Reviving Our Cities,
A Market Driven Perspective
Edward J. Dodson and Walter Rybeck
[1991]
Walter
Rybeck is President of the Center for Public Dialogue, Kensington,
Maryland. Edward J. Dodson is Director of the School of
Cooperative Individualism |
INTRODUCTION
Many of our nation's cities are plagued, despite major government and
private reinvestment programs undertaken, with continuing urban decay,
the loss of commerce and employment opportunities and a shrinking tax
base. These problems stretch from one end of the country to the other
and involve communities of all sizes. Everywhere, municipal
governments search for ways to reduce expenditures. In some cases,
even the most basic services such as police and fire protection have
been severely reduced or even eliminated. This is clearly a
catastrophe in the making.
Until recently, our cities have been thought of as islands of
problems in a sea of prosperity. Even within the islands themselves
there were pockets of prosperity. Urban centers experienced rebirths
and revitalization. Corporations built impressive headquarters in the
downtown areas. Aged residential neighborhoods within walking distance
of the city centers attracted, first, urban pioneers, then real estate
developers and higher income households. Many neighborhoods were left
out of this turn-around, however. Critics have looked to the financial
services industry as an important factor in this anomaly.
Despite what amounts to a prolonged period of
disinvestment by most regional and even local financial
institutions, the evidence suggests that there was no conscious
strategy adopted by these institutions to eliminate their presence in
certain neighborhoods. Rather, a process of unconscious redlining
resulted in areas where economic conditions discouraged private
investment. Many urban neighborhoods have, over a span of several
decades, become centers of blighted housing, abandoned structures,
business flight, joblessness and public disinvestment. Consequently,
within these areas a diminishing number of business and consumer
applicants for loans possess acceptable collateral or credit histories
to meet normal underwriting criteria. Yet, what is almost universally
recognized is that a failure to invest dooms such areas to even
further decline.
The question we have grappled with is how this cycle of decay be
broken. What public policies would lead to a healthier investment
climate in our inner-city neighborhoods while resolving the fiscal
crises now faced by nearly every community? This paper analyzes the
root causes of these problems and argues for specific changes in tax
policy as an essential element for the cure.
CITIES AS MAGNETS FOR THE POOR
The Great Depression touched off a massive migration of unskilled
rural workers into the nation's industrial centers. City governments
became overwhelmed by the problems of overcrowding and the
ever-growing demand for public services. Not until the late 1960s did
federal spending in the cities bring a real measure of external
financial support for the development of both physical and social
welfare infrastructure. At the same time, the nation experienced
significant population shifts and the influx of large number of
immigrants from other countries. The pressure on municipal and state
governments to fill the revenue and services gap increased enormously,
as did the pressure on taxpayers and property owners to absorb the
escalating cost of government.
While the cost of municipal government escalated, a counter-migration
from the cities to the suburbs was underway. Federal programs for
housing and highway construction stimulated suburban sprawl. Private
and public investment reserves where siphoned from the older cities
into new and more land extensive communities. Those who left the
central cities also tended to be the more higher educated and more
technically skilled, taking with them their potential for higher
earnings. Industry was quick to recognize the reduced cost of doing
business in the suburbs, and many corporate executives saw an
opportunity to relocate to what at the time were less congested areas.
New technologies reduced the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled
labor, and the interstate highway system turned the central cities
into transportation obstacles to be circumvented rather than
destinations. As office and industrial parks flourished in the
suburbs, the out-migration intensified. Major retailers and other
employers began abandoning the central city in favor of suburban malls
and shopping strips. For those at the lower end of the socio-economic
ladder, the opportunity to improve their circumstance was rapidly
disappearing.
One result of this pattern of disinvestment has been a continued
deterioration of the housing stock in the nation's older cities. Most
dwellings in the inner-city neighborhoods are more than fifty years
old and require substantial modernization of heating, plumbing and
electrical systems to bring them close to modern standards of decency
and efficiency. As out-migration occurred, large urban homes were
often purchased by investors and divided into apartment units or were
occupied by families whose lower incomes prevented them from properly
maintaining these aging structures. And, as low income renters
replaced owner-occupants, housing maintenance declined. Accelerated
depreciation and tax penalties imposed on owners for capital
improvements permitted (and even encouraged) investors to gain maximum
income while their properties deteriorated in physical condition.
Declines in market values occurred as the median household income fell
in these neighborhoods, adding to the disincentives for adequate
maintenance or rehabilitation by property owners. A large number of
absentee owners simply filled their properties with as many tenants as
possible at whatever rents they could obtain, discontinued paying
property taxes and allowed their properties to deteriorate until
condemned by city authorities. Once the properties were acquired by
the city at tax sale, the tenants were evicted and the property
boarded up or demolished. The tenants were then forced into public
housing, where available, or had to compete for the limited supply of
other rental units.
