The American Revolution in Indian country

Crisis and diversity in Native American communities

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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia

First published 1995

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Calloway, Colin G. (Colin Gordon), 1953-
The American Revolution in Indian country: crisis and diversity in Native American communities / Colin G. Calloway.
p. cm. — (Cambridge studies in North American Indian history)
ISBN 0-521-47149-4
1. Indians of North America—History—Revolution, 1775-1783.
2. Indians of North America—Government relations—To 1789.
3. Indians of North America—History—18th century—Sources.
I. Series.
E83.775.C35 1995
973.3′ 150397—dc20 94-28669
CIP

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 0-521-47149-4 hardback

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The peace that brought no peace

For all the devastation the American Revolution brought to Indian country, Indians remained a force to be reckoned with at the war's end. In reading the reports of American invasions of Indian country, it is easy to assume, as did some American commanders, that burning Indian villages and destroying crops constituted a knockout blow. But burning homes, razing fields, and killing noncombatants does not necessarily destroy people's will to fight or even their ability to win. Geoffrey Parker's observation about the resilience of peasant communities victimized by European wars – "as in Vietnam, what was easily burnt could also be easily rebuilt"[1] – sometimes held true for Indian communities during the Revolution. Many survived the destruction of their villages. George Rogers Clark recognized the limitations of the American search-and-destroy missions, and an officer on Sullivan's campaign agreed that burning crops and villages was not the same as killing Indians: "The nests are destroyed but the birds are still on the wing."[2] A British officer reviewing the American campaigns against the Iroquois and the Cherokees agreed that such a system of warfare was "shocking to humanity," and as sound military strategy was "at best but problematical."[3] The Indians in the West were holding their own in 1782. The real disaster of the American Revolution for Indian peoples lay in its outcome.

Speaking on a war belt in council with the British in Detroit in December 1781, the Delaware war chief Buckongahelas declared that his warriors had been making blood "fly" on the American frontier for five years.[4] The next year,

[1] Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[2] Draper Mss. 26J27–8; James Alton James, ed., *George Rogers Clark Papers 1771–1781* (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Society, 1912), 383; Frederick Cook, ed., *Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan against the Six Nations of Indians* (Auburn, N.Y.: Knapp, Peck and Thomson, 1887), 101.

[3] R. Lamb, *An Original and Authentic Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War* (Dublin, Ireland: Wilkinson & Courtney, 1809; reprint ed., New York: Arno and New York Times, 1968), 291–2.

[4] *MPHC*, vol. 10: 544.

1782 the last of the war, witnessed even bloodier conflict. Indians routed American forces at Blue Licks and Sandusky. Americans slaughtered Moravian Delawares at Gnadenhütten and burned Shawnee villages. Delawares ritually tortured Colonel William Crawford and, as atrocities mounted, they and the Shawnees pushed "their retaliation to great length by putting all their prisoners to death."[5]

Then the British and Americans made peace. The Peace of Paris recognized the independence of the thirteen colonies and transferred to the new United States all land east of the Mississippi, south of the Great Lakes, and north of the Floridas. Wyandot chiefs, who had heard rumors of peace, told Major De Peyster "we hope your children [i.e., the Indians] will be remembered in the Treaty,"[6] but the peace terms made no mention of the Indian people who had fought and died in the Revolution and who inhabited the territory to be transferred. The Peace of Paris brought a temporary lull in hostilities, but it brought no peace to Indian country. Rather, by ending open conflict between non-Indian powers, it deprived Indians of allies and diplomatic opportunities as they continued their struggle for independence against Americans who claimed their lands as the fruits of victory.

If a speech that John Heckewelder attributed to Captain Pipe is accurately dated and recorded, Indians were apprehensive of British betrayal even as they carried war to the Americans in 1781. "Think not that I lack *sufficient sense to convince me*," the Delaware chief told Major De Peyster at Detroit, "that altho' You *now* pretend to keep up a perpetual enmity to the Long Knives (American People), you may, e'er long, conclude a Peace with them!" The British, he said, had set him on their enemy like a hunter setting his dogs on his quarry, but he suspected that if he glanced back, "I shall probably see my Father shaking hands with the Long Knives."[7] Pipe's worst fears were now realized. As news of the peace terms filtered into Indian country, Indian speakers in council after council expressed their anger and disbelief that their British allies had betrayed them and handed their lands over to their American and Spanish enemies. The head warrior of the Eufalees refused to believe that the English would abandon the Indians; another Creek chief dismissed reports of the treaty as "a Virginia Lie." The Iroquois were "thunderstruck" when they heard that British diplomats had sold them out to the Americans without so much as a reference to the tribes. Little Turkey of the Overhill Cherokees concluded, "The peacemakers and our Enemies have talked away our Lands at a Rum Drinking." Okaegige of

[5] E.g.: Haldimand Papers, 21762: 13–14; 21775: 49. On the Kentuckian disaster at Blue Licks, see John Mack Faragher, *Daniel Boone: The Life and Legend of an American Pioneer* (New York: Holt, 1992), 215–24. Quote from J. Watts De Peyster, ed., *Miscellanies by an Officer. Arent Schuyler De Peyster* (Dumfries: Munro, 1813), XXXIV.

[6] *MPHC*, vol. 11: 355.

[7] James H. O'Donnell, III, ed., "Captain Pipe's Speech: A Commentary on the Delaware Experience, 1775–1781," *Northwest Ohio Quarterly* 64 (1992), 126–33.

Map 12. Map of the United States's boundaries as determined by the Peace of Paris. Courtesy National Archives of Canada, NMC. 7456. The map shows the location of some of the Indian peoples who were affected by the peace settlement but not mentioned in it.


80
75
70
50
45
40
35
Boundary of NOVA SCOTIA
Boundary
Boundary of CANADA
Montreal
Halifax
LAKE ONTARIO
Niagara Fall
Oswego
Lake George
CANADA
LAKE ERIE
PENNSYLVANIA
Albany
Boston
New London
C.Codd
PHILADELPHIA
JERSEY
Delaware Bay
Williamsburg
Chesapeak Bay
Norfolk
Albemarle Sound
Bath Town
Charles Town
FLORIDA
The Limited Boundary on the Sea Coast of the United States
ATLANTIC OCEAN
80
75 West of London
70

the Flint River Seminoles reminded the British that the Indians took up the hatchet for the king "at a time we could scarce distinguish our Friends from our Foes," and asked if the king now intended to sell them into slavery. Fine Bones, speaking for his Cowetas and other Upper Creeks, said they could not now turn around and take the Spaniards and Virginians by the hand; if the English intended to evacuate, the Indians would accompany them.[8]

Alexander McGillivray told the British he could no longer keep his people in the dark. After nine years of faithful service, "at the Close of it to find ourselves & Country betrayed to our Enemies & divided between the Spaniards & Americans is Cruel & Ungenerous." The Indians had done nothing to permit the king to give away their lands, "unless . . . Spilling our blood in the Service of his Nation can be deemed so." The Indians had been "most Shamefully deserted." Turning to the Spaniards, McGillivray reiterated that Britain had no right to give up what it did not own, and that the Creeks as a free nation had the right to choose what allies they thought most appropriate. "The protection of a great Monarch is to be preferred to that of a distracted Republic," he said, courting Governor Estevan Miró, but making it clear he would turn to the Americans for trade if necessary.[9] Spanish officials referred patronizingly to McGillivray as "nuestro mestizo," but McGillivray deftly pursued Creek, not Spanish, interests in the decade after the Revolution.[10]

Many southern Indians – "having made all the world their Enemies by their attachment to us" – expressed their determination to evacuate along with the British rather than stay and come to terms with the Americans and Spaniards, but the British discouraged them.[11] William Augustus Bowles, masquerading as a Creek chief in London eight years later, summed up the situation: "The British Soldier, when he left the shore of America, on the proclamation of peace, had peace indeed, and returned to a Country where Peace could be

[8] On Indian reactions to the peace terms, see: Colin G. Calloway, "Suspicion and Self-Interest: British–Indian Relations and the Peace of Paris," *Historian* 48 (Nov. 1985), 41–60; idem, *Crown and Calumet: British–Indian Relations, 1783–1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 3–23; Carleton Papers, PRO 30/55/69: doc. 7564 (Eufalies); C.O. 5/82: 368, 448 (Virginia lie); Haldimand Papers 21717: 146–7, or *DAR*, vol. 21: 126 (Six Nations); C.O. 5/82: 446–7 (Little Turkey); C.O. 5/82: 372–3, LC, C.O. 5/560: 55–7, or Joseph Byrne Lockey, ed. *East Florida, 1783–1785: A File of Documents* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949), 109–10 (Okaegige and Fine Bones). Additional Indian responses are in PRO, Foreign Office Records, F.O. 4/1: 143–6; 3: 83–5; C.O. 5/82, and Ernest Cruikshank, ed., "Records of Niagara, 1784–87," *Publications of the Niagara Historical Society* 39 (1928), 64.

[9] C.O. 5/82: 405; McGillivray to Miró, March 20, 1784, McGillivray to O'Neill, March 26, 1784, AGI, PC, leg. 197 (North Carolina State Archives box 26); John Walton Caughey, ed., *McGillivray of the Creeks* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1938), 73–4, 92.

