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Afghanistan

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## Focus on: Afghanistan

RAIMO VÄYRYNEN

### 1. *Afghan society*

The case of Afghanistan, both in its historical and present context, is a complex mixture of social, political, and geopolitical determinants which have shaped the development of Afghan society. Afghanistan has been located at the crossroad of British and Russian rivalry which resulted in three Anglo-Afghan wars in the 19th and early 20th century. Partly due to difficult geographical conditions and the independent mood of the population, Afghanistan managed to maintain most of its sovereignty and autonomy throughout these imperialist wars and World War II, in which she remained neutral. Thus the country has never been occupied or subjugated to colonial rule although it lost territories to both British India and Russia; these two powers thus drew Afghanistan's boundaries. On the contrary, the Afghan people, which is ethnically and linguistically divided, has become over time nationalistic and independence-minded. To put it in another way: there is a strong *anti-colonial tradition* in Afghanistan. The nationalistic element was strengthened by the 'Young Afghan' movement, headed by King Amanullah, who reigned until January 1929. The model of this movement was Kemal Ataturk's Turkey.<sup>1</sup>

That Afghanistan was never colonized had also other consequences. Colonialism normally distorts the social and economic structure of a country, but it also tends to cut the roots of pre-colonial social formations and to transform the society into an appendage of the colonial power. This never happened

\* I am grateful to Jon W. Anderson for sometimes constructive, sometimes harsh, but always interesting comments on the first draft of this focus-on article as well as to Håkon Wiberg for his penetrating remarks.

in Afghanistan and in this respect it resembles countries like Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Thailand in which pre-capitalistic social formations have survived until the present.<sup>2</sup> Afghanistan is still largely a traditional society in which about 85 per cent of the population live in the countryside. A large majority of them belong to settled agricultural population, but also the nomads are still a living reality in the country.

The character of the social structure in Afghanistan can be illustrated by the social conditions prevailing in the countryside in which land property has been very unequally divided. Although the figures concerning the distribution of the landownership are at best 'guesstimates' by officials, they highlight the nature of the problem. In the entire country 40 per cent of the rural population are practically speaking landless and another 40 per cent own less than 4 hectares. In the eight northern provinces two per cent of the population own 73 per cent of the arable land, while some 60 per cent of the village inhabitants are landless workers and peasants.

There is no uniform land tenure system in the various parts of Afghanistan, but the landless workers normally, of course, sell their labour, while small peasants have been involved in annual *sharecropping* arrangements with bigger landowners. This means that both of these groups have been subordinated to the landowners. The position of small peasants has been further aggravated by the local credit system, which is controlled usually by individual creditors and employs high interest rates. The drought in the early 1970s badly hit small farmers, who were often forced to sell their cattle to be able to pay their debts. As a consequence of

this, inequality within the countryside tended to increase.<sup>3</sup>

Political and economic power coincide in the countryside because the first man of the village, the *khân*, is elected among the big landowners. It would, however, be erroneous to imagine that the *khâns* are some kind of local dictators who only aim at subjugating the people. On the contrary, their power has been partly based on the conversion of their agricultural wealth into hospitality and, sometimes, employment. The power they exercise is thus not only *utilitarian*, but also *normative*; it aims at maintaining existing social relations. The normative influence on the rural masses is complemented by Sunnite Islam, the orthodox version of this religion. The social interests of the Muslim *mullahs* and landed local elite are no doubt intermingled in the sense that they are both opposed to any major social change in the countryside. This does not mean, however, that they would necessarily work in everyday life as a close coalition without any conflicts and disagreements.

An important role played by the *khâns* is their 'Kabul connection', i. e. they represent the tribesmen vis-à-vis the central authority. In this liaison role the *khâns* have an opportunity to regulate the relations between the center and the periphery, both by asserting the self-consciousness of the local communities and by relying on the social and political resources which contacts with the center provide.<sup>4</sup> The rural people in Afghanistan are illiterate, poor, and honor traditions which are at the same time combined with pride and independent attitudes. These attitudes are partly a consequence of the anti-colonial mood, partly based on the relative weakness of the center vis-à-vis the periphery. This weakness enables the rural population to be assertive towards Kabul and other centers. Suspicions prevailing in this respect have been traditionally strong and have led to the situation that center is considered intrusive and extractive in spite of its relatively meager capability to pursue these kinds of policies.

