Power and Privilege in the American Experience: Has a New World
Order Taken Charge?
Edward J. Dodson
[November 2014]
One of the great written histories of the modern era was provided to
us by Professor Carroll Quigley in his controversial work, Tragedy
and Hope, A History of The World in Our Time, published in 1966.
His objective, he explained, was to provide "an interpretation of
the present as well as the immediate past and the near future, which
is free from the accepted clichés, slogans, and
self-justifications which mar so much of 'contemporary history'."[1]
He accomplished this and much more. He confirmed the suspicions of
many thoughtful people that the invisible hand described by
Adam Smith had been and continued to be subverted by a level of
societal and global control few seriously considered possible. Class
interest and self-interest had been mobilized into very powerful
economic, financial and political forces:
"We could indicate this by pointing out that
capitalism, because it seeks profits as its primary goal, is never
primarily seeking to achieve prosperity, high production, high
consumption, political power, patriotic improvement, or moral
uplift. Any of these may be achieved under capitalism, and any (or
all) of them may be sacrificed and lost under capitalism, depending
on this relationship to the primary goal of capitalist activity -
the pursuit of profits."[2]
The pursuit of profit is, like the modern discipline of economics,
free of any concern for moral principles or ethical behavior. These
concerns may exist but only insofar as individuals are directed by
their own moral compass. In the United States, owners and managers of
businesses expend an enormous amount of individual and organizational
resources on ways to reduce the obligation to contribute to public
revenue as well as avoid compliance with all manner of regulations and
restrictions on their activities.
Less insightful, Professor Quigley joins almost all other historians
and writers in the use of the term capitalism to describe a
system that failed to fully develop. Dramatic increases in the
production of wealth occurred because of the inventiveness of people
working to solve practical problems and to shift the burden of wealth
production to labor-saving devices (i.e., to capital goods). His
discussion of the conditions in the industrializing societies of
Western Civilization ignores the fundamental issue of who controlled
the land and natural resources from which all material wealth comes.
Rather, he simply explains to the reader that the introduction of
industrial methods to agriculture resulted in a massive out-migration
of people following a "demographic explosion" that also
greatly expanded the number of military-age young men. "The
result," Quigley concluded, "was to create the greatest
social problem of the twentieth-century world."[3] That social
problem was two-fold: what to do with surplus people and how to
prevent wars now that leaders could put huge standing armies in the
field.
What also escapes the attention of Carroll Quigley is the changing
role of the rentier elite who dominated every society by the
nineteenth century, even those societies to which the surplus people
of Europe had migrated to in a quest for access to the land denied to
them at home, or employment where labor was relatively scarce. The
system of agrarian landlordism had evolved, to be sure, but
landlordism remained at the heart of socio-political arrangements and
institutions. Only the small group of political malcontents
surrounding the political economist and journalist Henry George
recognized the continuing presence and central importance of the
land question. Added to the system of law that sanctioned and
protected the monopolization of nature came laws eventually achieving
the same outcome where other forms of property, including paper
assets, were concerned. This did not occur right away, however,
because there continued to be places around the globe where land
remained relatively inexpensive. These were locations where businesses
could be profitably established and where people could afford to
acquire a residential property or family-owned farm.
We learn from Carroll Quigley that within this environment there were
many forces pulling the peoples of the world toward an interdependent
but fragile global system. Political and economic elites maneuvered
against and with one another to direct the future. Others sought to
challenge the course of history by means both peaceful and violent, by
organized protest, by public relations campaigns and by riot. As all
of these forces converged during the first decade of the twentieth
century, the First World War erupted to bring down much of the Old
Order. However, this outcome was understood by only a minority of
surviving leaders:
"The war brought nothing really new into the world;
rather it sped up processes of change which had been going on for a
considerable period and would have continued anyway.
