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THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

BY

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BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
The Riverside Press Cambridge
1911

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Published November 1911

PREFACE

THE following chapters are the substance of a course of lectures delivered in 1909 before the Lowell Institute of Boston. Delivered without notes, they were carefully reported and subsequently much revised.

The circumstances of their delivery were, I feel sure, favorable to certain good habits which I have tried to retain. My hearers, though exceptionally intelligent and critical, were for the most part untrained in the subject. Being hearers too and not readers, they constantly forced me, if I would be understood, to turn away from technicalities toward naturalness of speech; they led me to emphasize crucial points in the argument; and then by short sentences, easy transitions, and homely illustrations, to make the necessarily close attention rewarding and agreeable. These are useful habits for any one who undertakes to treat contentious topics.

Nor do I see that such adjustments unfit a discussion for consideration by specialists.

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Such men, it is true, rightly lay stress on fullness of knowledge, fresh points of view, candor in observation, and a scientific spirit. But lucidity is not unfriendly to these worthy qualities. Bishop Berkeley bids us "to think with the learned and speak with the vulgar." I wish I were able to conform myself to the precept of this profound and limpid writer. But at least I will offer here a fairly intelligible, systematic, and in some respects not unoriginal survey of an intricate, ancient, and ever-present problem.

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THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING OF FREEDOM

I

FEW subjects are for ordinary mortals so difficult and dull as the question of freedom. In it mental confusion seems to have secured a kind of province of its own from which ordered thought has been so excluded that the small amount remaining suffices merely to provoke acrimony, but not to stir broad and dispassionate pursuit. From the first a certain meagreness has characterized the discussion of freedom. Neither of the parties contending over it has appeared able to advance beyond a few central assertions. How these were related to other beliefs or to the tangled facts of life has been but scantily explained. When Epicurus proclaimed us free, he spoke of an unintelligible accident which since the beginning of the world has somehow disturbed its normal course. And when the Stoics assert that necessity governs all, it is hard to see how

the erroneous doctrine of freedom could arise, or indeed what room remains in a world like theirs for error, chance, or wrong. Nor is the lack of fullness and clarity less as we turn toward modern thought. What Augustine believed about free-will, what St. Thomas, no one can precisely say, though they and all the men of the Middle Ages wrangle over the matter with unceasing eagerness, virulence and uncertainty. The first appearance of the problem on English soil is in the dreary discussion of Thomas Hobbes with Bishop Bramhall, where neither seems to take any interest in what his opponent says and each considers what he says himself as too obvious for argument. Locke follows, a singularly candid writer and one ordinarily engaging; but his very ability to see much in many directions so confuses his account of Power that at the close of that laborious chapter a reader is hardly wiser than at the beginning. The smart epigrams of Hume's *Essay on Liberty and Necessity*, while making it evident that all who dissent from the simple doctrine there preached are probably fools, leave behind them an uncomfortable doubt whether Hume himself may not be about as blind as his adversaries.

In view of such slender results certain moralists of our time have begun to ask whether the age-long controversy might not now profitably cease and human conduct be approached from points of view more accessible and of a more comprehensive outlook. The most notable advocate of such a policy is Henry Sidgwick, who in his *Methods of Ethics* sums up with singular fairness the arguments for and against freedom, and concludes that they are substantially balanced, each side in itself convincing but neither providing room for the material presented by its opponent. Our wisest course is therefore to let the whole subject alone — an easy matter, since no practical issue is involved. Persons act, he thinks, substantially alike whether libertarians or determinists. Professor Sidgwick's plan has commended itself to several later writers. The valuable recent book by Professors Dewey and Tufts, a book remarkable for wide observation of human needs and daring suggestions of further moral advance, does not mention the subject of freedom. Many writers of to-day merely allude to it as something too difficult, too threadbare, or too unimportant for discussion.

II

But it is not easy to relegate fundamental problems to darkness. The unknown allures. Thoughtful men do not rest comfortably in ignorance, but repeatedly rouse themselves to ask whether such ignorance is really necessary. In this case especially there is much which prompts to further inquiry. The question is a classical one, like the being of God, the nature of the state, or the significance of poetry. These matters each generation debates, and there are few surer signs of the intellectual earnestness of an age than the zeal it shows over such problems. No age settles them, each formulates them anew, but in wrestling with them each gains a power and insight not to be otherwise obtained. That is what we mean by calling freedom a classical problem. It is one to which the human mind, however discouraged, invariably returns, one which always proves itself capable of kindling passion, one too large for complete solution, but one where even partial insight broadens all other apprehension. It is incredible that our critical time should refuse to join the earlier inquiring multitude, acknowledge itself baffled, and take

no share in what has invigorated the past. The fancy that it might is a dream of academic minds.

Indeed, as we look closely into the writings of those who professedly banish this question, we find that in reality they themselves unconsciously assume the truth of one or the other of the opposed doctrines. Nor can they do otherwise if they discuss ethics at all, for every part of that science is rooted here and changes meaning with our understanding of freedom. Accordingly, though at first sight forbidding, one can hardly imagine a subject which under examination proves more profoundly interesting. Here we try to learn what our nature is. Do we resemble the things around us, driven by blind law and incapable of modifying it? Or are we guardians of law and is the world in some degree directed by our thought? Only so far as we believe it to be, do we count ourselves capable of conduct; for I suppose everybody sharply distinguishes movement from conduct. Things are as busy as we, but we do not call their motions acts. Acts are movements so guided that they in some sense reflect our purposes. And what is that sense? What right have we to contrast

ourselves as persons with the objects around us as things? No doubt we constantly do so, but is the distinction sound or superficial? In short, is or is not human action a subtler variety of physical motion?

These weighty questions I propose to discuss in this book, and I believe them to be questions which nearly all my readers will already have agitated within their own breasts. To many such self-explorers there will have come a kind of despair, making them ready to say, "I do not know: I may be free, I may be determined; I cannot tell." But surely no present bewilderment can close the door on knowledge. That was a sagacious remark made long ago by Aristotle that "if we must not philosophize, then we must philosophize." He meant that reason is defeated only by itself. In order to know that a problem is insoluble we must have reasons for its insolubility, and so must already have advanced far in our acquaintance with it. Problems set by our own nature are unescapable. Closing the eyes does not rid us of them. It is wise, then, from time to time systematically to face them and also, patiently holding them before our hearts and minds, to allow them to illuminate and be

illuminated by the daily experiences of life. The latter important sort of exploration must be conducted by each person for himself. To the former I here invite my readers.

III

For anything like success in so difficult a search an open mind is the first requisite. Hunters after truth we must be, and heedless of everything else. Hortation, enthusiasms, the desire to say something uplifting, will be out of place here. We are to keep close to reality through all its windings and be firm against exactitude where it does not exist. If we gradually come to believe that the larger truth probably lies in a certain direction, we must still be as interested in detecting what hinders our taking that direction as in the considerations which favor it. Delight in discovering difficulties is a good preservative against error. Of course, then, we must start with no side of our own. Do not let us suppose we are called on to save freedom, to snatch the precious thing from unbelievers who, probably with malicious intent, are attacking it. Nor, on the other hand, let us for a moment imagine that the champions of freedom are shown by their

holding such a doctrine to be irrational or insincere. Conceivably they have not been bought up by religion, party, or social prejudice, but may have been led to their conclusions by what they themselves have seen. Partisanship is of course common, but it has no more natural connection with one side of this controversy than with the other. The best we can do is to banish it from our own mind and assume it to be absent from the mind of him who differs from us. In short, in order to make any progress in these perplexing regions our method and interest must be dispassionate and scientific.

Yet if scientific, that interest will have in it much that is dramatic too. The drama brings before us clashing forces, each relatively justified. That is not first-rate drama where a good character is overthrown by a knavish one. In the best drama noble human nature is arrayed against noble human nature, and our sympathies go forth to both sides. In Sophocles's masterpiece of *Antigone*, the state is set against the family, and we are aware how poor mankind would be if either were destroyed. It is this jarring of mighty opposites, each necessary for the well-being of man, which gives splen-

dor to the piece. In *Romeo and Juliet* the family and the individual clash. Just such tragedy is involved in the problem of freedom. Two importances are here in conflict. The libertarians are keepers of a great truth. They vindicate the work of man, the dignity of the person, his capacity for self-guidance. And certainly life would not be worth living if these interests were insecure. But the determinist has a matter of no less consequence in his charge, for he is defending order, law, the fact that in this universe all parts are influenced by all. He will not, then, allow a single portion to set up for itself, as if it possessed all worth. He compels each to be submissive to the whole. Who can say which of the two claims is superior? We cannot discard either, opposed though they seemingly are. It must be our endeavor to do entire justice to both, reproducing in our own minds the full stress of that on which each insists.

Such then will be our somewhat scholastic and technical task. I shall try to examine our subject as a matter of simple science, careless of consequences. And I cannot help hoping that some of my readers engaged in practical affairs may like to look into the mind of a

quiet scholar and see how he goes about his strange business. To many he will seem to be magnifying niceties and concerning himself too seriously with abstract ideas. I can only answer that a dispassionate search into the principles which underlie life, and in the long run shape it, is to me engrossing and fruitful beyond anything else. Out of such cool contemplation comes a strength and happiness which permeates all my more superficial experiences. Something similar I anticipate for my readers. While the discussion will not be aimed primarily at practical ends, the very fact that for the time likes and dislikes are laid aside, while exact observation and coherent thought summon us to do their bidding, should refresh and strengthen for the common affairs of the day. A sustained argument, too, though calling for close attention, may have, if well knit, plainly worded and freed from extraneous matter, the unfolding interest of a story. But clearness is vital. To it I sacrifice every other grace of style.

IV

Two nearly related questions confront us at the start: What do we mean by freedom?

and do we possess anything of the sort? These two questions usually considered together, I sharply divide. This chapter treats only of the first. Nothing in it favors either determinism or libertarianism. All it seeks is to discover what we have in mind when talking of freedom. We may be altogether deluded. Possibly there is no such thing. No human being may ever have been able to do otherwise than he has done. But even if freedom is not a matter of reality, it is a matter of thought. In ordinary conversation we constantly speak of it. "Peter acted freely," we say, "in going to New York." What have we in mind? If I make out here merely the contents of our consciousness, I shall be satisfied. We may then proceed to inquire whether this imagined freedom actually exists. But such an inquiry would be futile until we know what we seek to assert by either affirming or denying that Peter is free. And since in this chapter we are arguing no ethical doctrine, but only attempting a bit of psychological analysis, I will state a case of purported freedom and trace as accurately as possible what I at least am there thinking of, begging my readers to follow carefully and observe whether it is what they too have in mind.

Suppose I find that my tall clock has stopped and I say to some one, "Look into the case and see what the matter is." He, having looked, calls out, "Of course it must stop. The pendulum is not free." I ask, "Not free? How so?" To which he replies, "Somebody has stuffed paper into the clock-case. Every time the pendulum swings, it touches the paper slightly, and so is not free." Thus far, I suppose, there will be no dispute. All will agree that when interference is present freedom ceases. This, however, describes freedom only negatively, — free *from*, — and suggests that in order to be altogether free our pendulum must be rid of everything except itself. But how far can our thought travel in such a direction? Shall all environing influences be removed? Gravitation, for example, is tugging continually at the ball and drawing it toward the centre of the earth. Here is interference. And if by some magic art we could remove gravitation, should we then have made the pendulum more free? I begin to doubt and to see that this is not exactly what I meant by saying there should be no interference. Gravitation or weight is, after all, constitutive of the pendulum, so that we could

not do away with it and retain the pendulum itself. Something similar appears also elsewhere. At its upper end the pendulum is attached to a pivot, which never ceases to interfere with its motions, holding it rigidly in place. Suppose we detach it, will it gain or lose freedom? Evidently lose, for it will then be so free as hardly to be free at all. Negative freedom — freedom *from* — has been so greatly enlarged that positive freedom — freedom *to* — disappears. Adjustment to environment, which seemed at first an interference with freedom, is to some extent necessary. Let us then recast our definition with this fact in view.

Instead of saying that freedom is the absence of interference, suppose we now call it the absence of alien interference. Some pressures assist the pendulum to do its work, others prevent. The intruding paper, the sticky oil, the too-narrow case are alien interference. Lying outside the pendulum, they intrude upon its actions, oblige it to express them rather than itself, and so check its freedom; whereas interferences of the pivot, of gravitation, further the pendulum's designed end. These may be thought of as integral parts of itself. Here then will be our

amended definition : the freedom of the pendulum will mean its ability to express itself, unhampered by alien interference. So we ourselves, in order to be free, must be detached from certain portions of our environment. In the circumstances of each of us there is much which is not favorable to our best working. Environment of this sort we seek to abolish and so secure a negative freedom. But this is done only with a view to positive freedom, the development and expression of our powers themselves. Accordingly, in order to decide in any specific case whether we are free, we should need to know whether the circumstances are likely to help or hinder our interests.

Shall we not say, then, that in the absence of alien interference, as thus explained, we have a full statement of what is intended by human freedom? I could not say so. Something is still lacking. The pendulum does not offer a precise picture of myself. Its movements are of a different type. We suppose at least that it does not know what it is about, and that I do. It has no consciousness. Possibly if we were challenged to prove this, we might have difficulty in doing so. But at any rate there are no signs that the pendulum is

conscious, whereas when anything affects us it affects us all through and we perceive ourselves to be affected. A curious double agency is ours, of doing and at the same time knowing that we are doing. The two go together — not always, it is true. Many a blind movement going forth from every one of us allies us with the world of things. But these movements do not fall within the field of ethics. As moral or personal beings we are concerned with conduct only so far as it is conscious. If the consciousness is slight, then we are but slightly moral. The pendulum, having none at all, cannot illustrate what personal freedom would be.

v

Yet perhaps we can best set forth freedom as we conceive it in ourselves if we retain our illustration and hypothetically modify it. Let me endow the pendulum with a consciousness it probably does not possess. I will assume that it is aware of what is going on as it leaves the level, mounts to the right, returns on its perfect curve downward, and so climbs to the left. Let it even feel a quiet joy in its beautiful movement. Would there under such

conditions be in it all that, rightly or wrongly, we think we find in ourselves?

