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position to him, they have held that the infinite is either theoretically or factually impossible or both. For Cantor the infinite is not something variable, vague and boundless, growing beyond the finite; it is definite, well-defined and limited, mathematically and physically existent. The realm of the infinite, or as he prefers to call it, the transfinite, is the field of those numbers which transcend the finite. The smallest transfinite number is the number of all the finite numbers; it is not their maximum but the smallest of the infinities. After it follow an infinite number of numbers, each obtained in analogous ways. This doctrine of the transfinite, Cantor insists, is presupposed by those who argue for the philosophical or improper infinite; it justifies the Weierstrassian rejection of infinitesimals and reveals the falsity of the statement that a part must always be less than the whole. I think it must be admitted that, if one grants his definition and method, Cantor has proved his point, but when the assertion that the part is equal to its whole is seen to mean merely that they are both characterized by the same universal, and when it is recognized that the different transfinite numbers are discrete and are themselves part of another infinite, the alternative offered by Cantor and by contemporary mathematico-philosophers to the "philosophic infinite" will, I think, be seen to be no alternative at all.

Similar remarks must be made about Cantor's definition of the continuum. It seems a perversion of terminology to call a field of numbers a continuum when it contains but a tiny portion of all the numbers, or which loses its characteristic properties when it is deprived of its end points. In connection with both infinitude and continuity, Cantor is dealing with topics which have little to do with those discussed by philosophers, even though they are designated by the same names. Cantor is a great mathematician. I cannot, however, see that he has much to teach philosophers besides some mathematical technicalities, the wisdom of being clear and rigorous, and the virtue of persisting in the development of a new concept despite the scorn and abuse received from more respected contemporaries.

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The Philosophy of Henry George. By GEORGE R. GEIGER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1933. Pp. xix, 581.

Although Henry George has mostly been looked upon a bit askance by economists in the "prestige" institutions of higher learning, and has been thought of as most decidedly heretical, nevertheless he has always been and commonly still is thought of as primarily an economist. It seems to be something new for a professor of philosophy to make a study of the writings of Henry George from the viewpoint of the latter's general position as a social philosopher and with due

regard to other elements in his thinking than those relating directly to economic phenomena.

It is the ethical position of his subject to which the author first draws attention and the relation which, he believes, George saw or felt between ethics and economics. "The riddles that have attracted the ethical theorist", says Professor Geiger, "have been so often the product of metaphysical workshops, while those infinitely more direct and immediate ethical principles that are the consequences of a basically mal-adjusted social order here and now have been carefully put aside" (1). The author considers George's contribution, on the other hand, to be "an insistent attempt to clarify the relation between ethics and economics" (5). He believed, says Professor Geiger, that there was "a direct and obvious relation between economic conditions and the moral life of man" (9).

It is only by understanding this ethical viewpoint of Henry George that we can grasp the full significance, in his thinking, of his proposal for the social collection of the rent of land. For to him poverty "was the symptom of economic disease. That disease was a form of strangulation; the factors in the distribution of wealth, particularly wages, had been effectively throttled by the operations of rent" (161). Hence the proposed tax-reform was not primarily to simplify a muddled and inept tax-system; it was to be used rather to reform an ethically bad distribution of wealth.

His ethical philosophy thus applied to economic phenomena fitted into an economic philosophy of history. "It was a philosophy which did not confine itself to any specific type of culture or to any single economic system. . . . The land has been privately owned and exploited in all significant civilizations, and therefore George's economic determinism was bounded only by the limits of all civilizations. It was not a philosophy of capitalistic history, but one of history itself" (269). Indeed, his contact with the development of the Pacific Coast meant that he was enabled actually to witness in a few short years what might be regarded as successive stages of civilization. He may be said "to have been a privileged observer at the quite humble birth of a new civilization; the industrial unrest of the late nineteenth century was made strikingly manifest to him at that last American frontier, the Pacific Coast, and in that unrest of a still young social order he felt that he was watching no mere children's disease, but a cumulative pathological condition arising from a mal-adjusted distribution of wealth" (473).

Allusion is made to the somewhat theistic character of a part of George's writings and to the apparent acceptance of an eighteenth-century doctrine of natural rights. Perhaps the fairest comment which can be made on the latter is that which Professor Dewey makes in

the Foreword: "The importance of a knowledge of this underlying philosophy is urged in spite of the fact that the present writer does not believe in the conceptions of nature and natural rights which at first sight seem to be fundamental in the social philosophy of Henry George. For, as I see the matter, these conceptions are symbols, expressed in the temporary vocabulary of a certain stage of human history, of a truth which can be stated in other language without any serious injury to the general philosophy implied" (xi f.).

Interest is added to the book, for the general reader—and probably for almost any reader—by the introduction of a good deal of narrative, much of it biographical. And the reader who is not, to begin with, unsympathetic towards Henry George's remedial proposal, is likely to lay down the book with the feeling that he has gained an insight into the mental processes and background of one of the most significant of social philosophers.

It must be admitted with regard to economists, whatever may be true of philosophers, that very many, probably the majority, are antagonistic. Such forthright views about the rent of land as those of Henry George are not favored in what are currently reckoned, academically, as "the best circles" and are not conducive to the acquisition of academic prestige. And so, while many relatively inconsequential ideas and proposals receive large place in current economics texts, little attention is commonly given to the fact that an overwhelming majority of us has to pay billions of dollars a year to a few of us, for permission to live and work on the earth and to make use of situation-advantages which all of us—and not just a few of us—have produced. The book here being reviewed is both interestingly written and scholarly. But that it will be widely read or that, if so read, it will greatly affect the attitude of professional economists, is doubtful. Are philosophers birds of a different feather?

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