[10] O'Neill to Zéspedes, Nov. 2, 1786, AGI, PC 40–3 (North Carolina State Archives, box 26).

[11] C.O. 5/82: 368, 373, 397, 432; Carleton Papers, PRO 30/55/69, docs, 7688, 7717, 8084: 7; PRO 30/55/92, doc. 10116; Peter Marshall, "First Americans and Last Loyalists: An Indian Dilemma in War and Peace," in Esmund Wright, ed., *Red, White and True Blue: The Loyalists in the Revolution* (New York: AMS, 1976), 37–8.

enjoyed; But to the Creek & Cherokee Indians was left, to drain to the dregs the remainder of the bitter cup of War, unassisted & alone." McGillivray asked the British army at least to leave the Creeks military stores so that they could defend themselves against the Americans.[12]

Indian people farther from the center of revolutionary conflict felt the betrayal equally hard. The Chippewa chief, Matchekwis, visited Michilimackinac in September 1784, and when Captain Daniel Robertson refused his requests for presents, the Indian

> abused me in a very particular manner, as all our great men below, saying we were all Lyers, Impostures &c. that had encouraged him and others to go to Canada &c. to fight and loose their Brothers and Children, now despise them, and let them starve, and that they, the Indians ought to chasse us and our connections out of the country.[13]

British officers and Indian agents scrambled to save face and reconcile the Indians to "this unfortunate event," fearing that their former allies might with good reason turn and vent their rage on the people who had betrayed them. British traders prepared to leave Indian villages even as British officers stressed the need to maintain the usual supplies to the Indians although the war was over.[14] Sir John Johnson's speech to the Iroquois, in which he naively or cynically reassured them that he could not believe the United States intended to deprive them of their land on pretext of having conquered it, was relayed to other tribes. The Indians were advised to bear their losses with fortitude, forget what was past, and look forward to the blessings of peace.[15] Not too sure themselves about the peaceful intentions of the new republic, and determined to protect their interests among the Indians, the British resolved to hold on to the frontier posts that were supposed to be handed over to the United States "with all convenient speed" under the peace terms. Retention of these posts, which stretched from Lake Champlain to Michilimackinac, conveyed the impression that the British were on hand to support the tribes in continuing resistance to the United States, even though Britain carefully avoided renewed war with the United States.[16] Spain operated a similar policy to check American expansion in the south: Spanish officials encouraged McGillivray "by word of mouth" and did their best to "help the Indians without the Americans being able to prove that we have done so."[17]

[12] PRO, Foreign Office Records, F.O. 4/9: 9; McGillivray to O'Neill, Feb. 8, 1784, AGI, PC, leg. 197 (North Carolina State Archives, box 26).
[13] *MPHC*, vol. 11: 453.
[14] C.O. 5/82: 367–70, 413, 444; Lockey, ed., *East Florida*, 154–5; Haldimand Papers, 21717: 168–9; *MPHC*, vol. 20: 124.
[15] Haldimand Papers, 21779: 123–9; *MPHC*, vol. 20: 177.
[16] Calloway, *Crown and Calumet*, 13.
[17] Miró to O'Neill, Apr. 20, 1786, AGI, PC, leg. 4–14 (North Carolina State Archives, box 26).

Meanwhile, Americans made the most of British perfidy. They told the Shawnees that Britain had cast them aside "like Bastards."[18] Virginian emissary John Dodge told the Chickasaws that the English had been forced to withdraw from the country and "their Poor foolish Indians which refused to make Peace with us, is miserable on the Earth, Crying & begging for mercy Every Day."[19] General Philip Schuyler told the Six Nations Indians that the British deceived them if they told them they were included in the peace; "the treaty does not contain a single stipulation for the Indians, they are not even so much as mentioned." At the beginning of the war, Schuyler said, he had asked the Six Nations to sit still and they had not listened. Now, like the Loyalists, they had forfeited their lands. "We are now Masters of this Island, and can dispose of the Lands as we think proper or most convenient to ourselves," the general declared.[20] Six Nations delegates listened in bewilderment. From what he heard from his messengers, Joseph Brant (Fig. 10) thought Schuyler "as Saucy as [the] very devil," and thought the Iroquois delegates behaved shamefully. "After our friends the English left us in the lurch, still our own chiefs should make the matter worse," he wrote to Major Robert Mathews. "I do assure you I begin to prepare my death song for vexation will lead one to rashness."[21]

The peace signed in Paris did little to change things in the backcountry world inhabited by Indians and American frontiersmen. Frontier vendettas continued and old scores remained unsettled. Some people on the eastern seaboard were appalled by the massacre of the Moravian Delawares in 1782, but William Irvine, commanding at Fort Pitt, knew that people who lived closer to the Indians and had lost relatives in the war felt very differently. He warned his wife to keep her opinions about the massacre to herself, as he would: "No man knows whether I approve or disapprove of killing the Moravians."[22] The Indianhating that produced and sanctioned the Moravian massacre paid no regard to words of peace exchanged in Paris and made real peace impossible in Indian country. Commander De Peyster at Detroit warned his superiors in the fall of 1782 that the backcountry settlers would continue to make war on the Delawares, Shawnees, and Wyandots even after Britain and her revolted colonists made peace. Allan MacLean at Niagara feared that while he was busy preventing the Indians from going to war in the spring of 1783, the rebels "were preparing to cut the throats of the Indians."[23]

[18] Haldimand Papers, 21779: 117.
[19] *Virginia State Papers*, vol. 3: 500.
[20] NYPL, Schuyler Papers, reel 7, box 14, items dated July 2, 1783 and Jan. 11, 1784.
[21] Haldimand Papers, 21772: 223–4.
[22] Consul W. Butterfield, ed., *The Washington–Irvine Correspondence* (Madison, Wis.: Atwood, 1882), 343–5.
[23] Alfred J. Morrison, trans. and ed., *Travels in the Confederation*, by Johann David Schoepf. 2 vols. (New York: Bergman, 1968) vol. 1: 277–81; Butterfield, ed., *Washington–Irvine Correspondence*, 149; De Peyster, ed., *Miscellanies by an Officer*, XI; Haldimand Papers, 21756: 91–2.

Figure 10. Joseph Brant in 1786, by Gilbert Stuart. Oil on canvas. Courtesy New York State Historical Association. By the time this portrait was painted, Brant and most of his people were living in exile in Ontario, where they built new homes and lives on the Grand River.

Nor were all Indian people eager to embrace the peace. Warriors with relatives to avenge paid little attention to formal peace terms worked out by men far from the bloodletting. A Potawatomi, singing the war song, told Major De Peyster he was eager for action in 1781 because "you see me here in mourning and I am ashamed to remain so." Another asked De Peyster "for means to

enable him to revenge himself" for the loss of his kinsman.[24] John Montour, a mixed-blood Delaware who flits in and out of the records, "was one of Seven Brothers, all of them reckoned able good Warriors at the Commencement of the Rebellion, five of them have been Since killed in the service." While the war drew to a close and the British tried to keep their allies at peace, John and his surviving brother were out in Indian country, anxious for revenge. In November 1782, they came into Fort Niagara with four scalps and three young female prisoners, saying they knew nothing about the suspension of hostilities.[25]

The end of the Revolution produced a new phase of conflict between Indians and Americans in the Ohio country. Murders, horse thefts, raids, and counterraids continued with little abatement. "While empires and states went about making peace," explains Richard White, "the villages continued to act on their own." Like the British after 1763, American policymakers could no more control their citizens than Indian chiefs could control their young men. A flood of backcountry settlers invaded Indian country, broke down what remained of the "middle ground" arrangements of coexistence that had been built up over generations, and knocked the heart out of federal attempts to regulate the frontier. Many of these people, reported a congressional committee, had no more desire for peace with the Indians than the British had for peace between Indians and Americans.[26] As revolutionary violence gave way to postwar peace and a future of prosperity in some other areas of the country, vengeance and strife continued to be a way of life and of getting things done in Indian country, even in relations between whites. Tension between frontier settlers and eastern elites resulted in western demands for autonomy, separatist movements, violent confrontations, and the breakdown of normal means of redress.[27]

[24] NAC, C-1223, vol. 13: 18, 34.

[25] Haldimand Papers, 21762: 213. John Montour was described as "an Outcast" from the Delawares "on account of his foolish Conduct," who went to live with the Delawares at Detroit. His brother Che cheas was driven from Kuskuskias by Edward Hand's campaign – "He is a foolish Fellow & for revenge went & join'd the Wiandots." *Frontier Advance*, 343–4; Morgan Letterbook, vol. 3: 178–9; see also Butterfield, ed., *Washington–Irvine Correspondence*, 168–9. A certain John Montour also held a captain's commission in the United States Army and served with a contingent of Delaware soldiers in 1781: "Pay Roll of the Delaware Indians in service of the United States, June 15, 1780–Oct. 31, 1781," National Archives, Revolutionary War Rolls, 1775–83, Microfilm M246, reel 129. See also Draper Mss. 3H19–20, 76–7; 1AA201–2; and Neville B. Craig, ed., *The Olden Time*, 2 vols. (Cincinnati, Ohio: Clarke, 1876), vol. 2: 310, 378, 389. In December 1779, Guy Johnson opened a council at Niagara with a ceremony of condolence for the death of "two young warriors and a woman of the family of Montour." NAC, C–1223, vol. 12: 92.

