bank)."

What with Russian interests in Persia imperilled,
and the French threatened with exclusion in the oil areas of Mesopotamia by the Anglo-German treaty, no wonder "the inevitable war" was precipitated by the militarists.

It is just as well to understand that every move taken by Serbia in the Balkans was made with the consent of Russia. Indeed the question of the Straits and Constantinople was not an isolated one in Russian policy; Serbia and Roumania were Russian pawns in the diplomatic game of forcing an entrance from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. Mr. Bogitsch- evitch, the ex-Serbian attache at Berlin, attributes the war to the Pan-Slav policy of Russia and Serbia. How far the Pan-Slavists wished to go with their imperialistic policy, so far as Serbia was concerned, is indicated in the interview Paschitch, the Serbian Premier, had with the Czar, February 2nd, 1914, when he declared that: "If it should be decided that we are to have the daughter of the Tsar of Russia for our Queen, she will enjoy the sympathy of the whole Serbian nation, and she will be able, if God and conditions permit, to become the Tsarina of the Southern Slav, Serbo-Kroaitian people. Her influence and her luster will encompass the entire Balkan Peninsula." The Pester Lloyd and the Budapesti Hirlap, in reporting this interview, were under no doubt as to the close imperialistic and diplomatic associations of Serbia and Russia.

There is abundant evidence in the principal European journals of the spring of 1914 of how restless the Russian militarists had become. The story, pretty nearly complete, of Russia's preparations, down to the beginning of June, can be traced in the columns of the London Times. An article stated that Russia had raised her peace effectives by 150,000 men, "making a total peace strength of 1,700,000, or approxi-
mately double that of Germany.” Then the writer of the article adds:

“The Russian reply to Germany is next door to a mobilization in time of peace, and it quite accounts for the embittered outburst of the Cologne Gazette, and for the German pot calling the Russian kettle black. . . . There are signs that Russia has done with defensive strategy. . . . The increased number of guns in the Russian Army Corps, the growing efficiency of the Army, and the improvements made or planned in strategic railways are, again, matters which cannot be left out of account. These things are well calculated to make the Germans anxious.”

In April, 1914, King George and Sir Edward Grey visited Poincaré in Paris, and there the last arrangements were made for the war. The documents from the Russian Foreign Office which contain the report of the Grey-Doumergue conference, show that the secret naval understanding with Russia was consummated, and that Sazonov had sound reasons for telling the Russian Duma that the friendship of the three Powers had been firmly established, “irrespective of the form and scope of the written word.” How much the King and Sir Edward Grey knew when they visited Paris of Russian military preparations, and the warlike intentions of the Russian staff, no one seems to know; but it is safe to suggest that Grey knew that the Czar signed on February 19th, or 20th, 1914, an Ukase for the formation at Odessa of an expeditionary force which was to surprise and capture Constantinople in the near future. In an interesting letter to Foreign Affairs, Professor Fred C. Conybeare refers to the secret dispatches which passed between Paris and St. Petersburg over a month before the war, wherein the fact is mentioned that British ships had reached Kronstadt in pursuance of conveying
Russian troops from that port to Pomerania, in accordance with Lord Fisher's favorite plan of campaign. In support of the statement in the Russian secret dispatches, Professor Conybeare relates how a Lloyd's agent at St. Petersburg received cable instructions from London before June 28th, to go down to Kronstadt and report on the large fleet of merchantmen just arrived from England. "He found them, to his surprise, not full of freight, but empty; and on inquiry learned that they were to take Russian troops and land them in Germany."

After the return of Sir Edward Grey from the Paris conference in April, rumors were abroad of a deal that had been fixed up with the French and Russians. On April 28th, 1914, Grey was asked the following question:

"Mr. King asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that demands have been recently put forward for a further military understanding between the Powers of the Triple Entente with a view to concerted action on the Continent in the case of certain eventualities; and whether the policy of this country still remains one of freedom from all obligations to engage in military operations on the Continent?"

"The Secretary (Sir Edward Grey): 'The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative, and as regards the latter part the position now remains the same as stated by the Prime Minister in answer to a question in this House on the 24th March, 1913.'"

Then, on June 11th, two questions were put to the Foreign Minister:

"Mr. King asked whether any naval agreement has been recently entered into between Russia and Great Britain; and whether any negotiations, with a view to a naval agreement, have recently taken
place or are now pending between Russia and Great Britain?

"Sir William Byles asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make any statement with regard to an alleged new naval agreement between Great Britain and Russia; how far such agreement would affect our relations with Germany; and will he lay papers?

"Sir Edward Grey: 'The hon. member for North Somerset asked a similar question last year with regard to the military forces, and the hon. member for North Salford asked a similar question also on the same day, as he has done again today. The Prime Minister then replied that, if war arose between European Powers, there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. That answer covers both the questions on the paper. It remains as true today as it was a year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any Power that would make the statement less true. No such negotiations are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon so far as I can judge. But if any agreement were to be concluded that made it necessary to withdraw or modify the Prime Minister's statement of last year, which I have quoted, it ought, in my opinion, to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parliament."

It has been said that a certain amount of lying is absolutely necessary for a politician to indulge in in defense of his country, but secret diplomacy undoubtedly extended this branch of the art of juggling with the truth, by forcing British Ministers to lie in defense of foreign countries; still a Cabinet Minister's duty to civilization must be considered, though his
policy is in accord with that of the Power, which was
considered, not many years ago, to be inimical to
Western Civilization.

The Archduke was murdered on June 28th. Whether
the Entente diplomatic circles were much surprised
or no, the royalties and peoples were amazed at "an-
other exhibition of Serbian brutality." Some of the
English papers were merciless in their criticism of
the deed; and until within one or two days before the
outbreak of the war, the House of Commons was
told that "British interests in Serbia were nil." Serbia
was held responsible until it became evident that the
quarrel between Austria and Serbia could not be lo-
calized, and that a European conflagration was inev-
itble. What were the facts concerning the murder?
Briefly, they are as follows:

The plan to assassinate Franz Ferdinand was
made in Belgrade.

The bombs and Browning pistols used by the
murderers were obtained in Belgrade.

The bombs came from the Serbian arsenal at
Kragujevac.

The findings of the court of inquiry were, of course,
repudiated by Russia, and afterwards by the rest of
the Allies; then any statement from Austrian sources
on the subject was received with scorn. It was
said neither Serbia nor Russia had anything what-
ever to do with the culprits. Now, of course, every
intelligent student of foreign affairs knows that the
findings of the court were correct, and that the mur-
derers were Serbians, that they were members of the
Pan-Slav movement.

About six months after the war came nominally
to an end, the London Star published the following
announcement: "The Serajevo murderers. A mes-
sage from Prague to Amsterdam (says the Central
News) announces that the bodies of Princip, Cabri-
novic and Grabez, the Sarajevo murderers, were exhumed on Tuesday with great solemnity in the presence of thousands of the inhabitants. The remains of these Serbian officers are to be sent to their native country." Miss Edith Durham, one of the best-informed students of Balkan affairs, writing to the London Nation, comments upon the Central News telegram as follows:

"Up till now the Serbs have strenuously denied all connection with the murderers. It has been repeatedly stated that they were not Serbs, and the report was widely spread, and believed by many, that they were agents of the Kaiser, and had acted under German instruction. That German agents guilty of committing the deed which caused Europe to be swamped with blood and misery for four years should now be receiving public honors at the hands of the Serbs, would be one of the most astonishing events of history."

The facts in connection with the murder submitted by the Austrian Government to the Chancelleries in Europe are now known to have been substantially correct. Dispatch No. 3 in the British White paper shows clearly that the Austrian Ambassador at London acquainted Grey, July 23rd, with all particulars. The documents of the various Chancelleries show that Grey was fully informed of all that took place; indeed he knew of every diplomatic move made by the Powers. All the war-propagandist's yarns about his being taken by surprise by Austria and Germany can be relegated to limbo. Let us see what happened after the funeral of the Archduke. The first dispatch in the British White paper is dated July 20th, sent by Grey to the British Ambassador at Berlin, in which he records the conversation he had with Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador at London. Why should he go to Berlin to get information
on July 20th? when Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador at Vienna, had telegraphed him on the 16th, as follows: "As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th of July the forecast of what was about to happen, which I telegraphed to you the following day." Grey knew thoroughly well what was taking place in Vienna. He knew that on the 16th. It was not, however, until the 27th, when Bonar Law put an inspired question to him in the House, that he presumed to say anything. Then, as usual, he deceived the members by creating the impression that it was Friday, the 24th, when he received the first information of what was taking place. On the 28th, at question time, the Prime Minister was interpellated:

Mr. Bonar Law: I wish to ask the Prime Minister if he has any information he can communicate on the European situation?

Prime Minister: There is no new development sufficiently definite to enable any further statement to be made, but we hope that no unfavorable inference will be drawn from this. I cannot say more.

Lord Hugh Cecil: Can the right hon. gentleman say if hostilities have broken out?

Prime Minister: We have no definite information about that.