The social structure in the countryside is inequitable. Nevertheless, emergence of opposition and local consciousness against this vertical division of labor has been hampered by the identification of the Afghan people with the *horizontal social structure*: the household, lineage, clan, tribe, village, and ethnic group.<sup>5</sup> The existing pre-capitalist social structures have defended, in a way by their own power, themselves against any major changes towards modernity or radicalism. For these reasons the political changes which took place in Afghanistan in April 1978 were considered threatening by the rural leaders and the clergy. The roots of the Muslim revolt against the new regime(s) in Kabul have their roots in the social, political, and religious power structure in the countryside.

Some features in the power structure of Afghan society appear to be contradictory. Without any doubt there are in reality *hierarchies* and asymmetric dependence relations, while the prevailing attitudes are also based on *egalitarianism* of social relations within the local communities. The Pakhtun thinking seems to have traditionally departed from the dialectics of *hukumât* (where there are rulers and ruled) in the relations between the center and periphery, and *yagh-istân* (where no man controls another) in the local setting. It is a function of the *khâns* to play out by their balancing acts the tension between hierarchy and egalitarianism. This function has been based on the personal charisma and social legitimacy of the *khâns*.<sup>6</sup>

The prevailing inequality in the Afghan countryside has been in fact masked by traditional social relations and value systems. The social organization and personal relations are based on *mechanical solidarity* which is, however, gradually breaking down. The incipient mechanization of Afghan agriculture, especially the advent of tractors since the middle of the 1960s, has started to transform rural social relations. Tractors were almost solely bought by *khâns* or other wealthy individuals who started, in turn, to

sell their mechanized services to less wealthy farmers and peasants. This development has commercialized social relations in the countryside and increased — much in the same way as this sort of agricultural change has done in many other developing countries — hierarchical tendencies at the expense of the egalitarian social structure or, to put it otherwise, has replaced one kind of hierarchical order by a new one.<sup>7</sup>

It would be tempting to relate the gradual hierarchization and commercialization of social relations in the Afghan countryside to the Muslim revolt against the Kabul regime(s). From a theoretical point one could hypothesize that opposition is created not only by the resistance of the local power elite vis-à-vis the center, but also by the *relative deprivation* of the rural masses and the gradual disappearance of mechanical solidarity and traditional identities embedded in the local communities. According to this mode of thinking — for the support of which we have very little tangible evidence to offer — the rebellion has been inspired by a combination of traditional allegiances and social changes which have raised, because of their marginalizing impact, feelings of deprivation and dissatisfaction.

## 2. Political developments in Afghanistan

Because of space limitations, any detailed survey of the political developments in Afghanistan is out of question here. We simply note that Mohammad *Daoud* was the Prime Minister of the country from 1953 to 1963 when he resigned and was replaced, to quote one observer, by a 'clique of American-educated technocrats'.<sup>8</sup> This change of government in fact signified the gradual decline of the French-educated political elite and the rise of an elite educated in the United States. This development was not without political implications, especially in the late 1970s.

The Soviet Union was disappointed with the resignation of Daoud and with the advent of the new regime. It had signed with King Amanullah, in the beginning of the

1920s, a treaty that affirmed the Afghan borders and neutral non-interference. Under the first Daoud regime closer economic and political ties developed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The failure of Daoud's successors was sealed, however, in 1973 when he seized power again and proclaimed a number of social reforms to modernize Afghanistan. Times had changed, however, and the power of the new Daoud regime proved to be rather fragile and even impotent.

One of the main changes had been the establishment of the *People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan* (PDPA) in 1965. The leading figures of the party were Nur Mohammad *Taraki* and *Babrak* Karmal, who were also involved in a personal rivalry which soon, in 1967, led to a split in the ranks of the party. The two main wings of the party, named according to the newspapers they published, were *Khalq* (Masses), headed by Taraki, and *Parcham* (Banner) in which Babrak was at the top. Originally Parcham was considered more Soviet-minded because it allied with Daoud and was favoured by the Soviet Union, while Khalq was regarded as more nationalistic. In spite of different political orientations a common feature of these wings was their narrow geographical base, as their support was concentrated in major cities, although ethnically speaking Khalq was somewhat more representative than Parcham. Another distinction between these two orientations, which later on had several implications, was that Khalq wanted to build a working-class party — in a country in which the working class was almost absent — while Parcham spoke in favour of a broad national democratic front.<sup>9</sup>