[26] Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 410–11, 418–20, and chs. 9–11; Faragher, *Daniel Boone*, 249–55.

[27] Robert Gross, *The Minutemen and Their World* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1976), ch. 7; cf. Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, ch. 2, esp. 57; George E. Connor, "The Politics of Insurrection: A Comparative Analysis of the Shay's, Whiskey, and Fries' Rebellions," *Social Science Journal* 29 (1992), 259–81.

During the war, American soldiers had returned from expeditions into Indian country with stories of the rich lands awaiting them once independence was won. With the Peace of Paris under their belts, Americans now set about taking over Indian lands as the spoils of victory. Peace initiated a new era of land speculation and unleashed a new land rush into Indian country. Between 1783 and 1790, the white population of Pennsylvania's three western counties grew by 87 percent; by the end of the century, western Pennsylvania's population had jumped from around thirty-three thousand to ninety-five thousand.[28] Governor Benjamin Harrison of Virginia confessed to Governor Alexander Martin of North Carolina that he was "shocked when I reflect on the unbounded thirst of our people after Lands that they cannot cultivate, and the means they use to possess themselves of those that belong to others." Frenchman Francois Jean de Chastellux, traveling in North America as the war wound down, predicted that an inevitable consequence of the peace for the Indians "must be their total destruction, or their exclusion at least from all the country within the lakes."[29] A delegation of 260 Iroquois, Shawnee, Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, and "Loup" Indians visiting the Spanish governor of Saint Louis in the summer of 1784 already felt the effects of the American victory:

> The Americans, a great deal more ambitious and numerous than the English, put us out of our lands, forming therein great settlements, extending themselves like a plague of locusts in the territories of the Ohio River which we inhabit. They treat us as their cruelest enemies are treated, so that today hunger and the impetuous torrent of war which they impose upon us with other terrible calamities, have brought our villages to a struggle with death.[30]

Faced with an empty treasury and no means of replenishing it except by selling off Indian lands, the United States government focused its attention on the Old Northwest, where individual states relinquished their claims to western lands to the national government.[31] A congressional committee, reporting in October 1783, noted that the Indian tribes of the northwest and the Ohio Valley seriously desired peace, but cautioned that "they are not in a temper to relinquish their territorial claims, without further struggles." Nevertheless, the report continued, the Indians were the aggressors in the recent war. They had ignored American warnings to remain neutral and "had wantonly desolated our villages and destroyed our citizens." The United States had been obliged, at

[28] Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 65.

[29] *North Carolina State Records*, vol. 16: 442; Francois Jean de Chastellux, *Travels in North America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782*, 2 vols. (London: G. G. J. and J. Robinson, 1787), vol. 1: 404.

[30] *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, vol. 3, pt. 2: 117.

[31] Reginald Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783–1815* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967), chs. 1–2, provides a concise analysis of American Indian policy in the postwar years.

great expense, to carry the war into Indian country "to stop the progress of their outrages." The Indians should make atonement and pay compensation, "and they possess no other means to do this act of justice than by compliance with the proposed boundaries." Rather than continue a costly war, the report recommended that the United States make peace with the tribes and negotiate boundaries that could then be renegotiated as Indians retired west before the inevitable press of settlement.[32]

Acting on the assumption of Indian war guilt and eager for the spoils of victory, American commissioners demanded lands from the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix in 1784; from the Delawares, Wyandots, and their neighbors at Fort McIntosh in 1785; and from the Shawnees at Fort Finney in 1786. They brushed aside Indian objections in arrogant confidence that Indian lands were theirs for the taking by right of conquest. In 1775, Congress had instructed its treaty commissioners to "speak and act in such a manner as they shall think most likely to obtain the friendship or at least the neutrality of the Indians."[33] Times had changed. James Duane, chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs in the Continental Congress and mayor of New York City from 1784 to 1789, urged the United States not to continue the British practice of cultivating relations with the Indians as if they were nations of equal standing. The Six Nations should be treated as dependents of the State of New York. They should adopt American diplomatic protocol, not vice versa. Unless the United States seized the opportunity to implement this new hard-line approach, said Duane, "this Revolution in my Eyes will have lost more than half its' [*sic*] Value."[34] American treaty commissioners followed Duane's advice and dispensed with wampum belts and elaborate speeches. "In their place," writes James Merrell, they "substituted blunt talk and a habit of driving each article home by pointing a finger at the assembled natives."[35] Moreover, the federal government was just one player in the competition, as individual states, land companies, and speculators scrambled for Indian lands.

Iroquois delegates at Fort Stanwix tried to argue for the Ohio River as the boundary to Indian lands, but the American commissioners would have none of it. "You are a subdued people," they lectured the delegates. "We are at peace with all but *you*; *you* now stand out *alone* against our *whole* force." Lest the

[32] Washington C. Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds., *Journals of the Continental Congress*, 34 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904–37), vol. 25: 681–3; *Revolution and Confederation*, 290–4.

[33] Ford and Hunt, eds., *Journals of the Continental Congress*, vol. 10: 110–11.

[34] Hugh Hastings, ed., *Public Papers of Governor George Clinton* 10 vols. (Albany N.Y.: State Printers, 1899–1914), vol. 8: 328–32, quote at 329; *Revolution and Confederation*, 299–301.

[35] James H. Merrell, "Declarations of Independence: Indian–White Relations in the New Nation," in Jack P. Greene, ed., *The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits* (New York University Press, 1987), 201. References to the kind of arrogant attitude Merrell describes are also in Consul Willshire Butterfield, ed., *Journal of Captain Jonathan Heart . . . to Which is Added the Dickinson–Harmar Correspondence of 1784–5* (Albany: Munsell, 1885), 53, and in Clements Library, Harmar Papers, Letterbook A: 33.

Indians miss the point, American troops backed up the commissioners.[36] At Fort McIntosh, when chiefs of the Wyandots, Chippewas, Delawares, and Ottawas said they regarded the lands transferred by Britain to the United States as still rightfully belonging to them, the American commissioners answered them "in a high tone," and reminded them they were a defeated people.[37] At Fort Finney, when Shawnees balked at the American terms and refused to provide hostages, one of the American commissioners picked up the wampum belt they gave him, "dashed it on the table," and told them to accept the terms or face the consequences.[38]

Indian representation at these treaties was partial at best, and the Americans exploited and aggravated intratribal divisions. Six Nations delegates who returned home from Fort Stanwix were denounced by their own people, and the Six Nations in council at Buffalo Creek refused to ratify a treaty made under such duress. Western Indians were furious at the Six Nations for making a treaty without consulting them. In 1785, the Seneca chief Cornplanter delivered up his copy of the articles of peace concluded at Fort Stanwix, saying they had become "burdensome."[39] Chiefs who made cessions lost face with their people. Captain Pipe, who lost his place to other Delaware war captains in 1782, tried to regain standing by acting as a mediating chief rather than a warrior, and signed the Treaty of Fort McIntosh, which only cost him more support.[40] Nevertheless, chiefs had little choice but to make land cessions. Their ability to act as chiefs by backing up their words with the distribution of gifts to their followers had long made them dependent on outsiders. The British had provided them with gifts as allies seeking their support, but the Americans demanded land in return for the few gifts they offered. Some chiefs signed treaties knowing that others would do so if they refused.[41]

"If ever a peace failed to pacify, it was the peace of 1783," observed historian Arthur Whitaker in reference to the South. The end of the Revolution marked the beginning of years of turmoil as the region became an arena of competing national, state, and tribal interests, international intrigues, land speculation, and personal ambitions.[42] The principal result of the war in the southern backcountry

[36] Craig, ed., *Olden Time*, vol. 2: 424; *Revolution and Confederation*, 305–27.
[37] *Penn. Archives*, 1st series, vol. 10: 395. The treaty is in *Revolution and Confederation*, 329–31.
[38] Craig, ed., *Olden Time*, vol. 2: 524; *Revolution and Confederation*, 340–8, esp. 347; treaty at 349–51.
[39] Butterfield, ed., *Journal of Captain Jonathan Heart*, 51, 78, 89–90; Clements Library, Harmar Papers, Letter Book A: 81.
[40] White, *Middle Ground*, 436–7, 439; Graig, ed., *Olden Time*, vol. 2: 515–16, 518.
[41] White, *Middle Ground*, 496.
[42] Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Spanish–American Frontier, 1783–1795*, reprint ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 1; Lawrence Kinnaird, "International Rivalry in the Creek Country," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 10 (1931), 57–79; J. Leitch Wright, Jr., *Creeks and Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration of the Muscogulgue People* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), ch. 4; *Revolution and Confederation*, chs. 5–6. See also Alexander McGillivray's review of treaties, *ASPIA*, vol. 1: 19–20.

