City Planning in a Synergistic Environment: Trends in the U.S., Britain and the Continent -- Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

Edward J. Dodson

[A paper submitted as partial requirements for the course "Great Cities of the Western World," Temple University, Spring, 1989]

The issue before us is, I suggest, two-fold. First, is the question of why cities have developed as they have. And, second, is whether principles of planning are capable of operating universally with only minor adjustments for societal differences in institutions and culture. In comparing the development pattern of cities within Western Europe against that of the United States, there are clear reasons why and how development occurred along distinct paths. That does not, however, tell us much about whether the European approach to planning is feasible for future adoption within the United States.

THE OLD WORLD IN THE NEW WORLD

Historians have categorized the period of English colonization of the North American continent as one of salutary neglect, when isolation from central government fostered the growth of self-government built around the common and positive law of England. Britain's victories over France and Spain in the Old World secured for North Americans a framework of government that was strongly oriented to the protection of property (both in titleholdings to land and to production). And, although civil liberties were incorporated into the U.S. Constitution by means of the Bill of Rights, the primary concern of the framers was to protect property from confiscation by the State and from what they viewed as an entrenched system of monopoly rights sanctioned in Old World law.

What was happening in England, however, ran counter to most of the rest of Europe. The socio-political changes experienced by continental Europeans were largely those created by a tendency toward centralization and unification. As we have discussed in class, the continental cities arose more as centers of power than for the convenient operation of commerce. The walled cities of feudalism gradually incorporated inner citadels to house and protect spiritual and secular leaders. Alliances brought the European princes together against other princely alliances, and the process of warfare and intermarriage resulted in the consolidation of power, wealth and control over territory (and people). Prior to the arrival of large-scale manufacturing, the primary cultural arrangements sanctioned the extraction of production from tenant farmers by landed aristocracies; a portion of these agricultural goods were exchanged for coinage which made its way from the lesser to the higher nobility and finally into the hands of the monarchy.

With armies constantly fighting their way back and forth across Europe -- and with privilege as the basis of citizenship -- the continent's large cities had to be planned as a response to the probability of conflict from within and without. What happened in England was very different. For one thing, the English managed a shaky unification with the Scots, after subduing the Welsh and Irish, thereby consolidating power in the British Isles under one central government. What distinguished Britain from the continental powers, however, was a balance of power between the landed nobility, the commercial interests (who used commerce to gain landed status), and the monarchy. This was evident in the make-up of Britain's Parliaments and the outpouring of commercial law that developed to govern trade and commerce. London was not only the seat of government but was also the center of finance capitalism being fostered under British mercantilism. As other port cities arose on Britain's western coast, the landed found themselves sharing wealth and power with a strongly individualist commercial class whose philosophical attitudes were given voice by Social-Darwinism.

Given these differences in socio-political structure, we should expect to find different types of cities emerging on the European continent from those of Britain or North America. Up until the late 19th century this was certainly the case. Then, as participatory government expanded to include civil rights for those who had been propertyless (and, therefore, without political power), the physical and socio-political structure of all the major cities began to change. Liberalism (influenced to a greater or less extent in each country by Fabian socialism), presented the common challenge of improving health and safety standards, providing public access to recreation and establishing publicly-funded education. How these programs were implemented and administrated was, however, both determined by and contributed to the degree to which each society moved toward centralization or decentralization of public decision-making. In economist terms, such externalities influence what would otherwise be purely economic (i.e., cost/benefit) decisions.

Culture represent. what I see as a different category of externalities; the greater the homogeneity within a population group (e.g., ethnicity, language, socio-economic class, religious beliefs) the higher the probability that the cultural value system will result in consensus building around planning proposals. Conversely, in a society such as the United States, pluralism and the existence of Old World subcultures presents powerful obstacle to consensus building around centralized planning proposals. In the heterogeneous society, planning is most effective at the lowest levels of public intervention and decreases in effectiveness as the effort expands in scope. Despite notable exceptions, Federal spending has too often gone to pork barrel projects that are narrowly beneficial but are undertaken despite the recommendations of planning specialists. Planners in the U.S. must not only face 50 state governments but literally thousands of regional and municipal bodies that claim jurisdiction over resource allocation.

While noting the obvious problems associated with the U.S. model, a return to market-oriented growth policies during the 1980s has, I believe, countered the drift toward highly interventionist central planning (at least for awhile). Two reasons for this are a loss of public support and the decline in government revenues available for large-scale development/redevelopment projects. In the U.S., the Reagan era emphasized a return of program administration to the states and a scaling back of revenue sharing; regional and municipal governments then looked at a menu of ways to encourage private development that included below-market land sales and long-term tax abatements. Margaret Thatcher's conservative government has attempted to do the same in Britain, and even the French have moved to return industry and finance to private interests. In effect, there are no longer any full employment social-democracies (New Zealand may have been the last to change direction); absent the ability to redistribute income that characterized the 1950s thru the 1970s, private sector resources have not been forthcoming for development where household income does not support a high level of consumption. The market does not provide very satisfactory levels of housing, employment or support services for low income consumers. This is painfully evident in the United States; and, now that the Europeans have been forced by global financial pressures to relinquish control over economic planning, social planning inevitably takes on a more U.S.-like appearance.

My prediction is that the result can be none other than a growing wedge between the haves and the have nots, with less and less opportunity for upward movement in socio-economic condition. Removal of the levelling aspects of welfare state policies does allow for private investment decision-making; what privatization, deregulation and lowered marginal tax rates on incomes does not automatically generate is socially-desirable investment. As I see it, the challenge for the planning community is to convince policymakers that the above changes must be accompanied by other changes that discourage the allocation of scarce resources into wholly speculative investment opportunities that produce no new physical wealth or employment opportunities.

Comments on the paper by Professor Carolyn Adams

This is a very readable and interesting treatment of the topic. You took a different tack on the assignment than others did -- in itself a refreshing change of pace for your instructor. I have two quibbles with your presentation:

(1) I think your early pages present U.S. and English development as almost interchangeable. You contrast the Anglo-American model to the continental Europeans. But I would place England in a middle position, identical to neither the American nor the continental case. After all, the British legal and political institutions are far more centralized than ours, giving the British planners a distinct advantage over their American counterparts.

(2) You say that in the 1980s, virtually all Western governments have reined in their social welfare expenditures. OK. But I don't think you can assume (as is implied by our essay) that they have all moved to relax their regulation of investment. In fact, the response of some Europeans to world market pressures has been to give government a larger hand in promoting and guiding investment into the most competitive sectors of their economy. In short, to adopt national industrial policy.