CHAPTER TEN

THE DECLINE OF CIVILIZATIONS

I LITTLE thought when I was a choir boy and sang Henry Francis Lyte's beautiful verses that the day would dawn when the words "change and decay in all around I see" would become a text of some modern philosophers. Yet, in the middle of the last century it was not so easy to detect change and decay as it is today. Lyte, perhaps, was not thinking so much of the fluctuations in the desires of men and the destruction of their hopes as he was of the eternal law of civilization. Biologically it is all change and decay.

When Samuel Butler gave us his four brilliant works on evolution,[1] he startled the followers of Charles Darwin so thoroughly that they heaped coals of fire upon his head. In 1877 it was a task of singular courage to level shafts of searching criticism against the champion of evolution. Time, however, brings its rewards just as it so often brings its censure, and Butler, having come into his own, is today considered

by some scientists to be far wiser than the Darwinians themselves. The amateur who was scorned is now welcomed by the professionals. Perhaps no one during the nineteenth century delved so deeply into the subject of biological change and decay as Butler. In his *Luck, or Cunning?* published in 1886, he says:

> All change is *pro tanto* death or *pro tanto* birth. Change is the common substratum which underlies both life and death; life and death are not two distinct things absolutely antagonistic to one another; in the highest life there is still much death, and in the most complete death there is still not a little life. . . . [2]

Here, the man who resurrected Lamarck and gave new life to his theory that *sense of need* was the motive force of evolution directs our minds to the ever-present problem of being, which affects all intelligent creatures. This notion of death in life and life in death is perhaps the most profound of all the studies, for it touches everyone at all times, although comparatively few are conscious of it. Butler states:

> . . . When the note of life is struck the harmonics of death are sounded, and so, again, to strike death is to arouse the infinite harmonics of life that rise forthwith as incense curling upwards from a censer.[3]

For many years I had been thinking about this law in connection with the change and decay of nations, so when I read *The Decline of the West* I was somewhat prepared for its message. Spengler writes:

> Up to now everyone has been at liberty to hope what he pleased about the future. Where there are no facts, sentiment rules. But henceforward it will be every man's business to inform himself of what *can* happen and therefore of what with the unalterable necessity of destiny and irrespective of personal ideals, hopes or desires, *will* happen. . . . To birth belongs death, to youth age, to life generally its form and its allotted span. . . .[4]

The thoughts that came from this passage drove me to review, as well I should, the work of historians since the days of Grote and Arnold, and the more recent period of Freeman and Stubbs. It has been a fascinating occupation, one that would well repay the student who is now in danger of specializing in some particular branch of historical study to the exclusion of the higher achievement of taking in the whole general view of the fall of civilizations. Strangely enough, much that Stubbs, in *The Constitutional History of England*,"[5] and Freeman, in his historical essays,[6] suggested has been overlooked

because there was no special chapter to direct the reader to these findings or to emphasize those similarities of change at certain stages of a nation's development which they noted. One has to seek closely for these references in the various studies devoted to a great person, an event, or a period. Still, they are there and stand as shining lamps for those who need guidance.

May it be that this law of change and decay which is with us from womb to grave is also a law that affects the life of nations? Of course the one is biological and the other is political. The latter includes the economic, the industrial, and the social manifestations which, in turn, are affected by political governance and its laws for or against the well-being of the people. The two are distinctly separate; but there are likenesses that mystify one. Often enough they are so clear that it is difficult to cast aside the thought that something akin to a biological law is forever at work in the rise and fall of a nation. That there were men conscious of this before the days of Brooks Adams and Oswald Spengler is well known to the students whose work was accomplished under Arnold and Freeman. And the foundations laid by these men were so substantial that, when Lord Acton went to

Cambridge, he readily found eager throngs for his lectures.