Once more something is lacking; for the pendulum might be merely a spectator, a spectator of itself, conscious of all its motions, though without ability to change them. We ordinarily believe that in us consciousness is a factor and that the actions which proceed from us are not precisely what they would be if consciousness did not interfere. The pendulum, we have assumed, has but one way of acting and merely contemplates itself acting thus. To make it adequately representative we should take one further step. Having begun the process of enriching it with what does not properly belong to it, we may as well endow it with consciousness in our sense of that term. Its range of action will then be immensely enlarged. Formerly on reaching its summit, it turned and went down. There was nothing else to do. And at each stage of the descent there was ever but one thing before it, one fixed action following upon each which it had seen itself perform. But suppose, when the pendulum arrives at the point where it is usually conscious of descending, it could say to itself, "Shall I turn or shall

I rise, or shall I stay where I am?" Suppose it were not confined to a single issue, compelled, however consciously, to take the exact plunge it had taken before. Several possibilities are now open to it, on any one of which its attention may fasten. Only so does consciousness become a factor and the pendulum differ utterly from all which swing in our houses.

Now something of this sort we truly or falsely assume in ourselves. We go on the supposition that every instant opens before us varied possibilities of action, and that we may select, choose, decide which one of them shall be realized. We are not shut up to the single actual present, but through imagination press forward to a diversified future, foreseeing there many events which would differently affect our well-being, and finding that as we put our mind on this one or that among them it ordinarily occurs. Imagination is not, then, as we are apt to suppose, the peculiar endowment of a poet. It and the attention following in its train are the working factors of our daily lives. Through them we multiply the pendulum's single issue into dual or plural possibilities. And this is the full measure of what we have in mind when

we talk of being free. We mean that what will happen is not fixed, either in the nature of the environment or ourselves (negative freedom), but that there are before us alternative possibilities either one of which, by suitable attention on our part (positive freedom), will issue in an actual event. When I rise from this table I can go to walk, to bed, or to the bookcase. Consciousness, fastening on the first, lets the other two go. I say, therefore, that I went freely to walk, but please myself with thinking that I might just as freely have lain down or read.

Perhaps it will be convenient for future reference if we now gather up the results of our analysis and state them as a formal definition. This will furnish a clear answer to the first of our two inquiries, "What do we mean when we call ourselves free?" and will enable us to advance without ambiguity to our second and more important one, "Is there any sufficient evidence that we really are free?" Throughout this book, then, I shall mean by freedom that self-guidance through which, for purposes of our own, we narrow a dual future possibility to a single actual result.

VI

It is so important, however, that all the clauses of this definition should be clearly understood and felt to be necessary that I pass them briefly in review. Self-guidance needs little comment. The pendulum has made its meaning sufficiently plain. When that was directed by anything except itself, it ceased to be free. Alien interference and freedom were seen to be incompatible; I can be free only so far as I guide myself. We may not always be sure whether an interference is or is not alien; but we know that to whatever degree it is, we are under constraint.

In order to possess freedom we must have a dual future possibility, dual at least. There must be as many as two different courses open to us, possibly more. Often, I suppose, we have a multitude of things in mind which we believe we might accomplish. Two at least we must have, e.g., doing this or not doing it. When the pendulum became free it ceased to be confined to a single issue, being then capable of either descending or not descending. The possibility of freedom is staked on that of the ambiguous future. Where either

the environment or our own constitution permits only a single event to be realized, freedom ceases. Of course, at the last every result is simple; but for the free being no particular one is predestined for issue. A process of selection from a multitude, all alike possible, brings one to existence and checks the rest. This selective preference employed in positive freedom is usually indicated by the word "rather," a word which I have expanded into the phrase for "purposes of our own."

We often figure freedom as groundless selection. I choose A or B out of pure caprice, counting one of them of no more consequence than the other. But I do not find that men restrict themselves to this narrow usage and I shall show hereafter that arbitrary selection is in reality destructive of freedom. As I wish to formulate a definition acceptable to libertarians of every sort, I shall not fashion it for the few who champion this liberty of indifference. The great body of libertarians understand the ambiguous future, on which freedom turns, in a far less extreme sense. They say that action is undertaken with a view to supplying some one of our many needs, perhaps the need of action itself. Did

we not know ourselves to be incomplete, we should remain inert. I stand here and continue to stand until I am tired. Only when I need a seat do I move toward one. In that seat I stay until some sort of action occurs to me which promises to remove defects which I at the moment experience. I go to dinner because I feel myself hungry and desire to remove that hunger. Desire is precisely this recognition of a contrast between my actual self and what I might better be. The representations which lead up to action are always of a supposedly possible future self. These are examined to see how betterment may most probably arise. I may be mistaken in regard to this, may think I shall better myself by some course when in reality I shall not. But no matter. It is this thought that guides me. And so long as my turning in any direction is prompted by the aim at betterment, I call myself free.

VII

Our fathers used to discuss our problem in terms of Free Will. Is the will free, they asked, to choose its own good? Such language is no longer heard. Scholars now agree that no

detachable piece of us — the will — is free, but either nothing or the whole of us. Will is merely the act of self-direction. The antithesis, then, to the free will would not be the constrained will, but no will at all; and the real problem is not whether the will is free, but whether the person is so.

And is he? To that question we have come at last, and to it must devote the remainder of this volume. We now know precisely the point which evidence must illuminate. Is there ever an ambiguous future before us? Do several possibilities sometimes disclose themselves? And can I by attention shut off one of these and adopt another, thus enabling my powers to go forth more largely? These are different aspects of that second question with which this chapter opened. Discussion of it was at that time postponed until some agreement could be had as regards what should be discussed. The absence of such preliminary definition has been the commonest cause of the small results thus far obtained in this controversy. Doctrines have been attacked which were not those maintained, and others defended though not attacked, while each antagonist has often had but a hazy notion of

what he himself was championing. Ambiguity, in short, has been here as elsewhere the deadly enemy of scientific advance. Against such ambiguity this chapter is a guard. We now understand what it is to be free and may decline controversy with those who accept or deny freedom of other sorts. All we wish to learn is whether we are justified in counting ourselves free in the sense here explained.

CHAPTER II

THE IMPROBABILITY OF FREEDOM

I

It is highly improbable that any such power as has just been defined exists. The evidence against an ambiguous future, narrowed by ourselves, is so strong that whoever examines this alone can hardly fail to regard freedom as a fantastic dream. To bring out this adverse evidence in all its cogency is our business now. Putting ourselves sympathetically at the point of view of the determinist, we shall endeavor to see what he has seen. His truth must be our truth too. Truths neglected by him may appear hereafter, but for the present we want to feel the utmost force of the determinist's positive doctrine. By libertarians this is often overlooked or, still worse, misrepresented. We must examine it with friendly eyes. Those aspects of it which are tolerably familiar I shall treat briefly, developing at greater length certain turns of the argument not so generally understood. In this way I hope to clear de-

terminism of misconception and to set it forth as something having a rightful place in human thought. Probably the evidence for it can be most compactly summed up under three heads: that which is derived from the nature of the world, from the nature of the human mind, and from the nature of society. Experimental, psychological, and social proofs I offer in its behalf, taking them up in the order named.

II

As we first look out upon the world, it seems a loose and heterogeneous affair. Innumerable events happen. Here the sun shines and moisture rises. There a cloud is forming. Now rain begins to fall and grass to grow. Soon animals devour the grass, and men them. All these are distinct events. Each, so far as immediate and unscientific observation goes, might occur by itself. But closer inspection shows that events which were at first supposed to be independent are not really so. No one of them quite deserves the name of one, for each is inextricably interlocked with others. Such interlocking of event with event is what we know as causal connection, that is, events are parts of one another and come forth in a

fixed order. Regularly and throughout the entire line, A is followed by B, B by C, and C by D. Perceiving this, we find our world calculable and fitted for the habitation of man as it could not otherwise be. Without such fixity we could never anticipate what would happen next. Operations involving forecast would therefore cease; for what folly it would be to erect a house if some day gravitation might work upwards instead of down; or to build a railroad, not knowing whether heated water would turn into steam or ice; or to plant potatoes which might come up as corn or cabbage. We could not train a physician in the use of medicines which to-day might cure a fever and to-morrow cause one; nor a horse, if instruction in harness had no reckonable effect on future habits. Could we even take thought ourselves of what we should eat or what put on, if one day's experience gave no indication of what another would bring forth? Of such vast consequence is foresight, a power possible only in an ordered universe. Civilization reposes on the assumption that everywhere events move by fixed sequences toward single issues, undisturbed by alternative possibilities and ambiguous futures.

Such sequences constitute our laws of nature, which science sets itself to trace through all their subtle complications. Of course not all are yet known, nor probably ever will be. But whenever a new set of ordered sequences is observed, man's power enlarges and human welfare gains fresh security. Properly enough in early times men imagined that causal sequence governed only a portion of the physical world. So long as such connection was traceable but a little way, it accorded with the modesty of reason to believe that though many occurrences were causally linked, others were not. It was not then absurd to suppose that in parts of the universe where no linkage of phenomena was discoverable caprice of one sort or another had a field for exercise. Such unoccupied sections of existence were said to be ruled by chance. Or since under such conditions any number of possibilities were alike probable and the future wholly ambiguous, it was believed that free will, human or divine, was often the steadying influence which then guided affairs to a desirable issue. Before the rise of science a miracle, far from being an absurdity, was the sole rational means for saving our world from chaos.

To-day it is absurd. While we recognize that science is still in its infancy, during the last three centuries it has progressed far enough to convince us that there are no gaps in nature. All space is occupied by causation. The loose world where chance invites capricious will has gradually disappeared. Modern man perceives how things hang together, the events of to-day springing directly from what existed previously and that which existed previously no less closely bound up with what went still before. It is true that belated libertarians sometimes urge that the universe is not yet fully explored and that to talk of the uniformity of nature, as if causal sequence had been demonstrated everywhere, is to speak considerably beyond our knowledge. Let us then grant that the field of the unknown probably exceeds that of the known; yet even so we may rest secure in the conviction that the method of knowledge which has served us in the past will not fail us in the future. Hitherto wherever science has advanced causal sequence has been followed. This single clue has been steadily used. It has not always conducted to knowledge, but it has never itself been proved erroneous. If, then,

we suspect that the causes of the Aurora Borealis are not yet known, since many explanations of it have been proposed and objections have been made to them all, we still could not listen to one who should say, "Perhaps there is no explanation. Probably the Aurora is free. Under given conditions it may or may not illuminate the sky, without cause for either occurrence. Dual possibilities may be inherent in it and so one result be as likely as another." Should we not reply to such a person, "You are born out of due time. A few thousand years ago such talk might have been possible, but you speak a language unintelligible to modern ears. Your proper home is the lunatic asylum"? In short, to know no cause does not permit us to suppose that none exists. It rather gives a strong stimulus to hunt for one. Search nature as widely as we may, we come upon no unprompted change.

III

The belief that the material world is a world of law and order has now become practically universal. That world hangs together. Wherever we have experience of it, we find

sequential causation, wherever we do not find it, we have not full experience. But matter is only half the world, perhaps the less important half. Mind remains. And surely in our turbulent mental life no such fixity rules. In that inner world we still talk of casual thoughts, arbitrary volitions, of doing as we please. Who can find invariable law in such a chaos?

But in the seeming chaos of the outer world science has been so successful in detecting order that he would be rash who should now attempt to set limits to its scope. The line dividing the outer from the inner world is far from clear. On the whole, it seems more reasonable to attribute the confusion in the latter, as in the former, to lack of knowledge rather than to any disjointed condition of the facts themselves. Mental phenomena are certainly subtler than material. They will not stand and be looked at, but must in general be caught on the wing and at unawares. Accordingly they are harder to analyze. Here more than elsewhere it is difficult to determine which member of a complex mass of antecedents is connected with a given consequent. To enable us to do so, psycho-

logical laboratories have recently been set up with facilities for isolating phenomena and noting with exactitude in what connections they arise. In these laboratories much has already been accomplished. While the observation of thought has not advanced so far as that of things, we are now sure that the mind, even in regions commonly accounted most capricious, has its laws. The analogy therefore with the physical sciences daily becomes stronger. The argument of progressive approach applies to both. So far as we have knowledge, regularity appears. The field where it does not appear continually narrows. Shall we not eventually detect causation everywhere?

IV

Kant thought we must, but for the curious reason that it is observable nowhere. Causation, he declared, is not a product of experience, but a directing condition by means of which experience becomes possible. I see A occur and B occur, and B follows A. The causal tie between them I do not detect. The hammer falls, a sound is heard; but did the fall produce the sound? Kant,

and Hume before him, asserts that experimentally we observe only the sequence. Will he then deny causation? On the contrary, he affirms it to be universal because a necessity of our thought—or in his own clumsy phrase a category of the understanding. Causation is in us, not in things. He who wears blue spectacles sees all things blue. So if our minds are made with a causal twist, this cannot fail to affect whatever we observe. The changes of our inner life, no less than those of our outer, will inevitably present themselves in causal form. Nothing can escape. If freedom implies absence of causation, it may as well be dismissed to the limbo of unsubstantial ghosts. There is no such thing simply because we could not know it if there were. According to the previous experimental argument we perceive no cases of absent causation; according to the present one we cannot even conceive such a case. I offer this *a priori* plea for the omnipresence of causation, on account of its celebrity and in order to exhibit the deterministic case in its entirety. But to assess its validity, or even to render it fully comprehensible, would carry us far away into Kantian metaphysics.