was to transfer control of a vast frontier from the Indians and their British allies and associates to the Whigs and the new men who emerged to lead them in the course of the Revolution.[43] Until the southern states yielded their claims to western lands, the federal government had no lands to sell in the South and simply hoped to prevent full-scale Indian war. North Carolina did not cede its western land claims to Congress until 1789; Georgia not until 1802. These states, plus the "state" of Franklin, made their own treaties with the Indians, generally refused to cooperate with the federal government in its attempts to implement a coherent Indian policy in the region, and sometimes tried to sabotage federal treaty-making efforts. Meanwhile, the aggressions of Carolinian and Georgian backcountry settlers threatened to embroil the whole frontier in conflict.[44] The United States negotiated the Treaties of Hopewell, with the Cherokees in late 1785 and with the Choctaws and Chickasaws in January 1786. The treaties confirmed tribal boundaries but did little to preserve them.[45] Cherokee leaders appealed for assistance to Patrick Henry of Virginia in 1789: "We are so Distrest by the No. Carolina People that it seems Like we sho'ld soon become no People. They have got all our Land from us. We have hardly as much as we can stand on, and they seem to want that little worse than the Rest."[46]

The Creeks emerged from the Revolution with their lands relatively intact, but Georgia demanded all the lands between the Oconee and Ocmulgee rivers as war damages. At the Treaty of Augusta in November 1783, a handful of compliant Creek chiefs, primarily from the neutral and pro-American groups in the nation, led by Hopoithle Mico (the Tame King) of Tallassee and Cussita Mico (the Fat King) of Cussita ceded roughly eight hundred square miles to Georgia. McGillivray and the rest of the Creeks condemned the treaty, and in June 1784 signed the Treaty of Pensacola, placing themselves under Spanish protection. The Creeks entered the postrevolutionary era further divided into bitter factions. Factionalism had helped them avoid exclusive dependence on one ally throughout much of the eighteenth century and had secured them multiple outlets for trade. But as European allies began to fall away after the Revolution, McGillivray recognized that without Spanish support, "we may be forced to purchase a Shameful peace & barter our Country for a precarious Security." Now factionalism became dangerously dysfunctional, and the

[43] Edward J. Cashin, "'But Brothers, It Is Our Land We Are Talking About': Winners and Losers in the Georgia Backcountry," in Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate, and Peter J. Albert, eds., *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985), 240–75.

[44] *Revolution and Confederation*, ch. 5.

[45] For the texts of the treaties and related documents see *ASPIA*, vol. 1, and *Revolution and Confederation*, 393–410, 412–16, 418–26. Papers relating to the Hopewell conferences are also in Draper Mss. 14U

[46] *Virginia State Papers*, vol. 4: 620.

conflict between McGillivray and Hopoithle Mico augured the civil strife of 1813.[47]

Treaties made over the opposition of the majority of the tribes left boundaries in dispute. Indians punished intruders whom the United States government failed to keep off their lands, and settlers retaliated. Even where there was no conflict, the fiction that all Indians had fought for the British in the Revolution justified massive dispossession of Native Americans in the early republic, whatever their role in the war. Catawbas derived maximum mileage from their revolutionary services, and by wrapping themselves in the flag used their record of service in the patriot cause "to carve a niche for themselves in the social landscape of the Carolina piedmont."[48] However, they were an exception. Whereas other revolutionary veterans were granted land bounties, Indian veterans lost land. The Mashantucket Pequots served and suffered in the patriot cause, but in 1785 they were complaining to the government of Connecticut that "our Tribe find ourselves Interrupted in the Possession of our Lands by your People round about Cutting & Destroying our Timber & Crowding their Improvements in upon our Lands."[49] Neighboring Mohegans found that both "white strangers & foreign Indians" encroached on their land and sold their timber from under them in defiance of state laws.[50] In Massachusetts, Indians had fought and bled alongside the colonists in their struggle for liberty, but in 1788 the state reinstituted its guardian system for Indians, and deprived Mashpee of its right of self-government by establishing an all-white board of overseers.[51] The Penobscots and Passamaquoddies found their Maine hunting territories invaded by their former allies. Passamaquoddies appealed for justice to Congress, "that we may Enjoy our Privileges which we have been fighting for as other Americans," but Congress dismissed John Allan from his role as superintendent of eastern Indians, and Massachusetts resumed its pursuit of Indian lands in Maine. The state stripped the Penobscots and Passamaquoddies of most of their land in a series of post-Revolution treaties.[52] New England Indians

[47] Randolph C. Downes, "Creek–American Relations, 1782–1790," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 29 (1937), 142–81; David H. Corkran, *The Creek Frontier, 1540–1783* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 322–5; the Treaty of Augusta is in *Revolution and Confederation*, 372–3; Caughey, *McGillivray of the Creeks*, 75–6; McGillivray to Zéspedes, Apr. 15, 1787, Library of Congress, East Florida Papers, reel 43, bundle 114J9; Joel Martin, *Sacred Revolt: The Muskogees' Struggle for a New World* (Boston: Beacon, 1991), 81–3.

[48] James H. Merrell, *The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 215–22.

[49] Connecticut State Archives, Hartford, Connecticut Archives, Indian Series I, vol. 2: 248.

[50] Ibid., 329.

[51] Barry O'Connell, ed., *On Our Own Ground: The Complete Writings of William Apess, A Pequot* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), 239; Jack Campisi, *The Mashpee Indians: Tribe on Trial* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 88–91.

[52] *PCC*, reel 71, item 58: 59–63, 67–8, 75–9; reel 163, vol. 149, part 2: 561–2; James S. Leamon, *Revolution Downeast: The American War for Independence in Maine* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), 218–20; Colin G. Calloway, ed., *Dawnland Encounters: Indians and*

who had moved to Oneida country only to be driven back by the war, and "who for their Fidelity and Attachment to the American Cause, have suffered the Loss of all things," petitioned the Connecticut Assembly for relief at the war's end.[53]

The Oneidas had suffered mightily in the American cause during the war. General Philip Schuyler had assured them during the Revolution that "sooner should a fond mother forget her only son than we shall forget you." Once they had helped the Americans win independence, the Oneidas would "then partake of every Blessing we enjoy and united with a free people your Liberty and prosperity will be safe." But the Oneidas fared little better than their New England friends or their Cayuga and Seneca relatives in the postrevolutionary land grabbing conducted by the federal government, New York State, and individual land companies. Schuyler interceded on their behalf, and Congress guaranteed the territorial integrity of their Oneida and Tuscarora allies at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, a guarantee the United States confirmed at Fort Harmar in 1789, and at Canandaigua and Oneida in 1794. But paper commitments gave little protection. In 1794, the government absolved its obligations to the Oneidas with an award of $5,000, an annuity of $4,500, and promises to build a sawmill, a gristmill, and a church. The State of New York meanwhile negotiated a string of treaties, illegal under the Indian Trade and Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, that by 1838 had robbed the Oneidas of their entire homeland.[54] The bitter divisions the Revolution produced within the Oneidas were "not yet forgotten" by 1796.[55]

As many Revolutionary War veterans, often illiterate, signed away their land grants for a pittance to more powerful and prosperous citizens of the new nation, so too Indian veterans, who had fought to win the United States's independence, often found themselves reduced to selling off land simply to survive. Simon Joy Jay, or Choychoy, a Mohegan who was wounded in the Revolution, "fighting for the Country," had to sell his land to support himself in old age and infirmity. The widow of Indian Daniel Cyrus, a white woman named Sarah, who lost two sons in the war, likewise had to sell her land to

Europeans in Northern New England (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1991), 128–31; Paul Brodeur, *Restitution: The Land Claims of the Mashpee, Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Indians in New England* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1985).

[53] Connecticut Archives, Indian Series I, vol. 2: 227a.

[54] *Revolution and Confederation*, 69–70; *PCC*, reel 173: 551–5; Ford and Hunt, eds., *Journals of the Continental Congress*, vol. 29: 806; Maryly B. Penrose, comp., *Indian Affairs Papers: American Revolution* (Franklin Park, N.J.: Liberty Bell, 1981), 135–7, 265–6, 269; Franklin B. Hough, ed., *Proceedings of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs . . . for the Extinguishment of Indian Titles in the State of New York* (Albany, N.Y.: Munsell, 1861), 39–44, 84–108; Jack Campisi, "Ethnic Identity and Boundary Maintenance in Three Oneida Communities," Ph.D. diss., SUNY Albany, 1974, 88–94; J. David Lehman, "The End of the Iroquois Mystique: The Oneida Land Cession Treaties of the 1780s," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d series, 48 (1990), 524–47.

