Review of the Book:

Endless War
by James Chace

Edward J. Dodson

[A review of the book Endless War by James Chace. Submitted in partial completion of the requirements for the course U.S. Recent History, Temple University, Summer 1985]

Argue we do over the true nature of the major "isms" - communism, capitalism and socialism. Failing to reach consensus over what those terms mean makes it difficult to write about them. At the same time, not taking care to define one's terms leaves wide open the opportunity for confusion and abuse. One of the messages James Chace leaves in Endless War is that those who have attempted to impact the course of events in Central America have been experts at the art of using meaningless rhetoric to justify acts of self-interest and questionable moral purpose. Endless War strongly suggests that this process involved the United States almost from the beginning of its own history as nation.

Chase reminds us of the colonial people whose homelands now comprise the nation-states of Central America. Our leadership's condescending attitude toward these people as far back as our own formative years is brought out to race the consistency of our involvement in the affairs of Centrla Americans. "[M]any of the Founding Fathers and their immediate successors," writes Chase, "did not believe that the Latin American peoples were capable of creating, on their own, the sort of 'good government' (i.e., American-style democracy) that the Latin Americans themselves failed to grasp the underlying reasons why an individualistic, participatory system of political economy had evolved in North America adds fuel to James Chace's fire. In the minds of our early political leaders "Americans" were unique to the world. What Jefferson, Paine and a few others understood was the uniqueness of the American experience rather than any characteristics of the people themselves.

To state that "Jefferson … believed the ordained mission of the United States [was] to spread its enlightenment over as much of the Western Hemisphere as possible" and, therefore, that "Latin American attempts at self-government … could only hinder such a pursuit"[2] does not necessarily justify Chase's conclusion that:

… from the very onset of Latin American independence, the United States was hostile to instability and revolution in the region, not because of any serious evaluation of the needs and/or capabilities of the emerging states, but rather because of our own desire to expand …[3]

Yes, many of our political leaders sought to expand the nation's territory and influence. The reasons were diverse - the opportunity for personal fortune, nationalistic zeal, threat of European domination of the Southern Hemisphere. It is also true that the Americans, if not outright racists, felt themselves superior in civilization to the indigenous tribal groups in the Western Hemisphere (and to the salves brought from Africa) and - importantly - to the monarchy-dominated European societies as well. Jefferson knew better. In 1781 he wrote:

"The time for fixing every essential right on a legal basis is while our rulers are honest and ourselves united. From the conclusion of this war we shall be going down hill. It will not then be necessary to resort every movement to the people for support. They will be forgotten, therefore, and their rights disregarded. They will forget themselves, but in the sole faculty of making money. …The shackles, therefore, which shall not be knocked off at the conclusion of this war, will remain on us long, will be made heavier and heavier."[4]

The most obvious means of keeping off the shackles was to expand the new nation's territory. "I think our governments will remain virtuous for many centuries," Jefferson wrote to James Madison, "as long as they are chiefly agricultural; and this will be as long as there are vacant lands in any part of America. When [our people] get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt, as in Europe."[5] As his own words above foretold, Americans had not long to wait. Moreover, it can be argued (and has been argued[6]), that the events of 1776-1783 describe note a "revolution" in the modern sense of that term but a throwing off of an invasion/occupation by a foreign State. The North American experience, in a century and a half, had produced a unique system of political economy, with its own traditions and structures - self-reliance, individualism, minimal central government, widespread ownership of property (in land, capital goods and personal goods) and participatory local government. These people fought England in order to keep what they had acquired as beneficiaries of the special circumstances of distances and numbers: they were few enough in number not to get in each other's way that often, and far enough away from the police power of the State to escape repression.

Central Americans have no similar heritage. Their counterparts in the United States were the "Indians" and Blacks. All of these people have been severely treated by those of European descent. The primary difference is that in the United States this has been an oppression carried out by the majority. In Central America it was (and is) carried out by "that small portion of the population which could claim genuine Spanish heritage,"[7] - "large landowners (who) became … an oligarchy dominating the government(s)."[8] With one arguable exception (Costa Rica), revolution has consistently replaced an oligarchy with authoritarian State tyranny. These are really choices between the lesser of two evils.

