

# HATE

## THE ENEMY OF PEACE

A Reply to Lord Vansittart

By

FRANCIS NEILSON

1944

6-1490

*By the same author:*

HOW DIPLOMATS MAKE WAR (also in Swedish,  
German and French)

DUTY TO CIVILIZATION (also in German)

THE OLD FREEDOM

MAN AT THE CROSSROADS

THE TRAGEDY OF EUROPE (3 vols.)

**D**URING THE PAST forty years or more I have been occupied with the task of trying to find the reason for the unrest in Europe. Coming from Radical stock—English on my father's side and Scottish on my mother's—I became indoctrinated early in my youth with the Cobdenite policy of Peace, Retrenchment and Reform. Therefore, it was not strange that, when in 1897 I returned from America to the land of my birth, I should take a keen interest in British politics, although my vocation then was the stage (as an actor and a producer of plays).

In this long period, for the sole purpose of understanding the activities of the British imperialist in world affairs I have consistently read their books, striving, while doing so, to separate their political ambitions for the empire from their social power in England. Perhaps I have read more unscrupulous volumes in this quest than any other man. Indeed, I have never met anyone who revealed to me that he had been over half the ground I have traveled in pursuit of this aim.

But the most unscrupulous work it has ever been my fate to peruse is *Lessons of my Life* by Lord Vansittart, and I think I deserve a medal for my perseverance in going through it from cover to cover. Curiously enough, all the data that he sets out have been answered over and over again, and replies may be found in much of the literature written by reputable men of France and Great Britain in the years that followed the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. Moreover, the authors of the tragedy of 1914-18 and many of their satellites have left to us in their memoirs enough refutation of the charges made by Vansittart to satisfy any hard-boiled skeptic with a vestige of impartiality in his make-up.

I think so little of the influence of Vansittart in Great Britain, and here, that I would not waste a moment in exposing the man's irrationality, if it were not for the urgent request from friends to deal with his book. It is pointed out to me that several reviews by singularly uninformed critics have appeared in our newspapers. I have seen some of these, notably one in *The New York Times* and another in *The Chicago Sun*. These reviews, so my friends think, might poison the atmosphere and irritate the millions of people in this country who are of German lineage and who have, since the beginning of this war, supported Great Britain against Hitler. In this respect the short-sightedness of Vansittart is so obvious that one would think Lord Halifax himself would be conscious of it and call a halt to the propaganda that is making things extremely difficult for a large proportion of the citizens of this country. Therefore, to oblige my friends I shall undertake to show that Vansittart in this book, *Lessons of my Life*, is not only an author who wilfully sets out to give an utterly false account of what has happened, but that, at the same time, he is a person unworthy of the respect of decent-minded people, in remaining at the Foreign Office as Chief Political Adviser during the period of Chamberlain's policy of alleged appeasement.

I

**T**HERE IS UNFORTUNATELY a class of people in every country who will swallow wholesale such screeds as Vansittart's. However, they are folks who never take the trouble to investigate for themselves the statements upon which they feed. Their actions are stimulated by hate. They cannot tell you why they hate, they just do it, as if it were a part of the day's business. This class is comparatively a very small one indeed.

Its activity affects rich and poor and all the intermediate stages of well-being alike. Yet it has an influence upon opinion which is supported during a war by many of the pulpits, most of the newspapers, nearly all the films devoted to war yarns; and even the governments give tacit consent to the horror of the work. It is, therefore, necessary to remind people from time to time that the great mass is only temporarily affected by this detestable form of propaganda. After the last war both the British and the American people, when they were given time to think, revealed in many ways that they were utterly disgusted with the methods adopted by the propaganda departments for the sole purpose of making them hate the enemy. The bellicose parsons found their churches emptying. Many of the editors confessed that they had lied to save their country from defeat. But the great magnates of the film industry looked at it purely and simply from the dollars and cents point of view, pocketed their profits and, unashamed, "flouted their ill-gotten gains in building new palaces in which they lived the lives of 'pigs in clover.'"

Now in this matter it is necessary for the American people to understand clearly that their British friends are not quite the fools Vansittart would have them believe. Two years after the Treaty of Versailles was signed, it was exceedingly difficult to find in Britain more than a handful of people who had not utterly rejected all the atrocity stories. The present Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, made a statement when he was secretary of the London Labor Party in 1920 which just about summed up what the majority of people thought of the situation. He said:

All the governments of all the warring nations deliberately deceived their citizens and their fighting men. They founded propaganda departments for this special purpose, paying men out of public funds to deceive their fellows by

the spoken and written word. The government suppressed truth, newspapers, books, and organizations, and imprisoned good men and true.

Few even at that early date would have taken exception to his statement.

No, the British people are not at all the numskulls Vansittart imagines they are! With all their faults, their history reveals that the ethics they practice in sport are those they are ready to apply to the enemy in war. There is such a deep sense of justice in the mind and soul of the British people that our American friends can be very sure of this: when the government can no longer justify holding the truth from them, they will insist upon having it. They did after the Boer War, they did after the last war, and, though they have had to endure the most awful calamities in this one, I feel certain that, when the day comes for them to review what has taken place, they will be just and the severities of their judgments will fall upon their own politicians who have led them into this shocking disaster.

I am frequently asked by people who are becoming more reflective, more seriously disturbed as the war proceeds, whether we are to make the same gross blunders when the fighting ends this time as we made in 1919. My reply is that, if the Vansittartites have their way, the blunders will be greater and the consequences more terrible. Lloyd George told us in the frankest manner that every desire he held for a decent peace was thwarted by those who inspired the hate propagandas and insisted upon a treaty of vengeance. We know now that he had good reason for making that excuse. Let us then beware.

Comparing the situation as it is today with that of Europe after the last armistice, we find a chaos in the world unimaginable to the mind of anyone who had anything to do with the conduct of the last war. The whole world is concerned in this struggle, and the fate of many

millions on every continent lies in the hands of a few men. Therefore, it is imperative that we should think of the people who are goaded in blind ignorance of their future to support schemes for reconstruction which they will repudiate at the first opportunity when they are free of the restraints under which they now live.

Let us make no mistake about the people who speak the English tongue. They will react after this war as they have done after every war. They will demand the truth, and they will get it, for of all western peoples they still remain the folk who are truly historically minded and, moreover, their records clearly show that there still abides in them the saving grace of revivalism. The book which has been for long centuries their storehouse of spiritual wisdom is still that to which they turn to learn the cause of their distress. The Bible still holds its place in the sanctuary of their inmost souls. Beware of the people who speak Wyclif's tongue! Let us think of them and the power that is born of their suffering.

## II

**B**EFORE COMING TO GRIPS with the matter in Vansittart's book, I ought to make it clear to the reader that he must understand the geographical position of Germany in Europe, sandwiched in between France on the west and Russia on the east. In 1902 Professor Rose in *Germany in the Nineteenth Century*, told us:

We who live behind the ramparts of the sea know little (except in times of panic) of the fear that besets a state which has no natural frontiers and which has to reckon with three great rival empires on its borders.

Just before World War I, Sir Thomas Barclay wrote in his book, *Thirty Years' Reminiscences* (April, 1914):

Wedged in between France and Russia, with England dominating all her issues to the outer world, her frontiers

open to all the political winds that blow, Germany has a geographical position which forces her statesmen to listen with an anxious ear to any movements, projects or combinations of her neighbours.

No one has described so clearly the position of Germany as Lloyd George in his famous speech given at the Queen's Hall, July 28, 1908:

Look at the position of Germany. Her army is to her what our navy is to us—her sole defense against invasion. She has not got a two-Power standard. She may have a stronger army than France, than Russia, than Italy, than Austria, but she is between two great Powers who, in combination, could pour in a vastly greater number of troops than she has. Don't forget that when you wonder why Germany is frightened at alliances and understandings and some sort of mysterious workings which appear in the press, and hints in the "Times" and "Daily Mail." . . . Here is Germany, in the middle of Europe, with France and Russia on each side, and with a combination of their armies greater than hers. Suppose we had here a possible combination which would lay us open to invasion—suppose Germany and France, or Germany and Russia, or Germany and Austria, had fleets which, in combination, would be stronger than ours, would not we be frightened? Would we not arm? Of course we should.

It is important to have this fixed in the mind because in not one of the works I have seen, which have come from the pens of British imperialists, can there be found reference to the facts as set out in this review. Ninety percent of the works I have read in support of the adventures of British imperialists deal with Germany as if France and Russia did not exist and as though the movement of Pan-Germanism was aimed directly and specifically against Great Britain. None of these authors seems to be aware of the historical background of the enmities that arose in Europe after the French fleet visited Kronstadt in 1892 and the Russian fleet visited Toulon in 1893.

The present war and the horrors of it have little or nothing to do with the story scattered through the pages

of *Lessons of my Life*. The basic material of the work is taken from "sources" which date from 1897, and it is used as a scaffolding for Vansittart's brief, which reaches completion when he became Political Adviser to the Foreign Secretary. The chief purpose of this book is to convince the unsophisticated reader that Germany built her navy for the sole intention of attacking Great Britain with a view to gaining world dominance.

Vansittart begins his story with the year 1897 when, as a youth of nineteen, he visited Germany for the first time. If he knew no more about what had happened in the preceding six years than he reveals in his book, then no wonder he sedulously gathered false impressions of the state of affairs. He says: "I expected to find a collection of blood brothers and good fellows. I found something very different—hatred, jealousy and the determination to destroy us." Further on he says:

The turning point in the history of the world came in the year 1897, that is, history as lived by working diplomacy, which is not always reflected in calculated diplomatic documents. *In that year Germany inwardly declared war on the world, and has never since ceased to do so . . . She saw . . . that she could not destroy us without possessing a huge fleet as well as the overwhelming army which she already possessed.* She therefore set about building this great navy, and to justify and popularise it she embarked upon a deliberate flood of Anglophobia, which has never abated from that day to this . . . (Italics mine)

Here we have the whole of the charge he makes against Germany. It has been pointed out over and over again that the turning point in the history of the world came at least six years before Vansittart set foot on German soil. And in *How Diplomats Make War* (published in 1915) I laid bare the story of how first, France and Russia, then afterwards, Great Britain combined to cripple Germany.