In an article entitled "Lord Acton at Cambridge," by John Pollock,[7] we learn of the effect upon the students who attended the courses; of the intensity of conviction; and how Acton's feeling passed to the audience "which sat enthralled." He undoubtedly implanted in the mind of the youth of that day the necessity for regarding history in the universal sense and that this can be done only by realizing that the present can be understood solely through a knowledge of the past. Twenty years before, Stubbs had said that the germ of history in general "has a deep value and an abiding interest to those who have courage to work upon it." Then he continued:

> . . . For the roots of the present lie deep in the past, and nothing in the past is dead to the man who would learn how the present comes to be what it is. . . .[8]

This note had to be repeated many times, however, before it awoke the insular British student to the great fact that his own history was not only that of an island power but that it had a European significance. Indeed, its roots could be traced back to the dim ages when the Celt shared his culture with the Teuton.[9]

It would be simple for anyone who knows Freeman's work to select whole passages that reflect his consciousness of the pattern of the past in the autumn period of nations. In his lecture, "Europe Before the Roman Power,"[10] he refers to one "question" which from the beginning of recorded history has been awaiting solution. He says:

> . . . It is the "Eternal Eastern Question," the undying question between the civilization of the West and the barbarism of the East, a question which has here and there taken into its company such side issues as the strife between freedom and bondage, between Christendom and Islam, but which is in its essence simply that yet older strife of whose earlier stages Herodotus so well grasped the meaning. It is a strife which has, as far as we can look back, put on the familiar shape of a strife between East and West. And in that abiding strife, that Eternal Question, the men of the Eternal City, Scipio and Sulla, Trajan and Julian, played their part well indeed; but it was waged before them and after them as far back as the days of Agamemnon and Achilleus, as near to the present moment as the days of Codrington and Skobeleff. . . .[11]

The sweep from Herodotus to Skobeleff is a mighty one, but who, today, would blink the fact that the "Eternal Eastern Question" has not been laid? It is now a sinister problem so

far as Western Europe is concerned and within a few years it may become the crucial test of the stamina of what is left in Central Europe.

That some of the great nations of the past have been decaying slowly is not a new fact to us. Many observers have told us that Spain, Italy, and France have been in a state of decline for several generations. In the middle of the nineteenth century Renan said, "*La France se meurt; ne troublez pas son agonie.*"[12] The case of Spain is too well known to call for special mention; and as for Italy, before Mussolini appeared upon the scene, she had reached a stage when many thought her position was hopeless. But no Mussolini or Hitler or Franco can do more than spasmodically halt the rot for a short time. Whatever it is that undermines the vigor and resolution of the mass of the people, there is undoubtedly something organic that is wrong, and no injections of the serum of Fascism or Bolshevism can renew the tissue which formerly gave power to the people.

Notwithstanding the criticism of J. H. Round, in *Feudal England*,[13] I would advise young students of history to take up the Freeman lectures and essays again and study them closely. They are remarkable inasmuch as Freeman's anticipation of the similarities (discovered by the

historical investigators, such as Brooks Adams and Oswald Spengler in recent years) are acknowledged if they are not wholly accepted. What could be more significant than the following passage from Freeman's lecture entitled "The World Romeless":

> The latest times then are in truth a return to the earliest times, with this difference, that nations have taken the place of cities. Two of the masters of history in later times have pointed out the close analogy between the mutual relations of the cities of old Greece and those of the nations of modern Europe. The lesson has been taught us in its fulness alike by Arnold and by Grote. It hardly fell within the scope of either master to point out how truly the likeness is a cycle, how the later state of things is a return to the earlier, after the existence for many ages of a state of things wholly unlike either. . . .[14]

Further on in the same essay he says:

> . . . Athens, like Rome, has sunk to be a seat of local kingship; Achaia still lives, if not on her own Mediterranean shore, yet in the lands which reproduce her political life. She lives in a figure in the mountain land [Switzerland], the home of all that is oldest and newest in Western tradition and Western thought. And she lives too in a figure in the vaster federal and vaster English land beyond the Ocean. We indeed feel the Unity of History to be a living thing when we see the work of Markos of

> Keryneia and Aratos of Sikyôn reproduced on two such widely different scales in the younger hemisphere and in the elder.[15]

Let these two excerpts suffice, although one is tempted to cull more from Freeman's philosophy of history, reflections upon other manifestations of change, and about how the orbit of national development shrinks and is narrowed by the rise of the parasitical state.