The story told by James Chace is all the more saddening because it describes not only the failure of efforts to achieve in the New World's southern hemisphere any semblance of political economies respectful of human rights, but provides ample evidence that Jefferson's vision of America's future was cause for genuine concern. We may learn more about our own society the next time a serious recession and accompanying high unemployment return. The safety net may not be large enough to catch all those who are sure to fall. Many are already frustrated and impatient. In Central America, where all of these nations have largely agrarian and resource extraction economies, the gradualists have called again and again for "land reform." Always there have been problems.

"By 1954, one hundred thousand campesino families had received land, as well as credit and technical aid" in Guatemala under the Arbenz government.[9] The landowners had been paid the amount they declared as the land value for tax purposes, but they declared the land redistribution as "communist," and the anti-communist crusaders from the North (called in by the folks at United Fruit) saw to it that Arbenz was deposed, land redistribution reversed and the status quo maintained. These days, however, even the Reagan administration gives lip service to the goal of land redistribution in El Salvador. Chace follows such land reform efforts from a distance, never really taking them seriously. In El Salvadore, for instance, he writes: "The Problem for the reform-minded officers was how to bring about land redistribution without destroying the army as an institution, since so many older officers were clearly tied in with the small group of rich landowners that depended on the army for support."[10] He later astutely castigates the shallowness of United States foreign policy responses:

By expanding the officer corps … Washington hopes to break the intimate connection between the oligarchs and the officers. Once again ignoring history, Reagan and his advisers fail to understand that the probable result of such a policy … will not be the democratization of El Salvador, but the transfer of power to a new elite.[11]

Endless War describes both endless tragedy for the people of Central America (and for ourselves as well), and endless concern with narrow self-interest on the part of people in positions of power. Then there is the insanity of an American foreign policy establishment that reacts in knee-jerk fashion to all things labeled communist without every having stopped to find out what communism really means. We find out that McGeorge Bundy (of all people) learned a lesson from Vietnam; namely, that if the Salvadoran government "will not or cannot [be persuaded] to change its ways, then the soon we get out the better."[12] In the end, James Chace provides little reason for hope.

And, rightly so. What he has to say about the tremendous debt being carried by the Central (and South) American countries is crucial. Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Costa Rica, Venezuela - all of these countries borrowed heavily against their future agricultural and natural resource exports. They borrowed to carry out some social programs but mostly large industrial operations, many of which have never been completed. Corrupt political leaders skimmed a great deal of the incoming funds off the top. The International Monetary Fund and the bankers have told these countries to raise taxes, cut back on domestic consumption and export, export, export. One result has been that it has become a buyer's market for agricultural products and raw materials commodities. As supplies have risen, prices have dropped dramatically, making it even more difficult - despite falling interest rates - to earn enough foreign reserves to even carry the interest payments let alone repay actual indebtedness. Fro the standpoint of our historical concern for "stability," urging governments to do things that make poor people even poorer pushes those societies closer to insurrection and debt repudiation.

Policies that exacerbate confrontation and hasten a wasteful Central American arms race aren't going to bring democracy to the region. There are, as Chace points out, tremendous pitfalls in almost anything we do there. He concludes his excellent study by warning that American's "misread history if we conclude that democracy is impossible in Central America."[13] My only wish is that he had taken the time to explain what he meant by "democracy." We might know better how to achieve it if we had a better idea of what it is.

REFERENCES

[1] James Chace. Endless War (NY: Vantage Books, 1984), p.12.
[2] Ibid., p.13.
[3] Ibid., p.14.
[4] Fawn M. Brodie. Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate History (NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1974), p.156 (cited by the author from Notes on the State of Virginia, William Peden, editor [Chapel Hill, NC, 1955], p.161).
[5] Henry George Jr. Jefferson and the Land Question, a pamphlet (NY: publisher not provided, 1904), p. vii (cited by the author from Vol. XVI, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Monticello edition [Washington, DC])
[6] In his book The Future of Industrial Man (NY: John Day Co., 1942), p.219, Peter Drucker argues, for example, that "The American Revolution was based on principles completely contrary to those of the Enlightenment and the French revolution. In intention and effect it was a successful countermovement against the very rationalist despotism of the Enlightenment which provided the political foundation for the French Revolution."
[7] Chace, p.19.
[8] Ibid., p.27.
[9] Blanche W. Cook. The Declassified Eisenhower (NY: Penguin Books, 1981), p.224.
[10] Chace, pp.62-63.
[11] Ibid., 75.
[12] Ibid., p.126.
[13] Ibid., p.136