Privacy Rights, Liberty and Original Intent
What the Founders Gave Us
and What They Missed
Edward J. Dodson
[A paper submitted in partial completion of
requirements for a Seminar on Civil Rights and Liberties; Professor
Ellis Katz, Temple University; Spring 1988]
Any attempt to discuss the nature of 'privacy' and whether we, as
individuals, have specific rights to privacy is dependent upon
answering questions about the nature of man. Are we, for example,
primarily solitary and only secondarily social as a learned response
to nurturing? Is our association with one another one of mutual
dependency or of voluntaristic toleration? And, as has been raised
again and again, are all or any rights of the individual, as a member
in society, superior to those of the whole?
Government becomes important when one seeks to determine where the
well-being of the whole permits (or requires) restraint on the free
exercise of individual will. Is it important, as Judge Bork and others
have argued, for us to understand then adhere to what the founders of
our society thought and felt about this question?
Debate over what is called original intent is at least one of
the important issues raised by Judge Robert Bork and faced by the
justices charged with the responsibility of ruling on the
Constitutionality of laws. However, the mere fact that a law meets the
test of original intent or is in other ways Constitutional necessarily
may have only an incidental relationship to true justice; that is,
what is legal and Constitutionally permitted is not automatically
just. Thus, for rulings to meet higher, and hopefully objective moral
and ethical tests, our justices must reach beyond the intent or
wording of the Constitution when necessary. Yet, to do so requires
that we develop (through application of reason and the thorough
investigation of human history) what has been most elusive -- an
objective standard by which to say which acts are or are not just.
In a very real sense, the strict constructionist approach to
Constitutionality reflects a view that we cannot know what justice is;
therefore, we must resist injecting contemporary value judgments onto
the governmental framework established by the founders. Any changes
desired by our citizenry must be achieved directly by amendment,
through the political process, so that such changes will become
structural and permanent rather than interpretive and fleeting. Such a
view fails to consider that democracy (i.e., rule of the majority)
assures nothing insofar as justice is concerned. History reveals that
government has a strong tendency to become despotic and tyrannical,
and that the powers of government must be challenged continuously by a
citizenry if liberty is to be protected. Among the founders Thomas
Paine, for one, shared this view. In Common Sense Paine wrote:
Some writers have so confounded
society with government as to leave little or no distinction between
them; whereas they are not only different, but have different
origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our
wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting
our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices.
We are born into this world totally dependent upon others. Without
nurturing (a crucial form of cooperative behavior, whether one views
this as instinctive or learned) infant humans would not survive. Only
after significant physical growth combined with learning from others
does the human become a self-sustaining individual. That some degree
of social organization and cooperative nurturing is essential to all
adds to our uniqueness as a speces within the animal world. As Paine
makes clear, however, the cooperative nurturing process is imperfect;
as we become more self-sustaining we also become more competitive,
often overtly aggressive, sometimes unrelentingly cruel to others. We
should not forget that genetically we have changed very little from
the being who survived by hunting and foraging in a harsh and
dangerous environment. Indeed, many individuals continue to survive
under conditions similar to those of prehistoric man. Those same
behavior patterns are demonstrated to be very near the surface in many
of us still.
Anger and rage are as much a part of our emotional baggage as are
compassion and tolerance. The natural and legitimate responsibility of
government, as the agent of society, is to protect each citizen from
the aggressions of others. As Locke might have said, government is
there to see that individual liberties (i.e., just acts) are protected
from licenses (i.e., unjust acts) exercised by others. Included within
the scope of one's liberties -- and I suggest this cannot be otherwise
-- is the right of privacy.
Where we run into tremendous difficulty is in determining which acts
are within the realm of liberty and, therefore, legitimately private,
and which by their nature are licenses and, therefore, justly subject
to governmental control. The authors of our text, Constitutional
Law, looked to John Stuart Mill as a key source for the framework
of this debate:
[T]he sole end for which mankind
are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would
be wise or even right. . . . Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign.
I suggest that by definition the individual in order to be sovereign
must also be competent; that is, must be beyond the stage of nurturing
and no longer in a dependent (i.e., incompetent) position within
society.
During the nurturing period, the individual has learned from others
in society basic survival skills with which to function in life. In
the language of eighteenth century Philosophy, the individual is by
virtue of competency capable of exercising free will'. Yet, the
nurturing period has no definite length. Some of us, in fact, are
doomed to lifelong incompetency because of certain physical, mental or
emotional problems. One may often move out of and back into and out of
the states of competency and incompetency. It is here, where
government enters into relationships by making formal distinctions
between those who are recognized to be competent (and, hence, by their
competency responsible for their actions) and those who are not, by
which a liberty construct on behalf of privacy has developed. A
special responsibility of government, consistent with the protection
of individual liberties, is to act as trustee or guardian of the
interests of incompetents.