The second Daoud regime was a disappointment to the Soviet Union because it aimed increasingly at balancing political and economic ties between various power blocs, including fellow Muslim countries producing oil. In the domestic policy Daoud gradually turned more conservative, became isolated from the people, and failed to implement

reforms which he had himself declared. All these developments finally alienated the PDPA, including the Parcham wing which had tried to form a democratic front with the Daoud government.<sup>10</sup> The gradual disruption of its power base led to a coup d'état in April 1978 which was carried out by junior army officers backed by the coalition of Khalq and Parcham. There is a multitude of speculations on the real nature of this coup. The reality appears to be that it was inspired first of all by domestic economic and political concerns and that the Soviet Union did not play any role in the Saur Revolution.<sup>11</sup> In fact the real Soviet difficulties in Afghanistan started only after the collapse of the Daoud regime and the rise of the PDPA to power.

The new government, which was nationalistic and progressive in character, was committed to reform the social and economic fabric of the country. One of its main aims was to liberate small peasants from their debt burden, often owed to bazaar merchants, and from sharecropping for the wealthy local farmers. Cooperation between the two wings of the PDPA collapsed, however, in these efforts and a more radical and uncompromising orientation by Taraki and Hafizullah *Amin* gained the upper hand. They had decided to restructure the Afghan countryside almost at any price and as early as possible. With this purpose in mind the new government started to implement a number of Revolutionary Council decrees by which the debts of small peasants were abolished and cooperative funds established, a ceiling of 15 acres in land holdings established, the position of women improved, employment and educational opportunities enhanced, and a modest health care system initiated.<sup>12</sup>

These and other reforms were far-reaching, but hardly any of them were implemented in reality. This was to a great extent due to the fact that the base of the PDPA government was narrow and limited to people in urban areas and intellectual and military elites. Political cadres in the coun-

tryside and even in the urban areas were lacking. The reform policy was a *revolution from above*, and even though a response to the needs of the people, misguided in its implementation. The situation was in fact made worse by the effort of the *Khalq* to build a narrow leftist front during the three-month regime of Amin, which 'having virtually eliminated the Parchamite and nationalist opposition, tried to enforce its reform programmes from above without a party to mobilise support for their implementation'.<sup>13</sup>

The other side of the coin is the Muslim opposition from the countryside where the policy of the Taraki and Amin regimes was considered a serious threat to established values and power relations, although the reform policy produced very little tangible consequences.<sup>14</sup> The opposition of the fragmented Muslim groups, which had been fighting against the central government already during the Daoud regime, received new impetus and some external military and economic support flowing primarily through Pakistan.<sup>15</sup> Saudi Arabia and the conservative Gulf states have been, however, the prime actors in initiating such support and in pressing for unity and strength among Afghan insurgents, the *mujahiddin*. The Saudi royal house has resorted to a multitude of activities in shaping and strengthening the Muslim opposition against the PDPA and the Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup>

The Soviet Union became more closely involved with the Taraki government, which it no doubt supported from the beginning, in December 1978 when it concluded a *friendship treaty* with Afghanistan. This treaty contained some military commitments, although it was rather ambiguous in this respect. From the standpoint of further developments the crucial point is contained in Article 4 of the treaty which reads as follows:<sup>17</sup>

The High Contracting Parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and good-neighbourliness as well as the UN Charter, shall consult each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, in-

dependence, and territorial integrity of the two countries. In the interest of strengthening the defence capacity of the High Contracting Parties they shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them.

A characteristic of this central paragraph is its relative *vagueness* as it does not contain any clear-cut provisions on how, when, and under what conditions 'appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries' are taken. Because of this vagueness it is not very interesting to ponder who invited — and exactly when — the Soviet troops to Afghanistan, although these considerations naturally have certain significance in judging the legitimacy of the Soviet intervention.<sup>18</sup>

The Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan was hardly accidental, but based on quite thorough advance preparation. The Soviet leaders apparently had fairly reliable information on the developments in Afghanistan because of the presence of some thousands of Soviet military and technical experts in the country and because of the high-level missions which were sent out to explore the prevailing situation.<sup>19</sup> Probably after a relatively difficult process of decision-making the stakes were finally considered so high that the dilemma was resolved by resort to military means. It was no doubt expected that the operation would result in some tangible costs, but in the light of later developments, in particular regarding U.S. policy, they were probably underestimated. U.S. behaviour before the intervention obviously did not give reason to anticipate so tough a reaction.<sup>20</sup>

