Is Henry George's Political Economy Scientific?
Harry Pollard
[Reprinted from a Land-Theory online
discussion, March 1999]
Cliff Cobb wrote:
The recent exchange with Harry about his definitions
and concepts and the conclusions he derives from them, without any
reference to what Karl Popper called "falsifiable propositions,"
has reminded me of one of my pet peeves: the widespread belief among
Georgists that HG's political economy is "scientific."
Response from Harry Pollard:
One doesn't draw conclusions from defined concepts. One may
however, use the developed language as a tool with which to draw
conclusions. Why should this process require me to refer to Karl
Popper and his "falsifiable propositions"?
Are you suggesting that a science should proceed from its
beginning with no attempt to affix terms to phenomena. You are
anxious to introduce mathematics to a field demonstrably ill-fitted
for it. When Marshall, et al, did this at the turn of the century,
they failed -- and their successors have been failing ever since.
Essentially, you are saying that you prefer mathematical language
to our normal communicative language. That's fine -- but before you
pay with your As and Bs and Xs would it not be a good idea to
explain what you mean by them?
If you feel obliged to do so, I would advise you to have them
stand in for well defined mutually exclusive concepts. Or, would
that not be 'scientific?
I have laid out the beginnings of the Science of Political
Economy. Your contributions up to now seem to be like this comment
(it isn't really a contribution):
Cliff Cobb wrote:
Not only is that assertion of questionable factual
accuracy, it also tends to support an anti-empirical bias that I
have observed on this list. ("Numbers? We don't need no
steenking numbers.")
Response from Harry Pollard:
You've said this kind of thing before. So, what is your empirical
need? You told us.
Cliff Cobb wrote:
"All I want are rough approximations."
Response from Harry Pollard:
As this piece was in answer to my argument that we cannot measure
Rent in the present economy apparently, after casting doubt on the
accuracy of my statement, and making a little snide at the list --
you agree with me that accuracy isn't possible.
However, I was as usual, kind, saying "who could argue
against a rough guess?"
Once you had cast doubt on the scientific propriety of
establishing a language, you proceed to tell us the language you
use.
Cliff Cobb wrote:
"Those are not arbitrary or private definitions.
I am following conventions, the same ones that Victor appears to be
following."
Response from Harry Pollard:
It was the inadequacy of such definitions that led George
carefully to define the language he was using. Since the time of
George, economic language has become less and less adequate, mostly
by becoming imprecise.
But, if you wish to use this mess, while casting doubt on a
genuine attempt to provide our study with a scientifically based
language, you may. You won't be wrong -- words used for defined
concepts are never wrong. However, they may be suitable, or
unsuitable, more or less useful, an aid to communication -- or not.
Other than myself in a paper to the AAAS, I know of only one
outright attack on present terminology. This is by E. C. Harwood who
founded the American Institute for Economic Research. In his book "Useful
Economics" he analyzed 12 economics texts published between
1946 and 1954. They were used in a bunch of our most prestigious
universities as well as University College, London.
He found half the books made no attempt to use the term "Wealth"
precisely as the label for anything.
Of those who do use the term Wealth, three of them include land in
the definition. In the case of "Labor", Harwood tells us
in 3 of the 12 books "the authors use neither "labor"
nor any other name to specify the human effort applied in processing
things . . . "
In another five books, although the word "labor" is
casually used, there is no attempt to use the word precisely for
anything. That leaves the four who attempt precision. Their attempts
arouse laughter. The landholder who makes the land available for use
is a laborer -- but apparently not an entrepreneur -- who becomes a
special kind of labor.
Look at this delightful statement the students at Dartmouth
College had to read. They are told solemnly that the agents of
production are three. Well, that looks promising. The three are
(hold your breath) "Labor", "Capital including Land"
and "Entrepreneurship".
Finally, the text used at the University of Virginia and Penn
State asks delightfully (after describing Capital as "tangible,
material goods" produced by labor from natural resources) "Is
land Capital?" Well, they say, it depends on the usage of the
label.
I won't continue with these conventional terms. I'll just let them
lie there for your scientific use and pleasure.
Just one question -- can you see there could be a problem using "conventional
terms" that may be deficient? Did you check and applaud or
criticize their meanings?
Cliff Cobb wrote:
The Georgist notion that science consists of defining
concepts, reasoning deductively, and providing a plausible
explanation is a fundamental reason why this movement has had
difficulty being taken seriously.
Response from Harry Pollard:
Apparently, you believe in a science that doesn't know what it is
talking about -- because it hasn't made clear to itself what it
means, whether they be words or mathematical symbols.
I think you have only used a mathematical symbol once in our
discussion, for which I thank you.
Unfortunately, you used it badly. You said as you described my
contentions:
Rent >> land value. ("When Rent is
measured, invariably it is land value - a figure above and often
way, way, above Rent.")
I didn't understand what you meant by "Rent >> land
value" and said so.
You gave me a little homily on mathematical symbols. You said:
The symbol > means greater than. The symbol >>
means much greater than.
Of course, I was wondering why, even though most of the paragraph
pointed out that land value was usually "way, way, above Rent"
you used mathematical symbols to say that "Rent is much greater
than land value. Well, maybe you misused the math symbol --
something that happens to all of us. But please don't display an
arrogance when referring to people on this list.
If you want empiricism, check into what the Pennsylvanians are
doing -- particularly Dan, who is the ultimate empiricist as he
deals with Pittsburgh councilmen.
Cliff Cobb wrote:
George himself did not seem to understand that science is
about testable propositions, not plausible ones.
Response from Harry Pollard:
Plausible in its meaning of 'praiseworthy' -- or 'not to be
trusted'? As our high school students enter the Cycles we spend a
page or two on testable hypotheses and the prevalence of the
untestable kinds. Maybe we are not Georgists in LA!
Cliff Cobb wrote:
In his discussion of the nature of science, he
allows no consideration for methodologies for developing evidence.
He seems to have believed that one could discover regular patterns
(what he calls the "laws of nature") simply by direct
observation and contemplation. It is a tribute to his genius that he
derived so many propositions that have turned out to be true.
Response from Harry Pollard:
I would, at least, suggest the possibility that his true
propositions might just owe their success to his methods.
Perhaps the major difference between science and philosophy is
that science requires observation to substantiate its propositions.
Now, you agree with that (at least the bit about science) for in
your next paragraph you make a point about statistics, which numbers
depend on observation. You apparently believe that statistics are
the truth. But with all due respect, the depend on observation.
I forget the English Lord who pointed out that all the figures
counted depend at the bottom on the watchman on his beat. (If anyone
can tell me, I would be obliged.)
Those magnificent measurements you love so much have gone through
so many levels on their way to the top, picking up errors - and
later, subjective corrections - I cannot see why you would prefer
them to observations at the first level with little error and easy
testing.