Such was the pass to which secret diplomacy had brought the House of Commons. The work of deception and conspiracy had, however, to go on, though Mr. Asquith knew on the 28th of July that the British fleet sailed from Weymouth on the 25th, to "bottle-up the German Navy." Mr. Asquith also knew that every military preparation was being made at that moment for sending the Expeditionary Force to the Continent. He knew much more besides, for the
British Ambassador telegraphed from Vienna on July 27th, "that a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Serbians had been the aggressors." No doubt the British Ambassador at Vienna knew that Prince Alexander of Serbia telegraphed to the Tsar, that "the future of Serbia is secure now that it is the object of your Majesty's gracious solicitude." After 11 o'clock on July 28th, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reported to the House the dispatch from Crackenthorpe, the British Ambassador at Nish, that war had been declared by Austria on Serbia. Then on July 30th, Sir Edward Grey communicated to the House that, "Austria has begun war against Serbia, and Russia has ordered a partial mobilization, which has not hitherto led to any corresponding steps by other Powers, so far as our information goes."

With regard to the Austrian note addressed to the Serbian Government on the 23rd of July, it seems to have been overlooked by the critics that the differences between Serbia and Austria were of long standing. The last phase dates from the annexation by Austria of Bosnia-Herzegovina, territory, under the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, ceded to Austria. Perhaps no more disgraceful bit of diplomatic work was ever carried out than that extension of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but it must not be forgotten that Isvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, was as much to blame for the business as Aerenthal, for he agreed in advance to the annexation. The allegations to the effect that Aerenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minister, bribed Isvolsky have never been disproved. Be that as it may, the Serbian and Austrian Governments came to an understanding March 31st, 1909, as to their future relationships. The Serbian Government declared:

"Serbia recognizes that the fait accompli re-
garding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may make in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter.

From that time to the murder of the Archduke, Serbia was the Balkan hot-bed of secret societies fostered by the Pan-Slavs; and no similar case of the patience of a political State with misdemeanors against it permitted by a neighboring State, can be found readily in European history. For those who are familiar with the history of Mexico, China, Egypt, Tibet, Tripoli, Morocco, Ireland and South Africa, it is scarcely becoming in them to criticize the action of the Austrian Government in connection with Serbia.

The main provisions of the Austrian note of July 23rd, 1914, were well known in the Chancelleries of Europe long before the Archduke was murdered, and there is no excuse whatever why any statesman, or indeed, any professor of political science, should be ignorant of the declaration of the Italian Premier, Signor Gioielli, who said: "That the Marquis di San Giuliano, communicated to him that Austria wished to send in August, 1913, an ultimatum to Serbia, substantially identical with that sent last July."

Serbia and Austria seemed for some years to hang on the very precipice of war; indeed, it was thought a move in the wrong direction would bring about a conflict. Now, Brigadier-General Birdwood Thom-
son, a British general staff officer, who was at Grand Headquarters in France, can be accepted as an impartial critic. He went to the Balkans in the spring of 1914, and in his book, "Old Europe's Suicide," he says:

"I reached Belgrade early in April, 1914. The city had resumed its normal aspect. The General Staff were talking and planning war, the general public was more interested in the working of the Commercial Convention with Greece. . . . I stayed in Vienna for a few days on my way to London. Here it was generally recognized that in regard to Serbia, a dangerous situation was developing, which could not be neglected. Many serious people frankly expressed the hope that some incident would occur which would provide a pretext for taking military action against the Serbs. No one wanted war, but everyone felt that an end had to be put to an intolerable state of affairs; the time for conciliatory measures had passed, the Southern-Slav movement was assuming menacing proportions, and would wreck the Austro-Hungarian Empire, if steps were not promptly taken to nip it in the bud."

In the account given in L'Humanité of the conversation which took place between Clémenceau and Poincaré about the Three Years' War, it is stated that "the President gave him (Clémenceau) to understand that grave events were about to take place, that sooner or later the question of Austria will undoubtedly be raised, and that serious international complications would not fail to arise." This was never contradicted, though it caused something of a sensation in Paris. It is really amazing when one stops to think of the number of prophets that appeared in French and Russian diplomatic circles in the spring of 1914—unusual prophets, for they pre-
dicted war, and it came about over a quarrel which arose between Austria and Serbia, a quarrel at least five years old. Nobody puts the case in clearer terms than Lord Loreburn in his book, "How the War Came." He says:

"Serbia gave offence to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, cause of just offense, as our ambassador frankly admits in the published dispatches. We had no concern in that quarrel, as Sir Edward Grey says in terms. But Russia, the protectress of Serbia, came forward to prevent her being utterly humiliated by Austria. We were not concerned in that quarrel either, as Sir Edward also says. And then Russia called upon France under their Treaty to help in the fight. France was not concerned in that quarrel any more than ourselves, as Sir Edward informs us. But France was bound by a Russian Treaty of which he did not know the terms, and then France called on us for help. We were tied by the relations which our Foreign Office had created, without apparently realizing that they had created them."

Civilization was hard put to it at the end of July, 1914, when secret diplomacy made it impossible for Ministers to tell the truth about entangling alliances.

VI.

Mr. Sidney B. Fay's articles on "The Origin of the War," in the American Historical Review, are excellent illustrations of the necessity of the historian proceeding with exceeding caution when examining the official documents relating to the outbreak of a war. Mr. Fay has no doubt set about his task with a clear mind and a wholesome desire to get at the truth, but he has accepted the Austrian Red Book and the Kautsky documents without sufficient scrutiny. He, however, is not to be blamed for jumping to the conclu-
sion that Berchtold “more than anyone else was responsible for the world war.” The Austrian Foreign Minister was undoubtedly obstinate, impulsive and suspicious, but the matter of determining the guilt of Berchtold is not so simple as it appears in Mr. Fay’s analysis of the events and documents which he presents. For instance, he seems to consider the cause of the friction between Austria and Serbia to have arisen seriously for the first time at Sarajevo, when the murder took place; and relying on the Austrian Red Book, he considers that the Wiesner report is conclusive, inasmuch as it considers “there is nothing to prove or even to cause suspicion of the Serbian Government’s cognizance of steps leading to the crime, or of its preparing it or of its supplying the weapons, etc.” Now, Mr. Fay overlooks the probability of a perfectly honest investigator reporting no evidence of guilt in a case where evidence of guilt is abundant but not apparent at the time of the investigation. If Berchtold’s guilt is determined by the Wiesner report, what is to be said now that we have clear proof that the murderers were Serbian military officers, that they were Pan-Slavists, and, moreover, that the enclosure which was sent with the Austrian note to Serbia was substantially correct?

The enclosure, containing a summary of the criminal proceedings taken against Princip, was submitted to every European Power with the Austrian note, not later than July 24th, 1914. Indeed, Count Mensdorff described the nature of the note to Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office, London, July 23rd, according to dispatch No. 3 in the British White Paper, and, as I have already stated, the British Ambassador at Vienna telegraphed to Grey on the 16th of July what the character of the Austrian note to Serbia would be. Sir Edward Grey, therefore, knew the nature of the Austrian note six days before it
was presented to the Serbian Government, but the
first time he complained of the time limit in the note
was, according to the British White Paper, after
it had been delivered to Serbia. Moreover, it is
strange how dispatch No. 38 in the British White
Paper has been overlooked. It was sent by the Brit-
ish Ambassador from Rome, on July 23rd, but for
reasons not explained it did not reach the British
Foreign Office until July 27th. For an Ambassador
to send information of such importance through the
post was stupid, or, on the other hand, he did not
consider the news about the Austrian note was worth
the cost of a telegram. The dispatch says: “I gath-
ered that the Italian Government have been made
cognizant of the terms of the communication, which
will be addressed to Serbia.” This means that the
Italian Government was informed by Austria before
the note was sent to Serbia.

There is little doubt that every Chancellery in Eu-
rope was informed of the resolution, for which Count
Tisza was responsible, passed unanimously on July
19th, by the Austro-Hungarian Council, stating that
the monarchy had no intention of annexing Serbia.
What became of the notification of that resolution
that was sent to the Powers, no one knows, but who
can go through the diplomatic documents now on
hand without believing that there was a conspiracy in
Entente Foreign Offices to suppress the purport of
that resolution. The Austrian note was presented
July 24th. How the chauvinists of France, Russia,
Italy, and later Great Britain, could stir up a war
feeling against Austria by declaring it was Austria’s
intention to destroy Serbia and annex her territory,
can only be explained by the suppression of the Vi-
enna resolution. And that the Foreign Offices permit-
ted the jingo press in their countries to make state-
ments they knew to be untrue, is one of the features
of this discreditable affair that makes decent-minded folk shudder at the work of the Chancelleries. Havas Laszlo says:

“But what became of this resolution? As the *Pester Lloyd* rightly observes, how is it possible that on July 27th Sazonov (the Russian Foreign Minister) could still say to Count Pourtales, the German Ambassador, that Austria and Hungary want to “swallow Serbia”? And how is it that Pourtalés did not answer by the resolution of the Vienna Council of July 19th? Is it conceivable that nobody knew of a declaration that was clearly intended to be known—not even Lord Grey? Whose interest was it that the conflict should not be localized, as it would have been by the acceptance of Tisza’s demands? Russia and Germany have answered already; as to Rome, we may suppose that if it had taken into account the resolution of July 19th, it would no longer have had such a plausible excuse of exacting “compensations” in the Balkans. But a complete light will only come when the dark chambers of subterranean diplomacy are thrown open in Paris, London and Washington.”

