Answering Questions of Personal Political Philosophy

Comments by James L. Busey

Edward J. Dodson

[After writing a paper with the above title as part of my graduate work at Temple University, I sent a copy of the paper to James L. Busey, professor emertus of Political Science, University of Colorado, requesting his comments. What follows below is the text of a letter dated 21 July 1987 received from Prof. Busey.]

At long last, I'm finally able to take time out to comment with some detail on your paper, "Answering Questions of Personal Political philosophy," with the care that it deserves. When you note how long this letter is going to become, you will understand why I didn't sit down within the week after receiving your paper, to make my comments about it.

You asked me to give "some thought" to it before the conference in San Diego, and I presume you meant we might talk with each other a bout it at that time. Since I am not going to the conference, that question is moot.

I don't recall what I wrote you when I received your paper three months ago. In many ways it touches on political theory, which I offered during many years; and I also brought theoretical questions into a general introductory course in political science. Since your bent seems to run in the direction of such matters, you may have interest in one or more of the enclosed items. The "Basic Political Terms," the chart on "The Role of the State in Society" and article published about a third of a century ago in Social Studies would relate to some of the content of your paper, especially your chart on p. iii. The outline of Pol. Sci. 100, fall 1980 (my last term before liberation via "retirement") would just tell you what a general survey of the field would include.

You won't find anything in these papers smacking of Henry George or the single tax. A couple of times I dragged that into the course on political theory, but became quite embarrassed by my lack of objectivity on the subject, so dropped it thereafter. In the older traditions of academia, the students never knew what their profs really believed about controversial matters, and I adhered to that rule.

You must have told me, but I'm not clear as to your major field at Temple University, or the objective of your studies. M.A.? Ph.D.? You speak of having prepared the paper for an "M.L.A." course. What is that? The paper does not seem to fall within the rubric of political science -- more likely, I would think,; economics or kindred field.

The title, "Answering Questions of Personal Political Philosophy," is well suited to the subject-matter of the paper. From time to time the paper returns to the question of immigration policy, and Part I indeed includes that in its title -- and it is a centerpiece for pp. 1?-19. However, it is well that you used the broader title for the whole. You may wish to tighten up the immigration discussion, which seems to sort of dart in and out of the presentation.

It is fun to play around with charts designed to sort out the varied spectra of human political analysis. You may like to compare yours with mine, and may like to work out a synthesis between them. I would include the blank circle below mine so that students could devise their own, partly borrowed from mine, partly from their own ideas.

I consider your listing of the features of the "centrist" position (p.3) to be quite sound; and, certainly the ndecentralist" factors as you show them also constitute an accurate description of that point of view -- which in my chart, I simply subsumed under "individualism," whatever its configuration, proposals for "communitarian socialism," "direct participation in societal decisions by citizens," must remain highly theoretical because they have been so rarely put into practice on a large scale -- or, except in some Swiss cantons and New England towns, for any appreciable period of time. Even so, this constitutes a very important phase for philosophical concern.

Galbraith's use of the term "condign power" is his own invention. My dictionary tells me it has to do with "very worthy," "deserved," "suitable," "said esp. of punishment for wrongdoing." Galbraith, a "far left liberal" as you point out, puts a negative connotation on it when he associates it with alleged "conservative" biases having to do with bar-room bouncers, "conservative yearning for capital punishment," "dominance of men over women," etc. So, to invent another kind of power that is liberal and therefore nice, he comes up with "compensatory power." Insofar as they are both coercive, the two do not differ; but if it is "conservative" it is "condign" and therefore bad; and if it is "liberal" it is "compensatory? and therefore o.k,

; As between security and liberty, I think another approach is to consider them as being not in conflict, but complementary to each other. When they are in balance, both flourish; when not, one may destroy the other. Thus, George Washington: "Arbitrary power is most easily established on the ruins of liberty abused to licentiousness;" and Will Durant: "When liberty destroys order, the hunger for order will destroy liberty"; and the opposite is also possible, as in the forthcoming revolution in Chile.

I note the phrase, p. 8, that "What Americans have had difficulty accepting is that the United States again, after a quarter century of dominance, shares economic and political power in the global arena with many Other nations." Certainly there is a sharing of economic power with such as Japan and increasingly nations of Western Europe, including France; but I think the only one with which there is such a "sharing" of political power is the U.S.S.R. Here, I think, both countries have difficulty accepting the notion of "sharing," and each is hopeful of dominating the other. Until greater mutual tolerance and understanding can be developed on both sides, where one stands on this question depends on which side one is on, physically and/or ideologically. The nation-state system makes idiots of us all, but unfortunately it is the only international system we have.