The Soviet policy in Afghanistan is based on *geopolitical thinking*, which appears to have a sort of renaissance in international relations in general. The Soviet-Afghan border is some 1200 km long, and south of this border an unstable and unpredictable Muslim state was about to emerge. This created considerable anxiety in Moscow, especially among the military elite. Fears that Muslim nationalism might spread to the Soviet Union

were less central in this context. Soviet thinking appears also to be based on an idea of *maximum security*; not only real, but also potential threats to the security of the Soviet Union have to be removed. It was well known that Hafizullah Amin was rapidly losing support, both among the people and within the army, and to maintain power he was resorting to more and more brutal means. At the same time the Muslim opposition was gaining strength, partly because of the economic and military support which they received from outside the country. It is a fairly well established fact that the conservative Arab states and, to varying degrees, Pakistan, China, Iran, and the United States, have supported Muslim rebels in Afghanistan who were also able to operate over the Afghan-Pakistan border.<sup>21</sup>

The U.S. attitude to the Soviet role in Afghanistan appears to have been rather cautious, although the murder of the U.S. ambassador in Kabul during the first half of 1979 caused a stir. The decision-makers in the United States were unhappy about the growing Soviet role in Afghanistan, but partly because of their own problems in Iran they did not want to take any drastic measures. During the summer of 1979, the policy of the Carter Administration became, partly due to factors connected with the forthcoming presidential election campaign, tougher; means to utilize economic and military coercion were considered. In addition, the U.S. response has also been based on a geopolitical approach which is visible in the declaration by the Carter administration that the Persian Gulf now belongs to the immediate U.S. *sphere of interest*.<sup>22</sup>

The breakdown of the earlier regional order in the Gulf, based on the role of Iran as the regional gendarme, is now about to be replaced by a new order. Its precise shape is difficult to anticipate, but it appears to be based on the carving up of the Persian Gulf and adjoining regions between the great powers. Divisions are deepening, coalitions are established, and new and more effective means of influence and coercion are applied

by the great powers to defend their protégés. Nearly all the necessary elements exist in the Persian Gulf area conducive to the further deepening of the crisis which lends, in turn, to the increase in the probability of a major war. All necessary measures should be undertaken to avert the risk of this kind of war.

One of these measures should be a thorough criticism of the geopolitical doctrines by which aggressive policies are often justified. Geopolitics and spheres of interests are practically always detrimental to the interests of smaller powers which prefer peaceful and equitable relations with major powers.

The conflict formation in Afghanistan has both typical and atypical features compared with other relevant military conflicts in the Third World. The conflict within Afghanistan is based on the confrontation between the *center* and the *periphery*. The case of Afghanistan poses, however, a problem to the center-periphery analysis which tends too often to focus on the economic factors only and hence largely neglects the political implications. Even if they are analyzed the interest is often directed to the cases in which a repressive center faces a revolutionary periphery which aims at liberating itself and gaining power in the country.

Roughly speaking the situation in Afghanistan is characterized by the opposition between radicalized, but at the same time divided (between supporters of the old regime and the PDPA as well as between its two wings) center, and the periphery where the masses largely follow their leaders. The periphery is composed of conservative local communities. The horizontal social affiliations prevent the manifestation of the existing hierarchical cleavages in the periphery, although the gradual commercialization of agriculture may be breaking down this order. The periphery is, however, cemented by the traditional social and religious ties in its opposition to the center which is considered — and even more so after the Soviet military support — intrusive.

The situation is not improved by the fact that the PDPA is 'a small, mainly urban-based and predominantly middle-class party' which tried, probably too hastily and with considerable force, to remove the opposition from the rural areas of Afghanistan.<sup>23</sup> Babrak Karmal's regime has tried to be more moderate and more nationalistic, and also Islamic for that matter, but its latitude of operation has been considerably restricted because of the burden of events since April 1978. Furthermore, his government has been supported by massive Soviet troop transfers — amounting to some 100,000 soldiers — and their weaponry to the country. That is why Babrak is even more strongly tied to the Soviet Union than his predecessors, and this fact tends to intensify rather than to alleviate the internal opposition and the external support to it.