In a modified form, however, this argument from our inner structure is familiar enough. Everybody inclines to conceive his actions as manifestations of a self. Libertarians especially set up a fictitious entity called "I" and endow it with magical powers. Yet among the data of our internal life no such being is observable. Often finding it necessary to contrast the total train of thought with the notion of its single members, we give to the former the title of self, subsequently imposing on ourselves a belief in its separate existence. But this is an error. When, for example, I decide to live in Cambridge rather than in Boston, these two places are not ideally presented before a certain *me* with equal possibility; nor does that *me*, distinct from each, decide the case between them. It has no power to remove one from its natural setting and give it a sequence which in itself it would not possess. The deciding *me* is merely another name for the adjusting mental process. Cambridge has entered harmoniously into the current of my life a dozen times and Boston only three. Or Cambridge has perhaps affected that current through a wider tract of interests. It, therefore, has a

larger influence over my action, though this influence was not apparent at first, but gradually revealed itself in the process of deliberation.

So soon as under this closer psychological analysis we abandon the notion of a detachable ego, libertarianism collapses. If the ego is merely a name for the total train of thought, it becomes unthinkable that a portion of this train should change its position at the bidding of that total and be thus brought into collocations which would not otherwise arise. It would be nonsense for nature to suggest that the birch tree clothe its trunk for a space with the bark of an oak. There is no nature to work the change other than that which includes the smooth-barked birch. What one does and is are not two things, but only differing aspects of the same. In each of us there are merely so many possibilities as are covered by what we actually are, there being nothing to decide between them except that very ego which they themselves constitute. Confusion on this point is easy. When we once see that the mind and its contents are one and the same thing, we shall not talk of its dictating to them, as if it had a place apart. Our actions

proceed from what we are and have been, from which — except by external force — they cannot be turned aside.

v

But beside the disproof of libertarianism furnished by scientific observation and the nature of the human mind, there remains a third class of evidence which has carried even wider popular conviction. Belief in determinism is embedded in the structure of society. The predictability of conduct is a condition of man's associating with man. We have already seen how difficult life would be in a physical world where calculation was subject to dual possibilities. Figure the situation. I do not know whether the sun will rise to-morrow. It did rise to-day. I noticed it yesterday, and people tell me it has risen for many years. But after all, if the causal sequence is not tight, why expect that coming times will resemble past? It is grounded expediency which makes our world a fit place to dwell in. Equally true is this of the world of men. I at least do not see how we could live together had we no power to forecast each other's conduct. My act has reference to yours. In

proportion as yours is uncertain, mine must be thrown out of gear. I am a teacher; would my class assemble at nine o'clock if they could not reckon on my presence? Should I myself appear if I had no reasonable expectation of finding them? How could commerce proceed, or travel, churches, theatres, courts, or governments, if the act of one man could not be coördinated with fair certainty to that of another?

It may be said that this certainty is only fair, that members of my class surprise me by their absence every day. But I should not be surprised if I regarded them as beings endowed with ambiguous futures, as likely therefore to act in one way as another, beings whose conduct not even divine wisdom could foresee. No, the uncertainty here is not unlike that felt in watching an approaching storm-cloud. Will it rain? Undoubtedly, if such and such conditions are present. And are they? Of this we have only partial knowledge. In both cases, connections may be recognized as unalterably fixed and yet about the result our judgment may waver. All the determinist asserts is that given antecedents are followed by invariable consequents even in the

very complex circumstances of human intercourse; that the more fully these antecedents are understood, the more confidently we can predict results; and that regularly among friends and acquaintances they are in fact so fully understood that here we have something like a working certitude. All this predictability of conduct he finds incompatible with the libertarian fancy of multiple possibilities. Hume has so powerful a passage comparing our assurance of personal and physical events that I transcribe it entire: —

When we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence unite together and form only one chain of argument, we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the same nature and derived from the same principles. A prisoner who has neither money nor interest discovers the impossibility of his escape as well when he considers the obstinacy of the gaoler as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded; and in all attempts for his freedom chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The same person, when conducted to the scaffold, foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards as from the operation of the axe or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideals: the refusal of the soldiers to

consent to his escape ; the action of the executioner ; the separation of the head and body ; bleeding, convulsive motions, and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions ; but the mind feels no difference between them in passing from one link to another, nor is less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the objects present to the memory or senses by a train of causes, cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical necessity. The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volition, and actions, or figure and motion. We may change the names of things, but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change.

Were a man whom I know to be honest and opulent and with whom I lived in intimate friendship, to come to my house, where I am surrounded with my servants, I rest assured that he is not to stab me before he leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish ; and I no more suspect this event than the falling of the house itself, which is new and solidly built and founded. *But he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy.* So may a sudden earthquake arise, and shake and tumble my house about my ears. I shall therefore change the suppositions. I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed ; and this event I think I can foretell with the same assurance as

if he throw himself out of the window, and meet with no obstruction, he will not remain a moment suspended in the air. No suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the least possibility to the former event, which is so contrary to all the known principles of human nature. A man who at noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement of Charing Cross may as well expect that it will fly away like a feather as that he will find it untouched an hour after. About one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature attended with more or less of certainty, proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in each particular situation. (Essay XXXIX, sec. VIII.)

VI

Possibly we may find such prediction offensive, and feel that if it applies to us our character is impaired. Were I completely a person, I may imagine, prediction of my acts would be impossible. So long as I am but a creature of habit, not widely different from the objects about me, of course I can be predicted. In all of us there are large tracts which have not come under personal control. Within this region, it may be thought, prediction works. But in whatever degree we conceive a human being as a person we remove him from

the sphere of prediction. Prediction is something derogatory. As we honor the dignity of mankind we must hold hard to a belief in freedom.

I remember how surprised I was years ago on suddenly discovering that this sort of talk expresses exactly the opposite of the truth. Like everybody else, I grew up a libertarian. When a young man, I was fond of playing chess. One day as I was deliberating over a move in the middle of a game I suddenly asked myself whether an expert standing beside me could predict what that move would be. Not, I saw, unless I had a past history as a chess player with which he was familiar. If I were a beginner, he could not tell whether I would advance a pawn three squares, or move a castle aslant, or expose my queen to capture. All these, and a multitude of other possibilities would be open to me and therefore to his prediction. But if I had a knowledge of the game, these possibilities would be closed. And if I were an accomplished player, the expert at my elbow might whisper to his neighbor, "There is only one move he can make. He must attack his opponent's king with his black bishop." As I then, without hearing the

remark, proceed to make that move, should I feel belittled to have the expert announce that it was foreknown? Should I feel that having supposed my act to be one of freedom, I had now been deprived of something precious and myself degraded into a mere thing? On the contrary, I should probably feel much flattered and congratulate myself on being, and being known to be, a player guided by law. Evidently, then, as personality enlarges, conduct becomes more predictable. That was the impressive lesson taught me by this striking case. An endowment of freedom, where all things are equally likely, is no blessing but a sign of incapacity. We should desire to be rid of it and should count ourselves well off when we come under such necessity as is here described.

But how widely does this principle obtain? Apparently throughout human intercourse. Suppose, for example, that John and I were summoned to report on an affair in which we two were engaged last week, and I should say, "Since John is a free person, there is no telling what account he will give. It may be the truth, or an utterly false tale. We cannot predict." He certainly would not think me com-

plimentary ; nor, on the other hand, would he resent my saying that there was only one statement open to him, that nothing but the truth could issue from his lips. That is in reality what we all desire, to be such truthful persons that we simply cannot tell a lie, such courteous persons that no word of querulousness ever escapes us. The more thoroughly we are narrowed down to such single issues, the prouder we justly are.

It may be suspected, however, that what we like here is not the escape from freedom but the attribution to us of some praiseworthy act. Let us examine then an indifferent case, into which no praise or blame enters. Suppose John and I have been living together intimately for a long time, and one morning as I am dressing, another acquaintance enters the room. To him John whispers, "Observe him ! When he comes to his coat, he will put in his left arm first." If John should tell me of this after I was dressed, I should not be annoyed. I should smile and say, "How pleasant, my dear fellow, to have you know me rather better than I know myself."

Yet I do not profess that it is always agreeable to be predicted. In the last case predic-

tion would be offensively intimate if offered by a stranger. And for a still more questionable case take the following : When I am beginning my lecture some morning I notice that Mr. Smith is absent. I tell the class that he will appear at four minutes past nine, on entering will pass in front of my desk, waving his hand as he goes, will advance a dozen steps beyond, and then turn back to take a seat beside the door. When he has gone through this performance, I address him thus : "Mr. Smith, you evidently think yourself a free man and bear yourself with a good deal of confidence. But let me say that you are completely determined. In each of your late movements there was only a single issue open to you, and I foretold it. To all this company I explained precisely what you were going to do." Would he not feel uncomfortable, as if wound up with a spring to which somebody else held the key ?

Probably what strikes us here as uncanny in contrast with the preceding cases, is that Mr. Smith's actions do not seem his own, but to have been so shaped by outside influence as to be comprehensible without regard to himself. Remove suspicion of this sort, and

the annoyance ceases. Seeing Mr. Smith's perplexity, I hasten to add, "Do not imagine that you have been calculated like an eclipse. It is yourself that has interested me. I knew your wish to be present to-day and that you would come as promptly as possible. But the train does not arrive, I noticed, till a few minutes past nine. Your dislike, too, of bad air in lecture-rooms is well known. Before you took your seat I expected you to make sure that the window was open, which, with your poor sight, you cannot ascertain without pressing forward to examine; and I recalled the deprecatory gesture with which you usually pass my desk. Your seat is by the door, and to that you would naturally return when secure of proper ventilation." In all likelihood remarks of this kind would put an end to his annoyance; for what troubles us is not prediction, but the possibility that prediction is based on something external to ourselves. Let it be once seen that forecast comes from observation of established character, and we are not perturbed.

VII

But this case discloses how there may be several varieties of determinism, and to distin-

guishing them I devote the concluding section of this chapter. We might understand that though we apparently steer ourselves, the considerations thus far adduced indicate that man is a creature of circumstance. The projectile, as it moves through the air from the cannon's mouth, might naturally enough suppose, had it consciousness, that its course was directed by its own will; it would mistake forces of the universe for its own force. Just so the total framework of things passes through us also and cannot be evaded. An act may indeed be called mine in the same sense as perfume may be attributed to a blossom. But the forces which form that blossom spread far and wide, converging upon it from sun, shower, soil, air, and all the physical, chemical, and biologic agencies which encompass it. The flower is but their meeting-point. And just as we have seen how throughout the physical universe there is probably no ambiguous future nor any possibility other than has actually appeared, so I must believe that before I was born the chain of circumstance was tightly joined and every act that has since proceeded from me was already fixed in the constitution of things.

This is the famous doctrine of necessity, with its two branches of fatalism and predestination. Whoever holds it, yet believes that from an infinite intelligence things ultimately come, will figure its necessity as the predestinating will of God. Whoever is disposed to think of mind as incidental, or itself produced by material conditions, will talk of blind fate. In both cases alike the individual is impotent, only seemingly a factor in the sequence of events. Conduct is the product of the total whole.

Before the popular mind this doctrine threateningly stands as the alternative of libertarianism, and many a volume has been written to combat it. But so far as I know, it is held by no living teacher of ethics. Formerly it was common enough. Materialistic thinkers of Greece, Rome, France, and England maintained it with warmth. To-day it is gone, though still leading of course a vagrant life among the populace, the uninstructed, and such devotees of physical science as are besotted with a blind hatred of humanism. But no careful scholar defends it. Necessarianism is a spectre of the past. John Stuart Mill, under the prompting of Hume and Jonathan Edwards, substituted

for it the doctrine of determinism, and this has ever since been the regular theory of our time for all who are repelled by the improbabilities of freedom.

Accordingly the old necessarian formula that conduct is a product of circumstance is now changed so as to read that it is a product of circumstance and character. This second factor is even thought necessary for rendering the first intelligible, for circumstance is a slippery term, seeming to name something fixed, but indicating in reality what changes with the character of him who is circumstanced. We cannot say, for example, whether a given environment is favorable or hostile, enfeebling or stimulating, until we know what kind of man is environed. Between the two factors interaction goes on so that the one is continually modified by the other. Convinced that no act proceeds from us uncaused, the determinist maintains that if the facts of a man's character were fully known — his inheritance, history, habits, powers, defects and peculiarities — and if to this were added a complete acquaintance with his surroundings, his conduct could be calculated with the same certainty as the motions of the earth. Of course we never can

know this complex mass of mutually influential facts and accordingly our predictions are never altogether exact. Different degrees of consequence too are attached to the two factors by different determinists. Those who think circumstance more important, so approaching more nearly the old necessarianism, have been called hard determinists, while the soft determinists, because they lay the chief stress on inner conditions, are not always easy to distinguish from moderate libertarians. We must not be misled by names nor imagine that the varieties of earnest thought can be bound up together and ticketed with neat labels. Diversities are too precious to be standardized. Yet I shall gain brevity and dramatic interest in this discussion if I employ the general term determinism to indicate a disposition to find the grounds of conduct in the past character and circumstances of him who acts. The fact that character is taken into account will add no real ambiguity to a man's future. For the man and the character are one and the same, and it is accordingly meaningless to say that a man can act unlike his character. Whatever comes from him, determinism asserts, expresses just that man, so circumstanced at that partic-

ular moment. There is then neither within us nor without an ambiguous future possible nor room for capricious chance. We should think of the entire universe as embodied law.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBABILITY OF FREEDOM

I

SUCH is the weighty argument for determinism, which must convince any one who listens to it alone. And even when the libertarian brings to light certain sections of truth here neglected, it does not lose its worth. Representing the working faith of the naturalist, it is a needful supplement to the contrasted point of view of the humanist. To the world's progress its contribution has been at least as great as that of its companion. In every age the ideal of an orderly universe has been essential to man's peace and power.