As I have always been utterly opposed to what is called

the European political and diplomatic system, I hold no brief for any Power in Europe, including the British Isles. As an English Radical, I am just as much opposed to German imperialism as I am to British imperialism, or the imperialism of any state in the world. I see no difference whatever between a French political parasite and a German political parasite; none at all between a British political parasite and a Japanese political parasite. Political parasites are the scourge of the world. They batten upon lowly paid labor and treat it with contumely. They cant and lie; they grab and squander the people's resources; they snarl and bite at any other Power that attempts to do what has been done before and will always be done so long as the producers of wealth are fools enough to support the parasites in their struggles for power.

I have been called pro-Boer and pro-German, but I have never in my life been called anti-English. There never was a fool who had the presumption to do that. If I am pro-anything I am pro-people, pro-those who labor daily to fill the larders that are kept pretty bare by the holders of place and power. My record is clear. I have never wavered in my allegiance to the common folk, although their stupidities arising from willful ignorance have sometimes bent my loyalty to them to the breaking point. I have kept my love for them because they are the salt of the earth and the downtrodden of their own kin who batten upon their labor.

And why not think of them? Most of my life has been lived among them. I have suffered with them, I have worked with them, I have tried, feebly enough, alas, to do what I could for them. Still, great revivals come from the mass, and those of English stock have risen from great travail to new heights of spiritual endeavor. There is still hope that another revival may come and

sweep away the whole crew of perverters of truth and goodness.

So the year 1897 is the one that Vansittart selects for the great change that took place. That was the year when I, too, visited Germany for the first time. Anton Seidl had been invited by Cosima Wagner to return to Bayreuth to conduct the performances of *Parsifal*, and he took me along with him after I resigned from William Gillette's company which was playing *Secret Service* in London. Vansittart, according to his description, must have walked into a nest of rabid Pan-Germans and was so unfamiliar with the ravings of his own people who belonged to the "All Red Route" gang that he was amazed at what he heard.

On my visit I did not venture to associate with such people. Indeed, I did not know there were such folk. At Bayreuth I found the greatest international gathering to be met anywhere in the world. There were the Princess of Wales (afterwards Queen Alexandra), great statesmen, the representatives of literature and art, and the leaders of society from all the different countries of Europe and America. I went everywhere with Seidl and met many of the people who entertained him. He was the lion of the occasion and did more to revive the old memories of the Festspielhaus than anyone, for was he not Wagner's secretary during the period when *Parsifal* was composed? Moreover, he had been the master's stage assistant at the rehearsals of *The Ring* when the new opera house was opened. In all the time I spent there, I never heard one word about politics, not one expression of criticism against England, and it seemed to me that European music might prove to be that for which Wagner had hoped: a talisman resolving the national antagonisms of European states. I found no rancor against England in Nuremberg or Cologne and, after a few days in Berlin, I wrote to Seidl telling him that I had been received by

his friends with warmth and that every courtesy had been shown to me.

The reason Vansittart selected the year 1897 is as plain as a pike staff. It was the Diamond Jubilee Year, when the great display of naval strength was assembled during the festivities to impress the continental Powers. It was in that year the German naval authorities became fully conscious that it was time for them to regard the naval preparations of her neighbors, France and Russia, with caution. Let us see what reason she had for suspecting their intentions. In 1887 the figures for naval expenditure of Britain, France, Russia, and Germany (according to a British White Paper) were as follows:

Britain .....	£12,375,000
France .....	8,452,000
Russia .....	4,352,000
Germany .....	4,179,000

There was no evidence then, in the figures of naval expenditure, of any threat against Great Britain nor, indeed, was Germany at that time prepared to deal with France and Russia combined. For the next five years political and diplomatic affairs went along fairly smoothly, but in 1892 the French fleet visited Kronstadt, and in 1893 the Russian fleet visited Toulon. Here we touch the period when everything changed in Europe, and in the year when Vansittart visited Germany for the first time we find what the combination of France and Russia against the central empire meant in the way of naval expenditure.

Britain .....	£21,972,000
France .....	10,444,000
Russia .....	6,239,000
Germany .....	6,467,000

It will be seen that Russia and France combined spent that year £10,000,000 more than Germany, and Germany knew of the secret military understanding that was then in force, which had been made between France and

Russia. Still, there is not the slightest evidence that Germany was building a navy to conquer Britain.

The following year, 1898, reveals in naval expenditure a sudden change in the German policy, which somewhat bewildered the naval war-mongers in England. The parliamentary return shows for that year the following:

Britain .....	£25,674,000
Germany .....	5,972,000

Would it not then have been just for a German to say Britain was building her navy to destroy Germany, for she was the only Power that was singled out as a danger to the British Empire? Why should it be criminal for the Germans to build and saintly for the British? But we have reached the period when naval expansion proceeded at a great rate. During the Boer War Great Britain was alone in a friendless world, and she knew it. Even France and Russia told her plainly what they thought about the deprivations in South Africa. Turning to the year 1904, at the close of the Boer War, we find the following expenditures:

Britain .....	£42,431,000
France .....	12,517,000
Russia .....	12,072,000
Germany .....	11,659,000

Here the difference between the expenditures of Britain and Germany amounted to more than £30,000,000.

Now compare the expenditure over the eleven years 1890-1901. In the former year the following amounts were spent:

France .....	£ 8,060,000
Russia .....	4,360,000
Germany .....	4,938,000

In 1901 the expenditures were:

France .....	£13,107,000
Russia .....	11,659,000
Germany .....	9,624,000

The combination of France and Russia against Germany in 1901 amounted to nearly £ 25,000,000 as against approximately £ 10,000,000. This was the position Germany had to face without taking into consideration what Great Britain had done. No wonder Admiral von Tirpitz, speaking in the Reichstag in 1909, said:

We should be in a position to blockade the Russian fleet in the Baltic ports, and to prevent at the same time the entrance to that sea of a French fleet. We must also protect our ports in the North Sea from blockade.

I have before me a White Paper issued in 1905 by the British Government showing the naval expenditure of the great maritime Powers of the world. Vansittart has overlooked this because it is one of the most illuminating pieces of evidence that can be found on the close co-operation in building navies, which started towards the end of the last century and was aimed directly against Germany. At the risk of repeating figures, let me set out one or two facts I find in this White Paper, which are startling to say the least. The respective amounts were as follows:

Year	Great Brit.	France	Russia	Germany	America
1890	£17,042,182	£8,125,929	£4,268,203	£3,939,869	£4,627,203
1901	33,726,491	13,107,701	11,659,766	9,624,956	16,012,438
1902	34,201,994	12,271,948	10,667,983	10,029,083	16,203,916
1903	38,970,560	12,538,861	12,349,567	10,252,014	16,824,058
1904	40,327,850	12,513,143	12,072,381	10,567,342	20,180,310

My purpose in producing these figures is to show not only the advances made by the opponents of Germany, in Europe, but to reveal the amazing rapidity of growth in expenditure by the United States. For, as I will point out later, the year 1897—Vansittart's starting point—was that of the secret understanding between the United States and Great Britain. America, with no possible adversary in the world, increased her expenditure in fourteen years from £4,627,203 to £20,180,310. This beats all records for increases in gross expenditure.

Now consider the combination against Germany. Great

Britain, France, Russia, and the United States in the year 1904 spent £85,093,684, while Germany in that year spent £10,567,342. Yet, Vansittart maintains that Germany was a bloodthirsty Power and from 1897 planned the destruction of British commerce and her navy. This is perhaps one of the blackest indictments against the lack of intelligence of the people who elect governments. Is it not incredible, at this time of day, after all the books written for the express purpose of exposing the growth of naval power, that Vansittart has the temerity to write as if there were not one intelligent person left to read his book!

Let us turn now to the naval power of the Triple Alliance. So little were the navies of Italy and Austria regarded as a menace, even in cooperation with Germany, that the early White Papers issued by the Government at the beginning of the century often ignored these two countries and, indeed, very rarely did a naval expert include the figures for either vessel-strength or general expenditure in comparing the navies according to the two-Power standard which England adopted and always far exceeded.

The *Navy League Annual* is a reliable source for checking the strength of the world's navies and the expenditure of the governments upon this arm of the forces. I find for the four years 1910-13 the following dreadnought and pre-dreadnought strength:

	1910	1911	1912	1913
British .....	48	52	60	67
German .....	22	25	29	37

If the combination of Powers is taken in the same class of ships, it will be seen that Britain and France, without Russia, had an enormous preponderance over the Triple Alliance:





noughts"); total, ten "Dreadnoughts" built and building, while Germany, in March last, had not begun even one "Dreadnought." It is doubtful if, even so late as May last, a German "Dreadnought" had been commenced. It will therefore be seen, from this one fact, what a liar Mr. Reich is.

Again, at page 86, he makes out the Germans are stronger than we are in torpedo craft, and states that England has only 24 fully commissioned Destroyers.

Again, what are the real facts? As stated in an Admiralty official document, dated August 22nd, 1907: "We have 123 Destroyers and 40 Submarines. The Germans have 48 Destroyers and 1 Submarine."

