Ladies and Gentlemen:

In my last lecture I tried to give you some idea of the magnitude and range of changes which have taken place in the Pacific Basin since New Zealand was settled by Europeans one hundred and forty years ago and I ventured the opinion that the next fifty years could see changes just as great as those of the immediate past.

Just what these changes might be can be only a matter for speculation but it is possible that within that time Japan may be re-armed. Under Chinese influence and pressure, North and South Korea may peacefully re-unite. Taiwan may be re-united with China and its social patterns and successful economy might have a profound influence on China’s “long march” to modernity. The Philippine Republic may be jolted by revolution from feudalism to a juster social order. There may be stirrings and even revolt in Asiatic Russia whose population is largely non-European. It is unlikely, however, that any of these events will in themselves disturb profoundly the balance of power either military or economic in the western Pacific. There is no doubt that a Russian-allied Vietnam, with greatly extended borders, could have profound influence on the course of future events. Of these matters, however, we cannot know, we can only speculate.

Nuclear warfare between Russia and the United States of America is, I think, highly improbable. It is said that “no one wins a war” and this is doubly true of any possible nuclear conflict. This fact is grasped equally by the greatest and the meanest intelligence. The appalling waste of material resources on nuclear weapons—resources needed so desperately in other areas by the human family—make it not unrealistic to hope that the small and tentative steps forward represented by the SALT II Treaty may prove to be a movement on the road to nuclear disarmament.

A major nuclear war would bring changes so unpredictable and so profound that expectations for orderly international evolution and a national defence policy linked thereto may well prove to be futile. We must therefore read the future and provide for its necessities disregarding nuclear warfare as
being almost irrelevant to our task.

I venture to express the view that by far the most dangerous tension point, not only in the Pacific, but in the whole world is in the Sino-Russian area. I have spoken of China, with its population of almost a thousand million people, as a time bomb which must explode and the greater probability is that it will discharge its energy deep into Soviet Asia. A much less likely possibility is that the force may be diverted into the near-empty continent of Australia. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that the Chinese and the Russians may enter into an alliance to achieve that end. China's population will continue to increase. In spite of all social policies zero population growth cannot occur within the critical period. Although today a southern drive seems much less likely than a western one the balance of likelihood could change in the next fifty years.

Were such a undertaking entered upon by a Sino-Russian alliance the first limited objective might well be the occupation and colonisation of the North Island of New Zealand. It need not involve any great brutality or even very severe hardship to transfer the population of the North Island to the South Island. It need not be done with the speed and savagery with which Kemal Ataturk expelled a million and a half Greeks from Asia Minor to their ancestral homeland in 1922.

The occupation of the North Island would put Australia at the invaders' mercy. Every state capital, even Perth, would be within reach of short or medium range missiles. It is commonly asserted, even by the highest authorities, that in matters of defence New Zealand needs Australia but Australia has no need of New Zealand. From this view I dissent. Indeed, I believe the very opposite statement would be nearer the truth. We need each other desperately. Our defence must be totally unified. Our security is indivisible. In this context we are indeed one people and one country.

This scenario must not be taken too literally. Nothing is more futile in this volatile area than forecasting in 1980 the balance of military power in 2030 A.D.

China is not the only heavily populated Asiatic country. There are 200 million people in Indonesia and 600 million in India for example.

One thing is sure and that is that no military attack can be made on the coasts of the Tasman Sea without the support of very great naval forces. Today Russia and America are the only
naval powers in the West Pacific but America is further away and the Russians are nearer their home ports. Further, the Americans have much greater commitments in other oceans than have the Russians.

A defence policy must envisage all possibilities and not some probabilities.

There are many unknowns and unknowables ahead. Nevertheless, I venture to express the view that it is time to implement a defence policy based on this general concept which will reach maximal effectiveness in fifty years from now. This is probably the maximal length of time history will allow us.