[55] *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 1st series, 5 (1798), 16.

support herself in old age.[56] Abenaki Indian patriots in Vermont fell on equally hard times.[57]

The widows of men from Mashpee who had given their lives in the struggle for independence were forced to look outside their communities for husbands. By 1793, Indian towns like Mashpee included not only Africans and Anglo-Americans, but also Germans who had served in the war as mercenaries and had since married into the community and were raising families.[58]

Many Indian peoples clung to their ancestral lands, even where those lands had been in the middle of war zones. Some Mohawk families returned and remained in their Fort Hunter and Canajoharie homes until the 1790s.[59] But most Mohawks found new homes at Grand River or the Bay of Quinté. The peace that ended the Revolution did not end the vast movement of people that scattered Loyalists and African Americans across the globe and displaced Indian populations throughout North America.[60] The war's end found Indian refugees at Niagara, Schenectady, Detroit, Saint Louis, Saint Augustine, and Pensacola, and the peace continued to dislocate thousands of Indians. Indian peoples pressured by Anglo-American expansion continued, as they had in the past and would in the future, to seek refuge in Canada. The Moravians established a new Delaware mission village at Moraviantown on the Thames River. Indian Loyalists moved to new homes at Grand River and the Bay of Quinté in Ontario rather than return to homelands engulfed by the Americans.[61] By the end of the Revolution, Shawnees who remained in Ohio were crowded into the northwestern reaches of their territory. In time they joined other Indians in

[56] Connecticut Archives, Indian Series II, vol. 1: 70; vol. 2: 150.

[57] Colin G. Calloway, *The Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600–1800: War, Migration, and the Survival of an Indian People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 231–3.

[58] O'Connell, ed., *On Our Own Ground*, 240; Gideon Hawley, "An account of the number of Indian houses in Mashpee, July 1, 1793," Harvard University, Houghton Library Ms., autograph file.

[59] David K. Faux, "Iroquoian Occupation of the Mohawk Valley During and After the Revolution," *Man in the Northeast* 34 (Fall 1987), 27–39.

[60] Sylvia R. Frey, *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), ch. 6; John N. Grant, "Black Immigrants into Nova Scotia, 1776–1815," *Journal of Negro History* 58 (1973), 253–61; Mary Beth Norton, *The British-Americans: The Loyalist Exiles in England, 1774–1789* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972). Some former slaves who migrated to Nova Scotia later moved to Freetown in Sierra Leone, where they were known as the Nova Scotians. Gary B. Nash, *Race, Class, and Politics: Essays on American Colonial and Revolutionary Society* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 274–80; James W. St. G. Walker, *The Black Loyalists: The Search for a Promised Land in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone, 1783–1870* (New York, 1976). Highland Scots who had migrated to John Johnson's estate in New York and taken his side in the Revolution now moved to Glengarry, Ontario. Marianne McLean, *The People of Glengarry: Highlanders in Transition, 1745–1820* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991); ch. 6; *NYCD*, vol. 8: 682–3.

[61] Robert S. Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774–1815* (Toronto: Dundurn, 1992), 196–98; Carleton Papers, reel 17, No. 6742: 18, 23; No. 6476: 3; Charles M. Johnston, ed., *Valley of the Six Nations: A Collection of Documents on the Indian Lands of the Grand River* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1964).

creating a multitribal, multivillage world centered on the Glaize. There some two thousand people lived around three Shawnee towns, two Delaware towns, a Miami town, and British–French trading communities, along with some Nanticokes, Mingoes, and Chickamauga Cherokees.[62] Stockbridge Indians, unable to secure relief from their former allies after the Revolution, joined other Christian Indians from New England in moving to lands set aside for them by the Oneidas in New York, joining "People of many Nations" at New Stockbridge.[63] Hundreds of refugee Indians drifted west of the Mississippi and requested permission to settle in Spanish territory. Abenaki Indians, dispersed by previous wars from northern New England into the Ohio Valley, turned up in Arkansas and Missouri in the decade after the Revolution, testimony to the continuing dislocation of Indian communities that the conflict occasioned in eastern North America.[64] The migrations of Indian peoples across the Mississippi generated repercussions on the plains and threatened to disturb "the tranquility of the Interior Provinces of New Spain."[65]

For American Indians, the new republic was still very much a revolutionary world in which their struggles continued with little abatement. For many Indian peoples, the Revolution was one phase of a "Twenty Years' War" that continued at least until the Treaty of Greenville in 1795. Before it was over, a whole generation had grown up knowing little but war.[66] The Indians' war of independence went on until 1795, 1815, and beyond, and it took many forms, as Indians mounted "spirited resistance" and "sacred revolts."[67] Confronted with renewed pressures and aggressions, spurred on by the murder of mediation chiefs like Moluntha and Old Tassel, and encouraged by the presence of Britons and Spaniards waiting in the wings for the experiment in republicanism to fail, many of the tribes renewed their confederacies. Shawnees, Chickamaugas, and Creeks carried war belts throughout the eastern woodlands; Indian ambassadors traveled from Detroit to Saint Augustine and back, urging united resistance. Warriors from a host of tribes continued a war of independence that was multitribal in character.[68] In council held at the mouth of the Detroit River

[62] Colin G. Calloway, "'We Have Always Been the Frontier': The American Revolution in Shawnee Country," *American Indian Quarterly* 16 (1992), 44–5; Helen Hornbeck Tanner, "The Glaize in 1792: A Composite Indian Community," *Ethnohistory* 25 (1978) 15–39.

[63] Harold Blodgett, *Samson Occum* (Hanover, N.H.: Dartmouth College Publications, 1935), 195.

[64] *WHC*, 18: 434–5; *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, xxix–xxx, 186, 203–8, 255, 269, 280, 292; Louis Houck, ed., *The Spanish Regime in Missouri*, 2 vols. (Chicago: Donnelley, 1909), vol. 2: 70–1; Dubreuil to Miró, Dec. 14, 1785, AGI, PC, leg. 107.

[65] Elizabeth A. H. John, ed. *Views from the Apache Frontier: Report on the Northern Provinces of New Spain, By José Cortés, Lieutenant in the Royal Corps of Engineers, 1799* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 42–6.

[66] Craig, ed., *Olden Time*, vol. 2: 515.

[67] Gregory Evans, Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); Martin, *Sacred Revolt.*

[68] Dowd, *Spirited Resistance*, ch. 5; Draper Mss. 13S6–7; James Alton James, ed., *George Rogers Clark Papers, 1781–84* (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Society, 1926), 189–90; *North Carolina State Records*, vol. 16: 924–5; vol. 17: 83–4, 92, 159–60; *Virginia State Papers*, vol. 4: 118.

in November and December 1786, delegates from the Five Nations, as well as Hurons, Delawares, Shawnees, Ottawas, Chippewas, Potawatomis, Miamis, Cherokees, and Wabash allies, sent a speech to the United States from the "United Indian Nations," declaring invalid all treaties made without the unanimous consent of the tribes.[69] Led by capable chiefs who had risen to prominence during the Revolution – Joseph Brant, Little Turtle, Buckongahelas, Blue Jacket, Dragging Canoe, and McGillivray – revived Indian confederacies continued the wars for their lands and cultures into the 1790s and exposed the American theory of conquest for the fiction it was.

Americans in the new republic, like their British and Spanish rivals, were often hard-pressed to keep up with the political changes the Revolution generated in Indian country, as new communities emerged, new power blocs developed, and new players called different tunes. "Tribes" ceased to be the functioning unit of Indian politics and diplomacy, if they ever had been. Young warriors continued the war from multitribal communities. "Banditti of several tribes find asylum in the Lower Towns of the Cherokees," Arthur Campbell reported to George Washington; Cherokees removed to new homes with the Creeks, a nation that "seems always to have been the receptacle for all distressed Tribes," said the Cherokee Turtle at Home, who had joined the Chickamauga resistance and had spent so much time in Shawnee country that he spoke Shawnee fluently.[70]

Not until the mid-1790s did the Indian war for independence as waged by these warriors come to an end. General Josiah Harmar and General Arthur St. Clair met with defeat and disaster in their campaigns against the northwestern confederacy. Only in 1794 did the Americans inflict a telling victory on the tribes at Fallen Timbers and get at the extensive cornfields on the Auglaize and Maumee rivers, which had sustained the Indian war effort for years. Anthony Wayne described this as "the grand emporium of the hostile Indians of the West," and claimed he had never seen "such immense fields of corn, in any part of America, from Canada to Florida."[71] Defeated in battle and abandoned by the British, the Indians could only watch as Wayne's troops put the area to the torch. A dozen years after the end of the Revolution, the American strategy of burning Indian food supplies finally ended the Indians' war for independence. Before the war, said Little Turtle to the French scientist Constantin-Francois de Volney several years later, "We raised corn like the whites. But now we are poor hunted deer."[72] Cherokees had voiced similar sentiments after the Revolution

[69] *ASPIA*, vol. 4: 8–9; *MPHC*, vol. 11: 467–70; *Revolution and Confederation*, 356–8.

[70] Draper Mss. 13S6–7; Carl F. Klinck and James J. Talman, eds., *The Journal of John Norton, 1816* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1970), 33, 47.

[71] *ASPIA*, vol. 1: 490.

[72] C. B. Brown, ed., *A View of the Soil and Climate of the United States by C. F. Volney* (1804; reprint, New York, 1968), 382, quoted in Leroy V. Eid, "'The Slaughter was Reciprocal': Josiah Harmar's Two Defeats, 1790," *Northwest Ohio Quarterly* 65 (1993), 63.

and the devastation of their crops: "We are now like wolves, ranging about the woods to get something to eat."[73]

By 1795 the war for Ohio was lost. Little Turtle and others who had been on the forefront of resistance joined the old chiefs in making peace at the Treaty of Greenville, and ceded most of Ohio to the United States. That same year, the Treaty of San Lorenzo effectively deprived southern Indians of Spanish support in their resistance to American expansion.