There is one more piece of information I have to give. Admiral Tirpitz, the German Minister of Marine, has just stated, in a secret official document, that the English Navy is now four times stronger than the German Navy. Yes, that is so, and we are going to keep the British Navy at that strength, *vide* ten "Dreadnoughts" built and building, and not one German "Dreadnought" commenced last May. But we don't want to parade all this to the world at large. Also we might have Parliamentary trouble. A hundred and fifty members of the House of Commons have just prepared one of the best papers I have ever read, showing convincingly that we don't want to lay down any new ships at all because we are so strong. My answer is: We can't be too strong. Sir Charles Dilke, in the *United Service Magazine* for this month, says: "Sir George Clarke points out that the Navy is now, in October, 1907, stronger than at any previous time in all History," and he adds that Sir George Clarke, in making this printed statement, makes it with the full knowledge of all the secrets of the Government, because, as Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, he, Sir George Clarke, has access to every bit of information that exists in regard to our own and foreign Naval strength.

I hope this review of naval expansion is sufficient to show that Germany had reason enough to be alarmed, and I also hope the figures show why Vansittart begins his story in 1897. The whole of his charge would have fallen to the ground if he had started eight years earlier. And it must be pointed out that the man knows this perfectly well.

### III

THE ABSURDITY of Vansittart's charge about an overwhelming German military force is shown when one reviews the published figures of the armed forces in 1914. The German and Austro-Hungarian strengths, including officers, amounted to 1,239,000. The combined strengths of Russia and France amounted in winter to 2,639,000 and in summer to 2,239,000. These figures have been carefully scrutinized by British and French authorities, and they have never been challenged. Indeed, it is only necessary to turn to General Buat's book, *L'armée allemande pendant la guerre de 1914-18*, in which he says:

It is not only inaccurate to say that in 1914 Germany made the greatest effort of which she was capable, but when the difference in the size of the respective populations is considered it is equally wrong to maintain that Germany went as far as France in the utilisation of her reserves.

Furthermore, as to the relative strengths in the western theater of war, General Buat says:

France alone at the beginning of the war was at least equal in strength to, if not stronger than, her mighty opponent as regards the larger units.

When one considers this enormous preponderance of military strength in the combined armies of Russia and France, one is amazed at the statement of Colonel Repington, the military correspondent of *The Times* (London), who said after the maneuvers in 1911: "The possibility of a war on two fronts is the nightmare of German strategists, and, considering the pace at which Russia has been building up her field armies since 1905, the nightmare is not likely to be soon conjured away."

In a dispatch to *The Times*, dated October 28, 1911, Colonel Repington wrote:

The writer has not formed a wholly favourable opinion of the German Army, which appears to him to be living on a glorious past and to be unequal to the repute in which it is commonly held . . . Failing extreme measures, the best thing to restore new life to the Army would be to disband it for a year in order to give everybody, from top to bottom, a much needed rest . . . The nation which, after all, gives up little more than half of its able-bodied sons to the Army, is becoming less militarist than formerly. The military spirit in the country is less predominant than of old and the race for wealth is the consuming passion of the day . . .

These figures speak volumes. Indeed, they are sufficient to destroy the foundation upon which Vansittart attempts to build his case. Expenditures upon the navy and the size of the army, however, are merely two of the many sources to be tapped, from which there may be drawn conclusive proof of the most damnable conspiracy of war-mongering governments.

In 1892 Russia and France entered into a military convention directly aimed at the Central Powers. Vansittart knows this thoroughly well, but he does not refer to it as a contributing factor to the unrest in Europe. The particulars of this secret treaty were not made known to the general public until Lenin and his forces overthrew the old Russian Government. This treaty lays it down that:

In case the forces of the Triple Alliance or of one of the powers which are a party to it should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first indication of the event and without a previous agreement being necessary shall mobilize all their forces immediately and simultaneously and shall transport them as near to their frontiers as possible . . . These forces shall begin complete action with the greatest dispatch, so that Germany will have to fight at the same time in the east and in the west.

So that there would be no misunderstanding about what mobilization meant, General de Boisdeffre, the French representative in the proceedings, tells us that in his conversation with the Czar he strove to make it clear

that mobilization was war. His words are: "I pointed out to him (the Czar) that mobilization means war," and the Russian emperor replied: "That is quite how I understand the matter."

The secrets of the Franco-Russian alliance were given to the world in 1919, and the draft of the treaties will be found in the *French Yellow Book*. René Marchand in his work, *Un Livre Noir*, produced the secret dispatches between the Russian Foreign Office and Izvolsky, the Russian Ambassador at Paris. Then, besides, de Siebert published the secret dispatches between the Russian Foreign Office and Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador in London. De Siebert was secretary of the Russian Embassy in London. The title of his book is *Entente Diplomacy and the World*. It is, therefore, necessary in studying the figures of naval expenditure to keep in mind the fact that the two Powers were cooperating on the basis of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1892.

The works that have been published by British and French authors on this conspiracy run into the hundreds. In a bibliography supplied in one of the books from American authors I count no less than seventy-eight works that deal with the question of war guilt and produce evidence supplied by the governments themselves, which leave no doubt that primarily Russia and France were responsible for the tragedy. An excellent summary of what took place was published in *The Russian Imperial Conspiracy 1892-1914* by Senator Robert Owen. This little book was given to the public in 1927, and it is a thousand pities that it was ignored and that no one thought it worth while, after President Roosevelt made the "quarantine-the-aggressors" speech in Chicago (in 1937), to issue a new edition of the work.

When the statesmen of the European Powers were confronted with the contents of the Russian secret archives, most of them pleaded ignorance of the Franco-Russian

Convention. But when a time-sheet was made out of what took place in the last week of July and the first week of August, 1914, they could not fail to see that everything had clicked according to the plans made by the Triple Entente. Some of the British apologists went so far as to say that Grey could not possibly have known about it and yet, he was the one who continued the conversations between the French and British military staffs when he came to office in 1906. Then came the period of recrimination, and there were many of Grey's supporters who blamed Poincaré and suggested that he and the French Ambassador to London, Paul Cambon, had deliberately deceived the British Foreign Minister. In 1921 Poincaré published *Les origines de la guerre* in which he makes the attempt to justify himself at the expense of others. This book has been dealt with by several Frenchmen of high reputation and, upon analysis, it is found to be a defense which incriminates the author.

Why, then, it may be asked, is it possible for Vansittart to find an audience? This is a question that is often put to me. The reason is not far to seek. Ninety-eight percent of the people of this world are content to accept without suspicion statements by their leading politicians, or those that are brazenly published in the newspapers. The spirit of inquiry does not animate these folk, probably because they are so busy trying to make a living, in spite of the burdens that are placed upon them by their own statesmen. It is only the comparatively few who know that the statement of perhaps one place politician out of a hundred can be accepted without suspicion. And as for the newspapers and magazines, "the cesspools of the war propagandist," they fall in behind the government of the day and do its dirty work for it. Why be nice about the matter? Is this not now admitted by Tom, Dick and Harry?

The ex-Political Adviser of the British Foreign Office

would never dream of making an appeal to anyone who was informed. He thrives upon the ignorance of the crowd. Surely it cannot be imagined for a moment that Vansittart is as devoid of knowledge as the pages in his book indicate. And although he moves under the principle that everybody is out of step "but me," he cannot hide the fact that over and over again in *Lessons of my Life*, innumerable omissions in his story prompt the informed reader to conclude that he knows the facts but dares not produce them.

#### IV

LET US NOW CONSIDER the charge Vansittart brings against Germany of always desiring a war with Great Britain. He says that on his first visit to Berlin he found "hatred, jealousy and determination to destroy us."

I want to show, from sources accepted by the British Foreign Office, that no such desire animated either the German Government or the German people at that time or at any time before. As a servant of the Foreign Office, he had every opportunity to study the documents from the archives of the Wilhelmstrasse, compiled by Dr. Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and Friederich Thimme. This work was completed in 1927 and extends to more than fifty volumes. Selections from these documents were published in 1928 under the title of *Bismarck's Relations with England 1871-1890*. Captain Dugdale made the selections and translated them. An introduction to it was contributed by the Historical Adviser of the British Foreign Office, the well-known J. W. Headlam-Morley.

When the work was published in England, readers of it were amazed to learn for the first time that Bismarck's supreme desire was an understanding with England.

Even Headlam-Morley, who was never a friend of Germany, says in the introduction:

. . . In the serious and carefully considered documents printed in this volume, we find something very different, a constant endeavour to establish a friendly co-operation with the British Government, and even definite suggestions for an alliance between the two countries. There is no sign here that he under-estimated the importance which a good understanding with England might have for his country; what we do find is the constant expression of annoyance, disappointment and chagrin that he could not persuade the leaders of British policy to take that active and responsible part in the counsels of the European states which he desired.

The only reason why British people had an utterly false impression of Bismarck was that the war-mongers and their press distorted nearly every advance that he made. And Mr. Gladstone's usual pusillanimity with regard to foreign affairs made it extremely difficult for Bismarck to keep his temper. When Odo Russell was British Ambassador at Berlin (1881) he wrote to Lord Granville:

For ten years I have preached confidence in Bismarck as a means of success in foreign policy, but in vain. I never could overcome the deep-rooted distrust his wish for a cordial understanding with England inspired at home.

The documents from the German archives now prove that it was no fault of Bismarck that Europe was cast adrift and Britain threw in her lot with France.

Why, then, has Vansittart ignored the history which was at his disposal at the Foreign Office for the years before 1897? One would think a Political Adviser, after the experiences through which England had passed, would be informed on every important point of policy and it would be his duty in taking taxpayers' money for the job to remind his Foreign Minister that prejudice nourished upon false information leads to war. The reputation of the servants of the Foreign Office in Great

Britain, with few exceptions, stinks in the nostrils of decent-minded people; but at no time in its history did it ever fall so low as it did during the years after Grey and Vansittart were employed by it.