Turning to Lord Acton, we find that historical inquiry went further and deeper than it had done at any other time in the universities. He says, in *The History of Freedom and Other Essays*:

> Looking back over the space of a thousand years, which we call the Middle Ages, to get an estimate of the work they had done, if not towards perfection in their institutions, at least towards attaining the knowledge of political truth, this is what we find: Representative government, which was unknown to the ancients, was almost universal. The methods of election were crude; but the principle that no tax was lawful that was not granted by the class that paid it—that is, that taxation was inseparable from representation—was recognised, not as the privilege of certain countries, but as the right of all. Not a prince in the world, said Philip de Commines, can levy a penny without the consent of the people. Slavery was almost everywhere extinct; and absolute power was deemed more intolerable and more criminal than slavery. The right of insur-

> rection was not only admitted but defined, as a duty sanctioned by religion. Even the principles of the Habeas Corpus Act, and the method of the Income Tax, were already known. The issue of ancient politics was an absolute state planted on slavery. The political produce of the Middle Ages was a system of states in which authority was restricted by the representation of powerful classes, by privileged associations, and by the acknowledgment of duties superior to those which are imposed by man.[16]

There are many who will not agree with this, because serfdom, in some form, existed in many European states during the Middle Ages. But Acton realized there was a great economic difference between the serf and the slave. According to Thorold Rogers, the serf had not less than twelve acres of arable land and privileges in his lord's forests.[17] But the slave was economically helpless because he was landless.

It is a great pity that Freeman and Acton have been neglected for so long. When *The Decline of the West* was published, I fully expected some of the critics to turn to the Englishmen who had lectured on history at Oxford and Cambridge and draw from them comparisons that would be useful in their reviews of Spengler's work. If any did so, I was most unfortunate in not finding them. But even late as it is I would recommend that the student peruse Professor F. E. Lally's

book, called *As Lord Acton Says*.[18] It is an excellent introduction to the lectures and essays of England's most brilliant historical scholar.

The condition of the world today is so parlous that it seems essential for us to give more time to this grave matter of how we came to reach the present stage. The warnings thrown out by Adams and Spengler must have fallen upon dull minds—probably numbed by the propagandists of progress. That cry of facing the future, oblivious of the past, and advancing without reflection has cost us dearly. We need a mind cleansing, a spiritual purge that will wash away the clutterings of the superficial politician who has yielded to the blandishments of the barkers of the modern show.

Is it too late to reflect? We may well ask ourselves that question. Within a few short years after Spengler's work was published, his warnings became realities we had to acknowledge. Caesarism was upon us before we knew it. How incredibly short the time has been since the chief nations of Europe and of this hemisphere looked to the future with hope! Within three-quarters of a century the whole condition of the world has been changed.

It would be difficult to find in the annals of any nation a period in which men looked to a

future of security and progress with greater confidence than the British did from the end of the Franco-German War to the meeting at Algeciras. And as for this country, for nearly a generation and a half after the Civil War, serious men seemed to believe implicitly that this was an "El Dorado scarcely scratched" and that fortune was in the grasp of anyone who had the initiative and daring to accomplish "big things." Fifty years ago James Hill said, "The whole west is still wide open." And now, for the second time within thirty years, the youth of our country have been sacrificed on foreign battlefronts, and we have wasted our resources with small hope of redemption or revival. That will depend upon whether or not we are plunged into another world struggle.

Perhaps one of the most remarkable of our deficiencies is the utter absence of a spirit of revolt in the masses—the lack of demand for the restoration of rights. During the last war it was present in some degree in all nations. Now in this country I never hear of it. Surely the acid test of the political virility of a people is whether or not it has the courage to protest. There is no protest today, and, to my mind, this means a palsy has fallen upon us. Undoubtedly much of this may be attributed to

the patriarchal schemes of the state, which have undermined the independence and resolution of the people. There may even be a law at work operating against the spiritual stamina of the folk. After long years of struggle against the inflictions of bureaucracies, a weariness has set in which has weakened the fiber and left it a prey to the germs of decay. Whatever it be, the thoughtful man must recognize the fact that this generation has not shown at any time the courage of its predecessors.

In this respect there can scarcely be any difference of opinion about the parallels between this stage in our civilization and the time of the classical nations. But why they are disregarded by those who are at work upon schemes to reform the world is something that can scarcely be explained. The only conclusion one can draw for this neglect of learning from the past is that the past is not now known as it was by those of two generations ago. A manufacturer of motor cars some years ago said, "History is bunk." And I verily believe that the mass of the people agree with that remark. But is it? Richard Crawley, in the introduction to his translation of *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, says:

> . . . A lamented historian was able to fight the battle of English party politics under the names of "Nicias" and "Cleon," and there are probably few books that have so much contributed to the spread of liberal opinions in modern England as Mr. Grote's reflections upon the affairs of ancient Greece. Indeed, as Arnold remarked, the portion of history dealt with by Thucydides is only ancient in the sense that the events related happened a long while ago; in all other respects it is more modern than the history of our own countrymen in the Middle Ages. . . .[19]

But neither Arnold nor Grote ever imagined such a disaster falling upon the world as this we suffer. They little dreamed that whole pages might be taken from Thucydides which fit so closely the present burdens of the world that it would be difficult for anyone to cast them aside with the hasty remark that history does not repeat itself.