On the question (p. 11) of the normal "employers' desire to not compensate labor for the full value of what is produced," of course employers would prefer not to compensate labor at all; but the phrase implies that "the full value of what is produced" should all go to "labor." Of course you and I agree that the employer, as manager, also provides labor. An intervening problem is that certainly employers don't favor paying labor for more than the value produced, whatever that is; so immigration may in some instances Come into the picture to rectify wage scales that are inflated, not by value produced, but by coercive union demands. The same goes for imports from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore, Mexico, etc.

To p. 12, about the ungluing of things in Latin America, I would add that things in that part of the world have been unglued since as far back as memory runneth. Among other factors, gross land monopoly plus unbelievable corruption (especially in Mexico) have played very significant roles. This arose out of contributions of 16th-l7th century Spain and Portugal, today not especially corrupt by world standards. Intense poverty has been endemic to almost the whole region ever since the Spanish and Portuguese landed. It is called by Rosendo Gomez the "concessionary view of public office."

Of course the excessive foreign debts (encouraged by foreign banks and their governments), and the consequence IMF rules, have exacerbated this more or less permanent situation, but they certainly didn't create it.

I got a kick out of your remark that (p. 14) "American farmers have become an LDC in their own right" and your analysis of the reasons.

On the remarks on immigration, p. 16, let me go back to my comment that the nation-state system makes idiots of us all. What I mean is that the anarchy which prevails in the relationships of nation-states to each other is the fundamental reality that prevents rational solution of problems of either immigration or peace or trade or much of anything else at the international level. If there were no borders, or if there were some kind of effective rule by international law, many impossible international problems would be easier to solve. This is the central factor that is forgotten by all sides of the immigration question, by peacemongers and warmongers, and makes us do stupid and impossible things, such as peace marches across the U.S. or U.S.S.R., accumulation of world-destroying nuclear weapons, or other things that will either have no good effects whatever or will make the problems even worse than they are. Some textbook writer said the nation-state system is a condition Sof semi-organized anarchy. Until that can be resolved, nothing in the international scene can make a great deal of sense. The nation-state system louses up everything. If the advocates of peace would concentrate more on that question, and abandon their marches, their kicking and screaming, their slavish attachment to the dictates of one side or the other, we might get somewhere in solving these dangerous international problems.

I am not arguing for "world government" which at the present juncture would just put one side or the other in control of international hegemony. What I am arguing for is a great consciousness about the fundamental condition of international anarchy whose solution would provide a key to resolving the great problems of peace, trade, immigration, etc.

On p. 16 you say much the same thing. Your introduction to the last paragraph, "Given the constraints of sovereignty. … "is exactly the point.

I think, page 18, that states do have some rights, as implied in constitutional articles IV and X. Of course the first nine amendments (in addition to X), added as a condition for the ratification by the requisite number of states, make it clear that individual rights were a primary constitutional concern.

Regarding representative democracy vs. participatory democracy, pp. 19-22, I think many of us wish that full participatory democracy would be more feasible than it is. Representative democracy has many flaws, chief among which is that it is often a sort of fake representation. But so far, attempts at "participatory democracy" in large societies, as in Cuba, have become machete-clanging congregations of hundreds of thousands of hysterical people, screaming and yelling their support for "el lider maximo"; or as in Fascist Italy, a mob of people jammed together in the piazza, shouting endlessly, "Il Duce! Il Duce! … or in Nazi Germany, a sea of shrieking humanity in the sportsplast, shouting till their throats were hoarse, "Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil!" in honor of der Fuerher. Or, Nicaraguan "democracy."

Speaking of that, I'd like to get your impressions after the 3D meeting. I'm all for Georgists trying to bring The Word to fanatic Marxist-Leninists; but this can also work in reverse, and the M-Ls are usually better at it than we are. For one thing, Georgists tend to be pretty individualistic and do not coordinate too well on tactics; for another, the M-Ls have succeeded in taking over the two largest countries on earth, so they've had a lot of experience at this, and know not only how to influence people, but also how to ensnare them.

So, now you know why it took me so long to get around to my response to your thoughtful and stimulating paper. I just knew I'd have to set aside plenty of time.