Also, the
changes were much greater in objective facts and in the organization
of society than they were in men's ideas of these facts or
organization."[4]
There was no going back. The process of societal integration had been
disrupted at great cost, but now a New World Order emerged out
of meetings held to settle the issues of "reparations, economic
reconstruction, and acute political problems."[5] And, it is
here, during this period, that the fuel was provided to those who
interpreted the outcome as a conspiracy of the powerful to achieve
even greater control over political and economic institutions:
"At all of these meetings, as at the Peace
Conference itself, the political leaders were assisted by groups of
experts and interested persons, sometimes self-appointed. Many of
these 'experts' were members or associates of the
international-banking fraternity."[6]
History reveals that wars are rarely paid for by the direct taxation
of those who have the most to gain or lose in the conflict.
Governments issue bonds at interest, sold to those who have the
financial reserves to lend. When this proves insufficient, as is
consistently the case, paper currency is issued and declared legal
tender that must be accepted in payment for goods and services. Specie
is hoarded and removed from circulation, and the paper currency is
eventually discounted almost beyond any usefulness. The most
vulnerable are those who own no land or other material assets, who
must rely only on the demand for their labor to earn any sort of
income. Thus, in the wake of the damage caused during the First World
War, we should not be surprised by efforts to re-establish monetary
arrangements based on the value of gold. No less a figure than John
Maynard Keynes warned of the consequences that would otherwise result:
"There is no subtler, no surer, means of
overturning the existing bases of society than to debauch the
currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law
on the side of destruction and does it in a manner not one man in a
million is able to diagnose."[7]
Was Keynes being disingenuous here, or did he simply not fully
appreciate the extent to which the currency had already been debauched
by the laws that permitted banks to issue paper currency not fully
redeemable in specie. As a later critic of the modern monetary system
wrote:
"Modern governments
have become more astute,
more subtle, more sophisticated, and, unfortunately, more efficient
in their monetary malpractices.
[T]he ever increasing debts
and welfare activities of modern governments seem to have induced an
almost continuous devaluation or outright repudiation."[8]
Much of the subtlety and sophistication is rightly credited to the
efforts by Keynes, Harry Dexter White and other economists of the era
to bring the currencies of all major trading nations under the control
of a new International Monetary Fund. At the end of the Second World
War, the United States held huge quantities of gold in reserve, and
bank notes issued by the Federal Reserve System served as the currency
of international commerce. However, Keynes had in mind that in the not
too distant future just one currency would circulate, a currency
issued by a new world bank.
A Second World War ostensibly fought - by the United States and its
allies -- to defend individual liberty had the actual outcome of
greatly accelerating the expansion of government's jurisdiction over
matters involving individuals and their private interests. The new
threat to Western Civilization served to cement the gains achieved by
the State during the war. As Joseph Stalin's armies established
control over the territory and people who survived the genocide of
retreating Germans, the opportunity for any sort of peace dividend
quickly disappeared. New "forces of irrationality" (to
borrow the term Carroll Quigley used to describe Fascism) arose to
challenge a renewed advance of Western Civilization.
At the same time, scientific and technological advances had suddenly
created a situation where direct, intense confrontation became a
dangerous game with mutual total destruction the inevitable
consequence. Russian scientists, greatly assisted by scientific and
technological information passed on by communist sympathizers and
others who believed in the free sharing of the fruits of scientific
investigation, provided the means for an arms race that siphoned off
natural resources and capital goods needed for the development of
physical and social infrastructure. Another outcome was the shift from
"temporarily drafted citizen-soldiers" to "the use of
highly trained, professional, mercenary fighting men."[9] What
this change in the structure of the military would yield, Carroll
Quigley argued, was a new and far less rational hierarchical societal
structure:
"[I]t is increasingly clear that
the expert
will replace the industrial tycoon in control of the economic system
even as he will replace the democratic voter in control of the
political system. This is because planning will inevitably replace
laissez faire in the relationships between the two systems. This
planning may not be single or unified, but it will be planning, in
which the main framework and operational forces of the system will
be established and limited by the experts on the governmental side;
then the experts within the big units on the economic side will do
their planning within these established institutions."[10]
Thus, within a very chaotic and rapidly changing economic and
political climate, the fundamental conflict was far less ideological
than one between those who fought against the expanding role of the
State and those who accepted this expanding role as both inevitable
and necessary. For the citizens of the United States entering the
post-Second World War era, the challenge seemed to be to find a way to
embrace the middle ground between individualism and social democracy.
