The Correspondence of Thomas Jefferson
By Subject
FOREIGN RELATIONS / MONROE DOCTRINE
The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most
momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that
of Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and
points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time
opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances
more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to
entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to
suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North
and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and
peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own,
separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to
become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to
make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all, could
disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany
us in it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the
bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and
emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger
long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do
us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side
we need not fear the whole world. With her then, we should most
sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more
to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in
the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price
of taking part in her wars. But the war in which the present
proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not
her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the
American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of
never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of
our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from
it. And if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body
of the European powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful
member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's
opinion, that it will prevent instead of provoking war. With Great
Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two
continents, all Europe combined would not undertake such a war. For
how would they propose to get at either enemy without superi9r fleets?
Nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition offers, of
declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights
of nations, by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of
another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the
equally lawless Alliance, calling itself Holy.
But we have first to ask ourselves a question. Do we wish to acquire
to our own confederacy any one or more of the Spanish provinces? I
candidly confess, that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most
interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States.
The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over
the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, as
well as all those whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure
of our political well-being. Yet, as I am sensible that this can never
be obtained, even with her own consent, but by war; and its
independence, which is our second interest, (and especially its
independence of England,) can be secured without it, I have no
hesitation in abandoning my first wish to future chances, and
accepting its independence, with peace and the friendship of England,
rather than its association, at the expense of war and her enmity.
I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed, that
we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, that we
will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and
the Mother country; but that we will oppose, with all our means, the
forcible interposition of any other power, as auxiliary, stipendiary,
or under any other form or pretext, and most especially, their
transfer to any power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any
other way. I should think it, therefore, advisable, that the Executive
should encourage the British government to a continuance in the
dispositions expressed in these letters, by an assurance of his
concurrence with them as far as his authority goes; and that as it may
lead to war, the declaration of which requires an act of Congress, the
case shall be laid before them for consideration at their first
meeting, and under the reasonable aspect in which it is seen by
himself.
to James Monroe, 24 October 1823
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