In the history of nations we can no longer ignore the manifestation of cycles and repetition of growth and deterioration. Spengler suggests that this civilization is dying of an overdose of history. It may very well be that the historian of the future, in comparing what is now taking place in the world with those events that brought Rome and Greece to the winter of their despair, will say that the only difference is in the fact

that the tragedy of our day covers a greater area, goes deeper, and that the outlook for us is more hopeless. Those who wish to be deceived may play at hoodman-blind to their hearts' content, but that we have entered our winter, according to the findings of Adams, Spengler, and many others, is a fact no amount of optimism can hide. Spengler says:

> . . . Long ago we might and should have seen in the "Classical" world a development which is the complete counterpart of our own Western development, differing indeed from it in every detail of the surface but entirely similar as regards the inward power driving the great organism towards its end. . . .[20]

When *The Decline of the West* was published, many of its readers thought the leading ideas were new, but one or two reviewers reminded us that they had been expressed several times before by famous philosophers and historians.

There was recently published *The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico*.[21] It is a work that should be in the hands of every student of general history. The life of the famous author of the *New Science* covered the last quarter of the seventeenth century and the first of the eighteenth. Italian is a language I do not know, and I have not succeeded in finding an English translation

of the *New Science*. Therefore, my knowledge of Vico's philosophy has been gleaned from Croce[22] and especially from Professor Robert Flint's profound study,[23] which, to my mind, is a far superior avenue of approach to Vico's work than is Croce's. Flint, who was professor in the University of Edinburgh, in summing up, says:

> . . . His belief in cycles or *ricorsi* was, indeed, inconsistent with a belief in continuous progress in a straight line, but not with advance on the whole. . . . He was keenly aware of the gloomy and perplexing features of history; he was convinced that all nations tended to decay, death, and corruption: yet he was no pessimist; nay, he was an avowed and decided optimist, firmly believing that all that happened was for the best, and that the severest sufferings of humanity were of a remedial and educative character. . . .[24]

Were he at work today, his optimism would receive many hard blows. Certainly he would have to concede that our present state does not evince that we have remedied much or that our education has served us well.

I have found many references to Vico's philosophy in the books of historians and sociologists, but few of our authors seem to appreciate the significance of his work and its relation to this time. It was, perhaps, far better known

by the historians of a hundred years ago than by those of today.

We are reminded by the translators of Vico's autobiography that Thomas Arnold was the first English author to acknowledge his indebtedness to Vico. In his essay, "The Social Progress of States," Arnold realized that

> states, like individuals, go through certain changes in a certain order, and are subject at different stages of their course to certain peculiar disorders; [that] the largest portion of that history which we commonly call ancient is practically modern, as it describes society in a state analogous to that in which it now is; while, on the other hand, much of what is called modern history is practically ancient, as it relates to a state of things which has passed away.[25]

For more than half a century after Vico died, the ground cultivated by him lay fallow, and then Jacob Burckhardt (1784–1817) gave his lectures in Basel. He is likened by a few of our discerning writers to Henry Adams, but it seems to me the similarities of thought are more akin to those of Brooks Adams than to those of his brother. Burckhardt, in *Force and Freedom*, says:

> I have no hope at all for the future. It is possible that a few half endurable decades may still be

> granted to us, a sort of Roman imperial time. I am of the opinion that democrats and proletarians must submit to an increasingly harsh despotism, even if they make the wildest efforts, for this fine century is designed for anything rather than true democracy.[26]

The "half endurable decades" came and passed, and now despotisms of an order never imagined by Burckhardt have fallen upon Europe and threaten to enslave its people. In this Eurasian calamity we should ponder the following:

> . . . By no means every destruction entails regeneration. Just as the destruction of a finer vegetation may turn a land into an arid waste for ever, a people which has been too brutally handled will never recover. There are (or at any rate there seem to be) absolutely destructive forces under whose hoofs no grass grows. The essential strength of Asia seems to have been permanently and for ever broken by the two periods of Mongol rule. Timur in particular was horribly devastating with his pyramids of skulls and walls of lime, stone and living men. Confronted with the picture of the destroyer, as he parades his own and his people's self-seeking through the world, it is good to realize the irresistible might with which evil may at times spread over the world. In such countries, men will never again believe in right and human kindness. . . .[27]

In Burckhardt, too, I find many other likenesses to the thought of Brooks Adams. The following

passage might have been written for *The Law of Civilization and Decay*. Nichols says:

> And back in the days when there was scarcely a socialist party of note in Europe, Burckhardt foresaw economic socialism as the end of this democratic tendency. When all the other "rights of the people" had been exploited, and "envy and greed" encouraged by their success, then would come the turn of personal and family property and wealth. "I don't fear the evil will come from sudden attacks so much as from gradually increasingly socialistic legislation."[28]

In glancing back at the precursors of Spengler, it is surprising to find in their writings this critical examination of economic, political, industrial, and sociological conditions and, at the same time, almost the identical phraseology used in expressing the opinions. For example, Spengler says:

> . . . Of great painting or great music there can no longer be, for Western people, any question. Their architectural possibilities have been exhausted these hundred years. Only *extensive* possibilities are left to them. Yet, for a sound and vigorous generation that is filled with unlimited hopes, I fail to see that it is any disadvantage to discover betimes that some of these hopes must come to nothing. . . .[29]

Brooks Adams wrote in the same way:

Thus the history of art coincides with the history of all other phenomena of life; for experience has demonstrated that, since the Reformation, a school of architecture, like the Greek or Gothic, has become impossible. No such school could exist in a society where the imagination had decayed, for the Greek and Gothic represented imaginative ideals. In an economic period, like that which has followed the Reformation, wealth is the form in which energy seeks expression; therefore, since the close of the fifteenth century, architecture has reflected money.[30]

And, yet, those who wish to be deceived scarcely ever pause to reflect on what happened to the optimists of other ages. The soothsayers of Greece and Rome were no different from those who use the radio morning, noon and night. Before anyone here realized the coming of this catastrophe, I wrote:

Those who imagine that this civilization is proof against decay disregard the warning which is present in the history of the decline of every people that has passed. They seem to be under the impression that inventiveness and machinery or, to use the much-worn phrase, scientific approach, will enable us to escape what other nations suffered before their fall. There were always, however, optimists in every civilization who took just exactly the same attitude. The soothsayers our universities turn out are no different from those of classical times. No doubt, in Babylon at the time of the rise of Assyria, there

> were numbers of soothsayers to tell Sennacherib that his policies were sound and that his State was founded upon a rock. They did not tell him that his slaves would welcome the enemy, that his bureaucrats were discouraging producers, and that the internal discontent of his State was a danger which threatened to undermine its alleged stability. In Greece, too, there were many soothsayers, even a few days before the end came, when the freeborn Athenians who were captured as slaves were branded with the stamp of the coat of arms of Athens. . . .[31]

Suppose our optimists were to take my humble suggestion and go over the works that I have mentioned as forerunners of the thought of Brooks Adams and Oswald Spengler, in order to learn something of the past. I believe that they would realize it is high time to point the dangers of apathy and ignorance. I can very well understand how the reader of today, so short of real schooling, would turn from *The Law of Civilization and Decay* as being merely the opinion of one man—Brooks Adams. Not knowing the world of thought that lies behind this work it is not likely that he would be impressed by it. With Spengler it is altogether different, because only very few people would give the time to read *The Decline of the West*, even if they were qualified to fathom its deep significance. It is too big, too varied in scope for the man of today.

But Brooks Adams' volume is one that any intelligent person can read from beginning to end and, in some respects, he has a clearer economic knowledge than Spengler had. Adams' chapter on "The Eviction of the Yeomen"[32] might have been written by Thorold Rogers. And in the brief survey of "The Suppression of the Convents"[33] Adams neglects no essential part of the story of that crime. It is remarkable how he has compressed into one comparatively short book so much history.