The practical difficulties of an Asiatic thrust into the South Pacific are formidable. The core of these difficulties are in distance, transport and supply. None of them is insuperable in the modern world.

When I speak of defence I do not mean providing protection from assault by intercontinental ballistic missiles or bombardment from submarines or even from surface craft. Perhaps there is no nation on earth whose land-based defences could prevent or ward off such attacks. The defence I speak of is the defence against invasion and successful occupation by a hostile force. Such an attacking force does not aim to enter upon a nuclear desert and hence such attacks are not likely to employ nuclear weapons.

It is my conviction that Australia and New Zealand should look to their defences now, bearing in mind always that the lead time to the point where the defences are tested may be shortened by unforeseeable events.

Defense Planning

I think at this point it would be well to examine the principles which should inform our defence planning and the pattern they should take in their application.

There are three main alternatives which have at various times and with various modifications been advocated. I will call these three:

(a) Planned defencelessness
(b) Security through alliance
(c) Fortress Anzac

(a) Planned Defencelessness

This is a policy of pacifism. We will by choice have no
defences. Our country will be a Switzerland of the South Pacific — an oasis of peace in a violent world. This attitude expresses a sincerely held philosophy or is generated by the hopelessness of our present position and a belief that it can never be any different. There are a few who believe or hope that somehow, sometime, the United Nations will develop an effective mediator role in such a high degree as to render armaments unnecessary. In my view this approach to defence, whatever its motivation, is quite unrealistic. I could spend some time developing the reasons why I have reached this conclusion, but if I had to state the ultimate reason why New Zealand should reject a policy of planned defencelessness I would merely say “It is because we are who we are and we speak the English tongue.”

Because I have expressed these views do not think for a moment that I mean any disrespect for the United Nations. New Zealand should support in every possible way the splendid work of this world organisation. It incidentally is involved in many works of immense importance to the human family, other than matters of war and peace. Our voice should be raised at Lake Success clearly and often; to speak both on our behalf and, where appropriate, on behalf of our neighbours in the small, recently independent states on our northern defence perimeter. We should be willing and proud to contribute armed forces at any time to support the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations. Too frequently the United Nations is dismissed as unimportant, as totally powerless, as misused, as misinformed, as a mere talking shop for power and pressure groups. All these statements are in some degree true. It remains, however, the hope of mankind and we should do our small part willingly and constantly in support. Indeed I believe we should at intervals welcome the Secretary-General as an honoured guest of our nation not for any personal qualities he may have but because of the high office he occupies. The voice of these men has often expressed in the most public way the hopes, the aspirations and the conscience of mankind.

I have emphasised that in speaking of defence I do not mean aggression. I believe the time has passed, and passed forever, when New Zealand should deploy military forces of any kind beyond our defence perimeter except in the service of the United Nations.
I hold this opinion for three reasons:
1. We must do our utmost to live and trade in peace with all Pacific peoples and we must never excite their enmity or hatred for any cause. They will be our neighbours for ever.
2. Great powers may use military force, or the threat of force, as an instrument of policy but we can never be strong enough away from our base to act in such a way. Nor should we rattle a tiny sabre in unison with the great.
3. In 1942 when Australia was under attack by the Japanese the flower of her army was in North Africa and they had to be brought home. Further, some 22,000 men of the Australian forces were trapped in Singapore by the Japanese and 8,000 did not come home.

The lesson must be learned: A garrison must never leave the fortress.

(b) Security through Alliance

I use this term for want of a better one. This is the kind of defence we had when our motherland was the superpower of the world and it served this colony well.

Thinking on defence engendered by this dependence on England and the Empire still persists. The only change made is the substitution of the United States of America for the Empire or the Commonwealth. What a time it was when loyalty and patriotism and love set our hearts aflame! When no price was too high and no sacrifice too great to defend our people at home and beyond the remotest seas. The age has passed forever and no nation, however great, can replace in practical or emotional terms that Land of Hope and Glory. We are on our own now.