In the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the United States had committed itself to expansion while simultaneously treating Indian people with "the utmost good faith." Men like Henry Knox and Thomas Jefferson wrestled with the dilemma of how to take Indian lands and still act with "justice and humanity." With their victory finally secured and Indians no longer a major military threat, Americans finally resolved the dilemma inherent in their belief that United States Indian policy could combine "expansion with honor." Since too much land encouraged idleness and presented an obstacle to "civilization," and Indian people could survive in the new nation only by becoming "civilized," the United States would deprive them of their lands for their own good. Not surprisingly, the good intentions of a few men became lost amid the pressure to rid the Indians of their lands.[74]

Burned villages and crops, murdered chiefs, divided councils and civil wars, migrations, towns and forts choked with refugees, economic disruption, breaking of ancient traditions, losses in battle and to disease and hunger, betrayal to their enemies, all made the American Revolution one of the darkest periods in American Indian history. The emergence of the independent United States as the ultimate victor from a long contest of imperial powers reduced Indians to further dependence and pushed them into further dark ages. Two Mohegans, Henry Quaduaquid and Robert Ashpo, petitioning the Connecticut Assembly for relief in 1789, expressed the sentiments and experiences of many Native Americans as the new nation came into being: "The Times are Exceedingly Altr'd, Yea the Times have turn'd everything Upside down."[75] Seneca communities, in Anthony Wallace's words, became "slums in the wilderness," characterized by poverty, loss of confidence in traditional certainties, social pathology, violence, alcoholism, witch fear, and disunity. Cherokees, reeling from the shock of defeat and dispossession, seemed to have lost their place in the world, and the very fabric of their society seemed to be crumbling around them.[76]

[73] *ASPIA*, vol. 1: 48; *Revolution and Confederation*, 475.

[74] Francis Paul Prucha, ed., *Documents of United States Indian Policy* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), 10; Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783–1815*; idem, "The Indian Policy of an 'Empire for Liberty,'" paper presented at the United States Capitol Historical Society Symposium, 1992.

[75] Connecticut Archives, Indian Series I, vol. 2: 330.

[76] Anthony F. C. Wallace, *The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca* (New York: Knopf, 1969), ch. 7; William G. McLoughlin, *Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 3–4.

And yet, in the kaleidoscopic, "all-change" world of the revolutionary era, there were exceptions and variations. Despite new colors on the map of Florida, political change in Seminole country reflected not new dependence on a foreign power so much as increasing independence from the parent Creek confederacy. While Alexander McGillivray continued traditional Creek policies of playing off competing nations with considerable skill, the Seminoles emerged by the new century as a new player and an unknown quantity in the Indian and international diplomacy of the southeast. Many Indian communities succumbed and some disappeared in the new world produced during the Revolution, but others were in process of formation and asserting their separate identity.

Like the Shawnees who built and rebuilt Chillicothe, Indians adjusted and endured. Contrary to predictions of extinction and assumptions of stasis, Indian communities survived, changed, and were reborn. The Revolutionary War destroyed many Indian communities, but new, increasingly multiethnic, communities – at Niagara, Grand River, Chickamauga, and the Glaize – grew out of the turmoil and played a leading role in the Indian history of the new republic. The black years following the Revolution saw powerful forces of social and religious rejuvenation in Handsome Lake's Longhouse religion among the Iroquois, far-reaching stirrings of cultural assertiveness, political movements like the northwestern Indian confederacy of the 1780s and 1790s, a renascence in Cherokee country, and pan-Indian unity under the leadership of Tecumseh and the Shawnee Prophet in the early years of the new century.[77]

The American Revolution was a disaster for most American Indians, and the turmoil it generated in Indian country continued long after 1783. But by the end of the eighteenth century, Indian peoples had had plenty of experience suffering and surviving disasters. They responded to this one as they had to others and set about rebuilding what they could of their world. But now they were building on quicksand, for the new America had no room for Indians and their world.

[77] Wallace, *Death and Rebirth of the Seneca;* Dowd, *Spirited Resistance*; McLoughlin, *Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic*; R. David Edmunds, *The Shawnee Prophet* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).

Epilogue

A world without Indians?

Indian peoples experienced, interpreted, and defined the American Revolution in a variety of ways. Freedom, in Indian country, often meant siding with the British against revolutionaries whose independence was sure to imperil Indian lands and cultures. Many Mohawks, tied to the Johnson dynasty by marriage and to the crown by perceived common interest, joined other Loyalists in moving to Canada rather than return to life as dependents in the new republic. Chickamauga, Mingo, and many Shawnee warriors tried in the Revolution to regain some of the independence they had lost, by turning back the tide of settlement. On the other hand, Stockbridge and many other New England Indians spoke as if the cause of American liberty was their own and sacrificed as much as any of their patriot neighbors in the struggle. White Eyes of the Delawares saw in the Revolution and an American alliance the opportunity to assert his people's independence from Iroquois claims of hegemony. Dragging Canoe and younger Cherokees saw it as a chance to declare their independence from the policies and authority of an older generation of chiefs. Chickasaws pursued a variety of diplomatic options in an effort to prevent their independence slipping away in a world of shifting geopolitical power. Seminoles increased their independence from the parent Creek confederacy. The Iroquois, past masters at surviving by diplomacy, saw their confederacy torn apart in the Revolution. Abenakis, formerly the "shock troops" of New France, developed effective tactics to keep this conflict at arm's length. Some communities were destroyed in the Revolution; others grew out of it.

With the Revolution won, however, Americans reduced the diverse experiences of Indian peoples to a single role. In a sense, the Revolution became the United States' creation story. The myths spun around that story proved lethal for the peoples whose creation stories in America reached back thousands of years. As Kenneth Morrison has pointed out, "For many Americans, the story of who they are winds back to the Revolution."[1] It is equally true that for many Americans

[1] Kenneth M. Morrison, "Native Americans and the American Revolution: Historic Stories and Shifting Frontier Conflict," in Frederick E. Hoxie, ed., *Indians in American History* (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Davidson, 1988), 95.

the story of who Indians are winds back to that time. While embattled patriots fought for freedom against a tyrannical monarch in the East, "merciless savages" ravaged American settlements in the West. The agony of the American Revolution for American Indians was lost as the winners constructed a national mythology that simplified what had been a complex contest in Indian country, blamed Indians for the bloodletting, and justified subsequent assaults on Indian lands and cultures. In the aftermath of the Revolution, new social orders were created and new ideologies developed to explain which groups of people were included and excluded, and why. In the long run, the legacy the war produced in the minds of non-Indians proved almost as devastating to Indian peoples as the burned towns, fractured communities, and shattered lives of the war itself.

Americans at different times invented versions of Indian people to suit their particular policies and purposes,[2] but the Revolution had particularly enduring influence and fueled ambivalence about the future place of Native Americans in the new republic that was being created. After all, the Declaration of Independence depicted Indians as savage allies of a tyrannical monarch, who "endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions." The congressional committee whose report influenced the shape of United States Indian policy throughout the confederation era echoed Jefferson's sentiments: The Indians were "aggressors in the war, without even a pretence of provocation," and "determined" to join forces with the British.[3] Embodied in the document that marked the nation's birth, the image of Indians as vicious enemies of liberty became entrenched in the minds of generations of white Americans. Siding with the redcoats meant opposing the very principles on which the new nation was founded: having fought to prevent American Independence, Indians could not expect to share in the society that independence created.

The vicious border warfare of the Revolution produced atrocities and lasting impressions on both sides. Benjamin Franklin admitted in 1787 that "almost every War between the Indians and Whites has been occasion'd by some Injustice of the latter towards the former."[4] The Shawnee warriors Richard Butler encountered at Fort Finney in 1786 had grown to manhood knowing nothing but war, and they would live through another decade of conflict before their Twenty Years' War was over. When United States Indian agent Benjamin

[2] Roy Harvey Pearce, *Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965); Robert F. Berkhofer, *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York: Vintage, 1979).

[3] Washington C. Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds., *Journals of the Continental Congress*. 34 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904–37), vol. 25: 683.

[4] Albert Henry Smyth, ed., *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, 10 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1907), vol. 9: 625.

