

schools have the first requirement for culture. They have students who want to learn. The average student at a "regular" college is one of the funniest things on earth. He has no interest in learning; he is hardly willing to be taught. . . . I will recall that one can get culture by starting with any subject and following it through all its relations to life: languages, ancient or modern; history; physics; art or music—anything. And so students can get culture from agriculture or engineering.

But there's a chance to use these two fields for a peculiarly rich and modern culture. Take engineering first. Professor Johnson of Harvard gives his students of engineering the culture of his subject by showing them that what they learn of physical forces is probably true of social and political forces. He has written a pamphlet on "Political Engineering," and it is sound. And his students see it. They are interested in political and social questions because they see, what we all need to see today, that it is forces, not men, that we are up against. The colleges are turning out thousands of men every year who carry into politics and life the old, dead cultural notion that bad men make bad government and that good men would make government good. A cultural school of engineering, which would do what Professor Johnson does, would apply its knowledge not only to professional use, but to the practical use of the politician, reformer and sociologist; it would interest its students in the search for the unmoral and impersonal cause of all our evils: political, industrial and social. And if that general, human interest were fed and cultivated by a wise faculty, such students could be led on to want to know anything; just what the old Roman muck-rakers said in the original Latin; just why and when art comes and why it doesn't; and just what the matter is today with poetry.

And as for the agricultural schools, they can reach out in the same way. All they have to do is to teach that all they are learning about pigs and oats is true of men. They know, too, what the old moral culturist doesn't know: that if you want a good crop, you must select the seed and prepare the soil. That is true of men. Ignorance and disregard of that knowledge are causes of the slums of cities. . . . All I want to suggest is, that if faculties of our agricultural schools would take the utilitarian interest of their students in the course of agriculture and would show them the human, social significance of all they are learning, they could not only give them a very modern and a sadly needed culture, but they could easily incite them to an interest in life which would carry them through any of the subjects known to the old culture of the old schools. What they need, really, is not only this hint, but some of the conceit of our great universities; the proud

sense that they indeed have something fine and enlightening and humane—as they have.

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## BOOKS

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### BLOCKING LEGISLATION.

*Story of the California Legislature of 1913.* By Franklin Hichborn. Published by the James H. Barry Co., 1122 Mission St., San Francisco. Price, \$1.50.

Rudyard Kipling's "Jungle Book" is a series of good stories mined out of an imagination full of rich ore. Franklin Hichborn's story of the California Legislature of 1913—like his books on the Legislatures of 1909 and 1911—is a series of "Jungle Book" stories taken from life, without a line of fiction. As is well known to every man who has ever reported a State legislature, a legislative session is a real jungle; and an Indian or African jungle has nothing on it in the way of a zoological collection. From ape to zebra it is complete, and replete with everything covered with feathers, fur or scales.

"A Guide to Legislative Inefficiency" might have been the title of Hichborn's book. Then, again, if a member of a legislature, or a candidate for the legislature wishes to know the ropes and to be efficient, he may take the book as a "Guide to Legislative Efficiency." It depends on how one looks at it. The California Legislature of 1913 was not inefficient because it was "bad," but because of circumstances over which it had no control. The People can control those circumstances.

By knowing the facts before he meets them, the individual legislator may make himself efficient; but individual efficiency doesn't mean good team work; and first-class team work is almost impossible under present conditions.

The 1909 Legislature of California was the last of the machine-controlled legislatures of this State. Hichborn wrote a book about it, and that book had something to do with the political revolution in California in 1910, which gave the State a legislature that did splendid work in the way of clearing away some of the obstructions to constructive work. Then it was up to the people to elect a legislature that would do some really constructive work. The People did their part in that election, but there was something that was not on the ballot.

The most efficient corn-sheller will soon lose its efficiency if a mischievous or malicious person puts a stone into the hopper. Under present conditions, the most efficient body of legislators will fail to be efficient if Special Privilege feeds stones into the hopper. By hard work the California Legislature of 1913 did some things that should have been done; but no American legislature is going

to give The People one cent's worth of service for every dollar expended so long as anything remains of Private Monopoly. That is one of the big lessons of Hichborn's book.