But a libertarian belief has always existed side by side with this, its rival, and on the whole has been the faith most approved by common sense. Of late years it has gained in favor as a philosophic doctrine, and to-day some form of it counts perhaps a majority of ethical students among its adherents. The great transformation too in the opposing doctrine,

and the substitution of the mild sway of modern determinism for the ancient despotism of necessity, is thought by many to show that freedom is advancing and its foes retreating. I should rather say that the men of our time do not so readily array themselves in parties as did their fathers, are consequently more open to mutual understanding and to adopting in part beliefs from which as a whole they may dissent. Perhaps then even those who are convinced determinists will not be indisposed to hear what can be said for libertarianism. It is the object of this chapter to set forth the argument in its behalf no less strongly than in the last chapter the evidence was presented against it.

Let us see, then, what is the precise point at issue. Because the determinist holds that nowhere in human conduct can dual possibilities be formed, one might suppose that the libertarian discovers such possibilities everywhere. But this nobody alleges. All libertarians agree that a great part of human conduct proceeds exactly as the determinist alleges. They only assert that this is not invariably the case. To establish freedom it is merely necessary to prove that sometimes, or once

since the foundation of the world, dual possibilities have been narrowed by personal agency to a single actual result. This would be sufficient to break the bond of causative sequence. The question of the extent of freedom and of its existence are two different things. Free human actions are asserted to have occurred; how frequently, is a matter for further consideration. That they do occur is maintained on experimental, psychological, and social evidence; and it will assist comparison of the two opposing doctrines if we examine successively how freedom is involved in the nature of the person, in that of the human mind, and in that of society.

II

As regards the first, libertarians usually declare that they have immediate experience of freedom, each being conscious of it within himself. Every man believes that when conduct is most real and unhabitual several possibilities are at the moment of action open to him and that only in view of them all does he act. I decide to sit here, knowing that I might rise, to write when I might read, to make the letter *h* rather than *a*, *b* or *c*; that is, when I go to act I al-

ways recognize several courses which I might pursue, by a process of deliberation I pass them in review, and finally uncompelled adopt one to the exclusion of the rest. Decision is the cutting off of various possibilities any one of which might have been realized. Between a case where no such possibilities exist and one where they do there is a striking contrast. In the former I feel myself free, in the latter bound. Of the whole process I have hourly experience and am therefore beyond the reach of deterministic argument. Does any one tell me he has searched the wide world over and has come upon no instance of freedom? I readily assent since only in himself does each of us detect anything of the sort. Freedom is a unique fact, not outwardly observable. It is found not in the forthgoings of action but in its rise, when I issue a mandate that such an act shall occur rather than such a one. Were that *rather* cut off, and this be the only act which could occur, I should be no actor. I act only in view of a *rather*, perceiving that its lurch in this direction or in that awaits my prompting.

The consciousness expressed in the word "rather" sometimes takes on a form of weightier import. Instead of inclining to do this rather

than that, I may perceive that this ought to be done. Now "ought" even more authoritatively than "rather" contemplates more than a single line of action. It could not enter the head of one who had never known alternative possibility. The moment a being becomes aware of an "ought" he knows himself to be beyond the fixities of character and circumstance. This is the broad foundation of popular libertarianism. The belief that two courses lie before us and that we can because we ought, appears so little open to question that in the mind of the ordinary man determinism has difficulty in obtaining a hearing. It is apt to be passed by as absurd, an academic speculation for which clever men amuse themselves with offering ingenious defense. And certainly it must be acknowledged to conflict with some of the primary instincts of mankind.

If, however, freedom is an affair of daily, hourly, momentary experience, how can it be so frequently denied? Because of a diversity in nature itself. This world of ours contains contrasted types of being, things and persons. Or, if these terms seem a little occult and somewhat in need of definition, we may say that objects around us are for the most part passive,

incapable of originating movement. Energy goes forth from them, it is true, and they are in continual motion. But it is transmitted motion. Each object receives from something else the movement which it manifests. It generates nothing and is therefore inactive. It merely conveys activity. If then this is the character of all observable objects, from what source do we obtain the notion of a subject, i.e. of an originator of action? Certainly not from our fellow men. Looking on them from the outside we have no reason to suspect that they are not, like all other objects, engaged in sending onward motions imparted by something else. What leads us to attribute to them an active principle? Libertarians are quite willing to admit that nothing of the kind is externally observed. Every outward change can be construed as due to necessitated sequence. At only a single point of existence — when engaged in conscious purpose — does each of us go behind necessity, there watch the rise of action, and experience himself as no mere transmitter or perceived object, but a creative subject. By such subjective acquaintance with ourselves as beings often active, we come to comprehend our fellow men. To them

also we now attribute a directive power similar to our own, and our behavior toward them becomes in consequence utterly unlike our treatment of things. This fundamental distinction between man the passive object and man the active subject, the determinist, it is alleged, overlooks. Since a large part of our life runs on as mechanically as that of things, he assumes it all does so, and because personal direction cannot be inspected externally like other objects, he denies its existence. But we must stand by the facts of experience. We are immediately conscious of ourselves as creatively active, i.e. free.

III

A metaphysical turn is given to this argument by Kant. We have seen what aid and comfort he gives to the deterministic cause. No less does he give to the libertarian. In my last chapter he pointed out that the human mind knows its objects only under condition of causal sequence. But the self, as we have seen, is no mere object. It is a creative subject, appealed to by duty, *ought, rather*, estimates of comparative worth. Freedom, therefore, the ability to accept or reject among compared

alternatives, is involved as a postulate in the structure of the human mind. Nor does Kant feel his teaching here to be in conflict with that previously announced. The mind as a passive receiver of perceptions is itself an object and all that we observe in it conforms to the law of causation. But when practical or active it stands outside the flux of causation, so becoming free, a fact revealed to us in the peculiar consciousness we know as "ought." For the same reasons as before I do not elaborate this contention. But because it has gained much fame as the moral or *a priori* argument for freedom, I set it down briefly as a second section of the libertarian case.

IV

Perhaps before leaving the evidence for freedom drawn from immediate consciousness I had better mention certain objections to it. With its form I am not quite satisfied. It is true I quarrel rather with the mode of statement than with what is asserted, but I think we strain the truth when we talk of being directly conscious of freedom. I can be conscious only of facts. Now while at the moment of choice there are supposedly at least

two possibilities open to me, no one of them becomes a fact until I have fixed my attention on it, selected it, and sent it forth into action. Only of what I choose then am I directly conscious, not of what I did not choose. No doubt I believe that I might have chosen something else ; but as the power to do so was never exercised, I do not see how I can have immediate or positive consciousness of it. I should prefer then to put the matter thus : in action I must take dual possibilities into account and must assume that I am not restricted to any one of them. When I choose x I am not aware of being obliged to do so, nor can I discover anything which shuts me off from choosing the seeming possibilities y or z . It strikes me as an exaggeration, however, to call this an immediate perception. It is a strong and probably universal belief, with entire absence of evidence to the contrary. For practical purposes it amounts to the same as direct consciousness. Only as we are trying here to think exactly, we must be sure that our words do not at any point state more than we know.

A graver objection, however, is that which calls the belief itself illusory. It is not de-

nied that at the moment of action we seem to detect several possibilities, nor that as our deed goes forth we figure ourselves as restricting these possibilities to a single actual result. Such a belief even determinists acknowledge. But is it correct? May it not be an illusion? Men make mistakes; large bodies of men make the same mistake; possibly there are instinctive errors which belong to all mankind. There is for example the illusion of motion. Watching the sun, I cannot persuade my eye that it does not move. I perceive it, directly experience it, yet know myself to be deceived. A similar deception, it is said, there may be here when, going behind action, I feel myself free. In both cases a false interpretation is attached to an unquestionable fact.

To this it may be replied that the cases are not parallel. We are never shut up to errors of sight. In them we can check erroneous interpretation by evidence drawn from other sources. But no other sources exist by which the illusion of freedom can be corrected. It is uniquely universal, inevitable. And how will inevitable illusion, which admits no possibility of being proved illusory, differ from truth? "Wen Gott betrügt ist wohl betrogen," says

the German proverb; "cheated by God is cheated well." A universal illusion to which all mankind must submit and which leads to no demonstrable error, is probably itself illusory.

v

But after all, many will feel that we have thus far been moving over treacherous ground, for we have been dealing with subjective evidence only, evidence which is incommunicable and liable to private interpretation. Facts of my inner experience may convince me that I am free, but I cannot convey the conviction to another. From a difficulty of this kind libertarianism can never wholly escape. In the last analysis that doctrine is a summary not of external observation but of individual consciousness. If I am free, I am so only for myself. Still, certain objective evidence may give confirmation. The belief in freedom is imbedded in the structure of society, and thus a consciousness on the part of the many supplements and assures individual consciousness. To this third, or social, form of the argument for freedom I now turn.

In our intercourse with one another we employ certain conceptions and phrases which

are unintelligible except on libertarian grounds. These conceptions all spring from a common root, though its branches are many and their appearance diverse. That root is the great fact of praise and blame. Men cannot live together without approving or disapproving each other's conduct; and praise and blame are comprehensible, libertarians declare, only on the hypothesis of freedom. When I blame John for what he has done, I assume that, he being he, and circumstances being precisely what they were, he might have acted differently. Where I do not believe matters could have occurred otherwise, even though I feel them annoying, I do not regard them as deserving blame. If an apple bumps my head in falling from a tree, I am pained, annoyed, angry even, but I do not blame the apple. The child does. He is unacquainted with the laws of fixed causal sequence, but familiar with those of his own free action. By these latter something is picked out to occur from the many events which might have happened; and the child, little acquainted with the nature of external motions, carries directly over to the outer world that selective causal agency which he experiences every hour in himself. Naturally, therefore, he

blames the apple for his smart. We, out of our broader knowledge, try to make him see that what has happened is a misfortune but not a fault. When he says "naughty apple," we explain that the apple was not responsible, exhibited no malice or guilt, and could not have done differently. Expressions of blame and praise, suitable enough where freedom is and where selection is continually going on, have no place in a rigid world. A determinist is inconsistent who thanks his friend for a Christmas gift.

It may, however, be felt that this is largely true and that praise and blame had better have less part in human affairs. Undoubtedly we employ them too loosely. About the springs of each other's actions we know little. What influences of environment, of training, of habit, of heredity, had a share with intention in bringing about the behavior that offends us, we can only guess. It seems presumptuous to pick out a certain tract of conduct from a connected life and declare that it meets with our approval or disapproval. Why not take things as they happen?

"Why should I feel another man's mistakes
More than his sicknesses or poverty?"

But we cannot discharge moral judgment so easily. Estimates of worth are, for good or ill, deeply inwrought in all human intercourse. To abolish them would call for a fundamental reconstruction of society; when it was accomplished, all sense of a difference between good and bad conduct would have disappeared. But these are notions that cling, cling so close and are so significant that we even apply them where they do not belong. It is hard for example not to think the rat reprehensible that gnaws our shoes, the mosquito that stings our flesh, or the ivy that poisons our hand. Shall we ever be brought to reckon drunkenness as no more discreditable than sobriety, theft than generosity? I doubt it and believe that we shall long retain ideals of conduct to which wavering mortals will be summoned to conform.

This at least is the view of the law; for the rewards and punishments of civil society are only a special form of praise and blame. We punish the criminal because we believe him to be a wrongdoer and hold that he was not incapable of doing the right. We do not punish the things around us, nor ordinarily our animals, so doubtful are we whether dual possibilities are open to them. Much in their con-

duct suggests that they too may be free; and just so far as we suspect it, we give them the same praise and blame that we give one another. "Bad dog, you ought not to have done that; you knew better." So I address my poor relative, honoring him by bringing him into my blamable society. Of course I am not sure that the dog distinguishes right and wrong, and I easily admit that my words may be inappropriate. It is only in the case of my fellow man that I feel secure of having a proper subject for blame. For while even here I cannot assess nice degrees nor tell precisely how culpable one was in his evil deed, I feel that I should degrade him by assuming that he was shut up to the single act which he performed.

But praise and blame are not given to other persons only; I praise and blame myself. This sort of praise is known as self-respect, dignity, pride; this blame, as shame, regret, remorse. To the determinist, regret can be only a consciousness of unavoidable damage. The libertarian's anguish is rooted in the conviction that the harm need not have been wrought.

"I might, unhappy word! O me, I might!
Yet to myself myself did give the blow!"

This is the language of regret. It contains, over and above its sorrow, the knowledge of an unused opportunity. This distinctive quality of regret, lending it a poignancy unfelt in other pains, we have all experienced. We know how unlike it is to the mere sense of damage into which deterministic explanations would resolve it; and the universal consciousness of it has therefore always been a strong point in the libertarian case. Undoubtedly our regrets are often mistaken, we imagining that something need not have been done which — since we were we and circumstances such — we could not help doing. But unless we are prepared again to accept a universal illusion, there must be cases where we are not deceived. Already we have seen how in the moment of action all men believe in alternative possibilities. In regret this belief remains after the action has passed and when we look back on it from a cool moment. Upon full survey I blame myself for having done something, convinced that I might have done otherwise. This, according to the determinist, is an error. One should never regret. Taking everything into account, nothing else can happen than that which does happen. Regret

is therefore meaningless. Yet the determinist should see that he cannot assert this to be so without using the conception he denounces and falling into contradiction with himself. Does he blame regret? By that condemnation he assumes that in this instance at least another possibility existed than that which became actual. If there was a dual possibility here, why not elsewhere?