There are many other reasons why Vansittart chose the year 1897 for the beginning of his story. That was the year when John Hay, the American Ambassador to London, entered into an agreement with the British Government. There were no papers signed nor were any iron-clad pledges given; no acknowledgment of this agreement was made at the time, but, although nothing leaked out about it in London, many Americans knew of it and made covert reference to it. Roland Usher in his book *Pan-Germanism* tells us:

An understanding was reached that in case of war begun by Germany or Austria for the purpose of executing Pan-Germanism, the United States would promptly declare in favor of England and France and would do her utmost to assist them.

Usher was misinformed. It was not Pan-Germanism that brought about the work of Théophile Delcassé. During the period when he was at the head of the French Colonial Office he made commitments in Africa which threatened the peace of Europe. It was he who dispatched the Liotard mission to the Upper Ubangi, and in 1897 the international friction was so great that Delcassé realized he had gone too far and that France had better be on the lookout for an ally in case of trouble. It was the Liotard mission out of which arose the occupation of Fashoda by Captain Marchand in 1898. To protect French interests in Africa it was essential to get the consent of other Powers interested in that area of the globe, and he was so successful in his quest for support that in March, 1899, he concluded an agreement with Great Britain. At that time England also was a little alarmed about her imperial commitments, and she too

wondered if the time had come when the policy of splendid isolation should be abandoned.

As the French and the English grew together because of their interests in Africa, they agreed to make overtures to the United States. The sending of John Hay to London was the reply to these overtures, and very soon he committed his country to the understanding that Usher refers to in his book. All these moves were, however, done behind the backs of the legislators. In a way it is amusing to think of how easily a handful of men in three of the great democracies could dispense entirely with their legislatures in making agreements, which were not even submitted to the cabinets. Indeed, one or two great bankers knew far more of what was taking place than any member of Parliament, of Congress, of the Chamber of Deputies, or of the French Senate. There has never been a "hush-hush" system as perfect as that of secret diplomacy.

Another matter that was discussed in 1897, which bothered Downing Street a good deal, was the German notion of the Bagdad Railway. It was then, however, in the merest preliminary stage. Call it a Pan-German movement, if you will, but its importance at that time was not comparable to that of French and British interests in Africa. Therefore, the overtures made by Great Britain and France to the United States set the basis of the settlements between the two Powers of thorny questions in Africa, and particularly in Egypt; and upon this foundation was raised the edifice of the Triple Entente and the Act of Algeciras.

Perhaps encirclement is not the right word to use about what happened to Germany, because most people read from it that she was hemmed in by the land of her opponents. This is not true, for the Low Countries and the Scandinavian countries were neutral, or were supposed to be neutral. The word encirclement then can only

refer to the action of the navies of Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States. Under the circumstances Germany was sea-bound by the agreements France had with Great Britain and Russia, and America had made with Great Britain and France. This was encirclement far more effective than any encirclement by land could be. Just to show how practical the policy was, it may be pointed out that in the year 1890 America spent more than £4,500,000 on her navy, and in the year 1901 she had increased her expenditure to more than £16,000,000. Turn back to the figures I have given on page 14 and realize what happened to the growth of navies of the world after the Hay agreement was made in London in 1897.

The strange thing about all this turmoil is that no one who has written about Pan-Germanism has ever been able to bring forward conclusive evidence that it was intended at any time to be a menace to any European or American Powers. The name was merely a club used by the British, French, and American imperialists for the purpose of intimidating their own people so that higher taxes could be wrung from them and greater profits reaped by those who thrive on war contracts. There must be dozens of books on the shelves of libraries that give the whole show away. H. N. Brailsford's *The War of Steel and Gold*, G. H. Perris' *The War Traders*, and J. T. Walton Newbold's *The War Trust Exposed* are examples of many works on this subject published before the last war began. I could name fifty such books written in this country in the ten years after that war closed. *Shall it be Again?* by John Kenneth Turner (published in 1922) is typical of scores of volumes on this subject.

One of the duties of a Political Adviser to the Foreign Office, so I have been informed many times during my political career, is to familiarize himself with all works

of reputable authors which criticize not only the policies of the government of the day but the methods of the Foreign Office. If this be true, what is to be thought of this Vansittart who reveals the most amazing ignorance of what has been written since the last war began? Was there ever such a person permitted at large? I can very well understand a dangerous lunatic being deprived of a book, for he might eat it or, in some way, use it as a weapon against his warden. But how a Political Adviser to the Foreign Office could have spent more than twenty years in the service at Downing Street in complete ignorance of the literature of the period on the war and foreign affairs is inexplicable! My own opinion is that he never missed seeing a work of any importance. If he did see the criticisms of the government and the Foreign Office and deliberately sought to convey that they did not exist, then he is the most unscrupulous author that ever took pen in hand. If he did miss the lot, then he was not earning his salary.

## V

**W**HAT WAS PAN-GERMANISM? It is not easy to say what it was or when the movement started. Cecil Battine, in the *Fortnightly Review*, sets the years 1893 and 1895 as the beginning of it. That seems to me far too early because the colonial movement had not then taken shape in any definite form, and as late as the turn of the century the great mass of the German people was interested only in domestic affairs. The clearest account of it is given by Dr. Roland G. Usher in his book, *Pan-Germanism*. Her attempt at founding colonies was an absurd failure for, although over a period she occupied nearly 1,000,000 square miles, she derived no more than about five dollars value for each square mile. She came into the game too late to get what she desired without

having to meet the opposition of the other empires. Usher points out:

. . . A little study of the situation soon convinced the Germans that the French influence in Morocco, the English influence in Egypt, the English and Russian influence in Persia, and the influence of the United States in Central America were due precisely to these methods, and the Germans saw no reason why they should not "peaceably" penetrate some one of the South American nations, by pleading the same highly moral purpose of developing the country for the use and behoof of its inhabitants, who were, of course, to be assumed incapable of developing it themselves . . .

As the British and the French had extended their empires, the Pan-Germans saw the method of "peaceful penetration" was the only practical one they could adopt, and, as it had served the purposes of their neighbors so richly, they equipped themselves to enter into competition by giving better service than their competitors. According to the report of British consuls, they succeeded only too well in doing this. Hence, the tears of the British imperialists.

In an attempt to understand the position of Germany so far as world trade is concerned, it is necessary for us to stomach some unpalatable truths. The way Germany regarded the matter may be summed up in a statement which appeared in *England's Weltherrschaft und die Deutsche Luxusflotte*. This was published in February, 1912, and rumor had it that the author was a distinguished admiral:

On every one of the world's trade routes, like an ancient robber knight in full armor, lance in hand, stands England. All nations must run the gauntlet of England . . . The domination of the world on the sea enables the supreme naval Power to inflict the most terrible crises upon other nations. Every nation must combat this predominance for the sake of its future . . . All nations have become tributary to the city of London, some more, some less. Germany would find existence at England's sufferance unbearable.

For the purposes of British propaganda against Germany, Pan-Germanism and naval expansion were one and the same thing. And in coupling the two, the British imperialist was able to convince many of his countrymen that not only the trade of the country was in danger but that, at the same time, the Germans were planning to destroy the British fleet. And this became, during the naval panic under Asquith's Government, the strongest card Balfour and his friends could play in the constituencies. It was not true and they knew it was not true, but that did not matter. The Germans were quite frank when in the preface of the German Naval Bill of 1900 they stated:

For the protection of our oversea trade and our colonies, there is only one means: a strong fleet. Under the present circumstances, the only means for protecting Germany's oversea trade and colonies is: Germany must possess a fleet of such strength that a war, even with the strongest naval power, would involve such risks as to jeopardize the position of that power. For that purpose, it is not absolutely necessary that the German fleet be as strong as the fleet of the greatest naval power, for a great naval power will not generally be in a position to concentrate all its forces against Germany. But, even if the greatest naval power should succeed in meeting us with a fleet of superior strength, the defeat of a strong German fleet would so greatly weaken its own power, that, notwithstanding its victory, its own position on the seas would no longer be secure.

Again, it should be asked why such a course was open to Great Britain and closed to Germany? Why should Great Britain have the blessing of the bench of bishops, and Germany for adopting exactly the same methods receive the curses of Satan? No one attempts to explain this extraordinary attitude of mind. Mr. Balfour at the time of the Hague Conference (1907) told Henry White, the American Ambassador to Italy: "We are probably fools not to find a reason for declaring war on Germany before she builds too many ships and takes away our

trade." The high-minded gentleman who led the Tories through the naval panics and lent himself to the machinations of the despicable Mulliner let nothing stand in the way of maintaining the empire whose particular business was to educate the backward races in the tenets of Christian imperialism.

As for the advance Germany made in electrical appliances, in dry-salting and dyes, and in spinning and weaving, they were pointed out by Lord Haldane as exemplary lessons to the British manufacturers and the British government of what should be done to meet the challenge. I heard him speak one night at Caxton Hall on the research work for industry then proceeding at a great rate in the German laboratories. There was reason enough for Mr. Balfour making his remarks to Henry White.

Suppose someone had said to Balfour: "Would you advocate jostling in a race, or in a cricket match would you sanction the crippling of an Australian or a Canadian batsman because he was making a good score against your side?" Balfour would have taken it as an insult; but when it is a question of imperial supremacy, all ethics go to the wind, and Usher puts this very matter in a nutshell. He says in his chapter on "The Justifiability of Pan-Germanism":

It must be admitted in all candor that the impulses behind Pan-Germanism exist at present in all nations, and that no nation is likely at present to forego the possibility of future development because of even the most plausible ethical or logical pleas. The three nations, who have entered into the promotion of Pan-Germanism, are not different from the others in morals or in aims. Their geographical position, their peculiar economic fabric, the traditions of their past, all force upon them the aggressive part and make immediate action desirable. England, France, Russia, and the United States already possess the choice places in the world; their position is already everything they could reasonably hope to have it; and they scarcely deserve to be praised for un-



selfishness when they insist upon preserving a situation which is so very much to their advantage. Obviously, their national existence and ambition will be best furthered by the continuance of the status quo, because they will thus be able to keep what they already hold. Nor is it proved that they have obtained it by the observance of the ethical precepts which they would now be glad to apply to Germany; they secured their empires, in fact, by precisely those methods which Germany wishes to use against them . . .