From the adjournment of the 1911 session until the 1913 Legislature met, Special Privilege in California was collecting the stones to feed into the hopper; not a collection of "bad bills," but obstructions to the good bills that it saw coming. Special Privilege had more than two years to hire its agents and keep them at work collecting the stones; it had the money to pay for the work—was collecting the money from The People in the high rates it was charging for various services. Then it used the money taken from The People to fight The People in 1913.

Hichborn says that one of the most important problems before the 1913 Legislature, if not the most important, "was that of the legislature itself." That is true, and it's true of any legislature. Hichborn makes a splendid argument for legislatures of one chamber. One of the chief troubles of the American legislature is the two-chamber arrangement. That arrangement suits Special Privilege.

But who is Hichborn? He is the legislative correspondent of The Sacramento Bee. If you know The Bee, that's enough to know about Hichborn. When he signs his name to a statement about politics and politicians, the burden of disproof is on the other man.

V. G. EGGLESTON.



## TRUSTS.

**Trusts, Good and Bad.** Reprinted from "The Ethics of Democracy." By Louis F. Post. Published by The Public, Ellsworth Bldg., Chicago. 1914. Price, paper, 15 cents postpaid.

The trust problem has given rise to at least two great schools of thought. One advocates compulsory competition. We are to dissolve the combinations into their constituent concerns and force these concerns to struggle for the privilege of selling us what we need. The other philosophers scorn this view and say that combinations have come to stay, but that we can secure the benefit of their economies by regulating them and compelling them to deal with us on equal and reasonable terms. And here is Mr. Post, unmoved, apparently, by the arguments of both schools, reprinting these chapters from "The Ethics of Democracy" just as they were written ten years ago, changing not a word.

What, then, is Mr. Post's solution of the trust problem? It is simply free competition. "To make competition free, therefore, is to apply the natural remedy to the ills that flow from monopoly—free competition must be established." That is all.

Mr. Post would protect nobody against competition. He would abolish the tariff, as most of us

know, but that would be a mere incident in his program. He would root out the protective idea wherever he finds it.

To the small storekeeper who fears the great department store and would welcome legislation to restrict its activities, he says that "such legislation would be in effect legislation against buyers to prevent their economizing," and he will have none of it. To the workman who objects to labor-saving machinery, he says that we might as well think of interfering with the railroad for the benefit of the wheelbarrow industry. To the small farmer who may be driven out of business by the bonanza farm,—though Mr. Post doubts if he will be—he says that if bonanza farming "can produce more economically, then it is destined to be the farming of the future." If concerns combine and discharge laborers whom they do not need, Mr. Post will not interfere with them. To Big Business he has no objection based on its size.

Would he allow the combinations to take in as many concerns as they wish or can get, to sell goods as high as they can, to buy goods and material as low as they can? That appears to be his view. Only, he would remove the special privileges they have—monopolies of natural resources, coal and iron, and all the rest, monopolies of transportation, rights of way and terminals, railway discriminations, and everything else that forces consumers to do business with some concerns, and prevents free competition.

Mr. Post thinks that with special privileges removed, concerns could only grow to that point, whatever it might be in a given case, at which combination or large-scale production ceased to be economical. He believes that no concern, however large, could stay in business without special privileges, unless it served the public better than smaller concerns would. If its prices were too high, competition would reduce them—and it must be kept in mind that, in Mr. Post's scheme, competition would be entirely free.

With competition free, Mr. Post evidently believes, it would be as needless to make it compulsory as it would be to compel a healthy man to eat his meals. And if competition is free, Mr. Post thinks, monopoly is impossible.

"A combination of fishermen, for instance, could not, merely as fishermen, make a fishing trust. They have no monopoly. Their only advantage would be their fishing skill and equal skill could soon be acquired by others. Even with the advantages of such special privileges as dockage rights and transportation opportunities it has been found impossible to make an invincible fishing trust." But there are to be no such special privileges in Mr. Post's scheme, so that if a later effort to establish a fishing trust under present conditions should prove successful it would not decide the case against free competition.

Whether a combination without special privi-