Former editor of the Washington Post, Felix Morley put it this
way in 1949:
"We pay a great deal to government to provide what
F.D.R. called freedom from fear and freedom from want. In so doing,
we find our capacity to make personal contributions curtailed, even
with the generous tax exemption for educational and charitable
gifts. Individual freedom for is limited by collective
freedom from. And the widespread belief that this is as it
should be marks a very pronounced shift in American political
thought."[11]
At the time, then, only a small minority actively championed a return
to what they viewed was the proper laissez faire,/i>
relationship between the individual and government. Some, such as the
individualist intellectual Frank Chodorov, understood that the ancient
land question had never been resolved. Yet, Chodorov also
expressed a deep concern that all that is good was in jeopardy of
being lost under the heavy hand of a potent State:
"The only 'constructive' idea that I can in all
conscience advance
is that the individual put his trust in
himself, not in power; that he seek to better his understanding and
lift his values to a higher and still higher level; that he assume
responsibility for his behavior and not transfer his personality to
committees, organizations or, above all, to a super-personal State.
Such reforms as are necessary will come of themselves when, or if,
men act as intelligent and responsible human beings. There cannot be
a 'good' society until there are 'good' people."[12]
Understanding why we behave as we do is an ongoing challenge for
behavioral psychologists, sociologists and the planning community.
Privilege does not always result in personal success. Poverty does not
always result in personal failure. There is no way to predict who will
be a good person or a person who exhibits a total absence of a moral
sense of right and wrong. Which is the more powerful influence - nature
or nurture? We still do not have a definitive answer.
Many in the United States looked back nostalgically to find their
good society. They believed this was only possible by once
again withdrawing from the global stage. Unfortunately, Stalin's
aggressive stance and the expansion of state-socialism into an
increasing number of newly-independent, former colonies of the
European states made this a practical impossibility. To be sure,
astute analysts in the West fully recognized the systemic problems
faced by the people living under Stalin's thumb. Central planning
certainly allocated scarce resources, but without the price signals
delivered by competitive markets. Time would reveal even more serious
weaknesses characteristic of state-socialism.
Despite a huge land mass with extensive natural resources, the Soviet
system had great difficulty maintaining its military strength and also
providing basic goods and services to its citizens. In all likelihood,
the more optimistic analysts concluded, the period of global
instability would last but a few decades, until the Soviet regime
self-destructed. The gamble was that a war between the West and the
Soviet bloc could be avoided and a state of détente reached. In
the meantime, there was a good deal of work to do before the people in
the Western nations could be maneuvered to relinquish national
sovereignty to some sort of world government. A new system of
international law had to be introduced to replace the system that "had
regarded the state as the embodiment of sovereignty, an organization
of political power on a territorial basis."[13] Many of the
newly-established countries were nations in name only, divided
internally on the basis of ancient tribal rivalries, ethnic or
religious intolerance.
Conditions had also changed dramatically within the United States as
a result of the mobilization for the Second World War. Carroll Quigley
concluded that the very character of society in the United States had
irreversibly been changed by a combination of factors:
"The sincere effort, by aristocrats and democrats
alike, to make the social ladder in America a ladder of opportunity
rather than a ladder of privilege has opened the way to a surge of
petty-bourgeois recruits over the faltering bodies of the
disintegrating middle class.
"The petty bourgeois are rising in American society along the
channels established in the great American hierarchies of business,
the armed forces, academic life, the professions, finance, and
politics. They are doing this not because they have imagination,
broad vision, judgment, moderation, versatility, or group loyalties
but because they have neurotic drives of personal ambition and
competitiveness, great insecurities and resentments, narrow
specializations, and fanatical application to the task before each
of them."[14]
This did not mean that the old aristocracy was relinquishing power
and privilege. Their world had been changing for some time, and a
leadership cadre had been working for over a century to undermine the
operation and fundamental principles of social democracy while leaving
institutions essentially intact. To those who were paying close
attention, the subtle changes in societal norms and values seemed to
be deliberately orchestrated, and they did their best to follow
the money to the sources of influence. Some combination of shared
interest and coordinated activism was employed to deepen the
concentration of power and privilege already enjoyed. After examining
the literature on the subject, Professor Lance deHaven-Smith expresses
his dismay that so few historians or other members of academia have
bothered to undertake serious investigations into what he describes as
"State Crime against Democracy."[15] In his opinion:
"Many
political crimes in which involvement
by high officials is reasonably suspected have gone uninvestigated
or have been investigated only superficially.