Praise and blame then — with their attending conceptions of guilt, merit, responsibility, regret, punishment, and their implication of alternative choice — cannot be banished. The very effort to banish reinstates them. Here accordingly, in the impress which these have given to the institutions and habits of society our individual consciousness of freedom gains strong objective confirmation. But to these considerations what explanation does the determinist offer? He is no stranger to social institutions and habits. He adopts them, and in his own case sees the prodigious importance of praise and blame, rewards and punishments. Yet while employing, he gives them a peculiar significance. Let us see if we can seize it.

I am driving this morning. My horse goes

slowly. He may be tired from his travels of yesterday. But it is important for me to reach a given point at a definite time. Under present conditions my horse can go no faster. To secure speed something must be added. I add the lash. Plus that sting the horse will go well enough. Observing his slow pace, I do not count him culpable, as if he had willfully rejected a different rate of movement. I see that the causes of motion are insufficient and so increase them. Something similar occurs in human society. A man is about to break into a bank. Considering his famished condition, his heritage, his education, his habits of life, his need of money and the difficulty of obtaining it elsewhere, there is only one issue open to him. Into the bank he will go. The law with its penalties comes to his aid, furnishing just that supplemental motive which will hold him on the sidewalk. Punishment is then a humane contrivance for the protection of society and the reform of the criminal. It is not concerned with retaliation. We cannot by observing the evil done determine the turpitude of the doer and assign appropriate pains. The assessment of guilt lies outside our province. When we punish,

we do so in order to put obstacles in the way of unsocial actions. The function of blame is found in its deterring power.

This explanation will be satisfactory or the reverse according to the direction in which we believe praise and blame to look. Do they regard the future or the past? When John has done me a kindness, I thank him for it, praising his action as excellent. Am I in such praises contemplating the future, easing his way to what he shall hereafter do; or am I thinking of what he has already done and trying to indicate the quality of that past? Evidently I may do either. Gratitude has been defined as "a lively expectation of favors to come." We often praise children in order to stimulate them to repeat their good deeds. Praise is a valuable impulse and certainly does again and again regard future conduct. But I hardly think any persons able to read their own minds will believe this to be its exclusive office. Praise and blame are primarily assessive of past quality and are bestowed only where we suppose the action performed was chosen rather than some possible other. It is on this "rather" that our attention fastens. I thank my friend for his

Christmas gift, mindful of the fact that he need not have given it, not because I remember that Christmas comes again next year. I blame my clerk's negligence, knowing, it is true, that if passed by it will be persisted in; but also wishing to make him ashamed that in the given instance he did not take an energetic course. The sense of avoidable wrong is central in the minds of both blamer and blamed; the aim at future correction is but collateral.

Yet though moral blame primarily regards the past, less and less does civil punishment do so. Its aim in our day is for the most part corrective and protective, just that which the determinist would have all disapproval be. In times less civilized retaliation was prominent in the law. Penal reform has chiefly consisted in reducing this prominence and in punishing offenders only in ways which may save both the criminal and the community from further harm. In my judgment this is a wise change. The law is at best a clumsy contrivance, dealing with men in the aggregate rather than with individuals, and therefore little fitted to estimate gradations of guilt. But merely because the law's rough working properly

confines itself to an external and mechanical reckoning of conduct, we are not to suppose moral guilt absent and the evil inevitable. Justly, I think, does the libertarian insist that in private life we employ praise and blame in a far more fundamental way. Our feeling of shame over our own bad deeds, our feeling of reverence for the good ones of others, point to a kind of excellence unknown to natural law nor fully recognized in laws of the state.

Such then is the libertarian argument, which appears to me on the whole sound and conclusive. Its full strength, however, does not even yet appear. Although in this chapter I have often suggested the reply which a determinist might make to libertarian claims, I have not stated how the libertarian regards the important considerations adduced by determinism. With this attempted rebuttal I open the following chapter. Only after examining it can we decide whether, as he asserts, the libertarian sees all that the determinist sees, and something more.

CHAPTER IV

THE REPLY TO DETERMINISM

I

THE first section of the deterministic argument sought to prove that nowhere in the external world can freedom be found. We never come upon a case where we must assume its presence. Observed results can always be explained by other means. But this the libertarian no longer denies. Early libertarianism, it is true, thought to graft its freedom into a world which at points is vacant of causal sequence. But science long ago demonstrated that no such points exist. The modern libertarian perceives that breaks in the framework of things are not required for his purpose. He holds that we find freedom only within our own breasts, each person being conscious of it for himself alone. In the outer world we never directly envisage action. Thus we see merely its results. But since it is the origin of action with which freedom deals, and this is experienced solely by each for himself, it is only

through his own actions that any one comes to acquaintance with freedom. Over this first experimental evidence there is therefore little controversy. The state of things alleged by determinists is now generally acknowledged. Here genuine progress has been made in the ancient controversy and the field common to both parties has been permanently enlarged. So habitual has this common temper of mind become that an occasional departure from it strikes us as comic. I cut the following from the daily newspaper : —

“God prevents the transmission of disease through the use of the common communion cup,” declared Bishop C. C. Grafton, of Fond du Lac, when he commented upon the action of the State Board of Health in exempting churches from the operation of the rule against the use of the common drinking-cup.

“The good Lord,” he said, “would not permit the transmission of disease to any of the worshippers through the means of their worship of Him.”

For the most part, however, in our time the libertarian no less than the determinist inhabits a world linked by ties of causation. These ties he finds also in the inner world, so far as this can be made a passive object of observa-

tion. Only when initiating action does he come upon freedom, when viewing himself not as an object but as a subject. Over the whole observational field the libertarian admits the deterministic contention and declares that it does not make against his own creed.

In a similar way he has no quarrel with one portion of the second or a *priori* argument. He readily accepts the Kantian doctrine of causation as a fixed condition of cognitive thought, but he follows too the lead of Kant in distinguishing sharply the field of passive apprehension, ruled by sequence, from that of creative activity where freedom appears. And if any one chooses to call those beliefs illusory which like freedom have their origin in necessities of the human mind, he would merely remark that no species of truth is known uncolored by such illusions. On this Kantian doctrine and on that first section of the deterministic case, where emphasis is laid on the prevalence of law, there is little room for contest. While there may be individual differences of interpretation, the two contrasted lines of thought are here in substantial accord.

II

Dissent begins as we turn to the nature of the self or ego. This the determinist would dissolve into a series of conscious states, and even bid us not to take too seriously the idea of series. In reality there is no unity-giving thread running through the many sequences. They are but a lot or manifold, each tied by the tail to something preceding. Such a view belongs naturally to determinism and is indeed hardly to be avoided by it. For if a central consciousness is to have no part in shaping action, why should it not disappear? If it remained it would be contemplative only. As active beings, we should have no use for it. Libertarians on the contrary, while not asserting a detached existence for the ego, believe that each of us possesses a consciousness of organic wholeness and has a genuine individuality capable of reacting on special experiences and shaping them to its advantage. If asked to explain this ego and state what its directive power is like, they frankly say they cannot. It is like nothing else. As well might one ask an ultimate analysis of space or time. Descriptions of the functions and peculiarities

of all three are possible enough, but neither can be resolved into anything more elementary than itself. Being employed each instant of our lives as conditions of apprehending all else, they cannot themselves be separately apprehended. Nor on the same account can they be dispensed with. He who attempts to deny a personal self really implies its existence in the very denial. Experience involves an experiencer. We cannot say we are aware only of mental states without introducing somebody who is aware and setting up a doctrine of personality the very opposite of that which is asserted. It is wise to bring out into open consciousness what in any case we use. And since in considering human life we cannot escape thinking of something more than the passing show of mental states, it is evasive to call these real and that "something more" unreal. I count it an advantage for libertarians that they deal frankly with the self and insist on its importance.

III

The third argument for determinism, based on the predictability of conduct, looks formidable. In the same way as we predict events in

the physical world, Hume tells us, we can predict the behavior of our fellow men. I forecast my friend's act as I do the weather. Of course I am far from sure what that weather will be. Looking in the paper for increased certainty, I am often led still further astray. Unobserved conditions often falsify our calculation. But never on that account do we imagine that no cause exists for a fair day or foul, that the weather is a matter of chance and the world a free world, inherently endowed with an ambiguous future. Nor should we, frequently as we fail to predict one another's conduct, therefore infer that man is an incalculable being. Yet is not this just what the libertarian asserts? Claiming an ambiguous future for each of us, must he not maintain that the prediction of human conduct is impossible, either for ourselves or for the Almighty? If it is left to the individual in the moment of action freely to fix one of several possibilities, how will a libertarian explain the generally observed predictability of conduct? Will he deny it? Far from it. He, too, hardly less than the determinist, recognizes it as essential if men will work together, and here is his explanation of its occurrence.

Obviously no one is completely personal. To a large extent each of us is as truly a thing as the objects around. We all have bodies, bodies subject to the same laws as other animals, and much of our mental action is of the same type as theirs. Mechanism enters largely into the conduct of us all. In a previous chapter I have pointed out that no libertarian asserts that all conduct expresses freedom. Many believe that comparatively seldom do we definitely choose. The great body of action runs off from us without conscious guidance and in as mechanical a fashion as any other species of motion. All that the libertarian asserts is that at times something creative occurs. We initiate a new line of action which was not provided for in the past, initiate it without compulsion and with more than a single issue before us. Nobody regards this as true of the great body of our acts. In reference to these, therefore, prediction is as possible as if there were no such thing as freedom.

But the modern libertarian accepts still more of the deterministic creed. As we form our characters, we increase the possibility of prediction. What the need and method of such character formation is, this paragraph will

explain. By character we mean any established mode of feeling, willing, or thinking. Finding myself in some situation for the first time, I notice that there are several possibilities before me. I accordingly deliberate, examining what effect each will have if I choose it. Suppose I decide that I shall gain most of what I seek by selecting x rather than y or z . Half an hour hence I am in the same situation once more. Shall I repeat the former deliberation, resurveying the various possibilities and again come to my old decision? Certainly not. If the decision was a wise one then, the process of reaching it may now be shortened. As soon as the situation arises a second time, the sight of it may be a prompter, suggestive of what had better take place. To this suggestion I may yield. I need not examine y and z again, but simply let x occur. After it has occurred twice, it will run off more promptly a third time; and promptness is often a matter of importance. Were we obliged in each instance to deliberate afresh, the scope of our power would be enormously reduced. Accordingly the wise man accumulates habits. Deliberating coolly in a novel situation and making up his mind critically as regards his best mode

of action, he then mechanizes his conduct according to a pattern, discharging consciousness from immediate control. Each of us becomes strong about in proportion to the tracts of life thus mechanized; for as soon as our petty acts can be trusted to take care of themselves, conscious choice is set free to busy itself with broader issues. Thus indirectly, by the employment of associative suggestion and reflex action, we immensely extend the scope of our control. Freedom is now concerned with ultimate ends, the detail of means being abandoned to habit. That is the name we give to each associated train, character being the total bundle of such habits.

Now the libertarian is by no means a foe to habit. In the interest of the largest freedom, he even encourages its formation. Seeing how wasteful it is in the common concerns of life to be watching a multitude of possible issues, he would cut them down in each case to a single approved result. We might then say that the sagacious libertarian, while recognizing freedom as a valuable endowment, will daily try to lessen the occasions of its exercise. We are apt to picture freedom as something precious and are childishly anxious to prevent

its slipping away. But if it is to be serviceable, we must rid ourselves of much of it and stiffen what remains with a large element of determinism. However much of a libertarian I am, I do not decide each morning whether I will wear clothes. My parents decided this for me when I was born, and I confirmed their choice as soon as I was capable of dressing. Since that date I have been happily rid of freedom on this point and have known but a single issue as regards clothing. My kind of dress, my general style, perhaps even the tailor whom I shall patronize, have all in varying degrees been similarly settled. In short, by the time I am mature a large part of my life has been broken up into tracts, the proper mode of conduct within each determined, and an appropriate habit with its single issue has me in charge. From these beaten paths freedom is banished, reserved for service in regions less familiar. Nor could I escape a narrow outlook in any other way.

Evidently then within this field conduct is easily predictable, predictable indeed just in proportion as we become mature. In my former illustration of the chess player, the successful prediction of my move indicated that I had

acquired a chess character and had ceased to be a novice. To be predicted was therefore agreeable. We saw too how one often resents uncertainty in regard to his behavior, saying that if we had studied his character we should know how he would act. Fixities of action are a part of the goal of freedom, exactly that which it seeks ultimately to reach. Without them a man is hardly a person at all. The libertarian therefore finds nothing subversive of his doctrine in the fact that in the usual situations of life we are able to form intelligent guesses in regard to one another's doings. Of course we can, wherever men are grown up. We may not know all the conditions involved and so may fall into occasional errors. The man himself may not have learned how largely his freedom depends on his consolidating types of conduct into character and so he may leave us uncertain. But most of us early detect the importance of habit in considerable sections of our lives and so become in a fair degree dependable.

IV

But there is one curious circumstance in regard to predictability, often passed unnoticed

and not easy for the determinist to explain. It is this. If conduct is predictable in proportion to knowledge and has no reference to any freedom involved in the formation of character, then we should be likely to predict our own conduct with extreme certainty though doubtful about that of those around. Yet something like the reverse of this is the fact. Let any one scrutinize himself without prejudice and say if it is not so. I have hitherto been an upright man. I have never stolen, am not in the habit of telling lies, getting drunk, or toying with vice. My neighbors say I shall never do such things, and they expect clean conduct of me as a matter of course. But am I myself so sure? Holy men have acknowledged that they never saw a criminal without saying to themselves, "How easily might I be like him!" They detect in themselves possibilities hidden from others, and the knowledge of these makes them feel insecure. A striking case is recorded in the Gospel narrative. At the Last Supper when Jesus says, "One of you shall betray me," each of the disciples questions whether it may not be he. Unable to predict they turn to Jesus, thinking that an outsider may perhaps be better able to decide than themselves.