The case of Afghanistan indicates that it is not sufficient to analyze the center and the periphery only in terms of the *geographical location* or *socio-economic relations*. A possibility to develop the center-periphery analysis is to adopt the concept of the *mode of production*, by the aid of which the center and the periphery can be distinguished from each other.<sup>24</sup> In Afghanistan the mode of production has no doubt been pre-capitalist in its character. Any sharp distinction with the center is avoided, however, by the fact that it has not been very capitalistic either. That is why it is difficult to describe the center-periphery relations in Afghanistan in terms of the capitalist center intruding on the pre-capitalist countryside and integrating it into an unequal economic and social division of labor. Naturally there are capitalist traits in the economy of the center, and the commercialization of agriculture has imported these traits also into the periphery, but still the social situation in Afghanistan is not predominantly a clash between two opposing modes of production. This does not, of course, mean that one should neglect the specific *modes of economic integration* existing between the center and periphery.<sup>25</sup> In the case of Afghanistan, the analysis of these

modes is complicated but at the same time rendered more interesting by the fact that they have been never based on pure market mechanisms. Recently a measure of socialist reform policy has been introduced in dealing with the largely pre-capitalist periphery.

The inapplicability of pure economic reasoning to the center-periphery relations in the Afghan society leads to the consideration of sociological concepts. It seems to us that *integration* and *legitimacy*, in the general sense of the words, may be useful starting points in trying to grasp Afghan reality.<sup>26</sup> The integration between the urban centers and the rural peripheries appears to have been rather weak; strong aversions against intruders have been felt among the rural people. The *khâns* have functioned as middlemen between the center and periphery deriving a part of their local power from the monopoly of this mediating task. The avoidance of integration with the center rather than participation in and attempts to gain access to the center decision-making have been characteristic to Afghanistan. At the same time the legitimacy of the power exercised by the center is denied, and hence the preconditions for the opposition have been created.

The non-integration with the center and the emphasis on the lack of legitimacy in its efforts at political control are necessary elements in the understanding of developments in Afghanistan. The opposition has not been, however, led as much by *khâns* as by various Muslim leaders, advocating often conflicting social and religious aims, who have been able to assert their authority. This tendency is perhaps partly due to the changes in the countryside where the modes of social organization are changing and reducing the role of *khâns*. In these circumstances the mobilization of people by religious leaders has become easier.

### 3. *The Soviet role in Afghanistan*

The Soviet military activities in Afghanistan aimed in the beginning at securing the control of Kabul, the capital, and other major

towns such as Kandahar, Herat, and Jalalabad. In some cases, most apparently at Kandahar, this effort faced difficulties because the local garrisons supported the insurgents and rebelled against the new, Soviet-supported government. At this stage the Soviet military activities in Afghanistan had a low profile, because they tried to avoid actions that would antagonize the population. Also governmental policy changed, and Babrak Karmal appealed, mostly in vain, to common muslim and national symbols instead of emphasizing revolutionary rhetorics. The new regime has tried to create a more conciliatory atmosphere, but the Muslim opposition — which has been able to create some unity in its ranks — has taken a pretty tough attitude towards Babrak Karmal. Economic and military support from at least China, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia has no doubt encouraged the rebels. In its turn, the Soviet Union has made some initial steps towards the strategy of *economic appeasement* by which the support of the population is sought by means of economic support.

Soviet troops have hardly any possibility to control the whole of this mountainous country. In addition to some strategic locations the Soviet and Afghan forces, now amounting to some 70,000 men, have to supervise the central transportation routes such as the road from the Soviet Union, through the Salang Pass, to Kabul and the road leading through the Khyber Pass to Pakistan. From these centers and routes the Soviet troops have been able to extend their control to some parts of the Afghan countryside by using, according to some claims, artillery rockets, napalm, and nerve gas against the local population.<sup>27</sup>

It seems probable that the Soviet forces have not been able to acquire control over the Afghan countryside, the periphery, where the roots of opposition against the social(ist) reform are located. The inherent logic in the clash between *guerilla tactics* and *industrial warfare* is that the armies from the north cannot defeat completely the insurgents pro-



vided that the population supports the guerillas, which, in turn, are not able to win the war either. Thus the struggle will go on almost indefinitely or at least until a major change takes place within the intervening country. It has been shown, namely, that internal opposition in a particular center nation has been a key factor in the resolution of colonial conflicts in favor of the liberation movements.<sup>28</sup> Although the war in Afghanistan cannot be equated with colonial warfare, the above reasoning is relevant also in this particular case. However, considering the nature of the Soviet political system it is almost inconceivable that major opposition to the military operation in Afghanistan could develop within the Soviet Union.

