

course, would exempt the farmer. Is it just? These are grave questions that we must face and settle."



When the Grange members discuss this question thoroughly, they will realize that no exemption is necessary to make adoption of the single-tax beneficial to the farmer. The Washington State Grange is fortunate in having so progressive an official as Master Kegley to lead in its deliberations. The fact that he has for some years headed the organization shows that advanced as his position seems to be, he is not ahead of the rank and file in his views. The interests of the farmers of Washington will be well and intelligently looked after by such a Grange. S. D.



Jug-Handled Tax Reform.

Not exactly frank is the explanation by the Ohio Journal of Commerce of the plutocratic tax reform amendment that it is pushing. This amendment has one good feature in that it authorizes classification of property for taxation. But this good feature is more than offset by another one limiting to one per cent the tax rate for local purposes. The object of this limitation is declared to be to "make the Singletax impossible." Another object—not so frankly expressed—is that it will cripple the activities of progressive cities like Cleveland and Toledo, where municipal ownership movements are too strong to suit plutocratic interests. In its issue of June 26 the Journal of Commerce offers the following explanation.

The people of Ohio are not ready to exempt any considerable property from taxation, but they are anxious to have a lower tax rate put upon some classes of personalty. The proposed amendment will permit a low rate, and when a low rate is fixed for personal property farm implements and factory machinery will be in the same class; if not, it will be because manufacturers and farmers will be asleep on the job.

But will stocks, bonds and money in bank be put in the same class with farming implements and other personal property? The Journal of Commerce sheds no light on that subject. The object of classification is to accord different treatment for taxation purposes to different kinds of property. Exemption of intangible personal property, stocks, bonds, etc., will be easy under this amendment. These constitute beyond doubt the "some classes of personalty" mentioned by the Journal of Commerce. The people of Ohio are anxious to have a lower tax rate upon these, says the Journal of Commerce. Perhaps. But if they

are not anxious to exempt other forms of personalty, why was the clause put in designed to make such exemption impossible? Is it not fear lest, after all, the people may want to go further in the exempting process than the Journal of Commerce likes?



Exemption of intangible personalty is a commendable move in the right direction. But, if in taking it, an obstruction is to be erected to exemption of other property, equally entitled to freedom from taxation, or existing obstructions are to be left intact, then there will be more injustice than justice in the move. If owners of stocks and bonds want relief from unjust taxation, they should resort to no tricky devices to confine such relief to themselves, leaving others equally deserving to continued suffering. Those who want justice for themselves should not erect barriers to prevent others from getting it. S. D.



Why They Should "Kick."

The Virginian of Richmond, Va., asks in its issue of June 20: "If the immensely rich squeezed their wealth from the masses, as many people seem to think, the liberal spending of it now will get it back into circulation again whether it be in donations to libraries, colleges, soup houses or what not. Why should the masses kick?" The masses ought to kick, whether they do so or not, because they should be allowed to retain and dispose of their own money themselves. If legalized robbery can be justly upheld on the plea that the booty is used for philanthropic purposes, then illegal robbery can be justified the same way. The masses know best how they prefer to have their money spent. They have a right to kick when a philanthropically inclined person takes it from them, even though the taking be in a legal way and for philanthropic purposes. S. D.



From the Under Side.

The old problem of why crime prevention should be successful in inverse proportion to the severity of the punishment, seems to be in a fair way of solution. The fact was long ago recognized that drastic punishment did not prevent crime. When English law named more than a hundred offenses punishable with death, including sheep-stealing, and debt was a jailable offense, the hang man was busy, and the debtors' prisons were full to overflowing. Vindictiveness marked all relations between law and offenders. Society,

that is, such part of society as had the making of the laws, assumed that the sole motive of the criminal was a desire to injure his fellows, and any punishment was justifiable. Revenge was disclaimed, but the laws were drawn and executed much as though it were society's purpose; certainly it was so looked upon by the criminal. Motives were considered theoretically; practically, a man was a man, and a law was a law, and any infraction of the law was punished regardless of the moral or intellectual responsibility of the offender.



But man advances. Humanitarian prison reform has developed into the science of penology. Society is now beginning to realize that the physical body sometimes bears little resemblance to the real man within, and in its blundering efforts to restrain the inner man by inflicting pain upon the outer shell, more harm than good has been done. The possibilities for evil in such a course become strikingly apparent in the light of the investigations of Dr. W. J. Hickson, superintendent of the psychopathic laboratory operated in conjunction with the Municipal Court of Chicago. In presenting data, gathered in the Boy's Court, to the American Association for the Study of Feeble-Minded Children, at Columbus, Ohio, on the 18th, Dr. Hickson said:

"An examination of 245 boys from this court has revealed the following results: Only 18 tested normal on the Binet-Simon scale; in other words, only 7.34 per cent had a normal intellectual development; only 20, or 8.16 per cent, were borderland cases; and 207, or 84.49 per cent, were morons."

That is to say, of each hundred boys brought before the court over 84 were mental children. Though their physical age averaged 18 years, the mental age of these boys, with a most liberal interpretation of the tests, averaged less than nine years. Manifestly treatment of persons 18 years old is not appropriate for those of nine years.



Corroborative evidence of our mistaken penal policy comes also from the prisons themselves. The *Leavenworth New Era*, published by the prisoners in the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, is trying to present to the world the prisoner as a man, with all his limitations, imperfections, and handicaps. Its appeal is for justice. And by justice is meant something more than the stone goddess, blindfolded, and holding aloft sword and scales that commonly

graces our court rooms. That emblem is too apt to strike the friendless prisoner who sees the rich escape for the same offense as his own, as more in need of pockets than scales. In pleading for justice the prisoners are asking for an intelligent and sympathetic appreciation of the facts. What the penologist deduces by means of elaborate analyses; these men feel in their blind, helpless way. They feel that they have been subjected to conditions in society that were beyond their power to meet; and they are asking, not punishment for failure to do the impossible, but assistance to do what they can. Perhaps we shall find after all that Jesus and Buddha and Tolstoy had the right idea of what we call crime, and that as we approach their ideals, we shall do away with prisons—and criminals.

S. C.



Suppressing the Third Degree.

A precedent which other judges would do well to follow was set on June 17 in the court of Delaware county, Pennsylvania, at Media, by Judge Isaac Johnson. A murder trial was on and a confession obtained by third degree methods presented as evidence. The district attorney, to strengthen this evidence, wished to show that it took six hours to induce the prisoner to admit his guilt, upon which Judge Johnson said:

The District Attorney may show, if he wants to, that it took six hours to procure his confession, but if he does, it will be in order to make a motion to have that confession stricken from the records of this trial, and if it is proven, and such a motion is made, I will strike out the confession.

And so the confession was later, on motion, stricken out.



Judge Johnson is not numbered among the progressive or democratic members of the judiciary. Yet in this case he was both. He did much to put an end, at least within his own jurisdiction, to a dangerous practice that should long ago have been suppressed. Judge Johnson has to his credit an action as just as it is unusual.

S. D.



Impeachment No Remedy.

The national House of Representatives has refused to impeach Judge Emory Speer, although it finds charges brought against him to be true. But it also finds that these charges do not constitute sufficient grounds for impeachment. So we know that impeachment is no remedy when in any federal court a jury is not permitted to return a verdict contrary to the judge's wishes; when court