Review of the Book:
Conquering The American Wilderness, The Triumph of European
Warfare in the Colonial Northeast
by Guy Chet
Edward J. Dodson
[Conquering The American Wilderness by Guy
Chet,
published by University of Massachusetts Press, 2003]
In this slender volume, historian Guy Chet challenges the
broadly-held conventional wisdom that the uprising of colonials in
British America succeeded because of the use of unorthodox military
(i.e., guerrilla) tactics. He examines the engagements between
colonial militia and Britain's professional soldiers against the
indigenous tribes and their frequent French allies. His finding is
that from King's Philip's War on, "colonial wars were won not
through a succession of tactical victories but through a campaign of
attrition."[p.2] Moreover, whenever sufficient men and materials
could be brought together and efficiently employed, European
strategies on the battlefield prevailed.
Early on, the colonists relied on a combination of defensive
fortifications and protection provided by military officers with
European experience. As the decades passed, however, militia officers
were selected from the colonial leadership. They had no formal
training and "were ill-prepared for combat and, consequently,
were often tricked into abandoning the tactical defense, with
disastrous results."[pp.39-40] Despite these failures, the
long-term outcome in favor of the colonials against the tribes was
inevitable on the basis of population size alone. Any losses on the
battlefield or at the frontier were soon replaced by new immigrants.
This was not the case for the tribes who resisted colonial
encroachment. Moreover, as the number of Europeans increased so did
the incidence of disease against which the indigenous peoples had no
natural resistance.
On the battlefield, the tactics of the tribal warriors remained
static. They consistently relied upon "their mobility by drawing
the enemy in pursuit and then encircling it."[p.30] When the
colonial troops abandoned standard European tactics and safeguards,
chaos was often the result and losses were high. European battles
involved tens of thousands of armed soldiers, and victory came only
when troops were well-trained and highly disciplined, employing massed
firepower and protecting itself from flanking assaults. The colonial
forces were often smaller in number than their tribal opponents, so
they "relied heavily on their ability to surprise the enemy."[p.31]
One example was the 1675 surprise attack on the Narragansetts primary
settlement - and fortification - near Kingston, Rhode Island. Nearly
1,000 members of the tribe were killed in the assault, and the rest of
the tribe "were driven out to the forests, without shelter and
provisions."[p.52]
Isolated homesteads and small villages were obviously most vulnerable
to attack by marauding warriors. Even in larger and reasonably
well-fortified towns, their attacks could be very successful. "In
many instances," writes Chet, town watches were lax, defenses
were left unmanned, and garrison houses were not properly utilized.
This lack of vigilance was exacerbated by imprudence. Repeatedly
settlers were fooled into leaving their fortified defensive positions
and giving chase. Feigning retreat, Indian forces were able
consistently to surprise and ambush these pursuing English forces."[p.44]
At the same time, "[e]ven without the benefit of strong
artificial fortifications, English troops were able to defend
themselves successfully against larger Indian forces whenever they
maintained a defensive stance
"[pp.45-46] This proved to be
true even after the tribes began to acquire large numbers of (mostly
smoothbore musket) firearms:
"Since the Indians were armed with smoothbore
muskets as well, they had to advance to within musket range of
English formations in order to be effective. Thus, whenever English
troops maintained formation under attack, their assailants were
vulnerable to devastating massed fire. Educated by experience,
Indian troops rarely chose to take part in such battles."[pp.60-61]
For many reasons discussed by the author (and familiar to readers
knowledgeable of the period) the tribal societies resisting European
encroachment were not prepared for prolonged warfare. Recognizing
these weaknesses, English commanders carried out a "scorched-earth
policy" against Indian villages and food supplies. In the end,
this strategy forced the tribes to continuously move beyond the reach
of colonial armies or risk annihilation.
The conflicts between English and French monarchs greatly increased
the intensity of warfare in the New World. From Canada, spreading out
along the St. Lawrence, the French erected a string of forts designed
to protect the trading relationships established with the many tribes
stretched out for a thousand miles and more along the region's lakes
and rivers. First came English traders, then immigrant farmers moving
inland from the coastal towns in search of free land. On both sides,
the home governments began to commit more and more men and resources
to defend their claims. The beginning of the end to French power in
North America occurred with Queen Anne's War (1703-7). "The first
four years were characterized by raids and counterraids like those of
King Philip's War and King William's War," writes Chet. "During
the second phase of the war, this violence persisted, but was
complemented by large-scale offensive operations by colonial and
British forces."[p.87] He also observes that the "lack of
restraint and discipline in both offensive and defensive assignments"[p.89]
continued to plague English and colonial forces.
Another serious problem arose as the size of the armed forces on both
sides increased; namely, the difficulty of obtaining sufficient
supplies for long campaigns and then getting them to the troops over
long distances. By the time of the Seven Years' War, the British
military was far better prepared to dislodge the French and their
tribal allies:
"British military administrators were able -
through effective logistical support and the construction of forts
and secure roads - to bring Britain's logistical superiority to bear
against the French and Indians. Thus, they set the stage for a
string of British victories by creating battle situations that
favored the larger, richer, and better-supplied army."[p.101]
A large English merchant fleet and more efficient mercantile economy
also sealed the fate of French forces operating out of Canada. After
King George's War, the British built a strong naval base at Halifax in
Nova Scotia. "Slowly and consistently, from 1756 on, the British
Navy denied French forces in Canada vital provisions, munitions, and
reinforcements, while transporting to North America a well-supplied
army capable of overpowering its enemies on the battlefield and, more
important, of outlasting them through a succession of harsh winters."[p.113]
It was not long before "the cession of Canada to Britain."[p.117]
These lessons were not immediately learned by George Washington - the
person who would command American forces against a British military
force much larger than that employed against the French. Yet, as Chet
reminds readers, "Washington's conduct during the American War of
Independence indicates that maturity and experience had altered his
evaluation of European military conventions."[p.141]
Conquering the American Wilderness is a well-written and
valuable primer on the art of war. A reader with no training in
military tactics (such as myself) reaches the end of the book better
able to appreciate the underlying strengths and weaknesses of the
societies who fought so desperately for sovereign control over North
America.
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