Those who would base a defence policy on "security through alliance" imply that without a powerful patron and protector such as the United States our defence is impossible. This I deny and yet I am fervently thankful for ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty Pact) because in one sense it provides the only defence we have and no matter how deficient our defences may be fifty years hence it is my fervent hope that this alliance of English speaking peoples will continue for into the future.

No one who served in the Pacific during World War II and who saw at first hand the strength and valour of American arms could think differently. However, the special circumstances of those times may never be exactly reproduced.
American territory had been directly attacked. Her defence of Australia and New Zealand was a part of her defence of her own coasts. On Sunday December 12th 1941 the Japanese, without any declaration of war, made an aerial attack on the American fleet enchored in Pearl Harbour in Hawaii. Hawaii was then a Territory of the U.S. and became in 1959 the 50th state of the Union. Australia and New Zealand played a vital part in the campaign which ended with the conquest and occupation of the Japanese homeland. We provided an ideal base from which our allies could operate and we supplied what armed forces we could. We supplied them with food and a multitude of support services such as harbours, docks and communications. We cared for their sick and wounded and provided rest and recreation facilities for their fighting men. Such a set of circumstances may never recur.

The United States of America is a global power. She has a deep commitment to the defence of Europe and she has vital concerns in the oil rich Middle East. The Americas and Southern Africa involve her interests much more directly than this relatively remote southwest Pacific region. In world economic terms, in population and in crisis potential this area is relatively unimportant. The ANZUS pact, given the right circumstances could prove to be as loose a bond as that which bound America to Taiwan. The ties of cultural kinship, important as they are, may stand but little strain and certainly not survival stresses. They appear, for example, to have little force in Rhodesia or South Africa where the bitterest criticism of Europeans comes from their fellows.

The Treaty by no means can be interpreted as a total commitment by the United States to our defence. Article 10 provides that any of the three parties to the Treaty can withdraw after giving one year’s notice. Article 4 states:

“Each party recognises that armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the three parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”

In the United States, Congress alone has the power to declare war and “the constitutional process” therefore means that war will be declared if Congress so decides. Congress would no doubt, and quite properly, make decisions on peace
or war in the best interests of the United States as they exist at the time.

The point is not worth pursuing, however, because in fact no treaty can offer more than very limited guarantees of security in matters of defence. The experience of Belgium in 1914 and Poland in 1939 among a host of others illustrate the point.

I do not say these things to belittle the importance of the ANZUS Treaty. It is of the very greatest importance to us. Indeed at present it provides the kingpin of what defence New Zealand and Australia have and we must sincerely hope that it will endure long enough to enable us to develop our own defences to a realistic level and for many decades beyond. The best way to ensure the long continuance of this important pact is for us to make ourselves strong and useful allies by developing our own defence potential. We should aim at securing American participation in the building and equipment of a focus of defence in our own area and so give to the world visible evidence of the treaty's importance and the commitment of its signatories. But of this more anon.

(c) Fortress Anzac

This is the name I will give to the plan of defence which I think is preferable above all others and indeed the only practical plan which New Zealand can adopt.

I have said repeatedly that the defence of Australia and New Zealand is one and indivisible. This is the basic fact on which the defence plan of Fortress Anzac is built.

The subject is a large one but I will condense it into three statements:

1. Securely based on a steadily expanding economy and a steadily increasing population, Australia and New Zealand over a period of fifty years should expand the naval and air arms of the defence forces so as to be able to offer effective defence against any assault by invasion forces from the north.

2. The outer defence perimeters should be in the island states to the north of New Zealand and north east of Australia and every possible means must be taken to enter into a mutual defence alliance with each of these island states.

3. Ground forces should be expanded to be able to combat any force which might penetrate the outer defences and effect a landing on our coasts.

Before proceeding further I would like to say something
more, bearing especially on the second of these three statements, namely that which concerns our mutual defence alliance with the island states to the north.

