Housing Affordability
Edward J. Dodson
[August 1999]
When it comes to
housing as a distinct segment of the economy, the casual
observer in the United States cannot help but feel overwhelmed by the
dynamics. People are everywhere on the move. The out-migration from
the older, factory-dominated, city neighborhoods continues into its
fourth decade, offset to some extent by an in-migration to the
residential neighborhoods within and adjacent to the central city
business corridors and waterfronts. There is an out-migration from
older suburban bedroom communities, where housing costs have long been
high and are again rising, to more rural and sparsely populated areas
still within reasonable commuting time (distance is no longer the
measure) to the suburban employment and shopping centers. Small, rural
towns at the outer edges of commuting times are experiencing increases
in population -- generally of higher income households who bring their
spending power but also bid up the price of housing. In regions not
connected in this way to the nation's large metropolitan rings, other
rural towns are dying off as a consequence of the consolidations in
the agricultural sector. Corporate agribusinesses spent little
locally. With the disappearance of every family farm the threat to the
communities the farmers support increases. Vacant homes and closed
shops on small town main street is the unfortunate result.
Everywhere one looks there is a growing percentage of households who
cannot afford of achieve homeownership or are being pushed out of
existing homes by rising property taxes. Housing affordability is best
reflected in the form of an equation , of the relationship between the
cost of housing, household income, the market rate of interest charged
for long-term mortgage financing, and other annual costs of owning a
home (including property taxes, mortgage insurance premiums, utility
costs, condominium fees).
The United States has an enormous stock of housing units available
for owner-occupancy. Some 65 percent of the households in the U.S. are
homeowners (although fewer than 25 percent own homes free and clear of
mortgage debt). Buildings containing one, two, three or four dwelling
units are categorized by mortgage lenders and others as "single
family" structures. Those with five or more units are (somewhat
arbitrarily) categorized as "multi-family" structures, owned
generally by investors rather than by owner-occupants. In every year
since at least as far back as 1950 the U.S. has added more than one
million new housing units, with several years in the early 1970s
climbing well over two million. On the other side of the equation, the
rest of the housing stock is aging. Many units, particularly those
located in places where household incomes are low, are what appraisers
call "functionally obsolete" (meaning that they are in poor
condition generally and far below the standard for new construction).
The worst of this group is vacant, absentee owned and abandoned.
Many people seeking a place to live have few choices because their
incomes have not kept pace with the price for well-maintained housing
in neighborhoods considered as desirable places to live, work and
play. Inner city neighborhoods are populated by households
overwhelmingly at or below 80 percent of the area median income level.
Older, long-time residents in these neighborhoods are slowly turning
properties over (as they move in with relatives, move into retirement
communities or leave the properties to heirs). More and more, these
properties are remaining vacant for long periods of time, becoming
targets of vandalism. Speculators and slumlords purchase the
properties, divide them into apartment units and lease them to low
income households, dedicating very little to maintenance until the
properties become uninhabitable and is condemned by the municipality.
Absent the influx of households with incomes high enough to maintain
or rehabilitate these properties, the fabric of the community
disintegrates. The fall in housing prices to below replacement cost of
the dwelling means that homeowners (or potential purchases) cannot
obtain sufficient financing to acquire distressed properties and
rehabilitate them. On a piecemeal basis, government subsidies have
been introduced to fill this gap; however, the need overwhelms the
resources made available for the task.
