The Great Betrayal:
Land Reform and Latin America
Chris Baker
[Reprinted from Land & Liberty, May-June
1980]
Agrarian reform may be termed a 'critical issue': one which
potentially or actually re-orders society, affects the interests of
important social strata, pits numbers against wealth, power, and
prestige, and thus cuts deeply into the political and social system.
Hostility and opposition, which are inevitably found, suggest that
reversing or changing existing patterns and societal structures is the
task for revolutionary elites where effective reform sentiments or
organised support is lacking. In Latin America, where both have been
wanting, there are two levels of political functioning -- the
ceremonial and the operational. Needing to maintain publicly
acceptable postures, appeals to the abstract ideal of agrarian reform
have served to obscure the reluctance of the 'ruling classes' to
accept 'indispensable' reforms. Such is the case with agrarian reform.
Let us remember the climate of the early 1960s. A peasant invasion of
land, an agrarian-based insurgency or a general political upheaval may
do much to stimulate consideration of the total problem of agrarian
reform. Such political exigencies became a subject of international
concern with the coincidence of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. If
peasant discontent were to break out on a wide scale and take an
organised form, the existing power structure of the whole Latin
American hemisphere could have been upset. The conclusions to be
reached were immediately clarified -- the best approach to maintain
the political status quo and avoid an upheaval was to guide both
discontent and reforms into controllable channels, as seems to have
been the goal of the Charter of Punta del Este.
Thus the somewhat 'delicately contrived' agrarian reform programmes
of the 1960s became something of a holding operation, and increasingly
so as enthusiasm for major structural changes _ waned with the
ultimate control of indigenous guerrilla movements.
At the same time, whilst the political stage of Latin America is one
upon which the esoterics of the 'counter-reformers' have been easily
accommodated, tolerance of the reformer has always been tentative.
Under such circumstances, for reform to have been effective would have
required a constancy of pressure on administrators that could only
have come from the actual and potential clientele of government
programmes. Yet the laws on agrarian reform originated without seeking
the cooperation of the campesinos or their organisations.
Without this active involvement, and relying on the legalistic
approach to reform, the consequences of implemented policy were always
likely to be quite imperfect -- the initiation of change is constantly
subject to bargaining processes between a variety of established
groups negotiating a settlement designed to safeguard their vital
interest. On the one hand, affected elites have had access to the
presiding authorities and have thus been in a position to delay,
emasculate or circumvent the reform laws and the process of change
through 'Compromise bargaining' and legal loopholes, at the same time
as they have been able to introduce the 'developmentalist' or
modernisation argument (that which denies the need for reform).
Within the context of these influences there occurred, as early as
1963, a reversal in the order of priorities as spelled out in the
basic laws on agrarian reform. Economic growth rather than structural
change was to receive the emphasis as an engine to economic
development. The first consideration was to enlarge the pie; to divide
it more equitably was secondary.
In fact, the progressive de-emphasis on reform found its spokesman in
the very same advocate that had pressurised for reform in the first
place -- the United States.
Whatever the initial assumptions behind the rhetoric of the original
Alliance for Progress following the 1959 Puma del Este Conference, it
became apparent that both US and Latin American signatories of the
Charter were simply engaging in verbal rituals to exorcise the spectre
of Castro's agrarian reform. It is beyond doubt that a number of the
institutional changes stressed in the Charter would have had a
profoundly unstabilising effect on many existing governments.
In this light, as the Cuban spectre receded and the near destruction
of the campesino/guerrilla movement in the early years of the
1960s brought about a radical change in the political base which a
large-scale land reform movement could have counted on as a
springboard, the trend of policies was towards a more conservative
position.
Thus the 1967 Punta del Este Conference, while paying lip-service to
the need to guarantee the campesino full participation in the economic
and social life of his country, made, no mention of the prior
necessity of structural changes. And the US Congress (acting on
recommendations of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Relations)
barred, as from August 1962, the allocation of funds for the purchase
of private agricultural land.[2] Throughout Latin America agricultural
policy came to mirror the sequential change in the US technical
assistance programme.
So the arguments were turned towards attempting to correct an
unbalanced picture of agricultural investment. This meant, in effect,
a return to the anti-social investment pattern which prevailed prior
to the passing of the reform laws and which those laws were supposedly
endeavouring to correct.
UNFORTUNATELY, concern for a purely economic approach to reform which
accepted the existing social and political structures as given sought
only to discover development strategies within these parameters. An
established part of the Latin American legal, political and social
framework has always been the existence and protection of private
property. Notwithstanding the permissive nature of many of the laws,
one example being the Colombian agrarian reform law passed in 1961,
the legislators turned to the concept of the 'social function' of land
in order to rationalise the type of expropriation of estates which was
theoretically allowed by law. In this concept the counter-reformist
was provided with a powerful tool to justify the expropriation .of
only a few estates and to exempt the majority.
