Third World Problems:
A Post-Colonial Legacy?
Edward J. Dodson
[May 1989]
Political economy, an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of
history and current societal problem, has become a method of choice
for analysts in the related social science fields. Nowhere is this
acre evident than in discussing relationships between the highly
developed, industrial-based societies and those we often categorize as
members of the
third world. Why is it that so many of the third world
societies have, for the most part, failed to develop as stable,
social-democracies that generate for their citizens a reasonably high
standard of well-being? To what extent have the socio-political
arrangements established under their colonial experiences influenced
the rate and degree of their development? We cannot change these
societies from the outside; however, a better understanding of their
problem will allow us to engage in productive dialogue within the
international arena.
When one compares distribution of well-being (criteria that best
reflects quality of life issues) the circumstances in nearly all the
former mother countries is far better than in the former colonies by
whatever measurements one chooses to make. The question, then, is
whether the remnants of colonialism are primarily responsible.
THE VICTORS AND THE VANQUISHED
As is often noted, modern colonialism, which began in earnest during
the sixteenth century, is defined primarily in terms of the European
nation-state and its use of military force to gain control over
distant territories and other societies. One can summarize the
political economy categorization of these subordinated groups into one
of two types:
1. Nomadic groups whose numbers were relatively small and who
survived primarily as hunter-gatherers, who supplemented their
subsistence by some trade and crop/animal domestication. Their level
of socio-political sophistication might be high (as with the Iroquois
in North America and the Zulu of Southern Africa) or almost
non-existent (as with the Australian Aborigines).
2. Settled societies characterized by very structured urban
socio-political hierarchies. Power (and control over distribution of
wealth) us generally shared by the warrior class and those charged
with things spiritual. Although often successful in commerce and
warfare, these societies had not acquired the technology of firearms
manufacture.
The European invaders faced by these target societies were themselves
often in direct competition for control over the same trade routes,
raw materials and territory; and, the European nation-states made
effective use of existing animosities between indigenous groups to
further their conquests. A point not missed by today's analysts is
that once the number of potential adversaries us reduced, the
Europeans had a much easier time subduing the remaining tribal groups.
This us certainly the case during the first 150 years of European
expansion in the Americas.
Decimation of the indigenous people us also hastened by European
introduction of new forms of disease, which reduced their ability to
resist encroachments. In the Americas, both the British presence in
the north and the Spanish in the south resulted in the rapid
destruction of indigenous populations, so much so that after less than
a century the need arose for slave labor and the targeting of Africa
as the next colonial arena. The French influence was far less
disruptive because of their emphasis on acquiring trade monopolies,
the absence of sizable finds of gold and other precious metals, and a
restrictive emigration policy on the part of the French monarchy.
BRITAIN'S LEGACY OF MIXED BLESSINGS
Where many recent efforts to interpret the political economy effects
of colonialism fall short is in not adequately distinguishing the
large-scale migration of skilled and propertied individuals from the
British Isles (and other European states) to North America, Australia
and New Zealand, a migration of talent that set the stage for a very
different form of colonial experience than that which occurred under
Spain and France, as well as elsewhere under Britain itself. The drain
of talent from Britain was so great during the early 18th century that
an Act of Parliament was required to stem the flow to North America;
and, in the colony of Massachusetts, maximum wage laws were enacted
because the demand for skilled labor could not be met. Only much later
in North America did the arrival of the propertyless and unskilled
generate conditions similar to that in the Old World and its other
colonial outposts.
It is important to note that the British subjects in North America
considered themselves the equals of subjects living in the mother
country. They fused English common law and Parliamentary Acts with the
frontier experience of self-reliance to set the stage for later
independence. Indigenous socio-political arrangements in most other
targeted societies were replaced not by participatory, quasi
self-government but by military rule the purpose of which us to
institutionalize mercantilism and extract raw materials (including
slaves for transport to other colonies). The landed nobility and
commercial financiers in Europe (in return for loans to finance the
European wars of consolidation) were awarded extraordinary monopoly
licenses by their monarchs over trade, as well as virtually unlimited
land grants in whatever colonies they discovered. Britain, alone among
the major colonial powers, promoted and encouraged migration --
because their primary early objectives were commercial, even if
extractive. Mercantilism required a fairly skilled labor force to
harvest raw materials for the growing industrial sector at home.
Later, speculation and profits associated with land sales became an
added important component in the effort to attract new immigrants.
To a far greater extent than Britain or even France, Spanish rulers
depended on mineral resource extraction in the southern Americas to
buy goods their society was unable to produce. The process of
enclosure had been going on in Britain; however, in France and even
more so in Spain, those who worked the land were virtual serfs with no
rights to property or citizenship. Most of the peasants had been bled
dry by heavy taxation, while the nobility and the church were taxed
not at all. As a consequence, Spain was almost totally dependent upon
imports to feed its population and to finance its government (using
its still powerful military to extract tribute in its colonies).
