Why Are Theories of Value Important?
Lindy Davies
[2006]
Although the idea of value was a very important and contentious topic
in the development of political economy, modern-day mainstream
economics has little to say about it. One of today's most influential
textbooks, for example, Economics by Samuelson and Nordhaus,
does not trouble to define "value" at all -- doesn't even
mention it in its index. On the other hand, the concept of "price"
is extensively explored. This represents the shift from a "normative"
science of political economy, which seeks to design and build a just
society, to a "positive" study of economics, which seeks to
analyze facts and behavior, avoiding the notions of "ought"
and "should".
However, very few people are content with the present state of the "body
economic". All manner of "oughts" and "shoulds"
are constantly being debated. In our attempt to evaluate them, it will
be helpful for our modern study of political economy to turn once more
to the notion of value.
The major debate about value has always been about whether it
inherent in things, or is a function of human desires. Plato regarded
value as inherent in a commodity, but Aristotle attributed it to a
commodity's utility, and he said the standard of value lies in wants.
Thus the field was divided, ever since, between the "left"
and the "right".
The Labor Theory
The "labor theory of value" -- the idea that the value of a
thing is a function of the labor expended in creating it -- was a
tenet of the classical economists, especially David Ricardo. It was
Karl Marx, however, who most thoroughly developed the theory, and made
it influential. According to Marx, the value of a commodity tends to
be the "amount of labor time socially necessary" to produce
it. This is most clearly seen in the mode of production called
capitalism, under which commodities are produced, by unskilled
laborers, for sale in the market. The laborers exchange their labor
time for wages, and the "capitalists" own both the means of
production and the products.
What does "socially necessary" mean? It is defined as the
amount of labor required to produce a thing under the normal
conditions of production at a given time. In the capitalist mode of
production, the "labor value" of a thing is made up of three
parts: Constant capital (the equipment and location needed) Variable
capital (the workers' wages) and Surplus value (the parasitical "cut"
taken by the Capitalist class). All of the items in turn that go into
the category of Constant capital (commodities themselves, such as a
truck, a printing press or a factory) likewise have a labor value
composed of these three elements, as does every single part that
comprises each capital good. (If you think for a moment, you'll
realize the mind-bending complexity of these calculations.)
Under capitalism, there exists at any given time a general rate of
profit -- which is simply an average of all the rates of profit in the
various micro-markets. If the rate of profit in the market for a
certain commodity equals the general rate of profit, then the surplus
value of that commodity equals its profit to the capitalist, and its
market price tends to equal its labor value. Of course, some
commodities bring higher- or lower-than-average profits. In such
cases, the commodity's labor value will not match its "price of
production" -- and comparing the two will be helpful to the
economic planner (who will, once capitalism is superseded, have to
determine optimum production levels, without the helpful feedback of
prices).
According to Marxist analysis, capitalists invest in production in
order to collect surplus value. However, competition for market share
will put a downward pressure on profits. To keep their profits up,
capitalists will have to reduce wages (which will, in turn, reduce
demand for commodities, leading to "overproduction" and
depressions). The deterioration of conditions for workers will inflame
class antagonism and lead to revolution. Then, the workers themselves,
coming together to seize the means of production, will use the
efficiency of modern industrial production for their own benefit (the
"dictatorship of the proletariat").
The division of "labor value" into its three components
gives us a glimpse of how a socialist economy could ever hope to
function efficiently. Surplus value is merely the value of
exploitation in a capitalist society; it is over and above the costs
of Labor (Variable capital), and Land + Capital (Constant capital). If
-- according to Marxist theory-- this exploitative surcharge were not
imposed on the cost of every commodity produced, there would be a vast
fund available for raising wages, providing social services, and "scientifically
planning" an efficient socialist economy.
However, under the capitalist mode of production, decisions about "what?"
"how many?" and "for whom?" are made with the
invaluable aid of the invisible hand of a (more or less) free market.
The market, though, is precisely what leads to surplus value and (to
Marxists) all the structural failings of capitalism. Under the next
phase of history -- socialism -- allocation decisions would not be
made by the "higgling of the market", but by some form of
objective planning. This is where the labor theory of value comes in
very handy.
If value is not inherent in the commodity, but is a subjective
determination of the buyer(s), then socialist "scientific
planning" has no basis. For an efficient planned economy to be
possible at all, value
must be inherent in things. If the amount of labor embodied in
a thing is a quantity that can be observed and measured, then it
becomes possible for "scientific planning" to
achieve efficient production patterns.
Marxist theory, then, in its requirement that class struggle lead
society past capitalism into a socialistic mode of production, depends
on a labor theory of value.
The Subjective Theory
The other major contender for a modern theory of value is the
Austrian theory, which traces its roots to
Principles of Economics by Carl Menger. It tells us that value
is subjective. It has nothing to do with anything inherent in the
thing being valued, and therefore can have no relation to any amount
of labor that went into it. It is simply a matter of how much each
individual wants each thing.
To Austrian economists, if a glass of water is sold for a million
dollars to someone who is dying of thirst, then, by golly, that's its
value. A more conventional view would hold that, because of special
circumstances, the glass was sold for more than its market value. But
Austrian theory holds that there is no such thing as the "market
value" of a good; value is revealed in particular transactions.
One could compute an average of the various observed prices for which
a good has sold, but that can only lead to an approximation of the
thing's value. For Austrian theorists, "market value" is a
meaningless concept.