The concept provided that when land was being put to productive use
it fulfilled its social function but not so when it remained unused or
when used 'inefficiently.' But, of course, what is tricky about the
use of concepts like 'efficient' or 'adequately managed' as criteria
for expropriation is that they cannot be objectively defined,
especially when left in the hands of the landowners! The social
function shifted the reasons for expropriation away from 'social
justice' for the campesino and onto the neutral ground of land
use, and was used to introduce a new concept of social justice -- for
the landed elites.
In the same manner that it diverted attention away from the
injustices inherent in a sharply unequal distribution of land
resources, so the social function allowed that expropriation need not
be undertaken on a long-scale basis, but rather on an estate-to-estate
basis only. Similarly, instead of permitting that reform be carried
out on the best soils and in the best (and most densely populated)
areas, legislation, as in Colombia, provided that reform be carried
out first on public land and on private lands only "if it
appeared necessary." So provisions in the laws served the
objective of diverting the land reform to outlying districts where
land does not usually fulfil its social function. In this manner have
"colonisation schemes been the tranquillisers of the landed elite
and counter-reformers in the America," as Ernest Feder, a
foremost authority on the Latin American agrarian scene, puts it.[3]
The effective application of the laws also remained conditional upon
the existing constitutional dispositions. Unfortunately, the
constitutional texts were rarely adapted to the ends which the
agrarian reforms sought to achieve. The complex and dilated
proceedings for the acquisition of private property tended, more often
than not, to favour more the proprietors than the reform agencies.
Many of the factors which obstructed the implementation of programmes
were deliberately built into the agrarian reform machinery. One
technique, as Alan Gilbert says in his book Latin American
Development, "was to produce legislation which was too
complex to implement quickly and effectively. Such was the case with
the Peruvian and Chilean legislation. Another common technique was to
place difficulties in the way of the agency in charge of land
redistribution. Frequent changes of directors, selection of men who
could be manipulated, restrictions in funds
were all employed
in different countries."[4] The same thing happened with
compensation proceedings. The compensation price usually reflected the
relative bargaining position of the landowners and not some simple
economic feature of the land. For example, in ten municipalities where
the Colombian reform agency, INCORA, was in action during the 1960s,
evaluations of rural farmlands produced an average increase in values
of 143%![5] Such costs, carried over to the reform agencies, have been
important not only from the point of view of financing reform
proceedings but also because they became reflected in onerous terms
for the campeslno beneficiary. He has had to justify his
entitlement by his ability to produce sufficient surplus to meet his
payments for his 'new-found land.' Lacking many of the essential
inputs or the capital to acquire them, many beneficiaries failed to
meet the terms of their entitlement, prompting the machiavellian
attitude that the peasantry are incapable of using their land
efficiently. This idea, nurtured by the counter-reformists, was not
lost upon the governments of the '60s. The narrow dependence of
beneficiaries on the paternalistic reform agencies, and relegation of
reform to the poorer areas, further tended to minimize the potential
for success. Loading the dice this way has provided valuable
ammunition to discredit land reform. Theoretically, of course, the
reform agencies have represented the peasants' interests, but their
structures and composition and their very functioning within the
traditional political frameworks, made it unlikely that these
interests could ever be fully protected.
Only two Latin American countries (Peru in 1968 and Chile in 1970)
have undergone significant and genuine reforms within the last twenty
years. In Peru agrarian reforms followed a military coup which
established a peculiarly left-wing military government committed to
changing the inimical structures of that countryside. The 1970s,
though, witnessed an abdication of that commitment as the composition
of the military hierarchy swung to the Right and much of the valuable
work of the agrarian reform of 1969 has been undone.
Nor in Chile was the Allende government able ultimately to get the
better of the anti-reformist Latin American political machine. Here
was proof that the US was as indulgent in rhetoric about reform as the
Latin American governments themselves. When its economic interest is
at stake such rhetoric has always gone to the wall. In Guatemala,
between 1952 and 1954 the Arbenz government instituted a comprehensive
agrarian reform. The succeeding government, installed following a US
invasion of the country, reversed the reform, rather proving the
point!
Changing the agrarian structure in Latin America has always implied
disrupting the social and political balance, upsetting existing
institutions and threatening vested interests. For the Latin American
governments the rhetoric of agrarian reform has been enough to
stomach.
REFERENCES
1. Quoted by Dore, R. P., "Land
Reform and Japan's Economic Development" in Shanin, T. (Ed), Peasants
and Peasant Societies. Penguin, 1971.I>Politics and social
Structure in Latin America, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1970, pp.
249-274.
3. Feder, E., "Counterreform" in Stavenhagen, R. (ed), Agrarian
Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America, Doubleday Anchor,
New York, 1970, p.217.
4. Gilbert, A., "Latin American Development: A Geographical
Perspective", Pelican, 1974, p.163.
5. Baker, C.P., "Agrarian Reform in Columbia: Altruism or
Political Expediency?" Unpublished Thesis, Centre for Latin
American Studies, Liverpool University, 1977, p.153.
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