The nature of
the subject matter is such that official inquiries, if they are
conducted at all, are usually compromised by conflicts of interest."[16]
One result is that such investigations have been left to individuals
whose own objectivity is subject to question because of their
ideological bias or a failure to support their assertions with
verifiable evidence. A good example is the examination of the origins
and operation of the world's monetary system by G. Edward Griffin. The
research by Griffin is exhaustive and supported by an extensive
bibliography of sources, but has been criticized by the few mainstream
academics who have taken the time to review the book. His is a
detailed story of secret meetings and intrigues going back to the
nineteenth century and the dream of an Anglo-imperial union held by
Cecil Rhodes.
A subject of investigation for historians is to shed light on the
extent to which the politics and economics of the modern era are
dominated by those who have shared the vision and objectives that
motivated Cecil Rhodes. Some of the details we know.
With funds initially provided by Rhodes before his death in 1902 and
afterward by the Rhodes Trust, former British secretary of state, Lord
Milner, established a network of Round Table Groups in the British
Dominions and in the United States. Although Milner embraced the
principles of democratic socialism, his deeper passion was for
unification of all British dominions. Yet, the time had long past when
the citizens of Canada, South Africa, Australia or New Zealand moved
in lock-step with their English cousins. Proposals for unification
were rejected by each Commonwealth member during the1920s and finally
put to rest in 1926 with the Balfour Declaration, which established
autonomy to the dominions over matters of both domestic and foreign
policy. A new strategy was then needed, one that would rely upon the
growing global presence of the United States.
After the First World War ended, Isaiah Bowman, trained as a
geographer and assigned the task of helping to establish borders for
the New Europe, became one of the founding members of the Council on
Foreign Relations. Established in New York City during the war, the
CFR was chaired by Elihu Root, a Wall Street lawyer and former
Secretary of State and Secretary of War. The membership was dominated
by other lawyers, banking executives and other corporate officers.
Elihu Root was a prominent Republican. The CFR's President, John W.
Davis, was Woodrow Wilson's ambassador to Great Britain. They were
also joined by the economic historian Edwin F. Gay, the first dean of
the Harvard Business School and, after the war, editor of the New
York Evening Post. What brought Isaiah Bowman into this group was
a state of the world he and others believed was on a very destructive
path. In 1921, he explained:
"The world is not new in the sense that war has
ceased, that all political and social problems will be promptly
settled, that present international boundaries and economic
arrangements will forever remain unchanged. The qualities of selfish
ambition and envy are deep-seated; they will pass away only when
human life itself is extinguished. So long as they exist there will
be war, with its revolutionary effects upon political, social, and
economic life."[17]
These negative forces associated with human beings had to be
countered by coordinated, transnational effort. The CFR was at the
very least a small step in the right direction. The new reality that
had to be faced by Americans, was conveyed by Edwin Gay in a 1932 Foreign
Affairs article:
"A time must come when the United States as a
powerful world state and a great creditor nation, hence vitally
interested in world trade and world prosperity, will face the
realities of its new position. It will realize that a policy of
self-sufficiency is not only impossible, but that a policy which
presupposes it to be possible is stultifying and impoverishing.
The
World War affirmed the international political responsibilities of
the United States; the World Depression demonstrates the economic
interdependence of the United States with other states. It cannot be
a hermit nation."[18]
To author G. Edward Griffin, establishment of the CFR set the stage
for a combined concentration of control over the nation's political
and economic institutions and a narrowing of ideology in favor of
world government. In order to support his conclusion all he had to do
was repeat the public statement made in 1939 by CFR member John Foster
Dulles:
"Some dilution or leveling off of the sovereignty
system as it prevails in the world today must take place
to
the immediate disadvantage of those nations which now possess the
preponderance of power.