The pattern of domination/subordination in the more advanced targeted
societies differed in effect if not in intent for what I see as very
practical reasons. For one thing, Asia was less accessible and more
densely populated than the Americas or Africa. The financial resources
required to establish a permanent military presence in India and China
were extremely draining (and, a number of historians have demonstrated
that empire-building benefited only the few in the mother country
while placing tremendous quality of life burdens on the general
population). Many European leaders realized it made such more sense to
enter alliances with indigenous leaders who -- for a price - were more
than willing to sanction a monopoly trade relationship with one group
of Europeans and against the others. As industrial capital developed,
the partners merely worked together to force a shift in production
from foodcrops and other goods for domestic consumption to
extraction/export commodities. That arrangement continues today in
many so-called Third World nations.
DIFFERENCES IN OST-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT
Certainly, the nature of the colonial experience and the
socio-political arrangements imposed on indigenous people by outside
rulers has almost always been devastating. However, where the
indigenous society had already become settled and a sophisticated
division of labor established, the framework of oppression of the many
by the few merely acquired an added dimension. Landlordism of an
agrarian type evolved into industrial-landlordism centered in the
urban, colonial administrative centers, seaports and other cities that
were built. I contend, however, that left to their own accord, these
societies would have eventually acquired many of the same oppressive
characteristics of European industrial-landlordism; also as in Europe,
the Liberal counter-reaction (Fabian socialism, Marxism, or
Progressivism) would have arisen over time. Colonialism hastened the
process and helped to determine who the post-colonial rulers would be;
however, even without direct colonial rule technological changes would
have given to indigenous rulers the same power to organize production
to their own benefit at the expense of the masses. The framework of
monopolistic privilege was already well entrenched.
NORTH AMERICAN INDIVIDUALS
In North America, settlers were lured from Europe by the promise of
greater political liberty and by the access to free or very cheap
land. Land, then, became the basis for nearly universal property
ownership (and the rights of citizenship connected therewith) -- but
only for those of European heritage (and, for a long time, of a
particular religious affiliation). The same was true of Australia and
New Zealand. Virtually everywhere else in the colonial world the
military governors oversaw the creation of oligarchical systems that
concentrated all political and economic power in the hands of the few,
where necessary, they included already existing indigenous hierarchies
into the scheme. Too frequently, the departure of the European
colonial regime simply meant turning political control back to the
indigenous despots who then continued to sanction the monopolistic
extraction of resources and exploitation of the many.
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY/CONSERVATIVE AND ELITIST
If those at the bottom had any illusions about receiving assistance
from the United States in their struggles against ruling elites, U.S.
neo-colonial adventures in Central and South America during the 19th
and early 20th centuries left no doubt that our designs were very much
in the European tradition. Even Jefferson's own interpretation of free
trade supported the use of U.S. military force to secure access to
foreign markets.
From the very beginning, U.S. business interests were very successful
in directing the use of Federal monies and military force on behalf of
narrow self-interest. The emergence of the Soviet Union (and shortly
thereafter the Peoples Republic of China) as major military powers
whose agenda included a dismantling of Western neocolonialism -- to be
replaced, sadly, by equally despotic regimes under
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist colonialism -- added to U.S. monopolistic
interests the political weapon of knee-jerk anti-communism to an
already corrupted foreign policy agenda. By the late 1950s, the
Jeffersonian vision of the democratic-republic as agent on behalf of
universal property ownership had been replaced by incrementalist
Liberalism at home and realpolitik neocolonialism around the globe.
This is the legacy of the Truman Doctrine designed by John Foster
Dulles and carried into the 1980s by Kissinger and Brzezinski. In this
sense, the overwhelming majority of people in all societies have been
victimized by a global system of socio-political arrangements created
to sanction and protect privilege and power for the few.
THE DEBT OWED
More than anything else, what those of us in the
first world who are reasonably well off owe the disfranchised
and impoverished of the Third World is our constant support of
their efforts to secure just socio-political arrangements. We must
apply constant pressure on our own governments to make human rights
(the first of which is our birthright of equal access to use of the
earth) a primary issue in foreign policy relations; the monopolists
will fight this effort as they have done for hundreds of years and are
doing today. The difficulty is that far too few of us in the First
World understand why our own societies are not able to peacefully
provide for all what philosopher Mortimer Adler calls the basic goods
necessary for a truly human existence -- enough food, clothing,
shelter, education, medical care and security in one's person and
possessions. Until we are able to solve our own problem and provide
leadership by example, the most we can do for people in the Third
World is offer assistance that directly affects the daily lives of
individuals, which in many cases requires circumventing corrupt State
bureaucracies because of their propensity to siphon off so such of
whatever financial and material resources are directed to Third World
societies.
Working with the various transnational groups, such as Amnesty
International or Greenpeace, has become an effective strategy for
positive change in the global arena. At home, we must objectively
examine our socio-political arrangements, identify privilege and
clamor for its elimination -- so that government becomes the protector
of equality of opportunity principles.
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