Hawkins visited a group of Cherokees in 1796, he found the women fearful of him and "the children exceedingly alarmed at the sight of white men." In one cabin, a little boy of eight years old "was especially alarmed and could not be kept from screaming out until I got out of the door, and then he run and hid himself." Asking the child's mother the reason for his fright, Hawkins learned that these Cherokees were refugees from Keowee and Tugelo, towns that "had been much harrassed by the whites" in the Revolution. The old people frequently spoke of their sufferings and "those tales were listened to by the children, and made an impression which showed itself in the manner I had observed." As Tom Hatley points out, Cherokees and Americans alike resorted to caricatures of the other.[5]

However, in the emerging national memory of the Revolution, responsibility for the brutality and destruction of the Revolutionary War on the frontier lay squarely on the shoulders of the Indians and their British backers. In American eyes, the Gnadenhütten massacre and rumors of American atrocities at Onondaga and Piqua paled in comparison with descriptions of white "Women and Children strip'd, scalped, and suffered to welter in their gore"; whole families "destroyed, without regard to Age or Sex –\Infants are torn from their mothers Arms & their Brains dashed out against Trees."[6] The well-worn story of William Crawford's capture and torture by Delaware warriors in 1782 featured prominently in narratives of border warfare;[7] the frantic and often more typical peacekeeping efforts and shuttle diplomacy of Cornstalk, White Eyes, and Kayashuta tended to be forgotten. After the war, lurid accounts tended to increase rather than diminish, and the growing popularity of narratives of Indian captivity fueled stereotypes. Stories of Indian atrocities became implanted in the minds of an entire generation so that by the time James Seaver published his *Narrative of the Life of Mary Jemison* in 1824, there were few Americans of middle age who could not "distinctly recollect of sitting in the chimney corner when children, all contracted with fear, and there listening to their parents or visitors, while they related stories of Indian conquests, and murders, that would make their flaxen hair nearly stand erect, and almost destroy the power of motion."[8]

Bernard Sheehan, who sees the Indians' role in the Revolution as minor,

[5] "Letters of Benjamin Hawkins, 1796–1806," *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society* 9 (1916), 23; Tom Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era of the Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 235–9.

[6] *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 27 (1919), 316; *Calendar of Virginia State Papers* 2 (1881), 48.

[7] Archibald Loudon, ed., *A Selection of Some of the Most Interesting Narratives, of Outrages Committed by the Indians, in Their Wars with the White People.* (Carlisle, Pa., 1808; reprinted New York Times and Arno, 1971).

[8] June Namias, ed., *Narrative of the Life of Mary Jemison. By James E. Seaver* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 53. For example: Josiah Priest, *Stories of the Revolution, with an Account of the Lost Child of the Delaware; Wheaton and the Panther, &c* (Albany: Hoffman & White, 1838) contains anecdotes of Indian savagery and a frontispiece depicting an Indian massacre of fourteen prisoners.

emphasizes the importance for propaganda purposes of the image of the Indian as a savage, which their participation in that conflict created, or at least perpetuated. The story of the murder of Jane McCrea by Indians accompanying Burgoyne's army around Saratoga rallied American militia at the time and justified American policies in later years. "Jane McCrea became one of those important images used by white men to explain the meaning of the Indian in relation to the Americans' struggle to preserve their liberty," writes Sheehan. John Vanderlyn's painting (1804, Fig. 11) of the event "impressed it on the American imagination and made it legendary." A young white female, her breasts partially exposed, kneels beneath dark, muscular, half-naked Indians who grab her long hair and wield tomahawks with murderous intent. One of the first major artworks of the new nation, the painting fueled sexual and racial anxieties and vividly reminded Americans that Indians during the Revolution were "merciless savages." Few Americans remembered, if they ever knew, that if McCrea did die at Indian hands – and even that is debatable – the killers were probably Christian Indians, recruited from French mission villages on the Saint Lawrence.[9] Looking back from nineteenth- and twentieth-century vantage points, their view obscured by chronicles of border warfare, racist writings of Francis Parkman and Theodore Roosevelt, and romanticized depictions of conflict in paintings like Vanderlyn's *Death of Jane McCrea*, or the many versions of Indians abducting Daniel Boone's daughter, Americans telescoped the Revolution and the colonial wars into one long chronicle of bloody frontier conflict. Periods of peace, patterns of interdependency, and Indian efforts to remain neutral were ignored as racial war took a dominant place in the national mythology.

Such stories and images provided a rationale for dispossession of surviving Indians. Foreign visitors to the new nation regularly commented on the Americans' desire for Indian lands and their genocidal tendencies toward Indian people. "Certainly no effort is made to hide plans to strip the Indians of everything," observed Louis Philippe, future king of France, during a visit to the southern states in 1797, "and their eagerness to get on with it leads the whites often to paint the Indians in false colors."[10] When Andrew Jackson, arch exponent

[9] Bernard W. Sheehan, "The Problem of the Indian in the American Revolution," in Philip Weeks, ed., *The American Indian Experience* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Forum, 1988), 68–80, quote at 71; Brian Burns, "Massacre or Muster?: Burgoyne's Indians and the Militia at Bennington," *Vermont History* 45 (1977), 133–44. June Namias discusses "Jane McCrea and the American Revolution" in her *White Captives: Gender and Ethnicity on the American Frontier* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), ch. 4. Robert W. Venables, "The Iconography of Empire: Images of the American Indian in the Early Republic, 1783–1835," U.S. Capitol Historical Society Symposium, 1992, shows how images of Indian atrocity like the murder of Jane McCrea served the purposes of empire building.

[10] Louis Philippe, *Diary of My Travels in America*, Stephen Becker, trans, (New York: Delacorte, 1977), 97; William Strickland, "Journal of a Tour in the United States of America 1794–1795," *Collections of the New York Historical Society* 83 (1950), 167–8; Isaac Weld, *Travels Through the States of North America and the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, During the Years 1795, 1796, and 1797* (London: Stockdale, 1799), 370–1; Jack D. L. Holmes, ed., *Journal of a Tour in*



Figure 11. *The Death of Jane McCrea*, by John Vanderlyn. Courtesy The Wadsworth Atheneum, Hartford, Conn. Vanderlyn's painting graphically imprinted on the minds of generations of Americans the notion that Indians in the Revolution were, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, "merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions."

of Indian removal, looked back to the Revolution, he recalled "the scalping knife and Tomhawk [raised] against our defenceless women and children."[11] Powerful images and long memories of Indian violence primed subsequent generations for trouble with new Indian groups encountered farther west.[12] The psychology of conflict and dispossession became fixed.

As Indian peoples confronted the new American nation, outright resistance often gave way to more subtle forms of cultural resistance in Indian communities and Indian souls. But Indian cultural resistance only reinforced the inherited view that Indians fought against civilized people and civilized ways, and it was just as damning as bloody warfare in the minds of many Americans. "Civilization or death to all American savages!" had been the Fourth of July toast of Sullivan's officers as they prepared to invade Iroquoia in 1779.[13] "Civilized and uncivilized people cannot live in the same territory, or even in the same neighborhood," Benjamin Lincoln told historian Jeremy Belknap in 1792, voicing much the same sentiments, albeit in less strident tones, and ignoring the interconnectedness of Indian and white lives that had characterized large areas of colonial America.[14] Indian resistance to the expansion of American "civilization," whether it manifested itself as frontier warfare or adherence to traditional ways, only furthered the conviction that Indians must be "savages." Having fought against freedom at the republic's birth, Indians continued to fight against the very civilization on which the republic prided itself. Refusing civilization, as Sullivan's officers made clear, left only one alternative. As Bernard Sheehan has pointed out, frontiersmen murdered Indians; so-called humanitarians demanded

Unsettled Parts of North America in 1796 and 1797. By Francis Bailey (Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), 106; Durand Echevirria, trans. and ed., *New Travels in the United States of America 1788. By J. P. Brissot De Warville* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), 418, 420; Antonio Pace, ed., *Luigi Castiglioni's Viaggio: Travels in the United States of North America, 1785–87* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1983), 232. Though his own travels in America had been on the eve of the Revolution, John D. F. Smith wrote after the war that "white Americans have the most rancorous antipathy to the whole race of Indians; nothing is more common than to hear them talk of extirpating them totally from the face of the earth, men, women, and children." John Dalziel Ferdinand Smith, *A Tour of the United States of America*, 2 vols. (London, 1784), vol. 1: 345–6.

[11] John S. Bassett, ed., *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson*, 6 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1926–35), vol. 1: 500.

[12] Cf. Peter Mancall, *Valley of Opportunity: Economic Culture along the Upper Susquehanna, 1700–1800* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 158–9. Russell Bourne, *The Red King's Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England, 1675–1678* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), sees a similar phenomenon in New England after King Philip's War. John D. Unruh, Jr., *The Plains Across: The Overland Emigrants and the Trans-Mississippi West, 1840–1860* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979), ch. 5, esp. 120–1, 136.

[13] Frederick Cook, ed., *Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan* (Auburn, N.Y.: Knapp, Peck, & Thomson, 1887), 225–6.

[14] *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 6th series, vol. 4: 514; cf. Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge University Press, 1991); Colin G. Calloway, ed., *Dawnland Encounters: Indians and Europeans in Northern New England* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1991).

that they commit cultural suicide. "Ultimately, the white man's sympathy was more deadly than his animosity. Philanthropy had in mind the disappearance of an entire race."[15] In the new society, American frontiersmen, soldiers, agents, and missionaries continued to deal out heavy doses of both civilization and death to Indians.[16] In American eyes, Indian resistance, military or cultural, was a war Native Americans had no chance of winning after 1783, and the American future was something they had no chance of surviving. In a society and an age with a vision of "progress," Indians belonged to the past, and it was a violent past.[17] A future of peace and prosperity held no place for them.