It would be highly desirable if the ANZUS pact could be reviewed to include not only Australia and New Zealand and the United States of America but each of these island states as well.

The map before you indicates more precisely what I mean when I refer to the outer defensive arcs based on the northern islands. It must be the first aim of our defence policy to strengthen our naval and air forces to a point where our commitment to the defence of the islands on these arcs has some reality. You will notice that the two defensive arcs intersect at Noumea in New Caledonia and I invite you now to consider some matters pertinent to this fact.

New Caledonia is an island about one-sixth the size of the North Island of New Zealand. Its capital, Noumea, has a fine harbour. It is about a thousand miles from Auckland and eight hundred miles from the nearest point on the Australian coast. The island was discovered by Captain Cook. It was annexed by France in September 1853 to the intense chagrin of the incomparable Grey, at that time Governor of New Zealand. Sir George appreciated the very great importance of this island in the defence of Australia and New Zealand and he set out with Bishop Selwyn in the brig “Victoria” in November 1853 to make a personal reconnaissance of the area only to learn that the island had been annexed two months earlier by France. His efforts to persuade Britain to dispute French sovereignty were unsuccessful. The French at that time were the allies of the British and the Turks in the war against Russia being fought in the Crimea. The French used the island as a penal settlement for thirty-five years. It is now an Overseas Territory of French Polynesia and is represented in the French National Assembly by one deputy and one senator. There is a Territorial Assembly dealing with local affairs. Its jurisdiction is currently being enlarged. This is in response to a growing demand by the local inhabitants for self-rule and independence from France. The population is 142,000 (1974). Forty per cent are Europeans, forty per cent Melanesians and twenty per cent are other Pacific Islanders. The country is poor. It has a one product economy based on nickel mining and the price of nickel has slumped badly ever since 1972. The increase in the price of oil has been
very damaging to the economy.

It is my considered opinion that Australia and New Zealand, in partnership with the United States, if possible, should endeavour to secure at Noumea the right of establishing a major naval and air facility. Every diplomatic means possible should be employed to this end. The Russians have recently approached New Zealand and several of the island governments on our defence arc for special facilities for use by their Pacific fishing boats, scientific vessels and cruise ships. They have almost certainly approached the French government for such facilities in New Caledonia. Indeed were a communist government to come into power in France, or New Caledonia, Russia may even gain the use of Noumea as a naval base and Sir George Grey's fears will at length prove to have been well founded. It is not impossible that if New Caledonia were to gain her independence the difficulties in achieving this end might be increased rather than lessened.

Steadily Russian naval power is moving south. The facilities at the ex-American naval base at Cam-ranh near Saigon are now being used by the Russian Navy and if they were to gain a foothold in Noumea the whole pattern of power in the western and South Pacific and the Indian Ocean could be changed to the disadvantage of each of the ANZUS signatories. Noumea could become a Pacific Diego Garcia for the Russians. On this ground alone every effort should be made to prevent such an outcome and to gain for the ANZUS partners a permanent and exclusive foothold in Noumea.

It is my view that this proposal should be examined in depth at the highest level.

It might be asked on what possible grounds could the Russians wish to have a special position in Noumea. They could claim that their extensive interests in Antarctica and their legitimate interests in fishing in the South Pacific and Antarctic waters made facilities exclusively for their own use desirable and even necessary.

Events could even follow an Afghan pattern. Revolt against French rule — an unstable Marxist, largely Melanesian, government set up — call in the Russians to sustain a “legitimate government” against an increasing opposition.

Leaving aside, however, these flights of imagination the positive advantages of the mutual defence plans which I have discussed should be fully appreciated.
Such a pact between Australia and New Zealand with the island states on these two defence perimeters should have much to offer to our island allies. To New Caledonia it offers not only some defence where there is none but also valuable economic support which a permanent military installation could provide. It should also provide the means of policing the two hundred mile wide economic zone around her coasts. The distance across these two arcs is about two thousand miles and each island ally would gain in varying degree the same direct benefits as New Caledonia because airfields and port facilities would have to be developed around the arcs.