Every effort made by the Pan-Germans to enlarge the orbit of commercial enterprise was opposed by Britain. Whenever the Germans attempted to widen the channel of trade in competition with the "mistress of the seas," they found Downing Street and the whole of the consular service ready to interfere by not altogether legitimate means. The amazing part of this commercial and financial struggle is found in the extraordinary success that Germany achieved against such tremendous odds. Yet, it must be recorded that Pan-Germanism was something quite different from the regular trade movement organized and conducted by the merchants and banks. Indeed, I doubt very much whether any practical assistance was given to this movement by the Pan-Germans.

Shortly before the last war began, a deputation of German burghers visited London, and members of Parliament had an opportunity of meeting these men. Several of them at tea on the terrace one afternoon were closely questioned by their hosts as to the Pan-German movement, and we were surprised to find that these business men from German towns were far more interested in the daily routine of trade and commerce. In my investigations covering some ten or twelve years, I found no interest among my friends in Germany in the Pan-German organization. It was merely a name to them. So far as extending its influence beyond Europe, it was the greatest failure ever recorded. At best it was merely a Pan-Europa scheme for opening up wider channels of trade

and communication. But the merchants themselves were the chief instruments in performing these tasks. And unfortunately for Great Britain's trade, the chores were done so well that the competition was felt severely. Hence, the propaganda of hate and a determination on the part of the government to call Germany to account.

It was trade that was the question at the bottom of all the naval scares Britain had to endure from the inception of the *Entente Cordiale*. Indeed, a study of the Moroccan question reveals the whole problem. If anyone wants to know how the thwarting movements of the French and the British were carried out, it is only necessary to study the works of Frenchmen who revealed the diabolical business methods of the *Comité du Maroc* and its associated societies. This question, fundamental to an understanding of the unrest in Europe for more than half a generation before the last war began, must be studied, because the alleged necessity of wars can only be explained by the bitter struggle of finding markets. There is no use going to this study with any ethical or moral notions clouding the mind. These admirable qualities are all very well in their place, but there is no room for them in international struggles for holding markets and finding new ones. It is war to the death, for under the present system each country imagines it can survive only by killing competition. The assumption is utterly false, however, and is put forward to cover the determination of parasites to live at ease. As Balfour said to Henry White: in meeting German commercial competition "we would have to lower the standard of our living," meaning, of course, *his* standard of living. The standard of living of British producers would be quite sufficient to meet competition if they were able to get rid of their parasites. Workers don't make war. That is a job monopolized by those who batten upon labor.

Let us look at the other side of this ledger and consider

for a moment what a German merchant would think about the great Pan-British movement: The All Red Route. Try to imagine what a German thought of Cecil Rhodes' Cape-to-Cairo scheme and the covert support given by the British Government to such imperialistic ventures as the Jameson raid. It is quite unnecessary to go farther afield than South Africa to understand clearly that Pan-Germanism in any of its forms had not a ghost of a show in the struggle for territorial aggrandizement. British imperialists had taken the *Lebensraum* before the Germans woke up to the fact that there was not much left that was worth cultivating.

And at this time, when the empire's existence is threatened, it might be as well if we were to consider by what methods the people of Africa and of the Far East were brought into subjection. Long ago Herman Merivale in his review denounced "the wretched details of the ferocity and treachery which have marked the conduct of civilized men, too often of civilized governments, in their relations with savages." And Sir George Campbell, one of the most distinguished of Indian administrators, in his work, *The British Empire*, said: "The abuses of the Polynesian labour traffic are beyond doubt; there is nothing in modern times more shocking."

General Gordon himself said: "The English pioneers in Africa need civilizing more than the blacks." Such commentaries could be added by the dozen, and, if Vansittart takes any satisfaction in British methods of brutality and prefers them to the way he imagines the Germans go about the business when they have a chance, then there is nothing more to be said.

Suppose a German were to ask the people of India, whether Hindu or Moslem, what they thought about the marauders who went into their country under the banner of the East India Company. Vansittart must be under the impression that no one today takes the trouble to

read any history. For so long now have the imperialists hidden under the cloak of the administrative services in the dependencies (which are conducted by as fine a body of skillful, honest men as can be found) that they have quite forgotten the terrible stories of how the countries were brought under the dominion of the British Crown.

## VI

THE REAL REASONS for the campaigns against Germany were exposed clearly enough during Joseph Chamberlain's crusade for colonial preference. This was begun in 1902 at the close of the Boer War. For nearly three years the platforms of Great Britain rang with denunciation of the foreigner and the replies of Chamberlain's opponents. No question that had been placed before the electors of Great Britain since Cobden's days had received so thorough an examination as this one. Had there been the slightest truth in the case set forth by the colonial preference party, the British electors at the by-elections during those three years would certainly not have shown a decided preference for candidates who opposed the scheme. When the General Election took place in 1906, the Chamberlain party suffered the most devastating electoral defeat that has been recorded. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was returned by the greatest majority a British Prime Minister had known. At that election the Chamberlain party utterly failed in the attempt to poison the minds of the majority of the taxpayers by injecting the venom of hate.

What was Great Britain's position in the world of commercial affairs when Chamberlain led the country into the South African War? There are records enough extant for the student, if he will turn to them, to understand the precarious commercial position in which Britain was placed. She had reached the zenith of her power, and

she was unable to meet the challenge thrown out by the United States and Germany. A few of the keener minds in finance and commerce remarked in articles published in the conservative reviews of that time the strange change that was taking place. But little notice was taken of the opinions which seemed to presage a grave future for Great Britain.

What was the threat she had to fear? If this is clearly understood, then the history of the period that followed will be made plain. No better description of what had happened to Great Britain has been given than that contained in the articles on "Foreign Policy in Transition" which appeared in 1943 in *The Times* (London). They deal with the present anxiety about the right foreign policy for Great Britain, and they trace that anxiety back fifty years.

... In the 1890's the conditions which had given Britain an overwhelming and unquestioned supremacy in the world for three-quarters of a century were gradually passing away. The volume of British steel production was overtaken both in Germany and in the United States; and this significant landmark was in part cause, in part symptom, in part perhaps result, of a wider range of phenomena—the inevitable decline of British pre-eminence, due largely to Britain's long industrial start over the rest of the world, in technical efficiency, in scientific research, and in industrial organization. Industry was entering a new phase of large-scale production; and in this phase Britain, hampered by increasingly obsolete traditions and obsolete physical assets, no longer took the lead. Political repercussions soon made themselves felt. The South African War was widely interpreted as a symptom of faltering British supremacy.

British diplomacy, though perhaps not fully conscious of what was happening, reacted to it with vigour . . .

Here we find in a few sentences the reasons for the shift from the policy of splendid isolation to that of making alliances against the strongest competitor in trade. The change, however, instead of making Great Britain's posi-

tion more secure, actually worsened her situation, for it was not long after the Chamberlain campaign for colonial preference when it was whispered that Germany must be smashed and war was the certain outcome of the consequences of the *Entente Cordiale*. Far-sighted men, when they were rash enough to warn the short-sighted politicians that their policy might lead to disaster, were looked upon as Little Englanders and friends of the foreigner. The result of the alliances which brought about World War I was that, after it had been fought, Britain's position was so serious that the need for more alliances was greater than it had been in the early days of the century. The writer of the article in *The Times* (London) sums up the position in which Great Britain found herself after the last war, and here follow a few of the sentences in which he shows that "in reality the War of 1914-18 had accelerated the decline of Britain's relative strength as a world Power":

It stimulated the expansion of industry and shipping all over the world, thereby further weakening British pre-dominance in these fields.

It deprived Britain of her leadership in world trade, giving to the United States the first place in world exports.

It cost Britain a substantial fraction of her foreign investments and deprived London of its hitherto uncontested position as the financial capital of the world.

What, then, becomes of the myth of Germany planning a war to crush Great Britain? The evidence which can easily be gathered today shows in unmistakable terms that Germany was singled out for destruction by the parties to the various alliances fostered after the Hay agreement in 1897 and the French *entente* in 1904 because she was Great Britain's most dangerous competitor in trade and commerce. And the most extraordinary thing about this matter of Powers allying themselves for the object of protecting their trade, as the writer of the

article in *The Times* (London) tells us, is that "more alliances were concluded during the lifetime of the League of Nations than in any other 20 years of history."

Think of it! And yet there are people who imagine that the peace of the world may be secured if armed alliances can be made to deprive Germany of her place in the European system. Could anything really be more inane than such an idea? The alliances made during the life of the League of Nations were the very means by which the present war was brought about!

Strange as it may seem, there is still a section of people in Great Britain and the United States who persist in the quest of new alliances for purely Utopian reasons, such as the supremacy of the English-speaking peoples, or world peace; and occasionally one finds the silly old notion that it is all to be done for the sake of humanity. It is time these dreamers should get out of the playground and return to school and pour over their lessons. One to whom I spoke some time ago was mortally shocked at the idea that trade and markets were at the bottom of the wars. He would have it that there was only one reason for any of the wars that have taken place in Europe since the days of the Crimean, and that was the vain ambition of Germany to dominate the world. They never learn—these people. However, he sobered up considerably when I quoted some of his own idealists. Woodrow Wilson at St. Louis, September 5, 1919, said:

Why, my fellow-citizens, is there any man here, or any woman—let me say, is there an child here—who does not know that the seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry? . . . This war, in its inception, was a commercial and industrial war. It was not a political war.