There was little doubt in the minds of persons familiar with the Balkans that Russia was backing Serbia against Austria during the whole business. A glance at the English journals and illustrated papers will satisfy anyone that British opinion was on the whole sympathetic to Austria. Sir Owen Seaman’s verses in *Punch* of August 5th reflect middle class opinion:

To Serbia:

“You have won whatever of fame it brings
To have murdered a king and the heir of kings,
And it well may be that your sovereign pride
Chafes at a touch of its tender hide;
But why should I follow your fighting line,
For a matter that’s no concern of mine?”

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and John Bull's cry, "To hell with Serbia," expresses faithfully the opinion of Clerkdom. He must indeed have been a man wholly ignorant of foreign affairs who did not understand that Russia was backing Serbia all along.

That Europe would be embroiled must have been obvious to all the members of the Entente as early as July 23rd, for Grey, in his dispatch to the British Ambassador at Vienna, says: "Great apprehension had been expressed to me not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation." Further on in the same dispatch he remarks that Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador, said: "All would depend upon Russia."

From the date of the murder until the time of the publication of the Austrian note, British journals were unanimously opposed to Serbia. The change in opinion which came about on July 25th could not seriously be attributed to the stiff terms of the note. The warning editorial in the Times of that date, to the effect that "the danger of a conflagration is very serious to all the Powers," was prompted by its knowledge of the secret military and naval commitments of the Entente, and the special information that paper had of the policy of Russia. It was Russia that forced the issue. If any American leader of thought has any doubt of it, let him look through the files of the principal British journals. After the exchange of the notes some of the London and chief provincial dailies remained firm in their opposition to intervention by the Powers. Dr. E. J. Dillon's articles in the London Daily Telegraph described the situation accurately. On July 26th, commenting editorially on Dillon's articles, in which he complained that the
diplomacy of the Entente Powers was "on an entirely wrong tack," the paper said:

"Considerations of this kind prove how delicate and difficult the diplomatic action of the Triple Entente will be with regard to the crisis. Great Britain is by no means necessarily involved in the present Balkan trouble but circumstances might easily arrive in which her sympathy with the two other partners of the Triple Entente might suggest the necessity of some kind of action. In this country we have no sympathy whatever with Serbia. We reprobate all the crimes which are associated with the Serbian military party. On general grounds we are inclined to believe that Austria-Hungary is justified in demanding full and prompt repudiation of all those nefarious schemes which have politics as their excuse and murder as their handmaid. Nor could we have a clearer exposition of the Austrian case than is contained in Mr. Dillon's dispatch from Vienna, which we publish this morning."

The Manchester Guardian said: "Russia's threat of war against Austria is a piece of sheer brutality," and declared, "on the whole, English newspapers have avoided taking sides in the quarrel." then it adds: "all, with, we think, only one exception, have recognized the extreme provocation that Austria has received and her right to take the strongest measures to secure the punishment of all concerned in the assassination of the Crown Prince." Neither the terms of the Austrian note nor the Serbian reply to it was the cause of the electrifying change of opinion which began July 25th; it was brought about by Russia's action which involved Britain, France and Belgium in a quarrel started by members of the Pan-Slav movement in Austrian territory.

Let us now turn again to the diplomatic documents.
No. 6 in the British White Paper, from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Grey, is the basis of the opinion of those who said that if Grey had been in a position to declare publicly that Britain was secretly engaged with France and Russia and would fulfill her military and naval obligations, war would have been impossible. Stuck fast, however, between secret alliances he had not the courage to reveal to the House, and the sentiment in the country utterly opposed to war, he kept the people in the dark until he and they were lost. Woodrow Wilson was perfectly right, indeed he was only echoing European well informed opinion, when he said, March 5th, 1919: “We know for a certainty that if Germany had thought for a moment that Great Britain would go in with France or Russia, she would never have undertaken the enterprise.” Mr. Bonar Law said practically the same thing in the House of Commons, June 18th, 1918: “It has been commonly said—and I think it is very likely true—that if Germany had known for certain that Great Britain would have taken part in this war, the war would never have occurred.” It was Britain’s public declaration of participation delayed until the last moment which made it possible for the German Government to wage war. That dispatch from Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, received by Grey on July 24th, is conclusive. The parts emphasized by Buchanan are as follows:

“He (Sazonov) hoped that His Majesty’s Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.”

“The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia.”

“The general European question was involved,
the Serbian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue."

"M. Sazonov said that he thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have been carried out."

"Our (Britain) only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude."

"French Ambassador and M. Sazonov both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with France and Russian Governments."

"An attack upon Austria by Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe."

"M. Sazonov answered we (Britain) sooner or later would be dragged into the war, if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France."

This extraordinary dispatch was followed the next day by another, to Grey, in which Buchanan says: "He (Sazonov) did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but that her attitude was decided by ours (Britain). If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia, there would be no war, and if we fail them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into the war."

Before replying to the Austrian note, Serbia ordered mobilization and retirement of the Government from Belgrade to Nish. If there were no other grounds for knowing Russia was supporting every action Serbia took in this matter, these would be sufficient to convince anyone. The Serbian note did not satisfy Austria; but it was not, however, that which determined Austrian action; it was the fact that Serbia had ordered mobilization and removed
her Government to Nish before she replied to the Austrian note. Had Serbia not made these two provocative moves, Austria could not have had the slightest excuse for assuming a belligerent attitude to Serbia.

What procedure then was resorted to by the Entente Powers to avert war? War-propagandists made great play with Grey's suggestion of a conference—a conference that France, Russia and Italy never seriously intended to bring about. The first reference to the suggestion is in dispatch No. 10, which Grey sent to the British Ambassador at Paris. The French Ambassador, Paul Cambon, would not consider it till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. The suggestion is referred to again in dispatch No. 11 from Grey to the British Embassy in Berlin. In dispatch No. 18 from the British Ambassador in Berlin, Grey was advised that Germany "was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion, as to the four Powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg, if the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening." What use a conference would have been no one can surmise, for when Grey suggested it, the Austro-Serbian affair had ceased to be a local matter.

Russia began to mobilize on the 25th, and the preceding day the British fleet received an order to postpone demobilization. (See dispatch 66, French Yellow Book.) When Grey telegraphed to Buchanan at St. Petersburg July 27th, about the order not to demobilize the fleet, which was issued on the 24th, the fleet had sailed from Weymouth, "a welcome earnest of our intention to be ready for any course which the national interests may render desirable," as the Times said. What then was the good of Grey pushing his idea of a conference before France, Russia and Italy, when they had told him pretty plainly that
the affair was now changed to Russo-Servia versus Austria, in which all the principal Powers were involved. Russia spurned any idea of a conference on July 27th, and when Austria declared war against Serbia, July 28th, the suggestion of a conference was "adopted" by Italy and France; but Russia had rejected the suggestion, and, on July 27th, Sazonov telegraphed to the Russian Ambassador at London that he had told Buchanan at Petersburg he had begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favorable.

What historians of the future will say of the diplomatic documents time will tell, but I venture to state that the British White Paper (both editions of it) will be singled out of the lot as the fakiest bundle of dispatches ever published by a Foreign Office. Yet one can easily fill up the gaps and put the dates in order, now that so much is known of what really took place. On July 28th, Grey explained to the British Ambassador at Berlin that his suggested conference "would not be an arbitration but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement," and he adds "that a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia is the most preferable method of all." Then after learning that both Russia and Austria had agreed "to the most preferable method of all," a direct exchange of views, he telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Berlin, as follows:

"The German Government having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in re-
serve until I see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress."

So, within four days, the little Austro-Serbian affair had become one in which all the great Powers of Europe were involved, and not one of Grey's allies showed the slightest desire to be a party to the suggested London conference; and Russian mobilization killed any chance of seeking a solution through the direct exchange of views between Russia and Austria.

On July 28th, all the interested Powers were rushing on to war, all save Germany and Italy, and on the night of the next day the German Chancellor realized in his conversation with Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador, that the future was forbidding. In dispatch No. 85 the question of Belgian neutrality is raised for the first time, and then by the German Chancellor, who said: "It depends upon the action of France what operation Germany may be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected, if she had not sided against Germany." This dispatch, No. 85, has all the appearance of being faked. What Sir Edward Goschen really communicated in it to the Foreign Office may never be learned, but no impartial student will accept it as it stands. It served its purpose well, however, for Asquith and Grey used it with great effect in bolstering up their case before the House of Commons. This dispatch No. 85 is misplaced so intentionally that it is worth while plodding through the rather intricate analysis of what took place in the dispatching business on July 29th, that I have presented in "How Diplomats Make War." There it will be seen that Grey did not warn the German Ambassador at London that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of their conversation into thinking that Britain would stand aside, until several hours
after he had told Paul Cambon, the French Ambas-
sador. Moreover, Grey had telegraphed to the Brit-
ish Ambassador at Paris about the warning several
hours before he warned the German Ambassador.
Grey persevered with his wretched secret methods to
the bitter end. The result was that Paul Cambon's
brother, Jules, the French Ambassador at Berlin, was
able to wire to Paris on the afternoon of July 29th,
that:

"The attitude of the Chancellor (German) is
very probably the result of the last interview of
Sir Edward Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up
to quite the last days they flattered themselves
here (Berlin) that England would remain out of
the question, and the impression produced on the
German Government and on the financiers and
business men by her attitude is profound."
(French Yellow Book No. 92.)