This leaves in fact only one alternative; the fighting in Afghanistan will continue as long as the Soviet Union decides to keep her troops there. The intervention was a political decision, and so will the withdrawal be. The overarching aim in the Soviet policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan has been to avoid the option that its neighbour would be governed by a fiercely anti-Soviet Muslim administration. The Soviet Union most obviously wants in Afghanistan a government which leans rather heavily to Moscow or at least understands her security concerns. As long as she cannot be assured of that, the present situation will continue. Soviet decisions can be changed neither by U.S. *boycotts* of the Olympic games or of their mutual economic relations, nor by the European Community plans concerning the *neutralization* of Afghanistan, unless this scheme contains sufficient guarantees that Babrak Karmal will not be removed from power in the process of neutralization.<sup>29</sup>

If the present situation continues for too long the pressures will, however, continue to accumulate. In fact this has already taken place and there are signs that the Soviet Union — probably after some internal discussion — has become more willing to seek for a political solution. This presupposes, however, the availability of a credible alternative. The proposal of neutralization of

Afghanistan may be in fact the only candidate in this respect, although its credibility is undermined by the continued support of Islamic countries to the Afghan insurgents and the Soviet stubbornness to keep most of its troops in the country.

It is perhaps too easy to make use of the argument that the Soviet motive is and has been to defend its interests in Afghanistan against the intrusion by other leading powers, such as Great Britain in the past.<sup>30</sup> It is, however, difficult to believe that the motives of Soviet operations would have extended beyond the Afghan borders to, for example, the shores of the Indian Ocean or the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. The Soviet military operations in Afghanistan apparently aim at giving support to the Afghan troops to clear the country of opposition elements inimical to the Babrak regime and to the Soviet Union, since these elements potentially threaten — not so much alone but rather in coalition with other great-power interests — the security of the Soviet Union's southern regions.

Paradoxically the Soviet Union is protecting, by way of an offense, her defensive interests. This conclusion cannot undo, however, the fact that the Soviet Union has interfered by means of considerable military force in the internal affairs of a neighboring country. This is the first time since the presence of Soviet troops in northern Iran immediately after World War II that military operations of such size have been extended beyond the borders of the Warsaw Pact. To stabilize the situation the Soviet Union should remove, although this may be improbable for the time being, her troops from Afghanistan. Likewise the United States should end her military build-up in the Persian Gulf and the Arab Sea. The stabilization of the situation also requires restraint from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries supporting the *mujahiddin* within Afghanistan.

If the present military build-up in the Persian Gulf and the division of the region into spheres of interests continues, the pro-

spects for a *great-power conflict*, with inestimable consequences, will be even darker in the future. The question relates not indeed to Afghanistan alone, but also to the almost desperate search of the Carter Administration for allies and military bases in the Persian Gulf and in the surrounding areas. These efforts are no doubt partly related to the hostages crisis in Iran, but they are even more strongly a part of the intensified U.S. policy of rivalry vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The closer to the Soviet borders this competition moves, the more worried will the Soviet leadership become and the higher will be the probability of a military confrontation between the great powers.

#### NOTES

1. On King Amanullah's movement see, e.g., Fred Halliday, *Revolution in Afghanistan*. *New Left Review*, No. 1 (1978), pp. 10-14, and Arnold Fletcher, *Afghanistan. Highway of Conquest*. New York 1965, pp. 213-25.

2. This comparison has been made by Halliday *op. cit.* 1978, p. 7.

3. See, e.g., Norman Paech, *Zur Entwicklung in Afghanistan. Der schwierige Weg aus dem Feudalismus*. *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 2, 1980, pp. 164-66.

4. Jon W. Anderson, *There are no Khâns Anymore: Economic Development and Social Change in Tribal Afghanistan*. *Middle East Journal* 2, 1978, pp. 168-70.