What, then, most clearly falls within the realm of privacy where
competents are concerned? Society, says Locke, establishes government
in order that ~all men may be restrained from invading others' rights
and from doing hurt to one another . . ." or, additionally, the
goods produced by an individual's labor. The most fundamental privacy
right therefore is that of control over oneself and the products of
one's labor. Conversely, any acts (by individuals or government) that
intrude on these privacy rights are by their nature acts of license. A
discussion of the most important privacy rights and how we should
think about them follows.
THE INDIVIDUAL AS FAMILY GROUP MEMBER
The most basic biological and human relationship is that between
parent and offspring. The infant is (from conception and growth in the
mother's womb) an incompetent. Granting that as a society we have yet
to reach either a moral or legal consensus over the privacy rights of
the unborn infant, one fact is self-evident. For most of the period
during which the life within a woman's womb develops, government
cannot effectively invoke its responsibility of trustee on behalf of
the incompetent infant without either cooperation from the mother or
rather severe coercion Once the infant is born, however, government
can then act if necessary to enforce the infant's basic privacy right
of protection from physical, emotional or mental harm. Parental
privacy rights do not therefore include full and unbridled ability to
exercise licenses where they involve offspring.
Government's responsibility to step in to prevent parents from
physically or mentally injuring a child would seem to appropriately
fall into the realm of self-evident truths to which Locke and some of
the founders ascribed with great importance. Moreover, there is a
strong case to be made that a government that does not do so is
negligent in its duties. In order to fulfill this responsibility,
government must be provided flexible, yet well reasoned guidelines by
which to judge parental actions toward children. To err on the side of
greater protections for the privacy rights of incompetents is to apply
the most government on behalf of society's weakest members.
The challenge for society is to restrain government from coercively
imposing its will where no direct licenses have been taken against the
privacy rights of the incompetent. One example would be where, as a
solution to the generational cycle of poverty, children are forcibly
taken from their natural parents and --
for the good of the child --. placed with families whose
financial status will provide much greater opportunities for material
success. Doing so would break a bond that is both natural and
desirable for the survival of our species, by which government acts on
the basis of subjective, material criteria for reaching a value
judgment. Because of the family bond, government's authority to
coercively break such bonds must be restrictively applied and
diligently monitored by nongovernmental societal agencies.
The relationship between individuals as spouses involves equal
privacy rights of two competents. As in the protection of the rights
of incompetents, however, clear and descriptive guidelines are needed
in order to judge when the acts of one spouse represent licenses
exercised against the privacy rights of the other. The right to not be
Physically abused is the most obvious, yet inconsistently protected of
such Privacy rights as applied to women and their spousal
relationships with men in the real world. Despite progress in the
protection of Privacy rights for women, we are often reminded even in
our society of a time when (as observed by historian John C. Miller) "law
and custom relegated women to an inferior status, [when] a married
woman had no existence apart from her husband [and] was his chattel to
do with very much as he pleased." Where such licenses are
sanctioned and protected by the force of law, even when
constitutionalized, the self-evident nature of the license obligates
those who follow to bring an end to such acts of license. Failure on
the part of government to do so challenges the legitimacy of such
government.
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR IN SOCIETY
Mill's secondary argument is that society has no right or
responsibility to protect one from one's own rashness, so long as the
individual actions do not violate the liberty of others. The primary
difficulty arises, again, when government must fulfill its legitimate
responsibility of determining when, by the actions (or inactions) of
the individual, competency has been lost to incompetency. When, then,
does society resort to government to invoke its role as guardian?
Key to this question is how we identify
normal behavior. Who is to judge what is or is not normal
behavior in a society built not on homogeneity but ostensibly on
tolerance and pluralism? On this crucial question we continually reach
for answers as a society with very unsatisfying result. Certain
self-evident truths are there for us to grasp upon, so that such
truths suggest universal goods the achievement of which
justifies governmental intervention. The clearest example of this is
our legal Prohibition of suicide; to voluntarily take one's life is a
license not granted to the individual. Thus, anyone who attempts to do
50 is by virtue of such an attempt categorized as an incompetent.