The establishment of a common money
would deprive our government of exclusive control over a national
money.
The United States must be prepared to make sacrifices
in setting up a world politico-economic order which would level off
inequalities of economic opportunity with respect to nations."[19]
His words aside, John Foster Dulles was a lifelong defender of the
American System of property law and taxation that critics identified
as the cause of generational poverty and an economy prone to periods
of speculation-driven boom followed by prolonged recessions.
It was also during the 1930s that John Foster Dulles became friends
with Hjalmar Schacht, president of Germany's Reichsbank and minister
of economics. His law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, floated bonds
issued by German arms manufacturers. However, as the activities of the
Nazi regime became clear, his brother Allen saw to it that the
Sullivan & Cromwell office was closed. Allen Dulles had been a CFR
director since 1927. During the Second World War, he headed the
American intelligence operation in Switzerland, allowing him to keep
in contact with many of the financial and business leaders continuing
to do business with Nazi Germany. Eisenhower would later appoint him
to head the Central Intelligence Agency. A long list of covert
interferences in the affairs of other nations followed.
In 1933, John Foster Dulles had chaired a CFR discussion group
debating the desirability of working toward national self-sufficiency.
Many high level officials and executives participated, as well as the
journalist Walter Lippmann, who later summarized in Foreign
Affairs what he learned by the experience:
"From fear of military and economic aggression men
pass gradually to a general sense that the more they are entangled
in an international economy the less they are masters of their fate.
"The essence of the argument is that the decisions of markets
as expressed in rising and falling prices are better regulators of
human energy than any centralized planning authority could be.
"It seems to me reasonably clear that in the United States the
movement toward a closed and controlled economy derives its main
impetus not from a new social gospel but from the necessity of
overcoming the consequences of agrarian and industrial dislocation.
There has been no mass conversion from individualism to
collectivism."[20]
Affecting the broader societal debate was, of course, the increasing
infusion of money to foundations, think tanks and other policy
institutes. Colleges and universities continued to receive financial
support from wealthy financiers, industrialists and other alumni.
However, establishment of these independent, tax-exempt entities
allowed for a greater degree of influence over grant recipients, the
scope of research and other writing and support by a hand-picked board
for whatever mission the founder embraced.
The struggle by university faculty members to secure academic freedom
had achieved an important victory in 1900, when the presidents of
Harvard, Columbia and Chicago established a policy that donor's could
no longer have decision-making authority over the hiring of faculty.
The American Association of University Professors successfully gained
the goal of tenure for its members, formalized after the Second World
War to help rebuild faculties in order to meet the dramatic increase
in demand for higher education. Still, institutions competing for
donors and trying to build a secure financial future were more often
than not willing to impose a degree of self-censorship.
In 1911, on the advice of Elihu Root, Andrew Carnegie established a
trust to which he could transfer the bulk of his remaining fortune.
John D. Rockefeller followed Carnegie's lead two years later.
Economics professor Mason Gaffney offered evidence in 1994 to support
his view that the very development of economics as a discipline was
heavily influenced by the interests of powerful men such as John D.
Rockefeller:
"This was a period of secularization of US
colleges. Businessmen were replacing clergymen on boards.
They
were replaced by others more exclusively attuned to the Gospel of
Wealth. Academic tenure was a distant dream: top administrators
hired and dismissed with few checks and balances. They only needed
to dismiss a radical occasionally: others got the message.
Pressures
on academics were extreme: it was placate or perish."[21]
In 2008, a foundation supported by Charles G. Koch pledged $1.5
million to support new faculty positions in Florida State University's
economics department. This donation was contingent upon authorizing
foundation representatives the opportunity to interview and have final
approval for new hires. The new faculty members were to teach in a new
program promoting "political economy and free enterprise."
The result was that only two candidates were approved to be hired
during 2009. The expectation of objective research and academic
freedom, at least under such a program, must be seriously questioned.
This is certainly true whether the donor holds strong collectivist or
individualist views.