Even in non-moral matters our uncertainty about our own future is different in kind, and not merely in degree from that which we have when estimating another's. My friend's departure for Europe next year may seem calculable while my own, though announced and intended, is open to changes of mind. To us insiders the fixities of character appear not so fixed as they do to outsiders. Rarely does a depraved person believe he could not reform, or a righteous man that he might not fall. All this seems incompatible with the deterministic account. Under that teaching certitude of prediction is in proportion to the degree of knowledge. But here, increased knowledge breeds a peculiar doubt. There is some disturbing factor here. The libertarian may well attribute this disturbing doubt to the knowledge of alternative possibilities in our own case, a knowledge inaccessible to us in the case of another.

When we have once observed this strange difference between the calculation of our own future acts and those of our neighbor, we shall be prepared, I think, to notice a still wider difference in our certainty of causal sequence as exhibited by physical and human events. In the brilliant passage quoted on page thirty-nine,

Hume attempted to identify the two. "In musing over a connected chain of natural causes and physical events the mind feels no difference between them." A prisoner regards the "inflexibility" of his jailer as like in kind to that of the stone and iron of his prison. They are of the same nature and derived from the same principles. But are they? I wish my reader would turn back and reread the passage. I think he will see that Hume's zeal for a special doctrine has led him to overlook the psychologic facts. As often happens with him, he is more intent on fashioning handsome sentences than on exploring the intricacies of human nature. Let us grant that in certain cases our assurance of what men will do may mount to a degree equal to that with which we anticipate a physical event, still its "nature" is unlike. It "feels" different, and our expectation of the occurrence is not "derived from the same principles." The possibility of alternative choice is rarely left altogether out of account.

It would seem then that the predictability of conduct, on which determinism mainly relies, can be explained as well or better on libertarian grounds. But it has sometimes been

urged that the certitude here must after all be of substantially the same type as that which we observe in nature because, like that, it can be reduced to a quantitative expression. When mathematics enters freedom would seem invited to withdraw. Now the most capricious human actions can be mathematically forecast. Statisticians can tell with considerable certainty about how many marriages and suicides will occur in Massachusetts the coming year. These acts strike us as typically personal, as cases of conduct where our freedom, if any exists, would certainly operate. Probably we imagine that the impulse which starts our extravagant act was decreed by us at the instant; but the statistician with his tables is upon us and shows how all was settled a year ago. We were predestined to marry at just that time. Does not this fact then settle the case of libertarianism? The acknowledged power of prediction is due, according to the libertarian, to our disposition freely to form habits of conduct and to have these follow lines of a single, instead of a double, issue. Yet does not the fact that our actions submit to a quantitative formulation show that the possibilities contained in them are really as

single as those of the measurable world elsewhere?

I do not think so, and I am surprised to find that some people do. The only way I can account for the impressiveness of this flimsy argument is by remembering that the appearance of mathematics in any controversy is apt to brow-beat the non-mathematical mind and induce it to surrender whatever is asked, even freedom itself. If mathematics is only a form of language, without power of its own, what is said in it has no more cogency, but only occasionally greater clearness, than if uttered otherwise. In this case we inquire about the causes of certain facts. The statistician registers those facts, but is not concerned with their causes. Assume that his lists have causal significance, and they straightway become ridiculous. For example, I am about to marry, but looking over the statistical table I find it full and am prevented. Or, I had no thought of suicide but happening to pick up one of these calculations and noticing that one person is still lacking, I feel myself summoned. Could anything be more nonsensical? It is all a confusion of mind. What is asserted is that, whether there are alternative possibilities or

not, men have acted in the past and may be expected to act in the future about in the manner described. On this point there is no dispute. But in it there is nothing to exclude individual initiative. Mathematics may here be tabulating the effects of compulsory causation, of free choice, or of absolute chance. Nothing indicates which. To assume that it must be compulsory causation is to beg the point at issue. This is not then an argument at all, and I did not think it fair to determinism to include it in my second chapter, among the grave matters enumerated there which really require explanation before a doctrine of freedom can be held. It is only one of three question-begging statements of determinism which require attention here.

The second of these has had the widest currency and is still often heard in popular presentations of the deterministic case. It runs substantially as follows: since we always choose according to the strongest motive, there can never be more than a single issue open to us. For of two motives it will always be true either that one is the stronger or that the two are of equal strength. In the latter case no action ensues. Wherever action does appear, it is the

only act which under the circumstances was possible, for we are totally unable by any act to transform a weaker motive into a stronger. This "strongest motive" was formerly one of the doughtiest combatants of the deterministic camp. Libertarians always declared there was no blood in him, but only lately have they convinced their opponents that such is the fact. The impostor has now been silently dropped and rather rarely presents himself on the field. But what has been turned out of the scientific army still leads a vagrant life about the streets, and probably a good many years will pass before the last is heard of this curious circular phrase. To call it untrue or true would be equally mistaken, for it has in reality no meaning at all. How do we know a motive to be the strongest? By seeing action ensue. Have we any independent means of testing its strength? None. Then in saying that the will follows the strongest motive we have merely declared that whatever precedes precedes. Such a statement, while unquestionable, advances knowledge not a whit. We have said nothing, yet are in danger of begging the question to be discussed. For what probably leads us to utter anything so feeble is the assumption, covertly con-

tained in the words "strong" or "strongest," that ethics must be like physics and have antecedents of the same kind. That is what is denied by libertarians. They may be wrong, but they must be proved to be so by evidence and not by assumption. In the greater clarity of to-day, and in the greater desire to understand opinions from which they differ, scholars have pretty generally given up talking about "the strongest motive."

The third of these curious circular statements is contained in a name sometimes given to libertarianism. Recently it has been often called indeterminism, thus implying that libertarians in general suppose volition to proceed without motive, preference, or ground. Some of them undoubtedly do. Under the heading of the liberty of indifference I shall hereafter explain their doctrine and show it to be practically equivalent to extreme necessarianism. But whether my judgment of the theory is correct or not, it is evidently unfair to identify all libertarians with a peculiarly vulnerable section of them, and when this little body is discredited to assume that libertarianism as a whole is overthrown. It is well to understand an opponent before vanquishing him.

Here then is presented the full case of both libertarian and determinist. Each has presented his positive doctrine and has also stated whatever he has to urge by way of rebuttal. The amount of this latter on the deterministic side being small, has been given in connection with the libertarian evidence. But while determinists have usually been inclined to make short work of the belief in freedom, to call it a delusion and pass on, libertarians have entered pretty minutely into the deterministic teaching and have taken pains to show with what parts of it they could or could not agree. For the sake of clearness I have therefore separated their rebuttal from their positive doctrine and have dedicated to the latter this entire chapter.

Hitherto our aim has been not assessment but comprehension, and both sides of the case have been presented as strongly as possible. But fairness does not necessitate absence of conviction. Wherever comparison occurs, judgment should follow. If we avoid it outwardly, it almost inevitably goes on within. I have no desire to avoid it. To my mind the libertarian takes into account a larger body of facts than the determinist. When I ask which

of two sides in a discussion is more true, this is what I always mean: which is the more inclusive, which one has seen all that the other sees and something more besides? Now I find that the libertarian is usually the better listener. With pretty much everything that is in the determinist's mind he reckons, but the determinist is blind to many facts of ordinary life which are taken into account by the libertarian. Consequently if I were compelled to choose between the two cases as they here stand, I suppose I should rank myself as a libertarian. But am I so compelled? Has the libertarian adopted everything of worth in the deterministic creed? As unprejudiced students, we need not tie ourselves to one or the other. We seek the entire truth, wherever found. We must acknowledge that the world has never been able to get along without determinists. Narrow as we must often judge them, they have been the guardians of certain truths weighty for mankind. It is they who have been loyal to law, order, and causation, while libertarians have been defending life, spontaneity and progress. We need both. In cases where reason seems thus arrayed against itself it is usually well to inquire whether the appar-

ent conflict may not spring from some ambiguity in a term. That term cannot be freedom. This we defined with great precision, and to the meaning established in the first chapter we have held rigidly throughout. But have we as clearly fixed the meaning of causation? Have we not assumed that we know all about this? Such assumptions are the danger spots of thought. What we assume without criticism is apt to lead us astray. I believe, therefore, we ought to pause here and get a clearer view of causation if we will formulate a doctrine which shall not neglect important facts of choice.

CHAPTER V

KINDS OF CAUSATION

I

FOR analyzing causation so as to discover whether there may not be different kinds, and we be using the term in a confusing variety of senses, I will take as clear and familiar an instance of it as I can find and trace the working of the principle in detail. The instance chosen is one which I have already found serviceable in my *Field of Ethics*.

Here is a railroad track on which an engine runs. Behind the engine runs a car. What makes the car run? The engine, we say, and this is the process: in the beginning the steam, expanded by heat, enters the piston-box; not finding room for itself there, it presses against a valve and piston, obliging the two to move; as they move the steam escapes, and the piston is drawn back. These two motions of the piston, conveyed by it to the driving-wheels, force them to turn; and they, revolving, carry forward the truck and the engine resting upon

it. The engine, now in motion, is connected with the car by a bolt which conveys a tug to one end of an iron loop. The other end of the loop and a second bolt soon feel the impulse and, being inseparable from the car, carry it forward also. Such, in brief, is the chain of connected causes by which the force of expanding steam is transmitted to the engine and finally to the pursuing car.

Now the one invariable fact which deserves notice in this continuous series is that before an effect occurs its cause must already be present. Before the car can move, a tug must come upon the link connecting it with the engine; before the link can receive that tug, the engine must be in motion; before the engine moves, steam must be generated and the piston driven. In short causation is sequential. Throughout the whole train causes are first realized, then their effects follow. Out of the motion which has been comes that which at any moment will be. We rightly call such causes antecedents; for lying in the past, they dictate the future.

Extend the illustration and suppose a man running after the car. What makes him run? Asked what made the car run, we said it was

the engine. When we now ask what makes the man run, shall we not say it is the car? That is his antecedent, as the engine was that of the car. But the two cases are not quite parallel. The causal operation of the car differs from that of the engine. Not merely is its influence transmitted through sight and mind, instead of through links and pistons, but there appear in the man curious imaginative anticipations of what may be which transform the influence received from the car into an altogether novel kind of causation. The car's motion was induced by a past fact, the man's by a future possibility. What made the car run was a state of things already existing in the engine. The forces there had to have actual existence before the car would stir. What moved the man was the bare possibility of being on the car. As a fact, he was not on the car. Had he been, he would not have run. The cause that is working on him lies ahead, it is an affair of *to be*; that which works on the car lies behind, it is an affair of *has been*.

Nor is this case exceptional. The causes which operate personally are never in existence. They are unrealized, imaginary causes, mere future possibilities. Yet out of that futurity

comes an impelling influence. The man's action is no less truly caused than was the car's. But the nature of the two sets of causes is utterly dissimilar. In the one case while the cause was of the past, its effect is in the present. In the other, the cause is of the future and will only manifest itself at the end of a long series of antecedent effects. If the man is quick enough, he will catch that car, climb upon it, and secure a seat. Then at last the cause of the whole process will be complete and evident. The cause of the car's movement lay complete at the beginning.

II

The difference between these two processes and between the laws which express them, is so momentous that I am inclined to coin for them two technical terms which shall precisely mark out for each its way of working. That which moves from reality to reality — from actual *A* to *B*, then from actual *B* to *C*, then from actual *C* to *D* — I would call sequential causation. But that which, starting with possible *D*, summons actual *C*, *B* and *A* to coördinate themselves with reference to it, I call antesequential causation; and I do not much care

whether the first half of the compound is spelled with a final *i* or *e*. Spelled with an *e*, it would declare how all personal, moral, purposive causation comes out of a future. Spelled with an *i* it would indicate how by doing so it completely reverses the order of physical, mechanical, inert causation. Things, objects, the world without us, even the mechanical and habitual world within, are all subject to sequential causation. But at certain times of one's life, at least in those sections of his nature which are not yet fixed, a person may be subject to a kind of causation of a different type — antesequential causation.

But if I am right in believing that there are two broadly contrasted types of causation, the world at large can hardly have missed them. Affecting our lives so directly as they do, it is improbable that mankind has waited for me to keep the two apart. By what terms then is the contrast marked in ordinary speech? By a multitude of phrases, each presenting some special feature of the antithesis. I will give a brief list, including in it only the more important pairs: (1) We speak of efficient and final causation, that which operates where it stands, and that which proceeds *a fine*,

from the end. I have shown how in the latter case the cause comes to light only when the last link of the line is attained. Suitably, therefore, the whole process is called final causation. (2) Mechanical or physical, and moral or rational causation, is that which is distinctive respectively of things and of persons. (3) Positive and ideal, indicates that in the one case the cause is an established fact, in the other the representation of a future possibility. (4) The terms passive and active causation are sometimes employed when we wish to show how in the first instance motion is merely transmitted, but in the second initiated. (5) Kant has proposed heteronomy and autonomy, in order to mark the contrast which I had in mind in my earlier phrases "alien interference" and "self guidance for interests of our own." (6) Forces and ends, coercion and inducement, compulsion and persuasion, and — a pair of terms which characterize the whole system of the world — mechanism and teleology, all set forth the fundamental contrast in the types of linkage, around and within us. Everything is linked with everything, no part of the world, physical or mental, being detached. Only where personal life

is most distinctly manifested that linkage is managed in a way unlike that of other things.

Now all these terms, being taken from the lips of emotional men, are inexact and often bear about them some disturbing association. In an investigation which seeks to advance without prejudice I have thought that a fresh pair of terms, carefully defined, might best hold our minds to the required point. And I believe much clarity is gained by making the question of the time of causation the central feature of the discussion.