At St. Paul the same month, same year, he said:

The German bankers and the German merchants and the German manufacturers did not want this war. They were

making conquest of the world without it, and they knew it would spoil their plans.

What did the British people get out of it all? When this question is put, our idealists can only talk about honor and prestige. The trouble is very few Americans realize what Great Britain went through for years after the last armistice. Some of the professors I know were amazed when I described to them the social conditions that existed there for many years after the fighting had stopped. I have asked these men if they thought it were possible to find any honor and prestige in the thousands of unemployed processions, in the depressed areas, and in the queues that were formed to receive the dole. A few years after the first World War the Prince of Wales invited Louis Swift, who had entertained him in Chicago, to visit him at St. James' Palace. As they chatted on intimately, the Prince asked: "Well, Mr. Swift, what the hell's the matter with us?"

Swift was so surprised that at first he could only stammer, "I-I don't understand-er, your Royal Highness. Er-what do you mean, sir?"

"Mean? I mean the condition we're in. We're not getting anywhere."

"Oh," said Swift, "I see! Well the dole's one thing."

"Right! It is," said the Prince. "But, my God, we had to do it to save ourselves from revolution."

For myself I failed to find anywhere in Great Britain among the working people a sense of the value of honor and prestige won in the Great War. Indeed, quite the reverse: wherever I went I saw little but the undoing of the mass of the people. They produced the goods and gave the men for the fighting. And when it was over, the reward was a dole.

All these campaigns for alliances, which short-sighted politicians think will cripple trade competitors and secure for themselves greater prosperity, have had but one re-

sult, and that is to make worse the position which was to be defended. Never was there a clearer case of grabbing for the shadow and dropping the bone. It has been nothing but loss, but the loss is felt where it is so hard to be borne. The comparative few who earn £2,000 a year and upwards can manage perhaps to get through if the income is reduced 75 percent by taxation. But for those who earn £3 a week, the reduction of income is quite another story. And how it can be expected that trade will prosper when the vast mass of the consumers does not have sufficient to keep body and soul together seems to be a matter that is overlooked by the great statesmen who manage the affairs of nations.

Cobden said: "Raise the purchasing power of the shilling by 25 percent and trade is stimulated." The more commodities the shilling will buy, the better it is for labor. If the fields, the mines, the railroads, the cargo vessels, and the factories had to depend upon the 10 percent of the people whose incomes are over £2,000 a year, the industries of a country would be brought to a standstill. Look at the figures for 1937-38, and it will be found that the total number of persons assessed for surtax (incomes exceeding £2,000) on September 30, 1938 was 95,750, and yet the total number of individuals with incomes above the income tax exemption limit in 1937-38 was 8,800,000. Not until the 8,700,000 assert their incontestable claim to a just system of taxation will there be peace.

## VII

**I**T SEEMS TO ME that, when Vansittart started to get the venom off his chest, he pledged himself to the powers of evil to write the worst hymn of hate that had ever been penned. This book of his is complete evidence that he has kept his pledge. He says: "Seventy-five percent of Germans have for seventy-five years—the

figures are easy to remember—been eager for any assault on their neighbours." He also assumes "no bloodier body of men than the German Right has ever soiled or spoiled it."

On nearly every other page of his book one can read sentences about the brutality and ferocity of Germany and the Germans that would be regarded as stuff and nonsense if anyone attempted to make out that the British were hopeless cannibals because of their treatment of the natives of India and of South Africa. But when Vansittart sweeps, he does it with a will and never spares elbow grease. He gives no particulars to support his ravings save here and there quotations from authors who provide him with the ammunition of prejudice. It would be just as easy for a German to do the same thing and condemn the whole British nation. Certainly the French have from time to time said far worse about Englishmen, and it was not a German who invented the phrase "Perfide Albion."

The general public does not realize that this is all part and parcel of the snarling and biting campaigns that are waged intermittently between nations. Did not the English in the southern counties believe that Napoleon made a meal of babies? In Thomas Hardy's *The Dynasts* there is a reference to this. Surely Gilray's cartoons of 150 years ago reveal the lengths to which the British propaganda departments went when Napoleon was the monster. There have been times when no loyal Britisher would say a good word for the French, and how many times have the French believed that the British were the greatest liars in creation?

Vansittart does not tell us that Germany kept the peace in Europe for more than forty years while Great Britain was busy fighting the Opium Wars, the Burma Wars, the Afghan Wars, the North African Wars, wars against the Zulus, the Ashantis, and other tribes. Unfortunately

for us all, what Vansittart has to say about a small minority of German people, which he tries to make out is the great majority of them, can be said about any people. What he says about the Prussian Junker can be said about the British landlord, but it would be quite as unjust to label every British landlord a barbarian as it is to hold up every Prussian Junker as a bloodthirsty tyrant.

Years ago some friends of mine collected statements from the speeches and writings of well-known British militarists and among them I find that Colonel Maude in *Armaments and Arbitration* said: "War is the divinely appointed means by which environment may be readjusted until ethically fitted and best become synonymous."

Then Major Steward Murray, in *The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons*, wrote: "The worst of all errors in war is a mistaken spirit of benevolence."

It was not a German, however, but the famous British military critic, Dr. Miller Maguire, who, in *The Times*, July 12, 1900, told us:

The proper strategy consists in the first place of inflicting as terrible blows as possible upon the enemy's army, and then in causing the inhabitants so much suffering that they must long for peace and force their Government to demand it.

Since these books were published, we have had *Memoires* by Lord Fisher, who advocated "boiling them in oil," and who wrote a letter to Tirpitz about the submarine warfare. He said in it:

... I don't blame you for the submarine business. I'd have done the same myself, only our idiots in England wouldn't believe it when I told 'em!

It was the same Lord Fisher who suggested to King Edward "Copenhagening" the German fleet and landing 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. These are only a

few instances of the scores of such statements that could be quoted from British authors against the few German authors upon whom Vansittart builds his case. Anyway, the Germans never used black troops, and Vansittart forgets the story of what they did during the occupation of Rhineland. He attempts to drop the curtain upon so much recorded to the discredit of Germany's opponents that he merely succeeds in casting suspicion upon the whole scheme of his work.

The Germans were never responsible for such an outrage as that which occurred at the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre at Amritsar. This is what Tagore said in his message to his own countrymen:

A great crime has been done in the name of law in the Punjab. Such terrible eruptions of evil leave their legacy of the wreckage of ideals behind them . . . The cowardliness of the powerful who owned no shame in using their machines of frightfulness upon the unarmed and unwarned villagers, and inflicting unspeakable humiliations upon their fellow beings behind the screen of an indecent mockery of justice and yet not feeling for a moment that it was the meanest form of insult to their own manhood, has become only possible through the opportunity which the late war had given to man for constantly outraging his own higher nature, trampling truth and honour underfoot.

Fenner Brockway, Joint Secretary of the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, reported upon the massacre:

At Jallianwala Bagh, General Dyer fired indiscriminately, and without warning, upon over ten thousand unarmed Indians, killing 379 and wounding 1,200 (the official estimate; the casualties were certainly larger). The firing was prolonged even during the flight of the crowd in order "to create a wide impression," and the wounded were left lying on the ground unattended. For several days every Indian passing through the street in which an English lady missionary had been assaulted was made to crawl on his stomach. Indians were publicly flogged in the streets, and at Kasur, six school-boys were flogged, not because they had been

proved guilty, but because they were the biggest, to create an example. In Lahore, students had to attend roll call four times a day, involving a sixteen miles' walk in the burning sun. Indains were bombed indiscriminately from aeroplanes and fired upon from armoured trains, resulting in the loss of many lives. This is a bare summary of some of the worst acts of frightfulness committed.

Is it not strange that Vansittart overlooked the story of the concentration camps during the Boer War? It was quite unnecessary for those who reported upon them to bolster their accusations with faked photographs, such as was done by the British propaganda departments during the Great War. We have the evidence of Jan Smuts in his report to Kruger. He denounced "the awful mutilation of Boer soldiers found on the battlefield" and protested against the "torturing, imprisoning and ill treating of women." The conclusion of the report reads as follows:

The war has long since degenerated into an enterprise for the extermination of the Boer people. Day by day we learn of atrocities, all of which but form a commentary to the memorable words of the English High Commissioner himself that the Afrikanders must be exterminated.

British officers when they returned after that war, expressed themselves freely upon what they had seen. And in the communications that passed between the Boers and the British authorities, sufficient evidence can be found to condemn "the atrocious cruelties of the British military authorities." Commandant General Botha said:

... When the women were first made prisoners I thought that European intervention might perhaps be attempted, because to make prisoners of women is a thing quite outside the usual methods of warfare. But nothing was done even then ...

More than twenty thousand women and children have died in the camps during this one year.

For savagery, that beats anything that took place in

the last war. The charges that were made by the Boer leaders in the discussions with Lord Milner were never denied.

If Vansittart wants to feed upon atrocities, he might turn his attention to the accounts of his own countrymen as to what went on in the Rhineland when it was occupied after the Armistice. There is C. J. C. Street's book, *The Treachery of France*, which will provide him with real atrocity stories and tales of how the black troops treated the defenseless German women. There are many other works written by Englishmen of how native French officers encouraged their wretched black colonial troops to vent their passion and hate upon young girls. If he does not find enough there to satisfy his enormous appetite for this kind of thing, he might read the record of the recruiting of black soldiers in Africa for the French Army. It is found in the evidence given in a libel action brought by Diagne, a Senegalese Deputy, in Paris. Diagne said:

It wasn't recruiting but man-hunting. The villagers were surrounded and all who couldn't escape into the Bush, were sent to the Yser and the Marne.