In the suburban areas the problem is rather different, although
subsidies here also provide the primary means of mitigation. A large
percentage of younger adults are hampered in their efforts to achieve
homeownership not so much because of household income (although this
is certainly true of some, particularly single heads-of-household, and
more particularly female heads-of-household) but because they are not
able to accumulate enough savings for a down payment and closing
costs. The public policy response has been been two-fold: (1) require
developers to dedicate some percentage of the land they hold to the
construction of housing units affordable to moderate income
households; and (2) to provide income eligible (generally homebuyers
whose household income is less than 80 percent of the area median)
with conditional grants or loans to supplement savings. Typically, the
homebuyers must contribute 3 percent of the purchase price of the
property. A total down payment of 5 percent is required under the
financing terms, which means that these grants -- and, in many cases,
gifts from parents or other close relatives or nonprofits -- cover the
remaining amount of cash needed for the purchase. Homebuyers with
exceptionally good credit may qualify for 100% financing, under which
they may be required to contribute some minimum amount out of savings
but not be required to make a down payment. The introduction of this
level of financing has been made possible by the use of computers to
calculate "credit scores" based on decades of data
accumulated on how people handle repayment of debts. Interestingly,
there seems to be no direct correlation between household income and
debt management. As many lower income households as higher income
households (by percentage) have excellent to good credit scores.
Another expanding initiative in the cause of creating permanently
affordable, decent housing for lower income households is the creation
of "community land trusts" (CLTs). Here, again, the strategy
in some areas is very different from others. Within older
neighborhoods and the inner cities, the CLT is able to acquire
properties at relatively low (or even no) cost; however, the cost of
rehabilitation is generally greater than what the "as completed"
market value of the property will be. By placing the land in a CLT, by
imposing owner-occupancy requirements on the buyers and by
establishing resale formulas that limit any future gain on sale of the
improvement, the CLT model achieves the goal of long-term
affordability. In high cost areas, the CLT's role is to remove the
land cost component from the homebuyer's cost of acquisition. This
does make homes more affordable, of course, but requires a huge
acquisition fund (or access to financing). Because of the costs
involved, the CLT inroads into housing have thus far been minor.
Readers of Groundswell well appreciate the true nature of the
problem. I often describe the dynamics this way: Where land markets
are concerned, price is not an effective market clearing mechanism. If
we look at the component parts of the housing affordability equation
-- and break down housing costs into land, labor and materials -- what
we see can be represented in the supply-demand graphs economics
professors like to draw on the classroom boards. The supply curves for
labor and materials lean to the right, meaning that as the price
others are willing to pay for them goes up so does the supply (all
other things being equal). The supply curve for credit also leans to
the right (although the way the credit markets have evolved to
globally move credit from where there is more than enough to where
there is less than enough has meant that almost as much credit is
available at lower rates of return as at higher rates of return in the
U.S., which has returned to its pre-OPEC status as the "safe
harbor" for investing surplus financial reserves). But, the
supply curve for parcels of land leans to the left, meaning that as
the price people are willing to pay for land rises the supply offered
tends to fall. The reason, of course, is that every parcel of land has
a rental value in the market. This rental value accrues to owners of
land as imputed income. To the extent this imputed income is left
untaxed, the untaxed amount is capitalized into a selling price. The
lower the annual tax on imputed income in the face of rising demand
for parcels of land, the easier it is for owners to hold land off the
market in anticipation of buyers willing to pay even more.
We need to brace ourselves for the next land market-led downturn.
Where will it occur? Look to where land prices are rising the fastest
-- in places such as California' Silicon Valley. Housing affordability
is already severely stressed. Land costs are so high that businesses
are looking elsewhere when they need to expand and may begin to
downsize their work forces in Silicon Valley in order to lower the
cost of doing business and compete internationally. When the median
price of housing hits $300,000, then $500,000, employers must be
willing to pay enormous salaries in order to attract talented workers.
At some point these salaries cannot be sustained, the lease payments
for office space become too onerous and the costs cannot be passed on
(or absorbed by increases in productivity). The first signs of
weakness in the regional economy is a higher vacancy rate in newly
constructed office buildings and an increasing number of defaults on
bank loans. The softened commercial real estate market tends to have a
domino effect in a softening of the residential real estate market.
The last significant crash occurred just a few years ago in the Los
Angeles area (as high land costs drove employers and residents to
Nevada, Portland and Seattle). Before that -- from 1988 until around
1993 Boston and other parts of New England were hit. And, before that
the Southeast. And, before that Texas and the Oil Belt; And, before
that...
|