In a very direct sense, the influence of the CFR and similar
organizations grew because the number of academics, government
officials and business executives was growing rapidly during the
post-Second World War period. The old elite still existed, but they
were becoming overwhelmed by a new generation of professionals groomed
for leading roles in all segments of society. But, not quite yet.
Grey-haired men still held the reigns of power. John Foster Dulles was
sixty-four years old when appointed Secretary of State by Dwight
Eisenhower. Both men were members of the Council on Foreign Relations,
and Eisenhower had chaired the CFR's Study Group on Aid to Europe from
1948-1951. Here, Eisenhower developed many of his perspectives on how
to best respond to the Soviet and Chinese communists:
"The group examined the Marshal Plan, which
Eisenhower called 'a program in the foreign field without precedent
in our peacetime history', and considered suggestions 'that in
addition to economic aid we should make certain political
commitments in Western Europe and also provide the countries there
with military assistance'."[22]
John Foster Dulles was also very close to the French statesman, Jean
Monnet, the prime mover in the first steps toward creation of a "United
States of Europe." Monnet's assessment of Dulles reveals the
complicated nature of the political beliefs and objectives pursued by
these powerful statesmen:
"Foster was a simple man to understand, not a
Machiavellian. He was a man of one simple principle, the importance
of liberty.
"I do not say that Foster was without ambition. I do not say
that. But that was not a basic element in his make-up. I am quite
convinced that he would not have sought the Secretaryship if he had
not had his deep convictions regarding liberty. He sought it in
order to be able to advance his libertarian views."[23]
We might reasonably ask how Dulles reconciled his libertarian
principles with the dramatic increase in the centralizing power of the
national government.
By the time of Eisenhower's election to the U.S. Presidency, trust in
the nation's leadership was already eroding. Americans were frustrated
by the unresolved war in Korea, and there was growing concern over
discoveries of corruption at the federal level. Many Republican Party
leaders clamored for scaling back the nation's global presence. Dulles
warned Eisenhower against backing away from existing foreign policy
commitments. Moreover, Dulles was convinced that rapprochement with
the Soviets was not possible given their doctrinaire adherence to
Leninism. He anticipated a prolonged era of conflict. Many European
leaders regarded John Foster Dulles as the main obstacle to a
lessening of tensions between their countries and the Soviet Union,
now joined by China as societies ostensibly collectivist but in
reality dominated by a privileged elite supported by a vast network of
secret police suppressing all dissent and opposition to government
actions.
In 1959, illness forced Dulles to resign his position as Secretary of
State. Leaving office, he attempted to explain himself to the nation:
"I was brought up in the belief that this nation of
ours was not merely a self-serving society but founded with a
mission to help build a world where liberty and justice would
prevail. Today that concept faces a formidable and ruthless
challenge from international communism. This has made it manifestly
difficult to adhere steadfastly to our national idealism and
national mission and at the same time avoid the awful catastrophe of
war."[24]
The national mission, as identified by Dulles, was actually being
subverted by the support of oppressive regimes in countries where
access to important natural resources was the primary concern. Another
layer of subversion could be found in the failure of government to
secure for minorities their civil rights. And, of course, there was
the deep paranoia over the degree to which the U.S. government
employed communists and communist sympathizers in positions of
authority and responsibility.
The actions of each successive administration generated even greater
distrust, as explained by Lance deHaven-Smith:
"In the post-World War II era, Americans have
learned that the government has misled them about provoking wars,
assassinating foreign leaders, wiretapping American citizens,
stealing elections, collaborating with organized crime, and much
more.
Certainly there is no reason to assume that all of the
government's significant deceptions, domestic intrigue,
international crimes, and other wrongdoings have been exposed."[25]
What is even more disturbing to some is that what was thought of as
the American System has been dismantled. Even into the
mid-1980s this was not yet clear to many people, even those highly
critical of policies and practices adopted by agencies of the United
States government. Here, for example, is Jonathan Kwitny's
introductory statement to his deeply-critical history of U.S.
intervention in the affairs of other sovereign nations:
"The American people have built a great country.