I have expressed the view previously that there should be total freedom of trade among this group of allies and that complete freedom of movement in both directions should be a policy objective. Unity in defence, in the economy and in foreign policy will provide the “horns of steel” which I said in my last lecture should bind ourselves and these island states together.

The cost of defence

The plan of defence here outlined will seem to many of you to be pure fantasy. It will be said that the scale of the proposals and the cost of their implementation are far beyond the power of the Australian and New Zealand economies to sustain. With this view I must, of course, agree as of 1980. But I am here outlining a fifty-year programme and it is my firm belief that if the economic policies on which I will enlarge later are adopted the costs can be met. Indeed they have to be met if we are to enjoy any future as an independent nation at all.

At the moment Australian expenditure on defence expressed as a percentage of the Gross National Product is double that of New Zealand and is about to be increased still further. Each country will have to contribute to the joint cost in proportion to its population and on the same scale.

The defence of Australia involves peculiar difficulties which I have pointed out in my previous lecture. The size of the country and the distances are enormous. The west is separated from the east by desert lands and each looks out upon different oceans. India, Indonesia and West Australia are all Indian ocean neighbours. Under any circumstances if the western coast of Australia were attacked at the same time as the eastern coast it would go hard with the western defenders. The more
secure Australia is in the east, the less the danger in the west.

When Japan threatened Australia in 1942, at a time when most of her armed forces were in the Middle East, the military leaders of Australia decided to defend the country on the Adelaide-Brisbane line. Trace this line on a map and you will see the decision made was to defend about one-seventh of the area of the country and to abandon the remainder to the enemy as being indefensible. This decision is an eloquent commentary on what I have said. A defence policy of the scale which I have visualised should be enormously attractive to Australia.

The navy and airforce of both countries should be integrated under single commands, at least for the eastern part of Australia. The Tasman Sea is no obstacle to ships or planes but it is to troops and it will be necessary therefore to have separate commands for ground forces in New Zealand, Australia and on the island arcs. A further reason for separate commands of ground forces is that troops in all three zones will be primarily concerned with guerrilla warfare. The Australian terrain would demand different training and different equipment from the other two defence areas. Nevertheless the training of all ground forces should be integrated, weapons and equipment should be standardised and should be supplied from a common source.

Although the cost of the defence arrangement which I have discussed will be considerable the country will get a great deal in return for the expenditure if peace time functions of the armed forces are appropriately expanded.

The peace time functions of the armed forces

First let me say that no matter how useful the armed forces may be in any peace time role such functions alone can never justify their establishment.

Any services which they may offer to the community are merely a spin off from their primary purposes, which is the resistance to and the protection of the state from, alien aggression. However, in the nature of things, long decades of peace there will be, and efficiency and morale must be sustained at a high level and society must get the best possible return for the continuing and great expenditure which is involved. I must emphasise morale. For a man to find a satisfactory career in the armed services he must feel that in war or in peace he is serving his country in a special or even a
unquestioned way. Good men will not enter upon a career in any service which offers less than this. In the nature of things service in peace is the norm. Service in war is the exception. I will list briefly the peace time functions of the three forces as I see them:

(a) *The Army*

(i) First class trade training for a continual stream of young men and women in many useful trades.

(ii) Participation in search and rescue operations.

(iii) Civil defence disaster, such as earthquakes in urban areas, floods or hurricanes. The army can supply field hospitals, fire control, road clearance, building demolition, fuel supplies and sanitary services.

(iv) Constructing and maintaining bush and mountain tracks. A network of such tracks is essential for guerrilla warfare and extremely useful in peace time for recreation and the control of pests such as opposums, deer, and mustelids.

(b) *The Air Force*

(i) Trade training for a stream of trainees destined for the civil aviation industry.

(ii) The provision of supplementary emergency airfields.

(iii) Participation in search and rescue operations.