III

Antesequential causation is then preëminently the personal kind. But what has been said previously must qualify this. Most of our doings are, either by design or carelessness, as mechanically guided as any events of the physical world. While purposive causation is possible for none but ourselves, we do not always exercise it. Some men go through life in unresisting acceptance of whatever impulses play upon them. Others wisely turn over their ordinary actions to mechanized habit, thereby securing free attention for higher ends. There remains therefore, even

in the most intentional of men, only a narrow margin directly subjected to antesequential causation. But through that margin all the rest of one's life becomes significant.

Is antesequential causation, however, confined to persons? Are there no traces of teleology in nature? Until recently scientific men have been pretty well agreed that there are none, at least that it is no part of the work of science to regard them. Bacon thought final causes barren virgins, attractive in appearance but incapable of producing anything; and ever since his time inquirers have been warned off this ground as a region where vagueness, individual caprice, and lack of method are hardly to be avoided.

To-day these warnings are less stern. There is a suspicion abroad that man and nature cannot be kept altogether apart. In certain quarters something like a teleologic background is employed as a basis for scientific research. The science of our time chiefly differs from that of our fathers in its employment of the principle of evolution or development. Now evolution is something more than change. It is change tending in a predetermined direction, movement toward a mark,

progress to an end. We cannot understand a course of development until we bear in mind some end or type which it realizes. If then we are clear-sighted and take development seriously, we must suppose its far-off issue is not without influence on the changes which lead up to it, that its end or type does in some sense bias the whole course of developing events. Rightly or wrongly a teleologic thought usually attends the evolutionist. Yet even so, purposes do not need to be assumed in things. A purpose implies personal will, and I do not see that a scientific man who guides his investigation by the clue of development must presuppose a personal will in nature. Only if he does not, he will still imagine a goal or end as lending significance to a series of changes. And this is just what we have been describing as antesequential causation.

It is true nobody yet knows what precise place science will ultimately accord to evolution. Yet it is striking to notice how the Darwinian doctrine of natural selection — the theory of evolution which relies most on scattered changes and accidental coagulation — is breaking down through lack of organizing power. Many biologists declare that the

harmonious wholes which nature regularly produces could not come into being without some provision for coördinating the mass of small unrelated changes with reference to an anticipated end. Theories of organic evolution are now in the air. I am not entitled to an opinion as to the probable result in so technical a matter. Certainly the great body of workers in physical science still desire to banish teleology from their field. But in view of present controversies I have not felt justified in claiming antesequentiality exclusively for persons. In them it appears most distinctly. Whether it will ever be proved to permeate things remains to be seen. ..

IV

As we have now reached a kind of turning point in our discussion, it may be well to gather up the conclusions thus far reached and see where we stand. When anything happens it will always be proper to ask what made it happen ; always nonsense to suggest that possibly nothing did. Causation is universal. No such thing as an isolated event is known. Should one occur, there could be no evidence of it, lying as it would outside our entire universe. In our

world everything has connection with a past and a future. But this connection manifests itself in a twofold form. The first or sequential form dominates physical objects. As things existing, these are bound up with what already exists and not, so far as can be distinctly traced, with anything beyond. Human beings are to a large extent things also and to that extent are sequentially caused. They derive what they now are from what they and the world have been. But there is also in them a strange power of imaginative forecast by which they are able to lay hold of the future and make it a factor in shaping the present; and this is antesequential causation, the ground of freedom. Freedom being the fixing of a single issue out of two or more possible ones, it will always be present when antesequential causation occurs. For in this case there will have been at least the alternatives of purposive or unpurposive action, and probably also a variety of possible purposes will have been surveyed, with different means for their execution. If there is any such thing as antesequential causation — which I have shown to be more than likely — then freedom is a reality.

V

A doctrine of freedom thus understood has close relations with determinism. I have said that determinism is contrasted with the old necessarianism in this, that under the necessarian scheme a person is a creature of circumstance. His environment prompts him to action and through him that prompting passes on as the motion transmitted from the engine passes through the car. From oneself, however, comes no shaping contribution. Circumstance rules the world. Or we may take circumstance in its most abstract form and talk of the unavoidable-ness of fate or divine volition. But here the determinist parts from his necessarian ancestor, declaring that conduct comes not from circumstance alone, but from circumstance plus character. What we are is a factor constantly modifying our environment. Persons of different characters will behave differently under the same circumstances. Out of the interaction of two agencies all conduct proceeds.

Now this is a formula which may be used by those not sworn to determinism. Libertarian as to some extent I feel myself compelled to be, I heartily accept the deterministic

formula and think every act of mine directly caused by my character and circumstances, the conjunction of the two. Only the formula appears to me ambiguous. "Character" is merely another name for "self," conveniently indicating the point at which that ever changing ego has at any moment arrived. We must not be superstitious and imagine that through some sort of independent existence character controls the self. Yet unless we fall into such fancies the formula states just what libertarians have always claimed, that self and circumstance coöperate in all we do.

Conceivably one of the factors, self or "character," may look as exclusively to its past as does the other, "circumstance." But since this is the very point at issue it will not do to assume it — as determinists are accustomed to do — in the very formula. Mankind in general believes that character includes possibilities as well as actualities. To a great extent, no doubt, it is shaped by its past — its heredity, education, habits, physical setting, social adjustment — but it also looks toward a future and out of that future is able to draw a causative power for shaping its circumstances and its own partially formed being to new issues. If

we may reject the deterministic fancy that character is a finished affair, and may lay it open to conscious modifiability from the future, the deterministic formula will admirably express the conclusions to which we have been brought.

Without some such interpretation it is hard to see how the new doctrine approaches the facts of real life more closely than did the old necessarianism. That was abandoned because it denied me any share in my own actions. They were settled outside me, observed but not directed by my own consciousness. Against a view so external determinism protested. The man himself, it said, is a considerable perhaps a chief, factor in conduct. Character counts. There is such a transforming reaction of character on circumstance that by it results are brought about which would not otherwise have arisen. But about the nature of this reaction we may well inquire. A bullet fired at a granite boulder bounds off; fired at a pine tree, it sinks in. It encounters different characters in the two objects and so shows different reactions. In this sense character is universal, each object reacting in a special mode on its environment. If character is no

more than this, or with a powerless consciousness added, then determinism says nothing but what necessarianism has always said. Boulder, pine, and I had our characters imparted to us at the first tenuous beginning of creation and one who was clear-sighted might have discerned in those beginnings every action which we have since performed.

The fact is, determinism is a compromise doctrine, which has gained currency chiefly through its vagueness. It would respect the orderly universe of necessarianism; it would also respect superintending man; but it has never worked out the adjustment of the two. It accordingly asserts strongly the invariability of causation, hinting however in its word character at some sort of modifying personal influence. But unless this influence works through another kind of causation than the sequential, the acts of a human being will be restricted as rigidly as are all other motions. We need not then trouble ourselves much about the words determinism, character, or circumstance. The important question is whether our past has through and through locked up our future, or whether anticipations of that future may have influence in offsetting

what the past brings down. It has been the aim of this chapter to make that issue plain, and I have not hesitated to indicate the decision to which the evidence leads me.

CHAPTER VI

THE WORKING OF IDEALS

I

WITH this chapter a new stage of our inquiry begins, a stage of objection and criticism. A rational doctrine of libertarianism is now in large outline before us. I believe it to be a doctrine which, while avoiding the extravagance of popular libertarianism, is more exact and more inclusive than popular determinism or ancient necessarianism. It provides room for facts which all of these ignore. No event, it agrees, occurs without cause, but the future is as great a storehouse of causation as the past. Between the two stands the queer creature man who through a forward-stretching, backward-rooted consciousness is accessible to each and capable by voluntary adjustments of cutting off or granting approach to either. He thus possesses a freedom unknown elsewhere.

But while I believe this outline will hold firm, I think it far too simply drawn. We cannot count the doctrine ours until we have

explored its difficulties, turned ourselves against it with searching questions, and seen with what facts of life it is least in accord. On first approaching a subject it is well to have a receptive mind, to gather converging facts, and somewhat credulously to build up a tentative hypothesis. But this once constructed, fault-finding should follow and free play be given to the spirit which persistently denies. The old maxim is sound, that the exception proves the rule. Only we should understand "proves" to mean "tests," "puts to proof." If then we would fully comprehend our doctrine, we must now address ourselves to hunting out objections to it, that is, cases where it apparently breaks down. To this business of exploring difficulties most of the remaining chapters will be devoted.

II

I turn first to the puzzle which has most seriously disturbed my own thought, the source and operation of ideals. Where do they come from? Is it not from out that very past where lie hidden all other seeds of the future? Years ago when as a young man I was trying to traverse the mental wilderness of

freedom and could find no clear path, I hit on the illuminating distinction between causation of the past and of the future, between sequential and antesequential causation, and at once progress became possible. While before in clumsy fashion I had been trying to conceive freedom as something which stopped causation, I now perceived that it merely implied an alternative between two contrasted kinds. For a time I took great comfort in the simple doctrine until one day doubt fell on me and I wondered whether I had not been altogether befogging myself. For grant that such a distinction exists, still does not antesequential causation itself operate through a special variety of sequential? The man runs after the car. At first his running seems caused by that which has no existence, his sitting in the car. This sitting is ideal, not actual, and his movement we said was induced not by the past or present, but by the future. Yet was the statement exact? He would not run unless an idea of sitting in that car were already in his mind. Surely that idea is actual. It must be present. Does it not then operate as a sequential cause? It is true that this mental fact is not transformed into outward reality until the man has taken

his seat. But it was not the unrealized sitting which made him run; it was the idea of sitting, and this is actual. Are we not then juggling with words in talking about non-actual causes and assuming that what makes one run is the physical seat in the car? That, of course, does not exist till the end. But why should it? It is an effect not a cause. What starts the man is the thought of sitting there, a thought entirely real and present. That thought brings movement as its sequence, just as the expanding steam of the engine has for its sequence the moving of the car. The two forces are no doubt of different orders. One is a conscious affair; the other has nothing to do with consciousness. One operates exclusively in the material world; the other, in the world of mind. But this does not affect their sequentiality. In both cases we are obliged to have an actual existent cause at hand before anything occurs. Real and present causes are therefore the only causes. Ideal or future ones only become causes after passing through the reality of present time.

So I reasoned, and for a long while it seemed that all my work must be done over again. I was turned back into jungles where

I wandered as obscurely as before, falling with every attempted step. As I recall the dreary period, something like two years went by before I was able to discover any way past the bewildering obstacle. For obstacle it was, though I was not seeking to establish any particular doctrine and had no more interest in freedom than in determinism, merely desiring to see anything clearly. But I was plagued with the suspicion that there was a larger difference between the two kinds of causation than the objection permitted me to assert. What it was, I could not discover. There I stood in perplexity, turning the matter this way and that, unable to find satisfaction.

III

It would be unreasonable to demand that what required a couple of years to bring me conviction should convince another in five minutes. My reader may therefore properly dissent from what I offer him here. Let him do his own thinking; I can merely start inquiry by indicating the conclusion I reached and something of the path along which I passed.

Unquestionably it is true that an idea often

works sequentially and brings about immediate action through its mere mental presence. All have had the experience, for reaction to environment is universal. Nothing in nature touches its neighbor without influencing it. An idea in my mind accordingly breeds changes in my other ideas and, if unchecked, in my movements too. Ideas are forces. Sequentiality may go on among them as readily as among things. What a cause works in, whether mind or matter, determines nothing in regard to its nature. A few illustrations will make the matter plain.

The particles of a stone cohere and gravitate into unity not through deference to any plan of becoming united with itself and with all things, but through blindly following a physical and chemic sequence. We put a seed in the ground, pour water on it, and it begins to expand. But it does not expand with reference to a possible future. We may fancy that it forecasts a day when it will be a tree, with the present sprouting as its first stage; it is interested in shooting out a little root here or there so as to support its ultimate branches. But this is a fiction. No future whatever is contemplated. There has merely been a stim-

ulus of the environment on this side or on that, and reaction of a defined type has followed. Or I touch the leaf of the sensitive plant and it closes; not because it perceives that it will be damaged if it remains open, but by a reflex action according to which the passive experience of the leaf is at once transformed into its active closing. A similar provision exists in our own physical structure. When a light is suddenly brought into a dark room, my eye shuts. I might calculate that the flood of light would damage the delicate mechanism and that it would be well to draw down the protecting curtain and preserve the organ for future use. But such calculations are unnecessary and in fact are not made. I cannot keep the eye open. The mere feeling of the light makes the lids close.

Throughout our physical frame such reflexes occur, throughout our mental structure also. A certain thought may be so knitted with another that the second regularly follows the appearance of the first. If that second is a thought of action, action follows. I do not steer the action; it occurs sequentially, instinctively. I have often thought we might best illustrate the workings of these reflex

instincts by one of our household pests, the telephone. In speaking with my friend on the other side of the city I communicate with him through a central office and a central office girl. To her my words first go and her mind, if she has one, forms the link between that in-coming bit of telephone wire and the out-going bit. But a contrivance has been devised by which my voice, entering that central office and agitating a special key, itself connects the two wires. We may then drop the central consciousness and let what is brought by the incoming wire pass uninterruptedly into the out-going wire.

Exactly this occurs in reflex action. An object excites the nerve of my eye, and the excitement passes on to my central office of consciousness. There I survey it, questioning in what direction an order for action had better be sent. When this is decided, I start the outgoing nerve. But such deliberation is not essential nor always well. There are times when waiting for the central consciousness to reflect would cost us the opportunity for action. Accordingly it is provided that deliberation may be omitted, a direct mechanic connection be established between sensation and action,

and that very result occur which would have been judged best had we deliberated. Such expeditious connections are known as instincts or reflex actions. To establish them and successfully eliminate consciousness is a time-taking affair, usually requiring many generations. But habit is a process similar, though less complete, whose importance in carrying on the daily machinery of life I have explained in a previous chapter.