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FACTORS
The post-Second World War resurgence of European and Asian economies,
as well as the industrialization of certain developing nations
confronted the United States with a degree of competition in domestic
and global markets for which our industries and labor force were
ill-prepared. Technology transfers and the proliferation of
multinational corporations have all but obviated traditional policy
making as a tool for protecting domestic economies from external
competition.
Massive deficit spending during the U.S. military action in southeast
Asia, exacerbated by the market penetration of O.P.E.C., resulted in a
soaring national debt. We went through a prolonged period of
stagflation at home while other countries suffered various degrees of
recession and depression. As we have seen, a large number of the
countries described as
less developed have continued to live with hyperinflation and
reduced standards of well-being for the majority of citizens. In the
United States, the response of middle and upper income voters to ever
higher taxes and erosion in purchasing power was a political backlash
against runaway government spending. This resulted in Proposition 13
in California and other tax limitation measures across the country.
Ronald Reagan was also elected President on the promise to reduce the
size of the federal government, return authority to the states and
hold the line on taxes.
During this same period, the economy of the United States was in the
final stages of a dramatic transition from one that employed most of
its labor force in heavy industry to an information and
service-oriented economy. By the beginning of the 1980s most
corporations had positioned themselves to move production around the
globe to where costs were lowest. The initial impact was to shift the
equilibrium against blue collar workers, applying downward pressure on
incomes and weakening unions. Millions of workers nationwide entered
the group of marginally employed or long-term unemployed, placing
additional demands on city government services while simultaneously
eroding the tax base at a time of reduced federal support. Today, even
the highly educated and professional groups are subject to the same
pressures that blue collar workers first felt a decade ago.
A CHANGE IN FOCUS
Under conditions that demand self-sufficiency, city officials and
community leaders must focus on what can be done locally to resolve
financial and social problems. Economic growth is clearly critical. In
the case of housing, for example, the availability of residential
mortgage loans is directly linked with the expansion of full-time,
steady employment opportunities for those now left out of the
mainstream economy. The construction and rehabilitation of units as
rental housing is also a profitable investment opportunity only if
neighborhoods provide employment for potential tenants. Too often down
played by policy analysts is the fact that job-creating economic
growth is the cornerstone to revitalization of blighted neighborhoods
in our cities and fiscal solvency. Gentrification of historically
significant areas brings some professional households back to the
urban tax base; however, unless the housing stock and employment
opportunities are expanded for those now dependent upon government
programs for support the net gain is insignificant.
EXISTING PUBLIC STRATEGIES
Site Acquisitions and Tax Abatement
Many cities have created
public development corporations that attempt to attract new
industry, especially high technology businesses. One of the primary
elements in this strategy has been a site acquisition program. Land
suitable for commercial or industrial development is purchased by the
city (funded by the sale of tax-free municipal / industrial
development bonds), then resold to businesses agreeing to locate in
the city. The price paid for land offered under these programs is
often less than 25 percent of market value. Additionally, new firms
are normally exempted from city real estate taxes for a stated period
of time.
Such land cost write-downs and tax abatements are undoubtedly
attractive to new firms. However, these new businesses require local
services and facilities. The increased economic activity generated by
the new firms must be sufficient to pay for such services as well as
the subsidies given. In many instances, the land and tax bait may cost
the city more than the catch is worth. An important point to remember
is that the costs of attracting new businesses are borne largely by
older, existing businesses, which must then compete on unequal terms
(including, for example, the payment of higher taxes) with the
newcomers. One consequence is that older and often
marginally-profitable firms may be forced out of business, leaving
their employees without employment and the city with a zero sum
result.
Ways must be found for bringing down land costs and tax costs for all
producers in the community -- older firms as well as the new. Helping
existing firms in a city to thrive and expand is often more cost
effective than trying to lure new firms from other places. Companies
being sought after by competing cities sometimes put extravagant
prices on their locational decisions. A vital and growing economy, on
the other hand, acts as a magnet for business. When the environment is
right, commerce does not need to be subsidized in order to thrive.
THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF TAXES
Economists, as a group, are uniform in agreement that the greater the
tax burden on production the less production there will be. Taxation
at the federal level presents a serious competitive disadvantage for
many businesses who must compete with foreign producers. Overtaxing
production is, however, an equally serious problem at the local level.
Local revenue is raised primarily from taxes on individual and
business income, on retail sales and on real estate. Income and sales
taxes are large burdens on production. The real estate tax also
hampers production insofar as it falls on improvements such as homes,
office buildings, factories and equipment. Conversely, insofar as the
real estate tax falls on land, it is not a tax on production. The
quantity of land in existence is fixed and is not produced by people.