(iv) Helicopter services in Civil Defence training and operations. It is yet to be generally recognised that such services are not merely desirable but absolutely essential in Civil Defence Organisation and that any Civil Defence scheme is seriously inadequate without it.

(v) Helicopter spotting services in the case of forest fire and the utilisation of monsoon buckets to control fires at the earliest possible phase.

(vi) The ferrying of important missions or persons.

(vii) Surveillance of the two hundred mile economic zone around our shores.

(c) *The Navy*

(i) Trade training in a wide variety of skills including seamanship, electronics, communications and engineering skills. We have no training schools in seamanship and with an expanding fishing industry it is imperative that such should be supplied.
(iii) Participation in search and rescue operations.
(iv) Patrolling of the two hundred mile economic maritime zone.
(v) Coastal survey work and lighthouse services.
(v) Oceanographic research in conjunction with the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research.
(vi) Servicing scientific expeditions in the islands of the Pacific or in Antarctica.

Whether we have great armed forces or none at all the costs of the essential services which I have listed is considerable and must be met. This cost is in large part a deduction from the total defence bill.

National Service Programme

The introduction of a national service year for all school leavers has been advocated from time to time.

If such a national service year were introduced it would use to a maximum degree all military installations, facilities and personnel. In this sense it would be an economy and tend to reduce the cost of the defence plan I have outlined. I must say frankly that my principal doubts about the introduction of a national service programme centres around the question of cost. I think its introduction would have to be by stages because of this factor. In itself I can see much to commend it.

My view is that a National Service Programme should be primarily educational and only secondarily linked with military service. The year to be served would contain a mix of both elements. For most boys the mix would be about equal of military and civil education except for those who for reasons of health or conscience claimed exemption from the military component. For most girls the year would be spent wholly in civil education except for those who for positive reasons desired to include the military element.

Such a National Service Programme would further integrate the Services into the everyday life of the community.

I have said that a programme of this kind has much to commend it and I will list for you six of the possible advantages it presents.

1. It would ensure that every adolescent was fully medically examined and assessed and opportunity given for the remedial treatment of physical defects.
2. It would be an opportunity for the assessment of employ-
ment aptitudes and career guidance.
3. It would mix all elements of society in common tasks and serve to substantially democratise our society.
4. It would give every adolescent adequate training in civil defence.
5. It will enable every adolescent to be trained and instructed in the essential principles of environmental preservation.
6. Girls and boys alike could be trained in the essentials of child care and family life. In our society every girl should learn to use simple tools and every boy should know how to care for the baby.

From such a training programme could spring another social reform to which I personally attach very great importance. I believe that every mother of children under fourteen years should have help in the home in proportion to the number of her children. I believe she should get this help automatically, as of right and without cost.

A plan such as this could be built into or linked with the National Service Programme I have sketched out. To a young mother looking after a home and serving her country as well as her family by bearing and rearing young New Zealanders such a plan would be a very great support and a great deal more important than the family benefit. It would add substantially to the health of women, the strength of the family and the fulfilling satisfactions of parenthood. It would in addition be a very great advantage to the participants in the plan whether girls or boys. These few comments may serve to introduce to your attention the subject of population.

Population

There is no doubt that the primary requirement for the implementation of a sustained programme of defence such as I have outlined in this lecture is a greatly expanded economy and a greatly increased population. They are mutually dependent. The former will be the subject of later lectures in this series and I would like now to advert briefly to the subject of population.

I am aware that this is a matter about which there are many opinions strongly held. I do not wish to embark upon a discussion on the details of demography or of social philosophy but to confine myself to the main topic of this lecture, namely defence.

I will introduce the subject by making a dogmatic statement
which is the fruit of much long consideration. It is this. This country and Australia face the risk of foreign conquest two generations from now unless we can achieve a population of ten millions in New Zealand and fifty millions in Australia within the next fifty years. Of course this is a matter on which no one could pretend to speak with accuracy but I make the statement to dramatise the basic fact that population and defence are totally linked on both sides of the Tasman Sea.