Another deputy who accompanied the Diagne mission, Brunet, former Governor of the Sudan, testified that in 1917 the Governor of Senegal asked the French Government for 15,000 asphyxiating grenades and an equal number of hand tear grenades, and four bombardment aeroplanes, together with white troops to be sent him to assist in recruiting the blacks.

A friend of mine said Vansittart almost makes you believe that he thought the atrocity stories retailed by the British propaganda department and its disgusting press were true. It may seem so to some people, but it is impossible, for I know that the British Foreign Office watched carefully every book, pamphlet, or speech, that

raised a doubt about the lies that were circulated for the sole purpose of spreading the germs of hate. Therefore, Vansittart could scarcely have spent so many years in the service of the Foreign Office without knowing what was common talk among his colleagues. Many men in the British army, and also in the Canadian army, have written books with which the British Foreign Office must have been familiar and in which the authors reveal the most shocking stories of what men did in the armies of the allies. I wonder how many volumes have been penned on the atrocity stories about the Germans cutting the breasts off a nurse and chopping the hands off Belgian babies, the castration of English soldiers, the crucifixion of a Canadian, and the hundred and one lies fostered by the great men in Britain who were in charge of the prosecution of the war. I challenged one (who is still living) in 1925 about his knowledge of the atrocity stories. He smiled, shrugged his shoulders, and said it was awful, but nothing could be done to stop it. After reading Arthur Ponsonby's book exposing the whole dirty business, I asked a high church dignitary what he thought about it, and he said to me, more in sorrow than in anger, "Yes, Neilson, it was an abominable state of affairs, but our passions were overwrought and we feared we would be destroyed."

Neither the statesmen to the subjects nor the bishop to his flock apologized for making capital of these yarns. The horror of the detestable thing is that Vansittart, the fool, has reawakened this fearful nightmare, and many of those who read his book will go back to the records and find what awful liars arise during a war to play hell with the souls of unsuspecting creatures.

Why should the British propaganda department and the embassy at Washington be surprised that the American public has not swallowed the atrocity stories of this war? Is it to be inferred that they do not know the attitude of

mind of average Americans who have not yet recovered from the shock (after the last war) of learning that the lies were deliberately manufactured for the purpose of raising their ire against the Germans? One would think that Vansittart and Halifax would know what Americans thought about General Charteris, the inventor of the lies about the "Kadaver" factory. After the war that despicable creature came before audiences and gloried in the work that he had done. Then there was the notorious Basil Thompson and his forgeries of documents which he alleged were taken from Germans on the battlefield. There were many others, besides, who did not hesitate to tell the Americans how they were taken in.

Think of the Americans who received the trash of Gilbert Parker and learned after the war that they had been particularly singled out by Crewe House as likely dupes of British propaganda! Think of the disgusting stories told of Edith Cavell and the frightful movie that was made of that distressing incident! Many Americans know that Sir Austen Chamberlain condemned this notorious film root and branch, and said:

I believe that account of the execution to be wholly apocryphal, and it is an outrage on a noble woman's memory to turn, for the purposes of commercial gain, so heroic a story . . . I am speaking as an English gentleman what I think: the film is an outrage on humanity.

Americans know that Edith Cavell was a spy and that she had been warned by the German authorities. It was certainly a stupid blunder to execute her, but British soldiers know that she would have had short shrift if she had been a German caught behind the lines doing the same thing to the British.

Arthur Ponsonby (now Lord Ponsonby) in his book, *Falsehood in War-Time*, tells the story of how the atrocity yarns were manufactured, and he kept track of them during the war. Vansittart forgets that his book was



circulated in this country and read by many people who have not forgotten the vile lies disseminated by such people as Charteris and those who worked with him. It is strange that Vansittart seems to be ignorant of the fact that the whole show was given away in a book called *Behind the Scenes in French Journalisms*:

In the basement stood the machinery necessary for printing and reproduction; under the glass roof operated the photo-chemigraphic department. Its principal work consisted in making photographs and cuts of wooden figures with cut-off hands, torn-out tongues, gouged out eyes, crushed skulls, and brains laid bare. The pictures thus made were sent as unassailable evidence of German atrocities to all parts of the globe, where they did not fail to produce the desired effect.

In the same rooms fictitious photographs were made of bombarded French and Belgian Churches, violated graves and monuments and scenes of ruin and desolation. The staging and painting of these scenes were done by the best scene painters of the Paris Grand Opera . . . The Press house was the indefatigable geyser which belched forth incessantly false war reports and fictitious news from the rear and the front, the meanest and most brutal slanders of the opponents, the astonishing fictions of infamous acts attributed to them.

The insidious but efficacious poison thus broadcast has misled and infected a host of well meaning but unsophisticated people.

It seems to me that Vansittart's proper place was Hollywood, not Downing Street. Surely he is uniquely equipped in heart and mind for the position of war yarn spinner to the great firms built on what has been called "the film midden." Word is noised about that some of the great producers are short of atrocity material. I can scarcely believe this because there are American authors who have written on atrocities since the great days of the liberal triumph, when Woodrow Wilson was sent to the White House, who could give the real stories of what we did in Haiti, in Santo Domingo and Nicaragua.

To save time their busy scribes might read one short chapter in John Kenneth Turner's *Shall it be Again?* in which he tells the stories of what took place on the heights of Coyotepe in Vera Cruz. If sufficient material is not found in the books of American authors who have dealt with atrocities, they might look up the report on the treatment of conscientious objectors during the last war. A full record of this is to be found in the archives of the Department of Justice at Washington, if it has not been destroyed because of its horrific details.

## VIII

**S**UPPOSE IT BE GRANTED for the moment that the work of the Vansittartites is necessary for the purpose of raising the fighting spirit of the Allies, and in that way it helps to bring about the defeat of Hitler. What then? Another peace of vengeance? Surely not. Europe has had one such peace, and no one was satisfied with it. Some said it was "a travesty of justice"; others said "it was not vindictive enough."

The making of peace last time, compared with the making of peace this time, was a simple business. This is not the Europe Clemenceau and Lloyd George had to deal with. There was no Russia then; there is no France now. Notwithstanding the agreements of Cairo and Teheran as they have been declared to the public, there are incommensurable possibilities of grave friction arising among the conquerors as to what the basis of the next peace will be. The dissatisfaction which arose last time will seem paltry in comparison with the aims and counter-aims of Russia and Great Britain when the cards are exposed at the next peace conference.

Will the work of Vansittart make things any easier for Great Britain should the Russian Colossus decide to take a leaf out of Britain's diplomatic manual and tell Mr.

Churchill Europe has had quite enough of the British theory of balance of power and that Russia desires Europe for the Europeans without British interference?

We must think of such problems now while there is time, for it is already whispered that the next war is shaping and that Britain must hold the balance of power or become a third-class nation. The editor of the much-discussed article in the *Nineteenth Century* (September, 1943) on the Balance of Power has told us bluntly that, when this war began in September, 1939, "England fought to preserve the balance—for that reason and no other." This editor, Mr. Voigt, is known as Vansittart's mouthpiece. Again in plain terms we learn from Voigt: "The commonly accepted view that Germany made war to dominate the world is in our opinion mistaken."

So there are two Vansittarts. One enlightens the well-to-do classes in Britain on foreign policy; The other as high priest of the hate cult fabricates such screeds as the *Black Record* and *Lessons of my Life*. A pretty business for a Doctor of Literature! But the most startling of all the points raised by Voigt-Vansittart in the article refers to the probabilities of British action in certain eventualities for maintaining the balance, and we learn that emergencies might arise that "would compel England to reconsider her attitude to Germany."

There is enough dynamite in this article to blow our new world-planners to smithereens. However, what I should like to know is this: If Britain with the aid of America has to fight Russia for the balance of power, will Vansittart give us a *Black Record* on the wicked Bolsheviks and their atrocities, already authenticated? What a position for a Grand Commander of the Bath! Should Britain in the struggle find America weary of her job, what will Vansittart do if England links up with Germany to overthrow the totalitarianism of Stalin?

Who can tell what strange alignments are now in the

making? Who would hazard a guess as to who will be allies and who will be foes before this business ends? Is it not high time to sweep away all the tawdry properties of the hate shop and get down to the realities of the struggle in which we can gain absolutely nothing worth having and stand to lose all that is precious to us?

A dash of cold British Foreign Office realism such as is set out in Voigt's article in the *Nineteenth Century* is just what is needed to make our Congress understand the plight we are in. But what can be done about it? Nothing that I can see at present, for the millions insist this war must be fought to a finish. What finish? What do they really mean when they talk about the war ending with the defeat of Hitler? Surely this is only the beginning of the biggest problems they have to face. The defeat of Hitler does not mean that anything has been done to prevent another great war. The contest is clearly pointed out in the *Nineteenth Century* article. Great Britain and Russia are now fighting to gain what is called the "middle zone," for it is clearly understood by the European states that the Power that is master of that region is master of all Europe. The middle zone includes all the region between the Baltic and the Aegean and Adriatic Seas. This is what the writer of the article wishes us to understand:

... a Russian domination would bring the zone, and one of the great industrial centers of Europe, into Russia's closed economic and closed political system. It would bring upon Europe deep division, economic ruin, and political disaster, from which Great Britain could not escape. And the gainer, in the end, would not even be Russia, but Germany.

Is the United States called upon to supply 73 percent of the invading army to accomplish this end? Is this what the defeat of Hitler really means?

So long as people think war can be abolished by force there will never be peace, and so long as people believe

the enemy is solely responsible for the beginning of a war waged by the white race, hatred and vengeance will be fostered and used to foment more war. There is only one way to bring peace, and that is to abjure war. But to adopt this method of putting an end to strife between the nations it is necessary to raise a cultivated people. The primary thing in this is that men and women should desire to hold firmly to a sense of justice and reveal a consciousness of what is right. Christians must understand that hate is the enemy of the good. A prelate never yet discovered a way of bridging the awful abyss that lies between hate and heaven.