One may object to such a narrow statement of the causes of decay as the following:

> Thought is one of the manifestations of human energy, and among the earlier and simpler phases of thought, two stand conspicuous—Fear and Greed. Fear, which, by stimulating the imagination, creates a belief in an invisible world, and ultimately develops a priesthood; and Greed, which dissipates energy in war and trade.[34]

It was not all fear and greed by any means. For these two demons must have been present in the nature of the people at all times. To my mind these become the symptoms of decay, but for long centuries the springtime of a people seemed to be proof against them. When the people were historyless in their early spring, they were

townless, and their laws—unwritten—were those of the land-cultivating tribe.[35]

Neither Adams nor Spengler mentions the findings of Sir Henry Maine,[36] nor do they seem to realize that the simple economic principles of the springtimes they refer to as having passed away still exist in not a few Indian communities. And, yet, both men seem to be conscious that the historyless people survive. Indeed, Spengler grants that point although he says that the end of the winter means the return to the fellaheen. Perhaps the only chance that is left is to revive the religious and economic conditions of the early culture. Depopulation of the cities, as a result of a return to the land, might lead to salvation—economic and spiritual.

Adams, in *The Law of Civilization and Decay*, holds out no hope that we can grasp and turn to our advantage. Spengler, on the other hand, says:

> . . . But from Skepsis there is a path to "second religiousness," which is the sequel and not the preface of the Culture. Men dispense with proof, desire only to believe and not to dissect.[37]

This is to be found in the chapter on "Nature-Knowledge" in the first volume, but Spengler does not elaborate in that chapter what he means by this "second religiousness." In the

second volume, he touches upon it in several places as a condition into which we might enter, and in the chapter on "Pythagoras, Mohammed, Cromwell," he says:

> . . . The Second Religiousness is the necessary counterpart of Caesarism, which is the final *political* constitution of Late Civilizations. . . . It consists in a deep piety that fills the waking-consciousness—the piety that impressed Herodotus in the (Late) Egyptians and impresses West-Europeans in China, India, and Islam—and that of Caesarism consists in its unchained might of colossal facts. But neither in the creations of this piety nor in the form of the Roman Imperium is there anything primary and spontaneous. Nothing is built up, no idea unfolds itself—it is only as if a mist cleared off the land and revealed the old forms, uncertainly at first, but presently with increasing distinctness. The material of the Second Religiousness is simply that of the first, genuine, young religiousness—only otherwise experienced and expressed. It starts with Rationalism's fading out in helplessness, then the forms of the Springtime become visible, and finally the whole world of the primitive religion, which had receded before the grand forms of the early faith, returns to the foreground, powerful, in the guise of the popular syncretism that is to be found in every Culture at this phase.[38]

I would that this were probable, but the question it poses is: Are we not too far gone in

our decline to place our hopes upon a redemption of this order? The present war had not begun when Spengler passed away and, although he foretold it, he could not possibly have imagined its immensity. When other civilizations declined and a second religiousness appeared, there were still great areas of the world in which not only new civilizations were to know their springtime, but there was also a sense that somewhere beyond there was in virgin lands a refuge to be found for those who dared venture forth. Today every frontier is sealed. The omnipotent state in every section of the globe rules whether a visitor may cross its frontier. That was not so with the classical civilizations. However, there may be a way that a second religiousness might open up new vistas to the despised and rejected of the state—the all-too-many.

I wonder that neither Adams nor Spengler gave more thought to his cursory remarks on practical mysticism[39] and did not associate it with a goal to be reached. Such an idea would, of necessity, have forced them back upon the economic conditions that existed before fear, greed, and envy became, as it were, the foundation stones of the state, temporal and spiritual.

A revulsion of feeling on the part of the worshipers of the state may turn them to a second

religiousness. But if it should, it could be effective in only one way—to make itself proof against the power of the politician, the architect of the state. It would be essential for the people to understand thoroughly that their economic salvation lay in producing only sufficient for their needs. For I hold that, if the people have no surplus, a politician cannot exist. Their only hope, indeed, would be to have little or nothing upon which the parasite could feed. This would mean a return to practical mysticism[40]—a union with the Godhead—as clear a conception of worship as they had who raised the first altar, a token of thanksgiving to the Provider of the source of their sustenance.