I believe that this country is grossly underpopulated from whatever point of view one looks at it. I will not now enlarge upon the point but I will point out again that New Zealand is as large as Great Britain and has the same population as Sydney.

I point to the beautiful province of Southland. It comprises four counties Fiord, Stewart Island, Wallace and Southland. The first two have a tiny population and minimal production though they have great recreational and tourist potential. Leave them aside and look at the other two counties. Their area is about two-thirds that of Belgium which has a population of 10 million. They are just as well endowed by nature as that nation and they have a milder winter climate. Their total population is a hundred and ten thousand and two-thirds of these live in the Invercargill city and various boroughs. These counties are underpopulated and underdeveloped. This central fact applies in greater or less degree to every district in New Zealand.

Yet there are those, many of whom have enjoyed the advantage of a tertiary education, who speak of zero population growth or zero economic growth as desirable social objectives for New Zealanders to pursue. I would not enter into controversy with these advocates. They appear to accept uncritically ready made, imported, computerised but flawed opinions and statistical facts. Setting out from this point they journey into a barren wilderness. They express a timorous, despairing and even craven approach to the great drama of life.

I have indicated earlier that should aggressors actually invade our country they would have to be resisted by guerrilla warfare. It would be an advantage to the defenders if population were more evenly distributed over the two islands. Now if our mythical invader were to capture the Auckland province the rest of New Zealand would be at his mercy. It would also be an advantage to the defenders if the population were not clustered into urban areas with a semi-depopulated countryside. I say these things to show that the northward move-
ment of population and the drift of people into the towns from the country has military implications as well as raising fundamental social and economic questions. This is a simple illustration of the fact that no social phenomenon should be examined from too narrow a viewpoint or in isolation which is a prevalent weakness in political and social debate in New Zealand.

A question which must immediately spring to your minds is whether it is possible for the population to increase to a total of 10 millions in the next fifty years. The answer is yes — with some qualifications. Population increase depends on two principal factors, the Birth Rate and Total Net Immigration. Assuming that the Death Rate remains unchanged, a crude birth rate of 27 live births per thousand of population combined with a net total immigration of 20,000 persons per annum, both sustained over the projected period, would produce the desired population.

This level of birth rate should not be particularly difficult to attain. Over the eighteen years from 1946 to 1963 the average crude birth rate was 26.22 per thousand of population. If this rate were continued over the fifty-year period it would require a net immigration rate of approximately twenty-four thousand a year to reach this goal. I have expressed the opinion that the necessary population goal could be attained with some qualification. The reservation is that they can be attained only if there is some fundamental restructuring of the New Zealand economy. The first step on this road is total free trade with Australia and the small island states to the north. The second, and more important reform, on which I will address you, is a basic change in land tenure. These two reforms will set us on the road to national security.

One cannot reflect upon the question of New Zealand's population policy without being struck by the fact that the intellectual climate of this land is distressingly imitative. It responds sensitively to every whiff and puff of opinion magnified and multiplied by transmission from overseas. Opinions, theories and policies generated in a totally different economic and social milieu are immediately seized upon and earnestly adopted in this very different land. Soon the pronouncements of professors, newspaper articles and editorials, the speeches of politicians, even the sermons of clerics abound with carbon copy opinions in the utmost profusion. Nowhere
is this more true than on matters connected with population. There is at the moment a strong antipopulation wave of opinion in this country. I do not believe that it will endure. Social theories, however seductive, have not greatly influenced New Zealand society. We are pragmatists. We tend to be guided by the fruits of our life experience, modified only by the basic principles generated by historic experience which lie deep at the roots of our free society. I believe that current antipopulation attitudes will die. They are negative, they are non-productive, they are sterile. They have no appeal for the young, for the enterprising, for the ambitious, for the courageous, for the generous or the strong.

