The Price Mechanism and Land Markets
Edward J. Dodson
[An unpublished essay written in March 2009]
Yes, economic theory is or ought to be an objective means by which
public policies are evaluated. And, yes, Austrian theory of the
financial markets is an important component in the analysis of what
causes so-called "business cycles." However, Austrian theory
has a major weakness (the source of which plagues neoclassical theory,
neo-Keynesianism, supply-side economics, monetarism, rational
expectationism, etc.). This weakness is the discarding of nature
(i.e., "land" as treated by political economy) as a distinct
factor of production, the supply of which is essentially inelastic and
subject to hoarding and speculation distinct from that of labor,
capital goods and even credit.
Price does not operate to return land markets on an ongoing basis to
a state of general equilibrium. In the real world, the supply curve
for locations actually leans to the left in a period of rising prices.
With the exception of banks that acquire property assets due to
foreclosures (and, by regulation must liquidate those assets quickly
even when the demand for property is at a low point in the property
market cycle), owners of land will withdraw supply when prices are
rising in anticipation of even greater unearned gains. They will also
withdraw supply in a period of falling prices because land does not
experience depreciation or loss of functional utility. Land investors
who have not leveraged themselves by borrowing late in the property
market cycle to speculate will just sit out and wait for the return of
rising land prices. Moreover, the generally low carrying cost of
holding land means that a large portion of existing landowners do not
even think about the land they hold as potentially part of the supply
coming to market. In every community upwards of one-fourth or
one-third of the land area is held off the market for generations.
Ricardo (and Smith, and that entire generation of political
economists) understood the operation of land markets far better than
today's economists who adhere to any of the above schools of thought.
These early theorists understood that net imputed income streams
(i.e., what they referred to as "ground rent") derived from
control of locations were capitalized by market forces into a selling
price for land. Most economists have, paradoxically, ignored the
presence of location rents as driving forces in the property markets
and, hence, the corresponding stresses imposed on the economy that
pull us into a recession or depression.
The credit-issuing behavior of the banks, mortgage loan investors and
other players in the credit markets provided the accelerant to an
already existing speculative fire. Throughout this last property
market cycle (which began around 1989-90), the land-to-total value
ratio of mortgage loans made and securitized (both in the commercial
and residential markets) continued to climb. Thus, lenders were
lending more and more on land value and less and less on building
value. The frequency of outright fraud (and gross negligence on the
part of the bond rating agencies, the Fed and regulators) resulted in
the huge quantity of loans made to individuals and investors without
regard to creditworthiness and often based on appraised values
unsubstantiated by comparable sales. When the cost of land (both
purchase price and leasing costs as reflected in the rising costs of
leasing space in buildings) reached high points in 2006 and 2007, the
stress on the global economic system resulted in the collapse of
property markets. A chain reaction of defaults, foreclosures, business
failures, rising unemployment, government deficits and societal
instability has been the inevitable result.
The bottom line is that unless we implement policies that stabilize
land markets and remove the incentive to hoard and speculate in
locations (and, natural resource laden lands, as well as the broadcast
spectrum and other rent-generating components of the land markets) we
are destined to repeat this cycle every 18-20 years. That is, if we
actually recover from the depths of this latest economic crisis.
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