Its prosperity is based in large part on the extraordinary ability
of individual Americans to determine their own economic course, and
this is in turn rooted in an extraordinary concept of liberty.
However imperfectly at times, the United States still clings to the
ideal that liberty requires the diffusion of power. Maybe nowhere,
certainly not on such a scale, is there so much freedom to inquire,
to speak, and to publish, coupled with so much genuine popular
control of institutions."[26]
Kwitny then goes on to describe each of the cases where U.S.
government agents funded and supported the overthrow of foreign
governments - in the guise of anti-communist initiatives -- that
threatened American corporate monopolistic interests. What was and is
still true about Americans is our ignorance of how to distinguish
between liberty and privilege. The best definition of liberty
I have encountered was offered by the philosopher Mortimer J. Adler,
who wrote that "liberty is freedom constrained by justice."
Our continued challenge is coming to consensus over a definition of
justice.
In any event, no one in the Reagan administration, and only a few
serving in the United States Congress, paid attention to his warning:
"We constantly overlook the distinction between
what a country's government says, and what the people of the country
do.
By viewing the world as a chessboard, on which all pieces
are either black or white, either our friend or the Soviets', our
leaders are ignoring the principles of which genuine friendship, and
partnerships, are made.
"Only out of such principles can come true national security."[27]
Kwitny urged the political establishment in the United States to
objectively examine the actual accomplishments and failures of our
approach to dealing with other nations. He reminded readers that no
nation had attacked the United States in the post-Second World War
era. Yet, United States military forces had been dispatched whenever "American
interests" were even potentially at risk. As Kwitny concluded:
"[U]sing force according to the standard we have
used for the past nearly forty years simply hasn't given us a
successful foreign policy.
We have not produced a friendly
world, or even a mostly friendly world, to do business in. We have
produced enemies, in endless supply."[28]
As Jonathan Kwitny was finishing his manuscript for publication in
1984, the American System was undergoing a renewed domestic
confrontation between internationalists and those who sought to
strengthen national sovereignty. These were not the only areas of
societal conflict. To racial and gender inequality was added the
accelerating division of the population by social and economic class.
In 1992, two journalists at the Philadelphia Inquirer, Donald
Barlett and James Steele, won a Pulitzer Prize for their penetrating
study titled America: What Went Wrong? The put a basic
question to their readers:
"Worried that the people who represent you in
Congress are taking care of themselves and their friends at your
expense?
Their answer filled the pages of the book:
"You are right. Keep worrying.
"For those people in Washington who write the complex tangle
of rules by which the economy operates have, over the last twenty
years, rigged the game - by design and default - to favor the
privileged, the powerful and the influential. At the expense of
everyone else."[29]
Bartlett and Steele became whistle blowers on the new American
establishment:
"Why would the United States government rig the
game in that way? In part because of the influence exercised by
special interests in Congress and in federal agencies. In part
because of good intentions gone awry.
"One of the consequences: American companies and companies
worldwide are now conducting a replay on a global scale of a
business practice that became common in the 1960s. That was the
decade when United States companies began playing off one region of
the United States against another, one state against another, one
city against another. The objective was to locate a new plant or
relocate an existing one in whatever area would offer the greatest
tax incentives - so the company would have to pay the smallest
amount of local and state taxes - and where employee wages and
fringe benefits could be held down the most.
"Now that practice has gone global, as corporations and
financiers play off one country against another, one national tax
system against another, one country against its possessions."[30]
Of course, the behind the scenes orchestration of these
outcomes is even more troubling. At all levels of government, the
general belief is that the overwhelming majority of our elected
representatives have sold their votes in return for campaign
contributions and lucrative positions in the private sector or as
lobbyists once they are no longer public servants. The degree
to which these arrangements have undermined the very concept of
governance is made clear by John Perkins, whose 2004 book, Confessions
of an Economic Hit Man, deserves to be studied by every thinking
person and discussed broadly. The best end to this paper I can provide
comes from John Perkins:
"Some would blame our current problems on an
organized conspiracy. I wish it were so simple. Members of a
conspiracy can be rooted out and brought to justice. This system,
however, is fueled by something far more dangerous than conspiracy.