This bit of trickery is rather unique, even in the
records of diplomacy inaugurated by Delcassé, Is-
volsky and Grey. It amounts to this—that the French
Ambassador at Berlin knew all about the warning
that was to be given to Lichnowsky in London be-
fore the German Government knew anything about
it. How anything but war would result from the
procedure adopted by Grey is difficult to imagine,
still I do believe he was under the impression until
the last that he could avert a catastrophe by post-
poning a public declaration of his secret commitments
to France and Russia. He was fighting for time,
when really every hour of postponement was mak-
ing matters worse for him. Presumably he kept say-
ing to himself: "I have not committed myself pub-
licly, I am not publicly bound to France and Russia
—my hands are quite free, so far as public policy is
concerned, and if I only wait long enough these com-
plicated questions will solve themselves, and all the
armies and navies that have been gathering for the prospective fray will be demobilized, and nothing worse than another armed peace will be the consequence.”

VII.

Thursday, July 30th, was a very busy day at the London Foreign Office. The House of Commons had adjourned that morning at twelve minutes after three o'clock after the second reading of the Inebriates Bill. At question time Grey referred to the international situation:

“There is very little that I can say. I regret I cannot say that the situation is less grave than it was yesterday. The outstanding facts are the same. Austria has begun war against Serbia, and Russia has ordered a partial mobilization, which has not hitherto led to any corresponding steps by other Powers, so far as our information goes. We continue to pursue the one great object, to preserve European peace, and for this purpose are keeping in close touch with other Powers. In this keeping in touch we have, I am glad to say, had no difficulty so far, though it has not been possible for the Powers to unite in joint diplomatic action as was proposed on Monday.”

That was about four o'clock in the afternoon of the day when he sent his dispatch No. 105 containing the Cambon letters, together with the document from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Viviani, to the British Ambassador at Paris. The letters referred to in this dispatch were those exchanged by Grey and Cambon in November, 1912, relating to the secret conversations between the British and French military and naval staffs, begun at the time of the Anglo-French Agreement in 1904, and con-
tinued until the outbreak of hostilities with Grey's sanction. Cambon, in sending the letters and the document from Viviani, must have thought it was high time to nail Grey down. Poincaré also thought so; for Grey received that morning dispatch No. 99 from the British Ambassador at Paris, which reported a direct appeal from the French President, who said: "If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude." Everything was done by Russia and France to force a public declaration from Grey that Britain would fulfil her secret military and naval obligations.

The Viviani document, enclosure 3 in No. 105, which Cambon handed to Grey on the morning of Thursday, the 30th, states: "The German army had its advance posts on our frontiers yesterday (Friday) and German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance posts are withdrawn to a distance of ten kilometers from the frontier." The document is dated Paris, July 31st, 1914. It was published in the first edition of the British White Paper; the dates were eliminated in the second edition, when it became clear to the British Foreign Office editor that Cambon in London on the 30th could not very well be in possession of a document issued from Paris on the 31st, and that the German army with all its efficiency could not invade French territory for the first time "yesterday (Friday) when yesterday would be Thursday." The document, however, in the original version did its work; it scared Grey. Viviani made much of his distance of "ten kilometers from the frontier." Why not, with Russia driving hard against the eastern frontiers of Germany, and the
British Expeditionary Force bound to be on hand on the French left, why shouldn't he keep his army in reserve and wait until Germany kicked by Russia was forced to invade Belgium? One has only to glance at the works of Haldane, French, Repington, and any number of other British authors, to see how easily this arrangement would work. Viviani knew quite well that it was understood by the terms of the Franco-Russian Military Convention of August 17th, 1892, that the Entente military and naval authorities would understand that mobilization was to be considered a declaration of war. In the circumstances it was, therefore, a simple matter for Viviani to keep some troops "ten kilometers from the frontier"; but he was over-anxious to make a case against Germany. In the now famous paragraph in that document which says: "As you see Germany has done it (the "it" changed to "so" in the second edition of the British White Paper), I will add that all my information goes to show that German preparations began on Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in," Viviani was wrong again, for the Austrian note was not handed in on Saturday. The word "Saturday" must have referred to the date on which the Serbian reply was communicated to the Austrian Government; but what does it matter, when you are engaged in secret diplomacy, so long as you make some attempt at proving what is not so?

It is obvious from the dispatches received at the London Foreign Office on July 30th, that the British ambassadors at Paris, Berlin, Vienna and Rome were working more in the interests of the Entente allies than in the interests of European peace. Goschen and Grey, moreover, never seemed to get in touch with each other at the right moment. Of course, events passed rapidly, but not so fast as to preclude the possibility of the British ambassadors bringing
pressure to bear on Russia as well as on Austria. Nevertheless, that Germany was the Power that forced Austria to accept the proposal of direct exchange of views with Russia is clear.

Berlin, July 30th, 1914.

"The report of Count Pourtalés, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, does not harmonize with the account which your Excellency has given of the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government. Apparently there is a misunderstanding which I beg you to clear up. We cannot expect Austro-Hungary to negotiate with Serbia, with which she is in a state of war. The refusal, however, to exchange views with St. Petersburg would be a grave mistake. We are indeed ready to fulfill our duty. As an ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting our advice. Your Excellency will express this to Count Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness. "Bethmann-Hollwege."

This telegram must have had the desired effect, for Grey telegraphed the next day to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

(Telegraphic) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians
mobilizing eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Serbians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show good will in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia.

Moreover, Grey heard that morning from the British Ambassador at Vienna: "French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European War."

The next dispatch from Berlin to Grey, July 31st, indicated what effect Russian mobilization had on the mind of the German Chancellor:

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31st, 1914.

Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenseless while time was being utilized by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia
against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, today perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request. Later the same day another startling telegram from Berlin was received by Grey:

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31st, 1914.

According to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilized. Chancellor tells me that “Kriegsgefahr” will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed. Mobilization would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that “Kriegsgefahr” signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night
he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

The first information received in Berlin of the Russian mobilization came on July 26th, then the German Chancellor sent the following telegram to Count Pourtalès, the Ambassador in St. Petersburg:

"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter measures which must consist in mobilizing the army. Mobilization however means war. Knowing the obligations of France toward Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to bring about such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not call in question the existence of the Serbian kingdom, we are of opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more sincerely support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Serbia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to infringe upon the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."

Mr. Fay, in The American Historical Review, has dealt very faithfully with the documents referring to Russian mobilization, and his analysis of the orders of the military authorities proves conclusively that Russia was to blame for beginning the war. The perfidy of the Russian military chiefs has been exposed to the world, and no doubt General Sukhomlinov will be known to posterity as "the man who lied to the Czar." At his trial he admitted that much. That, however, is no reason why the Czar himself should be exonerated from blame. That poor weak-
minded, wretched creature in his telegrams to his
cousin, Welhelm, did not tell the truth, if one can
rely upon the statements that were circulated in Eng-
land at the beginning of the war by persons who
were in St. Petersburg during the last week of July.
The telegrams from the Times's correspondent in St.
Petersburg do not agree with the statements made by
the Czar:

St. Petersburg, July 27th.

"The Czar left tonight on his trip to the Fin-
nish Skerries. Now that matters appear to have
become calmer it may not be amiss to quote a
sentence used by the Czar at the close of the
Grand Council on Saturday (25th): 'We have
stood this sort of thing,' he said, 'for seven and
a half years. This is enough.' Thereupon his
Majesty authorized the issue of orders for a par-
tial mobilization confined to the fourteen Army
Corps on the Austrian frontier. At the same
time an intimation was given to Germany that
orders for the mobilization of the remainder of
the Russian Army would follow immediately
upon mobilization by Germany."

On July 29th, Reuter's Petersburg correspondent
telegraphed: "Confident of England's support, about
which doubts have mostly disappeared, the Russian
public is prepared to accept war."

Peace never had a chance. No matter how much
Austria was to blame for her obstinacy and stupidity
in not accepting the Serbian reply, Russia's interвен-
tion on behalf of Serbia not only complicated the
whole European situation, because of the secret alli-
ances, but jeopardized anything that was attempted
in the way of seeking a peaceful solution.

The action taken from the earliest by the German
Foreign Office in connection with the dispute between
Austria and Serbia is now pretty clear from the doc-
uments that have been published. It is also clear
that on July 26th Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to
the German Ambassadors at London, Paris and St.
Petersburg that “Austria having officially declared to
Russia that she had no intention to acquire new terri-
tory, nor to touch the existence of the kingdom of
Serbia, the decision as to an European war rests
solely with Russia, which has to bear the entire
responsibility.” That was quite a correct view of
the situation. On the 27th of July, Bethmann-Holl-
weg had not received news of the suggestion made
by Grey of a conference of the four Powers to be
held in London, but the German Chancellor that day
urged Berchtold that Sazonov desired a direct ex-
change of views between Russia and Austria. Hos-
tilities had, however, opened between Austria and
Serbia, and Berchtold considered Grey’s proposal of
a conference had come too late. Still, conversations
were proceeding between Austria and Russia when
the effect of Russian mobilization against Austria
jeopardized the whole business.