From what I have said it will be plain that I regard antipopulation attitudes as antisocial and nationally destructive. These attitudes however, will vanish quicker if official government policy and propaganda in their support were to cease forthwith. Publicly owned facilities such as the radio broadcasting service should not be used to promote them. Antipopulation propaganda should not be subsidized and supported out of public money. This is a field which, above all, could well, with great advantage be left to the market forces of private enterprise.

That there is government sponsored propaganda against an increasing population can be illustrated by reference to the booklet produced recently by the Environmental Council of New Zealand called “Population Perspective”.

There is a commendatory introduction by a Minister of the Crown. I will not enumerate the multiple deficiencies of this publication. They are epitomised on the last page under the heading “Conclusions” and it reads as follows:

“First, regardless of the direction of population changes from now on, the lower the number of people living in New Zealand, the better the quality of life they can expect to enjoy. Second, because our present level of population depends on massive consumption of finite imported resources it should be seen as only temporarily supportable. The carrying capacity that can be sustained indefinitely by renewable resources will be much lower than this.”

It is almost an achievement of genius to compress so many falsehoods into so few words. The booklet is apparently designed for distribution to schools. This is keeping up with
the Joneses with a vengeance. After all, in Guyana the Rev. Jim Jones poisoned only a few hundred bodies. This material is designed to poison thousands of young minds.

There is today in New Zealand, and indeed throughout the world, a deep interest and concern with the environment. To a man like myself who has spent a lifetime of involvement in the environmental movement, this is a source of tremendous satisfaction. This is my only excuse for this concluding remark on the matter of population. There is a widespread belief that increases of population will be damaging to the environment. I am of the opinion that nothing could be further from the truth. It will be beneficial. Eroded lands, shingle choked rivers, decendent forests, native birds destroyed by stoats, ugly towns, second rate quality in almost every aspect of society, are the fruits of a population too small to achieve civilized specialization or to control the destructive forces of nature first set in operation by the pioneer settlers. We cannot control the environment today because we are too few. Homo sapiens can live in civilized symbiosis with all other species. Clean air, clean water, beauty of towns and countryside, preservation of wilderness areas are in no degree imperilled by the population policy which I have indicated as being necessary for our preservation as a people.

I have become a little carried away by this subject and I beg your indulgence to allow me to make a few supplementary comments. My excuse is that the importance of the subject warrants some expansion.

When I was born the population of New Zealand was about nine hundred thousand souls. Multiply this by a factor of 3.3 and you have the present population. I am saying that the present population must be multiplied by the same factor of 3.3 to produce a population of ten million in fifty years’ time to secure our national survival. An increase of the same extent is in my view necessary to control environmental degradation.

In my lifetime in many respects the New Zealand environment has improved. In some degree it has changed. Lake Karapiro and Oriental Bay represent a changed environment but not a degraded one. In my boyhood days one could drive through miles upon countless miles of country covered by stumps and dead trees — twenty prostrate for every standing skeleton of a once magnificent forest giant. The same journey
now is made through a beautiful countryside. This is change but not degradation.

The gravest damage to New Zealand was done in the first seventy years of settlement when the population was under one million people and it was done by felling bush on hill country, burning tussock and introducing browsing wild animals and predators such as deer and stoats. The effect of these things and the resulting devastation have been continuing ever since. Today very great efforts are being made to halt the continuing damage. Knowledge has accumulated. Public opinion has become enlightened and government is fully aware of the facts but the remedial tasks of the National Water and Soil Conservation Organisation are far beyond its powers and its financial resources. Were their works, and those of other agencies operating in related fields, multiplied by ten or twenty there might be some chance of controlling soil erosion and the associated massive environmental damage. Such a multiplication of effort and resources demands a much expanded economy and a much expanded population.

In this lecture I have enlarged the question of "New Zealand's defence" to include defence not only against foreign aggression but also defence against environmental degradation. It does not matter; the essential ingredients for successful defence in both areas are the same.