Why it is Essential to Rid the Property Markets
of Land Speculation
Edward J. Dodson
[A response to the essay, "Don't Reform Housing
Finance -- Reinvent It," by Richard Morris appearing on the
Knowledge@Wharton (University of Pennsylvania) website, 26 November
2013]
"Richard Morris has been an
officer in corporate strategy for two large corporations,
including vice president of strategic initiatives with Fannie
Mae from July 2006 through May 2011. He currently advises
financial services companies on opportunities for growth through
business and market innovation driven by insights emerging from
the fields of behavioral economics and behavioral psychology. He
is also a senior advisor to the Boston Consulting Group for two
practice areas: financial institutions and regulatory
institutions."
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I congratulate Richard Morris for expanding the
debate over the nation's housing finance system. My own history
included twenty years at Fannie Mae as manager of a team of review
underwriters and later as a business manager performing market
analyses in the Housing & Community Development group. Mr. Morris
arrived the year after my retirement early in 2005. Prior to joining
Fannie I spent several years managing the residential mortgage lending
program for a large regional bank. So, many of the risks described in
his article are those my colleagues and I grappled with on a daily
basis.
What was most unique about Fannie Mae, from my perspective, was its
charter as a shareholder owned company with a public mission and a
very restrictive set of investment options. When I joined Fannie Mae
at the end of 1984, the company was in serious financial trouble. It
bought and held fixed rate mortgage loans at a time when the cost of
funds was skyrocketing. Fannie was in the same situation as the
thousands of thrifts scattered across the country -- bleeding red with
no regulatory relief in sight.
Fannie's presence as part of the secondary mortgage market allowed
mortgage originators to pass on interest rate and even credit default
risk; when loan volumes were relatively low, Fannie's underwriters
would look at each and every loan file before approving a purchase.
However, as my own generation of "baby-boomers" reached
adulthood and began to enter the work force and create new families,
transaction volumes forced the industry to adjust. Delegated
underwriting, shared risk structures and what were called "post-purchase
reviews" by Fannie were introduced in response.
The same demographic shifts also added fuel to what had always been a
speculation-driven part of the economy -- land markets. As new
suburban developments went up around every major urban center, the
asking price for still vacant land doubled and doubled again in only a
few years time. A handful of city planners and economists who had some
expertise in the operation of land markets offered warnings and advice
to policymakers. Rarely did their input have an effect. And, as we
know, the countryside everywhere retreated under the pressure of
sprawling demand for land. Developers kept going further out from the
regional center to find land at a reasonable cost. Local governments
looked to the state and federal governments for funding to help
shoulder the cost of putting in new roads, bridges, sewage treatment
plants, sewer lines, utilities and water systems. Few gave much
thought to the possibility that economic recession and "tax
reform" would combine to bring an end to the era of revenue
sharing initiated during the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson and
continued on through Jimmy Carter.
What frustrated me as I began to work in the housing finance sector
was the knowledge that most of problems we faced could have been
avoided. I never forgot what a city planner in Central Pennsylvania
had told me in the early 1970s. He explained the consequences of
intense land specuation. More importantly, he explained how the way we
taxed real estate caused land prices to skyrocket, imposing heavy
stresses on the general economy so that about every 18 to 20 years we
would experience a recessionary bust.
When I was given the responsibility at my bank for our CRA
investments, this problem became quite evident. Infrequent and
inaccurate property assessment actually penalized lower income
households, whose property values had fallen but whose assessments
remained fixed. With rare exceptions were property assessments in a
community maintained at a consistent percentage of market value. For a
long list of common sense reasons, the fairest and most economically
efficient means of raising revenue from real estate was to tax the
value of land only. I learned from the city planner that a handful of
Pennsylvania city governments had actually moved moderately in this
direction by applying a higher rate of taxation on land values than on
houses and other buildings. I hoped that during my career I might be
able to support this approach as I worked with distressed communities.
Over the years, writing papers on the subject and even testifying
before city councils, only the rare elected official could grasp how
important this policy change could be.