The true course of diplomatic negotiations as they
passed in Vienna between the 28th and 30th of July
is recorded in the report of Sir Maurice de Bunsen,
British Ambassador at Vienna, dated London, Sep-
tember 1st, 1914. He says:

“M. Schebeko (Russian Ambassador in Vienna)
endeavored on the 28th of July to persuade the
Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count
Szapary (Austrian-Hungarian Ambassador at St.
Petersburg) with full powers to continue at St.
Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had
there been taking place between the latter and
M. Sazonov. Count Berchtold refused at the
time, but two days later (30th July), though in
the meantime Russia had. partially mobilized
against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again
in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko (Russian Ambassador at Vienna) that Count Szapary (Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg) had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonov that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Serbian independence. M. Sazonov, Mr. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Serbia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff (Austrian Ambassador at London) to the effect that Austria had neither “banged the door” on compromise nor cut off the conversations. M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was using the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach (Austro-Hungarian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise. Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut
short by the transfer of the dispute to the more
dangerous ground of a direct conflict between
Germany and Russia."

Although Austria took a long time to accept all the
proposals of the Powers for mediation, in the end
she conceded everything, as Sir Maurice de Bunsen
proves, and everything that she conceded was wholly
in Russia's favor, the Power which meant war from
the first, and the Power that had backed Serbia in
all her negotiations. It was Russia, not Austria nor
Germany, that drew France, Britain and Belgium into
a catastrophe through the secret agreements entered
into by the military and naval staffs of the Entente
Powers. Dispatch No. 113 from the British Amba-
assador in St. Petersburg to Grey says that Russia
decided to issue orders for general mobilization July
31, the general mobilization that had been making
rapid progress against the frontiers of Germany and
Austria since July 25th. When it was known in
Berlin that the order for general mobilization of the
Russian forces had been issued, the German Govern-
ment sent an imperative dispatch to Russia saying
that full mobilization would follow Russia's, if she
did not within twelve hours stop the military meas-
ures she was taking against Germany and Austria,
and, with full knowledge of the terms of the Franco-
Russian military Convention of August 17th, 1892,
Germany gave France eighteen hours to determine
whether she would remain neutral in a Russo-Ger-
man war. If Russia made any reply to Germany's
request it never reached Berlin. France gave no
definite reply, but said she would do what she con-
sidered best in her interests. On August 1st, at five
p. m., the time given to Russia having expired, Ger-
many ordered a mobilization of her entire army and
navy, just about the time when Russian troops crossed
the frontier and invaded German territory.
The way the Russian torrent poured into East Prussia amazed everybody. Memel was attacked on August 3rd, and on August 7th Rennenkampf's main army crossed the German frontier at Suwalki. After a battle, which raged heavily for four days, the Germans were defeated at Gumbinnen on the 20th. The next day, at Frankenau and Orlau, the Russians were victorious, and by the 25th Russia occupied all of East Prussia as far west as the Vistula. No wonder people in Paris and London spoke of the Russian steamroller being in Berlin before Christmas.

VIII.

The British and French military authorities had a deeper appreciation of the strategic value of Belgium, in both a political and military sense, than most of the British cabinet. In a military sense, the River Meuse was considered to be the British frontier. The military authorities also knew that in a war between France and Germany, Belgian territory would have to be used as the avenue through which the armies must pass to attack each other. No one was so conscious of this fact as the Belgian Government, and so sure were they that there was a prospect of war affecting their territory that M. Davignon, the Belgian Foreign Minister, as early as July 24th, the day when the Austrian note was presented to Serbia, sent an undated circular to the Belgian Ambassadors saying:

"All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have
been put in a state of defence.” (Belgian Diplomatic Documents.)

Everything was done by the Belgian Government to protect its eastern frontier, and there the Belgian army was concentrated, not in the west, where Belgium might have been invaded by France or Britain. The first time Grey communicated with Brussels was on July 31st (dispatch No. 115):

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

“In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European War, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

“You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.”

In recording the visit of the British Ambassador to the Belgian Foreign Office, M. Davignon said: “The British Minister asked to see me on urgent business and made the following communication, which he had hoped for some days to be able to present to me.” Further on, in the same document, M. Davignon says: “In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis (British Ambassador) seemed to be somewhat surprised at the speed at which we had decided to mobilize our army.” The British Ambassador evidently did not know of the circular note, which had been issued to the Belgian Ambassadors, to be communicated to the Governments of the guaranteeing Powers, “should the danger of a war between France and Germany become imminent.” M. Davignon was a man of great sagacity, one who could look far into the future. He was indeed the only
diplomatist in Europe, of which we have record in the diplomatic documents published by the Powers, who realized that the integrity and independence of the State of Belgium stood in danger when the Austrian note was handed to Serbia. He did not bother about asking each Power whether it would respect the integrity and independence of Belgium; he went to work at once to prepare for war. He had no faith in the treaties of 1831 or 1839. Quite rightly so, for Belgium had learned in the '80's just how the matter of her neutrality stood. Perhaps it is worth reminding the reader of the controversies that took place in England during the '80's when the question of Belgium arose, owing to the likelihood of a Franco-German war. *The Spectator*, February 5th, 1887, said:

“The general idea is that England will be kept out of this war. . . . That she will try to do so we do not doubt, but there is the Belgian difficulty ahead. Our guarantee for her is not a solitary one, and would not bind us to fight alone; but there are general interests to be considered. The probability is that we shall insist on her not becoming a theater of war but shall not bar—as indeed we cannot bar—the traversing of her soil.”

Mr. W. T. Stead was the editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette* at the time this controversy arose, and in the issues of February 4th, and 5th, 1887, he dealt very thoroughly with the question of Belgian neutrality:

*The Standard* this morning gives special prominence to a letter signed “Diplomaticus” on the neutrality of Belgium. It also devotes its first leading article to the subject. The gist of these utterances may be summed up in two propositions: (1) England is under a treaty of obligation to defend the neutrality of Belgium; (2) but circumstances have altered since the contraction of the said obligation, and as against Germany,
at any rate, England must pocket its pledges and allow France to be invaded through Belgium without protesting or interfering.

Considerable importance is likely to be attributed to these conclusions abroad owing to its being understood that The Standard is at present the governmental Salisburian organ. Each of the propositions laid down by our contemporary is, it will be seen, likely to be taken hold of. Germany might read the second as an invitation to invade France through Belgium; France might read the first as an admission of our obligation to prevent, or rather to punish, such an infringement of neutral territory, if we dared.

It becomes important, therefore, to point out that The Standard's argument rests on a false assumption. We do not for the present argue whether in the contingencies contemplated it would be England's interest to intervene by declaring war against whichever belligerent might violate the neutrality of Belgium; we confine ourselves to the preliminary statement essential for clearing up the case—that it is not England's obligation to do so.

The origin of the mistaken views prevailing on the question is undoubtedly a confusion between the Special Treaty of 1831 and 1839 which is temporarily superseded. By the treaty of 1870 the obligation of England was, of course, clear and specific. Here is the pledge which was given in the identical treaties concluded mutatis mutandis with both France and Prussia:

"Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland declares that if during the said hostilities the armies of France (or Prussia) should violate the neutrality of Belgium, she will be prepared to co-operate with his
Prussian Majesty (or the Emperor of the French) for the defence of the same in such a manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to ensure its observance."

There could be no doubt about that pledge; but then it expired twelve months after the conclusion of peace. At the expiration of that period, so the treaty continued:

"The independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on the first article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839."

Now, what some people do is to read this treaty of 1839 by the light of the more specific treaty of 1870, and to deduce from the former the same obligation on the part of England to intervene against any infringement of Belgium's neutrality as was contained in the 1870 treaty.

This, however, is a completely untenable proceeding. The treaty of 1839 must stand on its own legs, and these, it will be seen, are by no means very strong. The following are the terms of its second article:

"His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, declare that the articles hereby annexed to the treaty concluded this day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, are considered as having the same force and value as if they were textually inserted in the present act."
and that they are thus placed under the guaran-
tee of their Majesties.”

Here, then, we are sent off from the treaty be-
tween the Great Powers to the treaty between
Belgium and the Netherlands. The seventh ar-
ticle of this treaty (which is identical with the
same article of the 1831 treaty) runs:

“Belgium will form, within the limits indicated
in 1, 2 and 4, an independent and perpetually
neutral State. She will be bound to observe this
same neutrality toward all other States.”

In this treaty it will be seen there is nothing
about any guarantee; all that can be elicited from
it, and from the one cited as referring to it,
is this, that this clause is placed under the guar-
tee of “their said Majesties,” that is, England,
Austria, France, Germany and Russia.

But that is not all. This constructive guaran-
tee must be considered in relation to the party to
whom it was given—namely to the Netherlands.
For the treaty of 1839 was one between the five
Powers on the one hand and the Netherlands on
the other; and what the five Powers did was to
guarantee to the Netherlands the treaty con-
tacted between it and Belgium, one clause of
which treaty said that Belgium should form “an
independent and perpetually neutral State,” and
should “be bound to observe such neutrality
toward all other States.”