Vansittart says: "The Germans had already been consistently miseducated." What he means by this is: "They had already long been taught that they had 'a world mission of conquest.'" This is so untrue that it seems scarcely worth refuting. But suppose there were some truth in it. Why should it be miseducation for the Germans and the same mission called for by the British imperialists be right education? Bernhardt is the only one man of influence in Germany whom the Vansittarts can produce as having any such idea, and his book was published shortly before the last war. In *Germany and the Next War* General Bernhardt said:

The Moroccan negotiations of the summer of 1911 gave an irrefutable demonstration of the unqualified hostility of England against us. It was clearly shown that England is determined to prevent by force every real extension of German power. One can scarcely doubt that England is thinking in dead earnest of attacking Germany in certain circumstances.

Then referring to the increase of the English fleet as a preparation for aggressive war, Bernhardt says:

It is impossible to regard the English preparations as merely measures of defence. The English Government know

well that Germany cannot think on her side of attacking England, because such an attempt is in itself hopeless.

This reference in his book is scarcely ever quoted by the British imperialists. They tear two statements from their context which bolster their accusation that Germany was determined to conquer the world. Now the two gems they polish are as follows: (1) that if the war forced upon Germany by England, France, and Russia took place, the extreme result hoped for was to "attain a position as a world Power by the side of, and in spite of, England." This and, further on, the following: (2)

We shall, in this struggle, as so often before, represent the common interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win recognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas.

For every Bernhardt Vansittart can produce, it would be a simple matter to name a dozen Englishmen who made far more reckless statements.

What form the education is to take which will help to raise a cultivated people is nowhere mentioned in *Lessons of my Life*. The author quite overlooked the indispensable suggestion of who was fitted to teach a German, or a Japanese for that matter, how to respect the imperialist of Great Britain. For that is what it amounts to, after all. Surely there is enough to be done in education at home to take up the time of many generations of Vansittarts, but he must know he is not cut out for that job and, therefore, thinking some education is necessary somewhere, he will start on the defeated enemy. My own opinion is that, if such a miracle could take place as having the ex-Political Adviser to the Foreign Office pack his knapsack and wander here and there to educational establishments in the Reich, he, for the first time in his life, would put himself in the way of learning something valuable that was overlooked when he went to Eton.

Since the days of Nietzsche and his wonderful strictures upon the state of German education, no people that I know of have been so conscious of their shortcomings and none so industrious as the German in seeking deeper and wider knowledge. This is surely not an overstatement, and the Englishman who knew Germany thoroughly well before the last war would undoubtedly agree to this description of them. No, their faults did not lie in their system of education, although they realized that it was by no means perfect. Dr. Frederic Howe said just shortly before the last war began that illiteracy was unknown in Germany. That is true, and it could not be said of any other country. The trouble lay not there. What I always disliked about the country was the form of government. I abominated the necessity of a system of compulsory service. I loathe the rattle of the drum and the flashing of the bayonet.

I asked Beyerlein (who wrote *Jena or Sedan*) what it was about so many of the German officers that set up the backs of English people, and he said it was "the system of discipline." "In an orchestra," he added, "it makes for perfection, in an army it makes for tyranny." The manner of some of the German officers seemed to an Englishman not only overbearing but scornful of the man in plain clothes. He certainly did not show up well beside the average run of British officers who, as a class, were men at ease with civilians and treated them with respect. There were faults enough, heaven knows, but the system itself was responsible for most of them. But when Vansittart opens his school at the headquarters of the German army, we shall find after a few terms that even the most bull-headed Prussian officer will coo like a sucking dove.

In addition to these objections there were the patriarchal systems many of which were adopted later by Lloyd

George, such as compulsory sickness insurance and labor bureaus, under which the vast majority of the people were ticketed and numbered. Then there was so much legislation that an enormous bureaucracy was required to run the departments. My objection to this was not at all soothed by the fact that it was incorrupt and the least expensive of any in Europe. Indeed, my objections to the German state were those of an English Radical individualist. But I did not let my prejudice stand in the way of appreciating and enjoying what I found to be worthy of respect in the country, and I can say, after all my travels in Germany and my meeting with so many different sections of society there, that I never met, over a period of twelve years or more, a British person on German soil who was not there to benefit from the knowledge of her industry, the advance in her science or the enjoyment of her music. There was no such person in Germany in my day as a Vansittart!

It is strange that I should spend so much time in Germany and meet representatives of sections of society unknown to the Vansittartites and never once meet the kind of people Vansittart must have sedulously cultivated. I did not know such folk existed until the Great War began when the nationalist cults of hate sprang up again like dragons' teeth and were welcomed by the leaders of society no matter how deep in the soil of mendacity they were rooted. I should like to ask: What is the precise difference between Vansittart's hate of the Nazis and Hitler's hate of the Jews? Is there any particular difference? In the case of Hitler it is hate for hate. He blames the Jews for much of the sorrow that has been brought to Europe by war, and he firmly believes he has a case against them. Whether it will stand on examination is another matter. So far it has not been adequately

investigated. Indeed, it may be said there were English and Americans who, before Hitler appeared upon the scene, believed all that Hitler says against the Jew, and it is well known that the anti-Semitic movement is not merely German, it is world-wide and as ancient as the apostle Paul who set his face against the people from whom he sprang. Only a person without prejudice can go into this matter and attempt to solve the mighty problem it presents to great sections of society in every country in the world. Perhaps Vansittart should start in England, where I learned of anti-Semitism for the first time. Here in this country the war has intensified the feeling against the Jews, and we know of many outbreaks in districts against them and that special pleas are put out occasionally begging for protection from the anti-Semites.

It is said that Hitler has gone to extremes and that his brutalities against the Jewish people are abhorrent, but it should be understood quite clearly by people who are seriously disturbed at what is taking place that the movement against the Jews in Germany did not begin with Hitler. It began shortly after the so-called "policy of fulfillment" initiated by President Ebert. Turn to the article on Germany in the thirteenth edition of *The Encyclopedia Britannica*. There we learn:

Owing to the number of Jews among the Democratic and especially Socialist politicians, this Nationalist agitation was also preached as the struggle of the pure-bred German against the "hidden hand" of Jewry. Finally, and in reality most essentially, it soon took the form of a conflict of Social Democracy against the anti-Socialist forces of the rural districts and capitalism. Unfortunately for the Socialists, they had been obliged to take almost the sole responsibility for signing the treaty; although refusal to sign had been out of the question. The association of Socialism with national treachery was thus as easy as it was unjust.

When in Germany before World War I, I was never made conscious that there was an anti-Semitic movement. My friends were Jews and Gentiles—fellow workers in the arts. If there was any ill-feeling, they never showed it to me. The world I traveled in must have been one forbidden to Vansittart. God knows what haunts he frequented and what terrible people he was acquainted with!

Well, if we are to take any stock at all in Vansittart's outpourings of hate, we must ask him to state clearly and truthfully why he remained at the Foreign Office at three thousand pounds a year paid by the British taxpayers. He tells us in his book:

Mr. Chamberlain was perfectly entitled to dismiss me; all Prime Ministers have the right to choose their instruments. I could not have accommodated myself to him and his policy, since *I knew it to be mistaken*, so it came to the same thing anyway. I am bound to notice that policy in this book, though I shall never go out of my way to do so, and it is better to look forward than back. (Italics mine)

No, it would not do for Vansittart to look back upon his days when he was Political Adviser to the Foreign Office, and he has very good reason for saying little about that time. He must know that many people in Great Britain and this country are asking if it were honest of him, believing Germany meant to destroy Britain, to be in any way associated with Chamberlain and his cabinet during the period of so-called appeasement.

During the period when Vansittart was at the Foreign Office hundreds of English people must have received passports permitting them to visit Germany and, undoubtedly, German passports were honored by the Foreign Office admitting Germans into England. I know for a fact that many English youths went to Munich schools after the first war. I presume there were educational

establishments in other parts of Germany that also received English students. Then, of course, there must have been the come-and-go of the thousands of British and German merchants and tourists passing from England to Germany and from Germany to England. Is it not extraordinary that this was permitted to go on when all the time Vansittart at the Foreign Office believed that the German Government intended to destroy the British fleet and capture her trade? To think of all these people in their bland innocence running the fearful risk of being entrapped in Germany is enough to make one wonder whether the Foreign Office was deliberately planning such an incident for war propaganda purposes.

Now consider the Foreign Office record of this paragon of a diplomatist. He was Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs for eight years (1930-38) and Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Foreign Secretary for three years (1938-41). All this time (if we believe what he has set down in the *Black Record* and *Lessons of my Life*) he was convinced that Germany was arming to disrupt Europe and conquer Great Britain. He says he holds that "Seventy-five percent of Germans have for seventy-five years—the figures are easy to remember—been eager for any assault on their neighbours." Nevertheless he drew salaries for his jobs at the Foreign Office for eleven years, and there is no record of his thinking it would have been wise for an honest man to retire from the service. He has told us he was convinced that in 1897 "Germany inwardly declared war on the world, and has never since ceased to do so." However, he stuck to his post and its salary through thick and thin and, as an adviser to the Foreign Secretary, he calmly watched Halifax and Chamberlain commit "criminal follies" before and after Munich. Yet he remained adviser to his superiors, silently acquiescing in their policies

which he was sure were utterly inimical to the interests of the British people. For all this he was presented with a peerage. In 1940 he was made a Privy Councillor. He was decorated with the orders of Grand Commander of the Bath and Grand Commander of St. Michael and St. George; besides he received the degrees of Doctor of Literature and Doctor of Laws. And this man loaded with honors thought £3,000 a year of more importance to him than the Nazi menace against the interest of the British people.