In the propaganda of the Revolution, Indian figures and accoutrements frequently symbolized the American cause. One school of thought even maintains that Indian influence was so pervasive among the founding fathers' generation that the League of the Iroquois provided a model for the framing of the United States constitution.[18] Confronting the question of where Indian people fit in the new republic, however, Americans found their answer to be explicitly negative. Indian influences endured in the new republic, but the United States had no place for Indian people.

Of course, Native Americans were not the only people to find that the new world created by the Revolution was a world of closed opportunities and exclusion. Other groups – women, backcountry farmers, and ordinary laborers, as well as African slaves – found that the Revolution and the republic to which it gave birth did not free them from restraints of gender, region, class, and race. For many, the victory in the war for independence meant continued, if not increased, dependence.

While ordinary working people struggled to keep themselves employed, and their families clothed and fed, in an economy that was sliding into postwar depression, the rich and the wellborn reaffirmed their domination of social, political, and economic life. "In less than a generation," writes Ronald Schultz, "Revolutionary hopes for a republic of small producers had been defeated by merchants and speculators in land, currency, and human needs." In Philadelphia, laborers began to organize to bring about the kind of society the Revolution had promised, but that their revolutionary leaders withheld.[19]

[15] Bernard W. Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian* (New York: Norton, 1974), 277–8.

[16] James H. Merrell, "Declarations of Independence," in Jack P. Greene, ed., *The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits* (New York University Press, 1987), 217.

[17] Pearce, *Savagism and Civilization*, 154, 160.

[18] E.g.: Donald A. Grinde and Bruce E. Johansen, *Exemplar of Liberty: Native America and the Evolution of Democracy* (Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center, 1991); Bruce E. Johansen and Elisabeth Tooker, "Commentary on the Iroquois and the U.S. Constitution," *Ethnohistory* 37 (1990), 279–97.

[19] Ronald Schultz, *The Republic of Labor: Philadelphia Artisans and the Politics of Class, 1720–1830* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chs. 3–4, quote at 90.

In western Massachusetts in 1786, small farmers whose debts brought them to the verge of ruin appealed for relief to a state government controlled by commercial and creditor interests. When their appeals fell on deaf ears, Massachusetts farmers did as they had done eleven years earlier and took matters into their own hands. They mobbed county courthouses to prevent creditors from foreclosing on their farms and marched on the federal arsenal in Springfield before the state militia restored order.[20] Almost twenty years after Americans had rebelled to secure self-determination, protection from unjust taxes, and more representation in government, settlers in western Pennsylvania did much the same thing. Disenchanted with the fruits of the Revolution, they invoked much of the same rhetoric in an effort to secure similar goals from a distant and seemingly unresponsive government. The "heroes of the Revolution" were now defenders of order, and the new federal government dispatched troops to suppress the revolt.[21] In Maine, postwar hard times and continuing contests for land between men of wealth and influence and desperate farmers produced violence and radicalism. Impoverished backcountry squatters organized secret groups to defend their property and liberty against powerful proprietors. In the eyes of these 'white Indians," a new breed of Tories was denying the people the rights they had fought for in the Revolution.[22]

The Revolution broke down many barriers to women's participation in public and political life, but, as the citizens of the republic redefined roles in the new society, they determined that a woman's role should lie in domestic responsibilities and raising republican sons rather than in political participation. Restricting women's politicization, in Linda Kerber's words, was "one of a series of conservative choices that Americans made in the postwar years as they avoided the full implications of their own revolutionary radicalism." For American women, the legacy of the American Revolution was ambiguous at best.[23]

Limiting the Revolution's revolutionary implications was especially important

[20] David Szatmary, *Shay's Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980).

[21] Thomas P. Slaughter, *The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

[22] James S. Leamon, *Revolution Downeast: The War for American Independence in Maine* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), ch. 7; Alan Taylor, *Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).

[23] Elaine F. Crane, "Dependence in the Era of Independence: The Role of Women in a Republican Society," in Greene, ed. *American Revolution*, 253–75; Mary Beth Norton, *Liberty's Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750–1800* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980); Linda K. Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 287; Joan Hoff-Wilson, "The Illusion of Change: Women and the American Revolution," in Alfred F. Young, ed., *The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976; Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., *Women in the Age of the American Revolution* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1989).

in race relations. As Gary Nash has pointed out, most Americans were no more willing to extend the Revolution's principles to Indian people than they were to fulfill the revolutionary ideal of abolishing slavery. Indeed, the Revolution gave slave owners new mechanisms to protect their human property, and the post-revolutionary era witnessed a dramatic expansion of slavery across the Georgia and Carolina low country and into lands acquired from Indians in Kentucky, Alabama, and Mississippi. Freed blacks in the North took new names, rebuilt their families, and created new communities and institutions, but even in states that abolished slavery, emancipation did not free black people from constricted opportunities, nor did it deprive white society of their labor. African labor, like Indian land, was a vital resource for the new republic, and Americans would not and could not forego its exploitation.[24] In the wake of a revolution that left social and racial arrangements in disarray, southern whites moved quickly to redefine the status of African Americans, and made clear that the promise of the Revolution did not apply equally to all men.[25]

Pequot William Apess bitterly understood that "the Revolution which enshrined republican principles in the American commonwealth, also excluded African Americans and Native Americans from their reach." Referring to the guardian system reinstituted by Massachusetts, placing Indian settlements under the authority of state-appointed overseers, he wrote, "The whites were no sooner free themselves, than they enslaved the poor Indians."[26] The new republic needed African labor, and it excluded African Americans from its definition of "free and equal" on the basis of supposed racial inferiority. The new republic needed Indian land and excluded Native Americans on the basis of supposed savagery.

American Indians could not expect to be accepted in a nation that denied the fruits of an egalitarian revolution to so many of its citizens and that lived with the contradiction of slavery in a society built on principles of freedom. Native

[24] Gary B. Nash, "The Forgotten Experience: Indians, Blacks, and the American Revolution," reprinted in Richard D. Brown, ed., *Major Problems in the Era of the American Revolution* (Lexington, Mass: Heath, 1992), 277–83; Ira Berlin and Ronald Hoffman, eds., *Slavery and Freedom in the Age of the American Revolution* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983). Even in Pennsylvania, where slavery declined in the revolutionary era, tensions continued between the rhetoric of natural rights and the power of economic interests. Emancipation there was a gradual and complicated business that had less to do with the application of republican principles than with demographic and economic developments; see Gary B. Nash and Jean Soderland, *Freedom by Degrees: Emancipation in Pennsylvania and Its Aftermath* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). On the revolutionary aspirations of black people in Philadelphia and their struggle to translate emancipation into independence, see Gary B. Nash, *Forging Freedom: The Formation of Philadelphia's Black Community, 1720–1840* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), esp. chs. 2–3.

[25] Jeffrey J. Crow, *The Black Experience in Revolutionary North Carolina* (Raleigh: North Carolina Historical Commission, 1977), 82–95.

[26] Barry O'Connell, ed., *On Our Own Ground: The Complete Writings of William Apess, a Pequot* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), lxix, lxxiii, 239–40.

Americans had been heavily dependent on, and interdependent with, colonial society and economy before the Revolution. But as Indian land became the key to national, state, and individual wealth, the new republic was less interested in their dependence than in their absence. Indian country, and the intermingling of cultures it involved, did not cease to exist. Indeed, as the new nation became increasingly biracial rather than triracial in character, consigning most nonwhites to the status of blacks, many Indian communities became increasingly multiethnic in nature.[27] But by the nineteenth century, Indian country was envisioned as a place beyond the Mississippi.

Indian people had been virtually everywhere in colonial America, building new worlds on the ruins of old worlds. Despite recurrent conflicts, many British officials had envisaged Indians as part of their North American empire. Southern Indian superintendent John Stuart had recommended to the lords of trade in 1764 that the government continue French policies of gift-giving and evenhanded dealings as the means of "fixing the British Empire in the Hearts of the Indians."[28] Stuart's vision was never realized, of course, but British officials did appreciate the imperial importance of Indian trade and presence, and that meant extending a measure of protection to Indian hunting grounds. The United States looked to build an empire on Indian land, not on Indian trade, and that required the Indians' removal.[29]

The United States looked forward to a future without Indians. The Indians' participation in the Revolution guaranteed their exclusion from the new world born out of the Revolution; their determination to survive as Indians guaranteed their ultimate extinction. Artistic depictions of Indian people showed them retreating westward, suffused in the heavy imagery of setting suns, as they faded from history.[30]

Fortunately for us all, Indian people had other ideas.

[27] Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 225, 240.

[28] C.O. 323/17: 264–70, quote on 270.

[29] Cf. Edward J. Cashin, ed., *Colonial Augusta: "Key of the Indian Countrey"* (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1986), 123: "Whatever else the American Revolution meant for Americans, for those in the Georgia backcountry it meant the end of a British policy that favored Indians' [*sic*] retaining their hunting grounds and the beginning of the American policy of Indian removal."

[30] E.g.: Rick Stewart, Joseph D. Ketner II, and Angela L. Miller, *Carl Wimar: Chronicler of the Missouri River Frontier* (Fort Worth, Tex.: Amon Carter Museum / Abrams, 1991), plates 1–2, 4–15; Brian W. Dippie, *Catlin and His Contemporaries: The Politics of Patronage* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), plate 12.