In the treaty of 1831, it is true, there was a
further article guaranteeing the execution of all
preceding articles (including, therefore, the one
just cited in similar terms from the 1839 treaty)
on which the independence of Belgium is now
said to rest. Lord Palmerston omitted any such
guarantee.

There is, therefore, no English guarantee to
Belgium. It is possible, perhaps, to “construct” such a guarantee; but the case may be summed up as follows: (1) England is under no guarantee whatever except such as is common to Austria, France, Russia and Germany; (2) that guarantee is not specifically of the neutrality of Belgium at all; and (3) is given not to Belgium but to the Netherlands.”

Belgium, as a casus belli, was a pretext, thought of at the last moment; the question never came before the Cabinet until August 2nd, 1914. During the last week of July, international jurists of repute had shown that England, because she was a signatory of the so called Belgian Treaties of 1831 and 1839, was not bound to intervene in an European war. It might be well to quote here an authority deserving of great respect, one who cannot be accused of “apologizing for Germany,” and who, in his long diplomatic career, demonstrated frequently the kind of duty an upright man owes to civilization. Wilfred Scawen Blunt, in his book, “My Diaries,” puts the case with characteristic English candor:

“The real cause of the quarrel with Germany, I well knew, was no more honorable a one than that of a dread of a too powerful commercial rival and the fear of Kaiser Wilhelm’s forcing France, if we stood aside, into commercial alliance with him against us in the markets of the world—that and a gambler’s venture, almost desperate, seeing that we were without an army fit to take the field abroad and were dependent on the thousand-and-one chances of the sea for our daily bread at home. In this madness I would take no part.

“That these were the true causes of the War, and not the pretended altruistic ones, I have since
acquired a certain knowledge from one of its chief promoters.

"The obligation of fighting in alliance with France in case of a war with Germany concerned the honor of three members only of Asquith's Cabinet, who alone were aware of the exact promises that had been made. These, though given verbally and with reservations as to the consent of Parliament, bound the three as a matter of personal honor, and were understood at the Quai d'Orsay as binding the British nation. Neither Asquith nor his two companions in this inner Cabinet could have retained office had they gone back from their word in spirit or in letter. It would also doubtless have entailed a serious quarrel with the French Government had they failed to make it good. So clearly was the promise understood at Paris to be binding that President Poincaré, when the crisis came, had written to King George reminding him of it as an engagement made between the two nations which he counted on His Majesty to keep.

"Thus faced, the case was laid before the Cabinet, but was found to fail as a convincing argument for war. It was then that Asquith, with his lawyer's instinct, at a second Cabinet brought forward the neutrality of Belgium as a better plea than the other to lay before a British jury, and by representing the Neutrality Treaties of 1831 and 1839 as entailing an obligation on England to fight (of which the text of the treaties contains no word) obtained the Cabinet's consent and war was declared.

"This I have full reason to know was the true history of this astonishing venture, entered on by Asquith through a miscalculation of the military value of Russia, and saved only from supreme dis-
aster by the fighting tenacity of our ignorant boy soldiers, who believed what they were told, and throughout the War pretended that it was one for liberty waged in the defence of weak nations and to set the whole world free.”

Mr. Blunt not only knows Downing Street, he knows the class from which England’s statesmen and diplomats are chiefly drawn.

Let us turn now to the letters of the Belgian Ambassadors at London, Paris and Berlin. No professor of political science will go so far as to say that the Belgian Ambassadors in their letters sent before the war to the Belgian Foreign Office, were guilty of “apologizing for Germany.” Yet it is impossible after reading these documents to come to any conclusion other than that they were certain of the policy of encircling Germany being detrimental to the interests of Belgium, and that nothing but war could result from the business. Baron Greindl, Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, wrote, April 18th, 1907:

“Like the treaty of alliance with Japan, the Entente Cordiale with France, and the negotiations pending with Russia, the King of England’s visit to the King of Spain is one of the moves in the campaign to isolate Germany, that is being personally directed with as much perseverance as success by His Majesty, King Edward VII.”

M. Leghait, the Belgian Ambassador at Paris, wrote, March 6th, 1906, of the visit of Edward VII to Paris, and his fraternizing with M. Delcassé, after the latter’s downfall. M. Leghait says:

“Such a mark of courtesy to M. Delcassé at this moment has aroused much comment. It is generally regarded as an act of great significance; baffling, indeed, by reason of the possible extent and seriousness of its consequences.

“In diplomatic circles this demonstration is con-
sidered useless and very dangerous at this moment. In French circles it is not over well received; Frenchmen feeling that they are being dragged against their will in the orbit of English policy, a policy whose consequences they dread, and which they generally condemned by throwing over M. Delcassé.

"In short, people fear that this is a sign that England wants so to envenom the situation that war will become inevitable."

Baron Guillaume, the Belgian Ambassador at Paris, wrote, July 2nd, 1911, at the time of the Agadir crisis:

"M. Jaures is triumphant today. He had all along blamed the Government for involving themselves in a bad business in Morocco, and maintained that there was never any necessity for going to Fez, and that the advance of the French army might become a source of serious embarrassments. There can today be no question that the attitude of the French Government brought about—or at least made possible—the Spanish landing at Larash, and the dispatch of a German man-of-war to Agadir."

A letter from Baron Guillaume to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated March 3rd, 1913, is of extraordinary interest, inasmuch as it refers to a conversation the Baron had in Paris with the German Ambassador:

"On Saturday the German Ambassador said to me: 'The political situation has greatly improved during the last forty-eight hours. There is an all round decrease in tension; a speedy restoration of peace is to be hoped for. But one thing has not improved, and that is the state of public opinion in France and Germany with respect to the relations between the two countries. On our side people are convinced that the spirit of chau-
vinism being aroused once more in France, a French attack is to be feared. In France they profess to have the same fear with regard to us. The result of these misunderstandings will be a common ruin. I do not know where this perilous path is going to lead us. Is there no man to be found who has sufficient good will and sufficient prestige to appeal to the common sense of all parties? The whole thing is the more absurd, because throughout the whole of the crisis through which we have been passing, both Governments have given evidence of the most peaceful sentiments and have intensely supported each other in order to avoid occasions of conflict.'

"Baron von Schoen is quite right. I am not in a good position to scrutinize public opinion in Germany, but I realize every day the growth of a feeling of suspicion and chauvinism in France. "Everybody you meet tells you that an early war with Germany is certain and inevitable. It is regretted, but acquiesced in. People demand the immediate, one might say, the jubilant passage of any measure calculated to increase France's defensive strength. The most reasonable people maintain that France must arm herself to the teeth, in order to terrify her opponent and so prevent war."

These extracts taken from the letters of the Belgian Ambassadors are an indication of the thought prevalent in the chancelleries before the war. Mr. E. D. Morel, in "Diplomacy Revealed," has given us these letters, and has provided much data explaining the references in them, at the same time supplying the reader with an impartial commentary on military and naval and other diplomatic developments going on in Europe from the time of the signing of the Anglo-French Agreement.
The military conversations that were carried on in Brussels between the Chief of the Belgian General Staff and the English Military Attaché, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston, with the approval of Major General Grierson have been dealt with in so many works that it is unnecessary to do more than to refer to the matter. It is clear that there was an understanding among the principals of the British, French and Belgian Staffs, and for anyone to say that the Belgian Government was surprised at the action of Germany is absurd in the light of the information which has been made public in many volumes since the armistice.

Marshal Joffre on the witness stand, before the Metallurgic Committee in Paris, stated that all forces were to be engaged simultaneously, adding that a military convention with Great Britain existed, the terms of which were secret, but nevertheless the aid of six British divisions was counted upon, and also the support of the Belgians.

The result of it all seems to be that Tallyrand’s desire to have Belgium under French control has come about, for the Franco-Belgian Military Treaty, recently concluded, places England, the Entente notwithstanding, in the very position that Palmerston sought to avoid by making the treaties of 1831 and 1839. So in considering it a duty to civilization that German arms should be overthrown, we are brought face to face with the very situation which was a nightmare to Canning and Palmerston, and, what is worse, nothing whatever has been done to reduce the armaments of Europe’s greatest military Power, or those of her greatest naval Power.

IX.

There may be large numbers of folk who believe that it is too late now to reopen the case of how the war originated, because the German Government has
accepted the terms of indemnity imposed by Lloyd George and Briand. This would be taking a rather short-sighted view of the matter, though it would, of course, be in line with the procedure usually adopted. Such a course has, however, many drawbacks. In the first place it would leave nothing settled, and in the second it would most assuredly be a means of fostering a revanche party by the chauvinists in Germany. Then there is to be considered the attitude of the serious historian who will deal with this matter with cold impartial application, and leave no stone unturned that will disclose new facts. Already we hear from many lands that historians are at work on this job.