Why is that important? Because if there is such a thing as "market
value", then it becomes possible for things to be sold for more
(or less) than their market value -- in other words, it becomes
possible for markets to fail. Monopoly, or subsidy, or political
manipulation, might end up allowing sellers to pocket the gleanings of
"market failure", enriching themselves at the expense of the
community. This, then, would lead to various kinds of interventions in
the free market, to remove the unfairness of "market failures".
(To Marxists, remember, the market economy is inherently a failure...)
In Austrian theory, this interventionism represents the very worst
kind of circular reasoning. In order to correct supposed imperfections
in the market allowing some "monopolists" to capitalize on "market
failure", government imposes restrictions on free-market
behavior! (Free-market economists tend to believe that monopolies, far
from being parasitical, benefit society by affording innovators the
extra capital they need to create the means for industrial progress.)
If "market failure" exists at all, Austrian economists see
it as a conflict between individuals or groups in their plans to use
certain scarce resources. Efficient resolutions to these conflicts can
be negotiated between the interested parties -- but not if the
resources are removed from the market process by confiscation or
regulation.
This gets us back to the question of why value theory is important:
If the value of a commodity is inherent, or socially-created in some
way, then it would be possible for it to have a "true" value
that is different from what it exchanges for in any particular
transaction. This would open the door to intervention -- to the
temptation to remove things from that free interplay of individual
desires, and individual plans for satisfying them, that constitute
economic activity.
So, in Austrian theory there is no "overall economy" apart
from individual transactions. This leads us to a political economy in
which everything must be made private property if it possibly can be.
If there is no "overall economy", then the community (or its
representative) has no right to interfere in individual transactions.
If anything that could be held privately is, instead, held
communally by the coercive power of the state, then the free interplay
of desires and plans is restricted; economic activity and freedom are
retarded.
Doesn't this seem to be a hard-hearted view of things? Perhaps. But
Austrian theory does not hold that ethical concerns have no place in
social policy -- only that they have no place in economic theory.
Society might decide, out of some ethical or otherwise over-arching
social concern, to communalize certain assets. Yet by doing so it
would always limit human freedom. In the Austrian view of things,
there is an inevitable trade-off between individual freedom and
government intervention.
The Problem with Land
It's interesting to note that each of these "competing"
theories of value encounters a pretty serious stumbling block when it
comes to the question of land. Marxist theory accounts for the value
of land as part of the "Constant capital" that goes into the
production of commodities. Land itself isn't produced by labor, of
course -- so it can only acquire value when labor is applied to it in
some way. This is reminiscent of J. S. Mill's justification for
property in land, which Henry George critiques in
The Science of Political Economy. Land can become private
property, according to Mill, when (and because) it is improved. Under
the Labor Theory, that is also why it acquires value. However, it is
evident that the value of improvements can easily be separated from
the value of raw land, and that raw land does indeed have value. This
is, of course, vitally important to the capitalist economy -- for we
see huge amounts of value tied up in urban locations that stand
completely idle, with no labor applied to them at all, sometimes for
decades.
Austrian theorists also get caught in a vicious circle when it comes
to land. This is not because land value is not subjective, measuring
the land's utility to the buyer; indeed it is. However, Austrian
theory holds that unrestricted privatization leads to efficient
allocation and promotes human freedom. This certainly seems to be true
in the case of the products of labor -- but it is clearly untrue in
the case of land. Although some still try to justify it, using exotic
interpretations of allocative efficiency, the evidence is overwhelming
that private collection of land rent leads to economic dysfunction.
(Public confiscation of the legitimate products of labor and capital
does, too -- but free-market theorists are eager to agree with that.)
George's Great Reconciliation
One of Henry George's most powerful attributes as a social
philosopher is his unswerving faith that science, if it is correctly
based on natural law, cannot lead society to violence or decay. On the
one hand, we have a Labor Theory of Value. Reasoning logically
therefrom, we determine that justice can only be secured by removing
the great vitality that society gains from the free market. On the
other hand, we have a Subjective Theory of Value, which leads us to a
"best of all possible worlds" in which our access to the
natural opportunities, which all of us need to sustain life, must be
purchased from private owners, for the sake of "freedom"!
George examined the theory that value depends on the labor embodied
in a thing, and found it to lack explanatory power; simple observation
showed that value is not inherent, but a function of the buyers'
desires. However, simple observation also demonstrated that private
ownership of everything -- whether or not it is a product of human
labor -- leads neither to justice nor efficiency. He managed cut
through this dilemma by introducing the concept of "value from
obligation". George saw that the
amount of value is subjective -- determined by nothing more
than the "higgling of the market". However, the source
of value is not subjective! It depends on one all-important objective
quality of a thing: whether it was or was not produced by human labor.
This distinction means nothing to the individual; land, stocks, money
or physical wealth all have the same kind of value to us, as
individuals. A political economy that sees the aggregate as nothing
more than the sum of all individual transactions and values would,
likewise, see no importance in the distinction between value from
production and value from obligation.
Henry George showed that labor is not the source of all value -- but
it is the source of some value: the value that comes from
production. Furthermore he demonstrated that the amount of
value a commodity has is subjective, bearing no relation whatever to
that value's source. With this firm theoretical foundation, he could
confidently build an economic theory that could reconcile freedom and
justice, proving his contention (which he stated in Progress and
Poverty) that "justice is the highest and truest expediency".
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