5. Richard S. Newell, *Revolution and Revolt in Afghanistan*. *The World Today* 11, 1979, pp. 436-37. However, one has to keep in mind that Afghanistan is both ethnically and linguistically split into several groups and that this fact has also major political implications; see e.g., Eden Naby, *The Ethnic Factor in Soviet-Afghan Relations*. *Asian Survey* 3, 1980, pp. 237-56.

6. Andersson *op. cit.* 1978, pp. 181-83.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-83. For a brief, but illustrative analysis of the overall impact of the green revolution in Asia, see Richard Franke, *Solution to the Asian Food Crisis: 'Green Revolution' or Social Revolution*. *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 4, 1974, pp. 2-13.

8. David Chaffetz, *Afghanistan in Turmoil*. *International Affairs* (London) 1, 1980, p. 17.

9. On the history of the PDPA see Halliday *op. cit.* 1978, pp. 20-27, and Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan under the Khalq*. *Problems of Communism* 4, 1979, pp. 37-39.

10. Chaffetz *op. cit.* 1980, pp. 19-20, and Newell *op. cit.* 1979, pp. 433-36.

11. Dupree *op. cit.* 1979, pp. 46-47. Dupree, who has been the representative of the American Universities Field Staff in Kabul, is widely regarded as a leading CIA agent in the area.

12. On the reform policy of the Taraki government see, e.g., P. B. Sinha, *The Afghan Revolution and After*. *Foreign Affairs Reports* (New Delhi) 7, 1979, pp. 117-20.

13. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 8, 1980, pp. 28-29.

14. See, e.g., Paech *op. cit.* 1980, pp. 168-72.

15. The Muslim opposition is described in some detail in Dupree *op. cit.* 1979, pp. 43-46, and Newell *op. cit.* 1979, pp. 438-42.

16. For more evidence see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 29, 1980, pp. 21-22.

17. The text of the treaty, which has been somewhat difficult to come by, has been published, for instance, in *Aryana* (1, 1979, pp. 9-10) which is the paper of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

18. A credible description of the events is that Amin had requested several times Soviet military aid, but under the condition that they would be placed under Afghan direction. The Soviet troops came, however, in larger numbers than expected and disarmed or immobilized the Afghan army under the pretext of changing their equipment. Karmal arrived in Afghanistan the night after the removal of Amin from power; see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 25, 1980, pp. 8-9.

19. See, e.g. *The Economist*, January 5, 1980, pp. 25-26.

20. On the boycott measures undertaken by the United States, see the statement by President Carter on January 4, 1980; published, e.g., *Survival* 2, 1980, pp. 66-68.

21. For evidence see Sinha *op. cit.* 1979, pp. 123-27 and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 29, 1980, pp. 21-22. In addition Egypt is training Afghan rebels in two camps located on her own territory, see *International Herald Tribune*, March 4, 1980. On interesting Soviet views concerning the foreign linkages of the Afghan rebellion, see *The Truth about Afghanistan. Documents, Facts, Eyewitness Reports* APN, Moscow 1980.

22. In the State of the Union Address to the U.S. Congress, on January 23, 1980, President Carter stated that; 'An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. And such an assault will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force'.

23. The quotation originates in Halliday *op. cit.* 1978, p. 40.

24. See Jon Naustdalslid, A Multi-Level Approach to the Study of Center-Periphery Systems and Socio-Economic Change. *Journal of Peace Research* 3, 1977, pp. 203-22, and Nigel McKenzie, Centre and Periphery: The Marriage of Two Minds. *Acta Sociologica* 1, 1977, pp. 55-74.

25. See Karl Polanyi, *Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polanyi*. Boston 1968.

26. Cf. Sivert Langhom, On the Concepts of Center and Periphery. *Journal of Peace Research* 3-4, 1971, pp. 273-78.

27. See, e.g., *The Economist*, January 12, 1980,

p. 40, and February 16, 1980, pp. 38-39.

28. For a more thorough analysis of these points see Andrew Mack, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars. *World Politics* 2, 1975, pp. 175-200.

29. The neutralization plan by the European Community is briefly dealt with in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 7, 1980, pp. 14-15.

30. Historically this point has been illustrated and to a certain extent proved by Gregorian Vartan, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Politics of Reform and Modernization*. Stanford 1969, pp. 91-128 passim.