The reason for telling the above story is that my desire to join
Fannie Mae was, in part, based on an exchange of letters I had in 1982
or 1983 with the then Chairman and C.E.O., David Maxwell. Reaching out
to Mr. Maxwell after viewing an interview of him with George Goodman
(on Adam Smith's Money World), he informed me that he was quite
familiar with the tax policy proposals I embraced and was in full
agreement. If any company seemed to have good reason to work for such
a change it was Fannie Mae. Non-inflationary economic expansion was
just what a company required when borrowing short-term and lending
long-term.
As it turned out, a combination of the Reagan recession and product
innovation slowly brought Fannie out of its financial black hole. Cash
was raised by selling off whole loans, but the losses were allowed to
be amortized over the remaining live of the loans rather than
immediately recorded. The adjustable rate mortgage was introduced,
stimulating investor interest in mortgage-backed securities that
offered protection against interest-rate risk. And, Paul Volcker's
policies at the Fed gradually brought interest rates back down to
single-digits. Deregulation did the rest, particularly the role played
by money market funds and REITs providing the credit to anyone who
showed the least bid of ability to act as a real estate developer.
Those of us in the trenches observed many warning signs. Year after
year Fannie and Freddie increased maximum loan limits in order to
sustain transaction volumes. This only added more fuel to the
speculative character of the residential property markets. By the time
of the 1989 crash property appraisals in some markets were reporting
land-to-total value ratios greater than 50%. In short, consumers were
paying as much or more for land as for the housing unit itself. And,
then, of course, the S&L meltdown occurred. Delinquencies and REO
climbed but these problems were kept manageable by a growing team of
specialists in this part of the business.
By this time several economists had entered my circle of contacts,
and they were warning that the next downturn would be far worse. The
historical data indicated that the next crash would occur beginning in
2007 and continuing getting worse through 2010. I was not convinced
for the simple reason that there was no one national property market
in the U.S. Our recent history was one of boom in on region even as
other regions were busting. Labor and capital moved from low growth or
no growth regions where the prospects were brighter. For example,
California's skyrocketing property prices and taxes opened the door
for the economic diversification of Las Vegas and new growth in places
such as Phoenix, Seattle and Portland. My attitude changed after the
British economist Fred Harrison recruited me to provide research
assistance for a book on the next crash that would be published in
2005. In one of the great ironies of modern social policy, the
creation of a uniform secondary mortgage market that simultaneously
took over a huge portion of the former jumbo market and funded the
sub-prime business formerly the province of finance companies and
second mortgage lenders brought on a nationwide crash. Fannie tried
but failed to side-step the direction the market took by allowing Wall
Street to build market share with private label MBS that increasingly
ignored conventional creditworthiness standards and was often plagued
by systemic fraud.
I remember hoping that the collapse of Wall Street's shell game would
not bring down the GSEs. I knew, as Dan Mudd would later testify, that
Fannie's Alt-A business was far less risky than the sub-prime loans
Countrywide and other lenders had generated. But, investors almost
immediately abandoned the entire MBS market. Fannie was forced (I
surmise) to mark down assets to market value and book the losses and
had no real hope of raising additional capital as the stock price
collapsed. Before long the sub-prime collapse expanded to a general
financial crisis, business contraction, layoffs, rising unemployment,
eviction notices, and millions of foreclosures. Almost unanimously,
economists and analysts said the "housing" market was in
free fall. Actually, what was falling everywhere were the
unsustainable land prices. In some markets (e.g., parts of Cleveland
and Las Vegas and new condominiums scattered throughout Florida)
demand collapsed which pulled property prices down well below the
depreciated value of actual housing units.
At that point, the one measure regulators should have pushed through
was to prohibit any financial institution that accepted government
insured deposits from extending credit for the purchase of land or
acceptance of land value as collateral for any borrowing. What this
would have done is to deny the property markets of the fuel to
reignite a return to land price escalation. Property prices had
already fallen. With this one change in regulation, buyers would be
required to accumulate savings sufficient to make a 20 percent cash
down payment (as was once the case before the introduction of private
mortgage insurance).
Instead of taking steps to keep the land markets from yet another
destabilizing climb, our state and federal governments and the Federal
Reserve combined forces to stimulate demand sufficient to pull
property prices back up to levels that would protect banks for further
losses and enable at least still employed homeowners to refinance out
of high cost mortgage loans.
As I see the problems, the measures proposed by Mr. Morris do not in
any meaningful way focus on the real causes.
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