It is driven not by a small band of men but by a concept that has
become accepted as gospel: the idea that with all economic growth,
the more widespread the benefits. This belief also has a corollary:
that those people who excel at stoking the fires of economic growth
should be exalted and rewarded, while those born at the fringes are
available for exploitation.
"The concept is, of course, erroneous. We know that in many
countries economic growth benefits only a small portion of the
population and may in fact result in increasingly desperate
circumstances for the majority. This effect is reinforced by the
corollary belief that the captains of industry who drive this system
should enjoy a special status, a belief that is the root of many of
our current problems and is perhaps also the reason why conspiracy
theories abound. When men and women are rewarded for greed, greed
becomes a corrupting motivator. When we equate gluttonous
consumption of the earth's resources with a status approaching
sainthood, when we teach our children to emulate people who live
unbalanced lives, and when we define huge sections of the population
as subservient to an elite minority, we ask for trouble. And we get
it.
"In their drive to advance the global empire, corporations,
banks and governments
use their financial and political
muscle to ensure that our schools, businesses, and media support
both the fallacious concept and its corollary. They have brought us
to a point where our global culture is a monstrous machine that
requires exponentially increasing amounts of fuel and maintenance,
so much so that in the end it will have consumed everything in sight
and will be left with no choice but to devour itself.
"The corporatocracy is not a conspiracy, but its members do
endorse common values and goals. One of corporatocracy's most
important functions is to perpetuate and continually expand and
strengthen the system."[31]
FOOTNOTES
- Carroll Quigley. Tragedy and Hope, A
History of The World in Our Time (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1966) Preface, ix.
- Ibid., p. 43.
- Ibid., p. 19.
- Ibid., p. 256.
- Ibid., p. 271.
- Ibid., p. 271.
- John Maynard Keynes. The Economic
Consequences of the Peace (London, 1919), p.220.
- Arthur Kemp. "The Monetary Basis of a
Free Society," in The Necessary Conditions for A Free
Society, edited by Felix Morley (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand
Company, Inc., 1949), p.42.
- Carroll Quigley, p. 865.
- Ibid., p. 866.
- Felix Morley. "Political Conditions for a
Free Society," in The Necessary Conditions for a Free
Society, edited by Felx Morley (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand
Company, Inc., 1949), p.14.
- Frank Chodorov. "Envoi," in One
Is A Crowd: Reflections of an Individualist (New York: The
Devin-Adair Company, 1952), p.176.
- Carroll Quigley, p. 1092.
- Carroll Quigley, p. 1272.
- Lance deHaven-Smith. Conspiracy Theory In
America (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2013), p.9.
- Ibid., p. 12.
- Isaiah Bowman. The New World: Problems in
Political Geography (Yonkers-on-Hudson, NY: World Book
Company, 1921), p. 1.
- Edward F. Gay, "The Great Depression,"
Foreign Affairs (July 1932), p. 540.
- "Dulles Outlines World Peace Plan,"
New York Times, 28 October 1939.
- Walter Lippmann. "Self-Sufficiency, Some
Random Selections," Foreign Affairs, January 1934.
- Mason Gaffney and Fred Harrison. The
Corruption of Economics (London: Shepheard-Walwyn Ltd., 1994),
pp. 50-51.
- Eben Kaplan. "American Presidents at the
Council on Foreign Relations" (Council on Foreign Relations,
7 December 2005).
- Quoted in: Roscoe Drummond and Gaston
Coglentz. Duel At The Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of
American Power (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company,
1960), p.55.
- Quoted in: Drummond and Coglentz, p. 228.
- Lance deHaven-Smith, p. 173.
- Jonathan Kwitny. Endless Enemies: The
Making of an Unfriendly World (New York: Congdon & Weed,
1984), p.4.
- Jonathan Kwitny, p. 403.
- Jonathan Kwitny, p. 406.
- Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele. America:
What Went Wrong? (Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1992), p.
2.
- Bartlett and Steele, p. 89.
- John Perkins. Confessions of an Economic
Hit Man (New York: Penguin Group, 2006), Preface xiv-xv.
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