Unfortunately, a wide range of individual behaviors lack such a
self-evident test for incompetence Mill, as a utilitarian, assigned
the greatest benefit to the least amount of intervention, writing that
"because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a
reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny,
that people should be eccentric."
The most pressing societal issue of our day involves this type of
struggle between the individual's 'free choice' to be eccentric and
societal protection of those who have shown themselves to be
incompetent. I refer to the widespread and growing consumption of drugs;
that is, substances shown by scientific testing to damage the physical
and mental health of the user. On the one hand society has instructed
government to treat the manufacture and sale of such drugs as a
criminal license, for which severe (though many would argue not severe
enough) penalties are attached. Users of such drugs are, on the other
hand, viewed largely as victims of their own individual weakness, as
having lost the quality of rational decision-making associated with
competent behavior. And, so, as a society we delegate to government
the responsibility to intervene in an effort to rehabilitate the
individual (i.e., re-establish competency) By any measure, however,
the effort is failing; for reasons too involved to present in this
writing, the criminal exercise of drug trafficing now involves more
individuals than ever before.
Every increase in governmental attempts to apply greater coercion to
slow the trafficing has the effect of causing trafficers to become
more brutal themselves. The results are an escalation of violence over
control of the drug market, as well as an escalation of drug users
themselves exercising criminal licenses in order to obtain the funds
to pay for their addiction Which raises the most difficult of the
moral questions for society; which is, when the committing of an act
reveals a clear loss of competency should the individual be punished
or rehabilitated?
Loss of competency, as opposed to never having had competency,
suggests a crucial distinguishing measurement for behavior. Clearly, a
five year old child is not competent to understand the consequences of
many actions; with maturity (which must be assessed on a case-by-case
basis) is it not self-evident that the individual should be held
responsible for criminal licenses committed, even though the act of
taking such license suggests a loss of competency? By this standard
for behavior, then, there can be so such thing as a plea of 'temporary
insanity' to excuse the criminal acts Perpetrated by one individual
against the privacy rights of others. Even then, however, an
unresolved moral dilemma is that of degree of Punishment, a subject
related to but beyond the scope of this paper.
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY RIGHTS TO CIVIL LIBERTIES AND ECONOMIC
EQUALITY
Would those who interpret the Constitutional powers of government as
does Judge Bork use the court to protect privacy rights as a function
of civil liberty and economic equality? One of the dangers presented
by Judge Bork's Positions is that they are argued on principle. As
Bernard Bailyn observed in his classic study of the revolutionary
literature:
Formal discourse becomes
politically powerful when it becomes ideology; when it articulates
and fuses into effective formulations, opinions~ and attitudes that
are otherwise too scattered and vague to be acted upon; when it
mobilizes a general mood; when it clarifies, symbolizes, and
elevates to a structured consciousness the mingled urges that stir
within us.
There can be no doubt that those who cling to strict constructionist,
original intent rhetoric have an ideological agenda. As the submission
accompanying my course essay argued, this so-called conservative
ideology is injurious to the securing of our liberties because of its
inconsistencies in logic. How, for example, is the guarantee of
liberty furthered by protecting monopolistic and unnatural property in
the economic value of licenses and titleholdings, when such values
belong to no individual and exist only because society exists?
Although the ideology to which Judge Bork ascribes is given the
identifier libertarian, this term is certainly a misnomer. By
failing to recognize that values not produced by the individual are by
their nature societal and not private property, the Bork ideology
systematically invades the privacy rights to oneself and one's
property (i.e., production) identified by Locke, thereby sanctioning
private confiscation of the property of others. This by no means
suggests that those identified with so-called redistributive
policies are on any firmer moral ground; ostensibly designed to more
fairly distribute the burden of paying the expenses of government
based on ability to pay, the system tends to confiscate wealth earned
by Production (of goods or services) while allowing so-called capital
gains to escape taxation until an asset is sold, and then making
sure such gain is taxed at a rate lower than that experienced by
income from production. With the greatest of ironic twists our Federal
tax system makes no distinction at all between the increases in value
that fall to the holders of titles arid licenses -- values having
nothing whatever to do with the efforts of the recipients --and the
increases in the value of tangible capital assets that only hard work
and success in the market can bring. That nature cannot be individual
property and that production cannot be otherwise is a truth so
self-evident that I cannot but attribute the failure of so many to
recognize that this is so to, as Locke concluded, "fear that an
impartial inquiry would not favour those opinions which best suit
their prejudices, lives, and designs
" Bork is merely one
of the more articulate in a field of many candidates for membership in
the flat earth society.