There are many institutions and periodicals in European countries that are giving information to the public that would utterly confound our leaders of thought if they read them. Take for instance the work done by the editors of *Foreign Affairs*, the English publication. It records regularly the findings of European investigators of repute, and produces the documents as they are gathered for examination. Besides there are the Union of Democratic Control, with its international branches, and the “Société d'études critiques et documentaires sur la guerre,” to mention only two at work with headquarters in England and France. The truth will out no matter what some professors of political science in American universities may think of the expediency of it. These men will soon learn that they must put out of their minds all the chief points given to them by war-propagandists in the Official Entente case against Germany. The Potsdam Council did not take place; Mr. Fay, in his articles in the *American Historical Review*, has exposed that preposterous legend. They must also put out of their minds the idea that the ex-Kaiser deliberately planned this
war, and that he and his Government instigated Austria to measures that would bring about European conflagration. Another notion put into their heads by the minions of "Crewe House" was that Britain went to war to defend the rights of small nations. That must go to limbo, and with it must go the notion that the war began when the Germans violated Belgian territory on August 4th, 1914; and every idea about the mobilization of the various armies, cultivated by the war-propagandists of the Entente Allies, must be rejected as utterly fallacious.

There will, notwithstanding the information that is now abroad as to the origins of this war, remain in the minds of some professors of political science, all the stories wrought from the frenzied imagination of partisans, who after the war, began retailing fictions which beat anything attributed to Baron Munchausen and de Rougemont. These "revelations" had, of course, nothing whatever to do with the origins of the war; still the case against Germany was, so far as the general public was concerned, largely based on them.

American leaders of thought must know that the Germans, in preparing for the struggle, did not place concrete foundations for their heavy guns in Belgium, the Pas de Calais, and Brixton. Mr. Buchan, the English official historian of the war, laid that yarn. There were no angels at Mons. The British nurse whose breasts were mutilated by German soldiers, according to the hallucination of her sister, was not on the continent at the time the alleged deed was done, and this was proved at the hearing of the case which took place before the Lord President of the Council at Edinburgh. "Little Alf's postage stamp," which when removed disclosed the statement in writing that his tongue had been cut out, was another fiction run to earth by Canon Peter
Green of Manchester Cathedral. The story of the crucified soldier was another figment of the imagination of some journalistic Munchausen, and was denied by General Marsh at Washington; yet, that yarn served its purpose as the basis of a war-propaganda drama, which had the blessing of Woodrow Wilson; and so on with 99 per cent of the particular atrocity sensations retailed in the press, and circulated by platform patriots. Of course, there are "Black and Tans" in every army, and this war was attended with as much military atrocity as any that ever took place. There is no denying that, but what has that got to do with its origin? Anyway, what is the good of the leaders of thought getting indignant about the atrocities of the enemy army, while they overlook the atrocities perpetrated by other armies? It is difficult to catch the sound of protests that are rising from American leaders of thought at the atrocities that have been perpetrated since the armistice!

I do not hear the pulpits of the land ringing with denunciatory terms at what has taken place in Ireland, Rhineland, India, Egypt and Hayti. I cannot remember hearing very much from the American leaders of thought at what took place in South Africa and in the Philippines. Well, perhaps these things were not brought so vividly to their notice as the crucified soldier incident was. Were they really sincere in their complaints against the atrocities attributed to the enemy soldiers in this war? Frankly, they were not, for they, themselves, neither took the trouble to investigate the cases, nor would they tolerate such a course when undertaken by others.

The Bryce Commission was to them all embracing and final, yet the Bryce Commission did not deal with one single case of atrocity that was retailed for the purpose of inflaming the worst instincts of the people.
When American leaders of thought reveal the desire to put an end to wars and all their atrocities, then the purpose of the Bryce Commission will have some value, and may be used as a means of saving mankind from the horrors of warfare.

British Radicals have a clear record as to this matter, as anyone who can remember their actions during the time of the Boer War can well understand. All through the period of this war, though their sensibilities were outraged over and over again by such incidents as the loss of the Lusitania, the sinking of hospital ships, and air raids over their country, they never lost sight of the fact that it was warfare that was going on. But, of course, they were raised in another school, and they were familiar with the notions of their own militarists. They knew quite well when the Lusitania, an Admiralty designed and Government subsidized vessel, carrying ammunition, was sunk, that it was done according to the tenets of Lord Fisher himself, who had the brutal courage to say, when he heard of the retirement of Admiral Tirpitz: "I'd have done the same myself, only our idiots in England wouldn't believe it when I told them." (See "Memories," p. 31.)

A few weeks before the war began, a controversy took place between Lord Sydenham and Admiral Sir Percy Scott on the use of the submarine against merchant vessels in war time. In a letter to the Times on July 16th, 1914, Admiral Sir Percy Scott cited this extract from a letter of a foreign naval officer: "If we went to war with an insular country depending for its food on supplies from overseas, it would be our business to stop that supply. On the declaration of war we would notify the enemy that she should warn those of her merchant ships coming home not to approach the island as we were establishing a blockade of mines and submarines. Simi-
larly we should notify all neutrals that such a blockade had been established, and that if any of their vessels approached the island they would be liable to destruction, either by mines or submarines, and therefore would do so at their own risk.” This is Sir Percy Scott’s comment upon that forecast of future action: “Such a proclamation would, in my opinion, be perfectly in order, and once it had been made, if any British or neutral ships disregarded it, they could not be held to be engaged in peaceful avocations, and if they were sunk in the attempt, it could not be described as a relapse into savagery or piracy in its blackest form.”

Moreover, it should not be forgotten that it was Lord Fisher, himself, who says that he made a memorandum in 1902, when he was Commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, that “for a purpose unnecessary to be detailed here, it is absolutely obligatory for us to have ‘offensive floating mines’ instantly for war against Germany.” (“Records,” page 223.)

There is indeed not one matter of consequence that has been raised by the war-propagandists in connection with the conduct of this war that has not been considered over and over again, long indeed before American leaders of thought became immersed in the way in which German militarists were said to have conducted this war. Consider all those points that were raised in connection with the conduct of the military authorities of the German army in Belgium, and how Professor, now Brigadier General, John Morgan, in his work, “The German War Book,” gave a lead to Entente leaders of thought in holding up the authors of German military law; the men, by the way, that Lord Haldane accepted as guides in his work of preparing the British Expeditionary Force, as horrible examples of barbarians. Perhaps it is not known to some professors of political sci-
ence that there is little or no difference to be found in the British War Book, "The Laws and Usages of War," and the German "Kriegsbuch." I should like to quote from an article which appeared in the London New Age, May 20th, 1915, called "Advocatus Diaboli—The Policy of 'Moral Indignation,'" by C. H. Norman, an English radical. This is what he says:

"As with the British moral indignation about Germany's breaches of international law, so it is with the bitter complaints of German military methods; there is equally little substance in the criticisms. In reading through The Laws and Usages of War, published by the British War Office in 1914, one is struck with its similarity to the German Kriegsbuch, in the clauses dealing with the Occupation of Enemy Territory. The following sections are from The Manual of Military Law, published by the British War Office in 1914: (357) The occupant can claim certain services from the inhabitants, and may impose upon them such restrictions as he judges necessary. He can, under certain conditions, use, requisition, seize and destroy their property, and they may, in various other ways, have to suffer under the effects of the war. (362) Political laws and constitutional privileges are, as a matter of course, suspended during occupation; for instance, the laws affecting recruitment, those concerning suffrage, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, and the freedom of the press. (370) The inhabitants of occupied territory expose themselves to the punishments for war treason in case they contribute to funds which enable their legitimate government to prosecute the war. (372 and 423) The occupant may raise money by contribution. Cash, over and above
taxes, may be requisitioned from the inhabitants and is then called a 'contribution.' (378) Public worship must be permitted and religious convictions respected. If the salaries of the clergy are paid by the State they must be continued. The clergy must refrain from reference to politics, and if they use their position to incite the population to resistance or revolt, they may be dealt with as war criminals. When one recollects the uproar there was in this country because Cardinal Mercier was placed under detention in consequence of his pastoral to the Belgian people, one is surprised that so many prominent politicians, who must have known the military rule on this subject, should have lent themselves to that absurd demonstration. The Cardinal was dealt with somewhat leniently from the British militarist standard. (386) If, contrary to the duty of the inhabitants to remain peaceful, hostile acts are committed by individual inhabitants, a belligerent is justified in requiring the aid of the population to prevent their recurrence and, in serious and urgent cases, in resorting to reprisals. (414) The custom of war permits as an act of reprisal the destruction of a house by burning or otherwise, whose inmates, without possessing the rights of combatants, have fired on the troops. (458) Although collective punishment of the population is forbidden for the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible, it may be necessary to resort to reprisals against a locality or community for some act committed by its inhabitants or members who cannot be identified. In a footnote the editors give this interesting example of the futility of certain kinds of reprisals re prisoners: 'In 1813, the British Gov-
ernment having sent to England to be tried for treason twenty-three Irishmen naturalized in the United States, who had been captured on vessels of the United States, Congress authorized the President to retaliate. Under this act, General Dearborn placed in close confinement twenty-three prisoners taken at Fort George. General Prevost, under the express direction of Lord Bathurst, ordered the close imprisonment of double the number of commissioned and non-commissioned United States officers. This was followed by a “threat of unmitigated severity against American citizens and villages” in case the system of retaliation was pursued. Mr. Madison retaliated by putting into confinement a similar number of British officers taken by the United States. General Prevost immediately retaliated by subjecting to the same discipline all his prisoners. A better temper, however, soon came over the British Government, by whom the system had been instituted, and the prisoners were released on both sides.’ Perhaps Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Asquith will study that incident in regard to the fatuity of the differential treatment of submarine prisoners of war.