A change in tax policy has no effect on the amount of land in a city.
Whether or not land is taxed and how heavily does have a direct effect
on the availability of land and its price to potential users.
Land is unique as a commodity because of two characteristics: it is
both fixed in total supply and in location. An individual or business
can leave an area, can take possessions, equipment (and, occasionally,
even a home or factory) with them, but not the land they occupy. Labor
and capital are mobile, while land is not. A pro-employment and
pro-production tax structure must be fashioned to recognize this
distinction by collecting a much greater proportion of local taxes
from land values than any other source (i.e., sources that can leave).
A CLOSER LOOK AT LAND TAXES
To suggest that a tax increase would reduce the price of a commodity
runs counter to conventional wisdom and, most would respond, to common
sense. Nevertheless, if taxation could be used as a means to bring
more land onto the market at reasonable prices, to encourage the
production of more and better housing, and to reduce construction
costs while generating more jobs, such a tax policy should stir
excitement and support among economists, policy makers, officials and
all citizens concerns with the social and economic climates of our
cities. A growing number of economists are convinced, in fact, that a
tax on land values is a tax policy fully capable of generating these
results. The evidence is provided by the experience of more than a
dozen Pennsylvania communities (including the city of Pittsburgh) that
have moved in this direction.
Historically, the tax on land value has been linked with the tax on
buildings as part of the much-maligned property tax. As a result, the
virtues of the land tax have been largely obscured. Consistently heavy
taxes on improvements reduce the incentive to build and to maintain.
To reverse the economics of the real estate tax, we ideally should
gradually reduce the building tax while increasing the land tax until,
say, within five or ten years the real estate tax will be levied on
land values alone -- with all improvements fully and permanently tax
exempt.
An important element in the efficiency of the land tax is accurate
assessment of land value. As a consequence of infrequent and archaic
assessment practices, present taxes on land throughout most of the
United States are relatively nominal and constitute a low annual
holding cost for titleholders. Imposition of a higher rate of taxation
on land -- even when underassessed -- reduces profit from speculative
holdings and causes owners to release more land onto the market for
development. Although the absolute quantity of land remains constant,
the increased supply of land brought to the market will tend to bring
land prices down. Reductions in land prices will then be reflected in
a reduced cost of housing for the consumer. Moreover, substitution of
the land tax for the present property tax will, for most homeowners,
result in lower property taxes and a reduction in housing-related
expenses. A property tax that exempts improvements also means that
higher assessments and a tax penalty will no longer follow the
completion of a new dwelling or rehabilitation of an old one.
THE LAND TAX AND BUSINESS PROPERTIES
When only the underlying land value is taxed, a capital-intensive
office building is subject to the same tax as a surface parking lot
using an identically-valued site. Owners of properties improved to
what the market (and zoning) directs as
highest and best use would experience considerable reductions
over what they now pay. Owners of vacant sites or significantly
underused sites get a tax push to put their land to more appropriate
use or to sell the land to someone who will.
LAND BANKING
Land banking, the practice of buying up sites for future use, would
become costly under market conditions subject to a land value tax. On
the other hand, the need by developers to acquire and hold sites for
long periods of time would disappear. Developers have historically
inventoried more parcels than they need for immediate or medium-term
use in order to avoid losing a large share of their future income
stream to land speculators. A high enough land tax makes speculation
unprofitable; therefore, the land market will experience less hoarding
and developers will find attractive sites at reasonable prices when
they are ready to build.
A NEW ECONOMIC EQUATION
Promoters of economic development should note that the land tax leads
to a very positive business environment characterized by low land
costs and low taxes on production. In effect, an enterprize zone is
created for all businesses and not just a privileged few. New and old
firms benefit, as do large and small. The land tax exempts all
buildings and generates no tax increase as a penalty for modernization
or expansion. These incentives to produce goods and services also have
a ripple effect in a local economy.
REVITALIZING DETERIORATING NEIGHBORHOODS
Disinvestment has been presented in this analysis as the result, not
the cause, of neighborhood decay. The evidence strongly suggests that
the tax policies practiced in our cities, with their heavy burden on
production and commerce, are serious obstacles in the way of efforts
to revive older neighborhoods and provide a decent opportunity for
meaningful employment to large numbers of citizens. The real estate
tax as it now operates is, in particular, a blighting influence that
must be dealt with if renewal is to occur. Moving to a tax based on
land values only represents a market-centered rather than a subsidy
approach to resolving this problem. The benefits accrue not only to
blighted areas, however, but to cities as a whole.
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