The contention of the authors of our text that "the meaning of
privacy .. . is not too clear is a current problem in large measure
because the discussion has failed to focus on identifying acts of
license. As you have been good enough to provide an agenda for
discussing a number of other specific privacy rights falling in the
realm of civil liberties, I shall offer my thoughts on 'how to think'
about these rights.
I. THE RIGHT TO BELIEVE WHAT ONE WANTS TO BELIEVE
Can it be otherwise? Inherent in this right is, however, the
restriction that while the thought is protected by one's right to
privacy, any action taken by a competent party (and many taken by an
incompetent party) is not so Protected. Actions must be judged on the
basis of whether they are an exercise of liberty or license.
II. THE RIGHT OF PARENTS TO INCULCATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS INTO
THEIR CHILDREN
To the extent that specific religious inculcation is consistent with
the higher moral and ethical values on which liberty is based, parents
are fulfilling their nurturing responsibilities to their children.
Although our society is pluralist and tolerance for divergence of
thought is protected liberty, government has a responsibility on
behalf of society to intervene as guardian of the right of children to
not be indoctrinated where the ideas involved clearly involve an
exercise of license. While this is sometimes difficult to achieve in
practice, mankind's religious beliefs do have a strong core of
commonality -- with most differences occurring in the Particulars of
ritual. A most obvious example of license guised to look like
religious practice would be the worship of
Satan and the teaching that the violation of the liberties of
others is demanded by followers of such a pseudo-religion.
III. THE RIGHT NOT TO BE INDOCTRINATED
If to be indoctrinated is to be coerced into accepting certain
statements as
truths or actions of government as proper without
question, then we need a carefully reasoned definition of coercion.
Much of the indoctrination we are concerned about today has to do with
solicitation of the young for membership in so-called religious cults,
where acceptance requires the individual to abandon existing social
and family nurturing relationships and to relinquish all privacy
rights within the political system to the belief system of the cult.
Again, there are difficulties in proving coercion. Is the individual
merely entering into a private, contractual arrangement with the cult
under which the individual is to be represented (i.e., protected) by
the cult leadership? Or, is the individual's decision to enter such a
cult an indisputable sign of loss of competency the knowledge of which
requires government intervention on behalf of the privacy rights of
the individual?
IV. THE RIGHT TO SILENCE
THE RIGHT NOT TO BE INTRUDED UPON
THE RIGHT NOT TO BE FORCED TO DIVULGE INFORMATION
THE RIGHT NOT TO HAVE INFORMATION ABOUT ONESELF GATHERED
UNREASONABLY, OR DIVULGED TO OTHERS
I have grouped the above four categories of privacy rights together
because, in the context of our rights as competents, the
responsibilities of government to protect society center on acts of
criminal license. At issue is whether society is at greater risk from
individual criminal licenses or from the historical tendency of
government when too great power is vested therein to be tyrannical and
despotic. Admittedly, striking a balance between these two evils has
never been satisfactorily resolved. Widespread poverty caused by the
concentrated control of both socio-political institutions and wealth
are conditions which have pushed individuals in many societies to act
violently, sometimes by self-serving, violent acts against their
neighbors; or, when able to form a political bond with others, in
attempts to overthrow the oppressive governments under which they must
live.
In the United States, we suffer from many of the same symptoms but do
not look too deeply for root causes or for solutions. Most of us are
convinced of the general goodness of our socio-political system and
therefore tend to concentrate on such problems as racial
discrimination or ethnic bigotry as causes rather than as symptoms.
Then, there is the already huge cost of government.
As a result of the strong opposition to any large-scale increase in
the police powers of government (or for the expenditure of funds to
hire more law enforcement officers or build more prisons) we are
forced to live fearful of the growing exercise of private, criminal
licenses against our privacy rights. Once again, we are traumatized by
the limited scope of options entertained. The Bork faction suggests we
must, given the times, relinquish some of our privacy rights to
preserve order in society. Those who recognize that poverty,
discrimination and low self-esteem are somehow inter-related as
underlying causes of criminal licenses, have voted to spend hundreds
of billions of dollars to build a welfare state that ignores the
fundamental structural problems I have described as self-evident.
In general terms, Earl Warren gave us good advice in 1972 when he
wrote in
A Republic
If You Can Keep It, that "a nation
which enforces its laws while violating the fundamental rights
guaranteed to its citizens is contributing to its own ultimate
destruction." And, so we are.
COMMENTS BY PROFESSOR KATZ
Interesting essay - you provide a way of thinking about issues that
is very useful.
|