“A second example of reprisals is thus stated in a footnote by the editor: ‘In his proclamations of May 31, June 16, and June 19, 1900, Field Marshal Lord Roberts threatened reprisals for wanton damage to property and damage to railway and telegraph lines by the burning of the houses and farms in the vicinity of the places where the damage was done.’ In a pamphlet on The War in South Africa (1900) and How It Is Being Carried On, signed An Officer in the Field, some of these orders are set out: (1) If occupants of farms are disloyal, or have
fathers and sons still serving against us, the cattle and stock are to be seized without payment or receipts. (2) While giving protection to loyal inhabitants in his district the general officer commanding will see that the country is so denuded of forage and supplies that no means of subsistence is left for any commands attempting to make incursions. Another proclamation ran thus: (1) The principal residents of the towns and districts are to be held jointly and severally responsible for the amount of damage done in their district. (2) Heavy fines are to be inflicted and the receipts for all goods taken by the troops to be cancelled. (3) The principal residents may be forced to travel on the trains. (4) The houses and farms in the vicinity of the places where the damage is done are to be destroyed, and the residents in the neighborhood dealt with according to martial law. The consequence of this sort of conduct was put thus by the writer of the pamphlet: In England, people are astonished at the mobility which enables DeWet to defy all the efforts of our generals; but they would cease to wonder if, for instance, they could see the march of a column of the Imperial Light Horse, with its endless array of wagons and vehicles of all sorts, piled up with the contents of Boer houses, beds, chairs, tables. All things that can be removed are carried away, and not by this corps alone, but Canadians, New Zealanders, Yeomanry; all pursue the same game. Such proceedings are a sad commentary on the Peace Conference at the Hague. The writer then describes the effect of this warfare upon the Boer women: Some went to Kaffir huts to beg from their former servants; some came to the camps suppliants for food. When women
live on the charity of a camp, it is needless to
describe to what depths of infamy necessity soon
reduces them. . . . That we should force the sur-
render of our enemies by starving their children
and degrading their wives and daughters is surely
a barbarity that no European nations would be
guilty of at the end of the nineteenth century
of the Christian era. So the Germans have some
way to travel still upon the road marked out by
some British militarists! The conclusion of this
pamphlet is rather sinister, in its warning note,
in view of the present critical state of Europe:
‘I am convinced that ruthless destruction of prop-
erty and the deliberate exposure of women and
children to horrors worse than those of the bat-
tlefield will draw sooner or later the vengeance
of God on the perpetrators. An Empire built
on such deeds cannot last, and we may well trem-
ble to think that an emissary may soon be selected
from among the nations to devastate as an aveng-
ing angel the homes of England.’

‘To continue the extracts from the Handbook
of Military Law: (434) General devastation of
enemy territory is, as a rule, absolutely prohib-
ited, and only permitted very exceptionally when
it is imperatively demanded by the necessities of
war. The question in what circumstances a ne-
cessity arises cannot be decided by any hard and
fast rule. For instance, in the case of a levee
en masse on already occupied territory, when self-
preservation compels a belligerent to resort to
the most severe measures, a general devastation
might be absolutely necessary. (408) No dam-
age may be done that is not required by military
operations, but even total destruction of prop-
erty is justifiable if it is required by the exigen-
cies of war. (392) Services for legitimate pur-
poses may, if necessary, be obtained by force, and the refusal to work may be met by punishment. (411) Neither can rent be claimed for the use of property, nor compensation for damage caused by the necessities of war. (437) As war is the last remedy of Governments for injuries, no means would appear to exist for enforcing reparation for violations of the laws of war. Which certainly sounds good sense! (450) All war crimes are liable to be punished by death, but a more lenient penalty may be pronounced. (462) Use has, in recent times, been made of hostages by placing prominent inhabitants on the engines of trains, on the lines of communication in occupied territory for the purpose of ensuring the traffic from interruption by the native population.

"Two other clauses which are curiously interesting, in view of certain occurrences during the present war, are Nos. 33 and 38: (33) Should some inhabitants of a locality take part in the defence, it might be justifiable to treat all the males of a military age as prisoners of war. (38) Troops formed of colored individuals belonging to savage tribes and barbarous races should not be employed in a war between civilized States. The enrolling, however, of individuals belonging to the civilized colored races and the employment of whole regiments of disciplined colored soldiers is not forbidden. The Austrian Red Book on the atrocities of the Allies complains bitterly of the breach of the first part of No. 38 in the employment of the Gurkhas and the Turcos. No doubt Britain and France would defend their enrollment under the second part of No. 38; but the Gurkhas and the Turcos could hardly be described as civilized races as the practice of both
is that of mutilation. However, enough has been quoted to indicate that the practical differences between German militarism and British militarism are somewhat difficult to detect. It is always the custom in war to accuse the other side of atrocities and infractions of the rules of the game; but it looks as though this were done to embitter the confiding civilians of the various bellicerent States."

The way the "moral indignation" crew wrote and talked about the enemy in this war must have impressed a great many people with the idea that war had never been waged before. It was rather amazing to find so many English liberals, who in less than twenty years had forgotten the incidents of the South African War, which had filled them with loathing; it is difficult to account for that extraordinary change of front in men who supported Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, when he denounced the British Government as conducting the war against the Boers with "methods of barbarism."

Can anyone read the pages of General Christian Rudolf DeWet's "Three Years War" (Scribners), or Sir Francis Vane's "Pax Britannica," and believe that any decent-minded English speaking citizen could be a party to the propaganda campaigns set in motion during this war for the sole purpose of confusing the issue and traducing the enemy? Yet, numbers did it, and now when the truth is known, I am sorry to say, there are numbers who are not ashamed of their actions. When one's duty to civilization leads in the direction of making war worse than it is for the sake of stimulating patriotism to the point of hysteria, then it is time for some one to reconsider the meaning of the word "duty" and find another definition for the term "civilization."

I can, however, respect the action of a man who,
without humbug, announces courageously that he supports his country right or wrong. I can understand such a person, but I cannot for the life of me understand a person who works up his moral indignation to a frenzy against the enemy's war, and takes no steps to denounce his country's war. Was it not Charles Gide, the well known French economist and jurist, who said: "It is the duty of every man living on this earth to weigh in a just balance the responsibility for this frightful massacre, to rise above his sympathies and his interests." I would commend this appeal to American leaders of thought, who, loathing war in the abstract, never took the trouble during the war to test the authenticity of the evidence supplied by the official war-propagandists.

Can any useful purpose be served by reopening the question of who was responsible for the war? I admit it is difficult to impress people with the necessity of doing this, for men as a rule do not like to admit that they have been humbugged, that they have lent their support to something that was not right. Furthermore, vast numbers of people are sick to death of the war, and do not want to learn anything more about it. They have lost so much physically, mentally and spiritually that they are only too glad to turn their attention in other directions. I recognize all this, but there is Europe, and the European political system remains, and so long as it remains the peace of the world is in danger.

Secret diplomacy was more rampant during the war than at any time that preceded it, and since the Armistice secret diplomacy has over and over again been the cause of nearly setting the Allies at one another's throats. Moreover, armaments today are a far greater burden to the peoples of France. Great Britain and America than they were at the time of the outbreak of the war. Then it did seem to some
people that the time would shortly come when the peoples of Europe would demand disarmament, but now the making of armaments as a business has drawn in tens of thousands of workmen, whose livelihood depends upon the maintenance of the system, and therefore the question is just that much harder to deal with.

Both Gladstone and Bismarck said that the wresting of Alsace and Lorraine from France in 1870 would be the cause of another war. Gladstone said: "I have an apprehension that this violent laceration and transfer is to lead us from bad to worse, and to be the beginning of a new series of complications.” Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador at Paris, recorded an opinion of Thiers, who, after a visit in 1870 to the Prussian headquarters, found “that there was a political party and a military party, each clearly defined. The political party, with which Count Bismarck himself in a great measure agreed, was desirous of bringing the war to an end by concluding peace on comparatively moderate terms. The military party held that the glory of the Prussian arms and the future security of Germany demanded that the rights of war should be pushed to the uttermost, and that France should be laid waste, ruined and humiliated to such a degree as to render it impossible for her to wage war again with Germany for very many years.” It was the military party in Prussia that was responsible for the peace terms in 1870.

The military party of the Entente Allies was responsible for the peace terms exacted after the armistice. Now, if the peace of 1870 was a danger to Europe, what sort of a danger to the world is the peace of Paris? Is there a man so purblind as to dream of the utter annihilation of chauvinism in all shape and form in Germany and Austria? He must be a particularly sanguine citizen who can rest con-
tent with such an idea, so long as the peace of Paris is based on the idea that Germany was wholly responsible for the war. The only way another European conflagration, or indeed a world conflagration can be averted, is by facing the ugly facts which confront us in connection with the origins of this war, and admit, like men who desire to live in peace and amity, that we were wrong where we were wrong, and that an entirely new peace should be made. That is the first step towards destroying the European political system, and it is futile for anyone to think that progressive steps can be taken in the direction of disarmament and the avoidance of wars in the future until this step has been taken.