Thomas Paine, in his observations upon "The French Declaration of Rights," says in a note:

> There is a single idea which, if it strikes rightly upon the mind, either in a legal or a religious sense, will prevent any man, or any body of men, or any government, from going wrong on the subject of religion: which is, that before any human institutions of government were known in the world, there existed, if I may so express it, a compact between God and man from the beginning of time; and that as the relation and condition which man in his individual person stands in towards his maker cannot be changed by any human laws or human authority, that religious devotion, which is a part of this com-

> pact, cannot so much as be made a subject of human laws; and that all laws must conform themselves to this prior existing compact, and not assume to make the compact conform to the laws which, besides being human, are subsequent thereto. The first act of man, when he looked around and saw himself a creature which he did not make and a world furnished for his reception, must have been devotion; and devotion must ever continue sacred to every individual man as it appears right to him; and governments do mischief by interfering.[41]

Religion did not spring from fear. Its origin came from the soul of thankful man who worshiped the Provider of the source of his needs who had given to him, as the classical writers tell us, the earth, the sun, and the rain for his happiness. Early man knew this far better than our philosophers. In this way the second religiousness might be the avenue through which our heirs may pass to a serener day.

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES

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[1] *Life and Habit* (1877); *Evolution, Old and New* (1879); *Unconscious Memory* (1880); *Luck, or Cunning?* (1886), all republished in London: Jonathan Cape, 1921–22.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[4] Vol. I, pp. 39–40.

[5] Three vols.; 2nd ed.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1875.

[6] Edward A. Freeman, *Historical Essays* (First, Second, Third, Fourth Series; London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1886–92).

[7] This appeared in the *Independent Review* (England) for April, 1904.

[8] Preface to *The Constitutional History of England*, written in 1873.

[9] See Dr. Martin Bang's essay on "Expansion of the Teutons" in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, I, chap. VII, 183–218.

[10] *The Chief Periods of European History*, six lectures (London: Macmillan and Co., 1886), Lecture I.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 5. Sir William Codrington was a soldier who commanded in the Crimean War, and General Mikhail D. Skobeleff was a Russian who figured prominently in the Turkish War of 1877.

[12] Quoted by Algernon Cecil in *Metternich* (rev. ed.; London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1943), p. 10.

[13] London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895.

[14] *The Chief Periods*, Lecture VI, pp. 183–84.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 198–99.

[16] London: Macmillan and Co., 1907; reprinted, 1919, p. 39.

[17] *Six Centuries of Work and Wages* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, no date), p. 40.

[18] Newport, Rhode Island: Remington Ward, 1942.

[19] Everyman's Library; London: J. M. Dent & Sons; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1936, p. x.

[20] *Op. cit.*, I, 26–27.

[21] Trans. from the Italian by Max Harold Fisch and Thomas Goddard Bergin; Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1944.

[22] *The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico* (trans. by R. G. Collingwood; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913).

[23] *Vico* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1884).

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 228–29.

[25] Fisch and Bergin, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[26] Edited by James Hastings Nichols; New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1943, p. 8.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 363.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35.

[29] *Decline of the West*, I, 40.

[30] *Law of Civilization*, with an introduction by Charles A. Beard (new ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943), p. 348.

[31] Neilson, *Man at the Crossroads* (Appleton, Wis.: C. C. Nelson Publishing Co., 1938), pp. 267–68.

[32] *Op. cit.*, chap. IX. See also *supra*, chaps. IV and V, "The Conspiracy Against the English Peasantry."

[33] *Ibid.*, chap. VIII.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[35] For the significance of the growth of the city, the reader might be interested in Neilson, *The Roots of our Learning* (1946), chap. XI, "The Cloister or the Town."

[36] *Ancient Law* (Everyman's Library; London and Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1931); *Early History of Institutions* (6th ed.; London: John Murray, 1893); *Early Law and Custom* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1883); *Popular Government* (London: John Murray, 1885); *Village-Communities* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1876). *Cf. supra*, p. 66 and p. 82, *note* 25; and *infra*, pp. 284-85.

[37] *Decline of the West*, I, 424.

[38] *Ibid.*, II, 310–11. *Cf. The Roots of our Learning*, pp. 280–81.

[39] *Cf.* Brooks Adams, *op. cit.*, chap. IV, and Spengler, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, chap. IX.

[40] See Neilson, *The Roots of our Learning*, chap. X, "The Return to Mysticism."

[41] Quoted in *Thomas Paine* by Harry Hayden Clark (New York: American Book Company, 1944), footnote, p. 134.