IV

Now it is entirely possible that when the man sees the car running the sight of it may through habit excite the nerves and muscles of his legs to propel him along the path in its train without conscious intention on his part and without regard for his future. Such semi-instinctive actions are common enough. As I enter my study this morning to write this chapter, I see a newspaper lying on the table. An unread newspaper always suggests to me stretching out my hand, and almost automatically the hand goes forth. I do not intend to read the paper, but to pick it up seems unavoidable. Having it in my hand, the impulse is strong to run my eye down a column. And

when I have once begun to read, each moment compels another moment of reading until, as I look up, I see that an hour of the precious morning is gone and my chapter will not be completed to-day. I had no intention here, compared no alternatives, depicted no future. In a half-instinctive way, as beasts may be driven or children, an idea pushed me to action, one act to another, and so on. All of us are well aware how often this sort of thing occurs. It would be idle then to deny that an idea may be the sequential cause of another idea or even of an act.

Yet surely this is not the whole story, an adequate account of the way in which ideas normally influence conduct. Acknowledging that an idea does again and again induce action merely because it is here — a fact, something derived from our past, a present cause — we must also see that an idea often influences us through its prophetic quality, by its indication of what the future may bring forth. The idea which sent my outstretched hand toward that newspaper, might, if scrutinized, have disclosed its significance and I might have formed a judgment whether reading or writing was the better employment.

What I desire to point out then is that ideas have different modes of affecting us. They may work as present facts, like other parts of our environment, in a purely habitual or reflex way; and certainly then we come under the influence of sequential causation. Or ideas may appeal to us through their representative character, depicting what may hereafter occur; and by their report of what lies ahead may influence us as truly as by their actuality. When the importance of an idea is found on this its representative or prophetic side, we add the letter *l* to it; an idea becomes an ideal. A difference of function separates the two. Operating as a present fact, an idea has just the same causative influence as any other present fact; operating through its suggested possibilities, it becomes a personal ideal. The same idea then may have a two-fold causal working.

Accordingly we were not in error in distinguishing between sequential and antesequential causation, only it would be wrong to suppose that all our ideas work in the antesequential way. As I have already explained, the great body of them, even of those which relate to action, do not. Through the general

current of our hum-drum days we are impelled by whatever enters our mind, impelled not otherwise than the brute or the physical object, except indeed that we are generally conscious of what is happening. But when an idea is seen to report some possible future of myself, I am likely to inquire whether that is the only possibility. Soon I detect others, and then there arises that selective process or deliberative choice which distinguishes voluntary action from instinctive. For now recognizing that one or the other of several possibilities may become actual, recognizing too that I have a hindering and a prompting power, I question why I should choose one rather than the other. For weighing alternatives a standard of value is essential, something unnecessary in passing through the single issues of a sequential series. That standard is found in my total welfare, and I continually ask which of several courses will draw from the circumstances around me the largest contribution to my good. That is counted best which enables me most fully and coherently to bring out sides of myself hitherto suppressed. Not, as has been said, that conduct regularly proceeds in this way.

More commonly it moves in deterministic fashion, following sequentially the promptings which come from past and present character and environment. But the forecasting process is ordinarily open to us; and when we speak of personal causation, it is precisely this we mean. Our peculiar constitution enables us to employ ideals instead of mere ideas. And the moment I ask the great question what is the value of one of these ideal possibilities to me, I am living in a moral and not a merely natural world. In the latter I am guided sequentially to one fixed issue; in the former I steer myself antesequentially among alternative possibilities.

It may be well to notice here how different is the suspense of ideals in mental deliberation from the balance and composition of natural forces. When two physical forces conflict or press in different directions, a pause may come bearing a certain resemblance to deliberation. In a mechanical metaphor we often speak of weighing divergent considerations. But there is this difference between mechanic and teleologic hesitancy. Even during their seeming pause natural forces are still at work and when they go

forth they produce a resultant in which all are represented. Nothing similar can be observed in voluntary suspense. There the several inducements are held for a time in strict inefficiency; and when at last a decision is reached, a single factor is picked out to receive the right of way and the rest disappear. Surely this marvel of suspended volition is more compatible with the libertarian's conscious supervising self than with the deterministic notion that there is no other self than a series of successive mental changes.

v

Probably a few words are needed in regard to the mode of connection between ideals and realities, especially in those departments of life where we are aiming at an increase of our health, wealth, learning, reputation or any other form of personal good. Before acting on an ideal it would seem that we should have a completed plan, should know what we seek to accomplish and be fairly sure that we have the power to reach our intended end. Certainly ideals are often employed in this way. Before a single stone is set in a building the size and shape of each block is deter-

mined, the blocks are hewn, marked, and an exact understanding reached of what the place of each shall be in the completed structure. The architect decides how large and expensive a house is required, what rooms it should contain, what strain its beams must bear, and how solid should be its foundations. All this he ideally anticipates before actual construction begins. Is it in this way that we proceed in elaborating our own well-being, in "building up the beings that we are"?

I do not understand it so. Though personal causation gets its cogency from the future, and though we are occupied all day long in subjugating the present with reference to our advantageous futures, I believe we rarely foresee that future of ourselves as the architect foresees that of his building. Instead of starting with the notion of what we should be were we complete, we set forth from the other end, with a sense of our own littleness. We aim at betterment and not at a finished best. Usually the first prompter of action is an apprehension of some need, impoverishment, or pain. I was not drawn to dinner today by picturing the powerful frame which I hope to acquire through years of careful diet.

Some such vague notion may have lain in the back of my mind, but my immediate incentive was hunger. I was uncomfortable, weak, and sought to be rid of these checks and hindrances. So we constantly act. A boy goes to college because he knows how ignorant he is, not because of a vision of what he would be if altogether wise. The merchant seeks wealth through finding himself hampered by narrow means. Everywhere some restriction, limit or need is our prompter to personal progress. For while we may say we sometimes act out of exuberance and for the mere sake of expressing the abundance of life we feel, yet this is true only when that unexpressed abundance is still attended with some sense of incompleteness. The negative factor, the feeling of restriction, is that which keeps the personal world in motion. Desire may accordingly be defined as the felt disparity between a present limited state of being and one with the limitation removed. It is true that when other conditions are reached, fresh limitations will be found and new desires spring, and to this experience there is no end. But neither is there to man's aspiration and enlargement.

VI

These considerations will sufficiently answer the question about the origin of ideals with which this chapter began. Ideals are not arbitrary things, of another order than facts, existing by themselves in futurity, and by us endowed with command over the present. Such abstract entities could get no hold on an orderly world. Ideals are merely realities filled out. They express realities which have been begun but have been left half finished. More real therefore are well-constructed ideals, though less actual, than the realities themselves; for they set forth in full significance that which reality has been unable to attain. Only they must be obediently fashioned and contain nothing fanciful. We form an ideal horse not by dropping the four legs, ear-crowned head, shapely body, and inner organs which we see the animal now to possess. We do not start unprejudiced in the construction of our creature. A sound ideal would be based on a study of how these parts have failed to work completely together and of the adjustments needed to bring them into closer unity. So must our runner after the car shape his ideal of obtain-

ing a seat there with reference to the speed of the train, its time of arrival, the other means of conveyance, his strength of leg and heart, and the importance of his reaching home at just such an hour. Failure to take these facts into account will render his ideal useless. Manifestly the popular notion is absurd that ideals rest on no solid ground, but are airy creatures, begotten of each whimsical mind according to its wayward pleasure. We contribute something to the shaping of them, it is true, since we design them to mark out paths to our future betterment. But realities dictate to them no less than they to realities; for they are orderly affairs, having laws as firm though more subtle than the things around us. Parted from these, they do not reach actuality. Yet it is evident from their outlook on the future that they can never be sequentially derived from the past. The car could not directly produce an ideal of running. That ideal it might suggest; but before this could become an ideal another factor would need to be added. The man must appraise a place in the car as better than one outside, contemplating the two as future possibilities, and himself as restricting them to a single issue.

VII

A brief summary of this intricate chapter may now help to its completer understanding. The doctrine of libertarianism which we have accepted maintains that while causation is unbroken everywhere, a special form of it may proceed from persons, modifying with a view to their future good the sequences which have descended from their past. But the problem then met us of where these antesequential causes come from and whether they too do not reach the future by way of the present and the past. I have acknowledged that in large measure they do. The past, in the form of associated ideas and reflex or habitual acts, often brings about sequentially the same results as they; and an unrealized future can work changes in the current of sequential causation only by itself becoming for the moment a present idea. The ideal, too, clings to the actual, representing merely what is still needed for its completion, ideals of our welfare moving away from the imperfect present only toward an immediate betterment, but not usually so far as to the vision of an ultimate and complete best.

CHAPTER VII

CHANCE

I

So much for our first difficulty. But a difficulty more commonly felt now lies before us. Having seen that we possess ideals and learned how they originate, we have still to inquire about a field for their exercise. For in what sort of world could they find room to operate except in one which has in its constitution a certain element of chance? In approaching this dark region I hesitate, knowing how hard it is here to be clear-sighted oneself, how much harder to clear up the mind of another. Here I enter on more contentious ground than has been crossed before. In this chapter I shall clash against deep prejudices, prejudices which my readers will rightly regard as important, representing as they do men's regular ways of regarding this world. I shall call on my readers to view it differently; and my novel modes will, I dare say, seem destructive of much which gives that world its

worth. Some persons may even suspect that the doctrines proposed savor of superstition. Let no such thoughts be checked. Let them be fostered rather. All who read should differ from me as deeply as they can. I have tried to differ from myself, and fundamentally questioned how to escape from the conclusions I here present. Just such questioning I desire from my readers; for my aim is not to impose my opinions on others, but to stimulate them to vigorous and connected thought of their own. Let us then together enter this repellent region and scrutinize the obstacles which hedge it in.

Our first business will be to see why we need treat of chance at all, when so many other disturbing topics are already on our hands. In my judgment we cannot escape it. A field must be provided where freedom can move, and no such field appears. Suppose we agree that a man is endowed with a power of reaching forward into the future and drawing from it influences by which the present may be shaped. Yet where could he exercise so curious a faculty in a world like ours? Here all physical events are bound together by sequential cause. I have acknowledged that no

clear-sighted person in our day can suppose that at certain points the laws of sequential causation are suspended and that what we used to call a "miracle" occurs. The deterministic argument obliges me, at least, to attach some other meaning to the word "miracle" or else to divest it of all meaning whatever. But if in this way no event is loose, unconjoined with one which antedates it, how is it possible to reach into the future and shape by what lies there the already determined present? From the present must go forth exactly those fixed sequences which invariably spring from these conditions. In our world nothing is arbitrary; it is a world of law.

To this conception of the universe as a cosmos, an embodiment of universal law, mankind has painfully climbed until we now look back with wonder on that infancy of the race when caprice and arbitrariness were accepted in explanation of what happens. Yet this infantile world full of uncertainties is the only adequate home for freedom, while our modern orderly system bars its way. Where freedom is at work, there must be uncertainty, chance, an ambiguous future. Freedom takes hold only on possibilities; and in the tightly

locked world we have been describing there is a single fixed issue everywhere. The defender of freedom will thus be forced to affirm that chance still lingers, and this I am hardy enough to maintain. Chance I believe meets us continually. Not that I retract my former statement. Each event is linked with that which went before. But while I see sequential causation everywhere, I see free action also. Accordingly I am obliged to defend something so paradoxical as chance or an ambiguous future in a world where all is causally connected.

Evidently then the topic of this chapter is likely to prove repellent. In the preceding years I have repeatedly tried to discover whether I might not escape one or the other of its harsh alternatives. But I find no way. Both are certainly true and in some degree are confessed to be so by everybody. We all employ the word chance and imagine we mean something by it. The most ardent naturalist, insisting most stoutly on the reign of law, cannot altogether cleanse his mouth of the word. It and its compeers play an important part in life. Chance, luck, casualty, happenings, accident — take these and kindred

words from our speech, and we should not easily communicate with one another. Since these words maintain a persistent life through all the advance of science, they must have some use and point to something about which we often need to speak.

II

What that something is, is plain enough it may be said. Chance means uncertainty; not uncertainty in the frame of things, but uncertainty in the beholding mind. That is all. Chance is a negative term. It announces the absence of knowledge and is a way of stating ignorance. When we cannot trace the causative connections which have brought an event about, we say it was due to chance. Such a word furnishes a convenient label for marking occurrences as still dark. Not detecting the tie between *A* and *B*, we say *B* follows *A* by chance, meaning merely that there is uncertainty there. This uncertainty it would be ridiculous to suppose exists in the order of things, but it is far from ridiculous to say that I can discover no bond. By chance then I indicate nothing of a positive kind, but merely state that as yet I have no full ac-

quaintance with *A*, *B*, and their connections.

A few instances will set forth this frequent meaning of chance. I shake my dice-box, and say it is all chance how the dice will fall. Nobody understands that in the brief space between box and table causal agency is suspended, nothing obliging one of the dice to turn up the number six. I certainly never intended such a notion, rather this: it is impossible so precisely to reckon the forces which steer that bit of ivory that we can forecast the number which will finally appear. Such minuteness of knowledge implies a delicacy in observing the complex play of forces about those little objects which nobody to-day possesses; and though I can make a fairly accurate guess as to the frequency with which the number six will turn up, this will not at all hinder my attributing the result to chance; for I still wish to mark the fact that I know nothing of the way in which laws of gravitation have been attacking the different sides of the cube. Its fall is therefore uncertain, uncertain to my mind and to any mind similarly constituted.

Or again, I may properly say that it is all

an accident whether to-morrow will be fair or foul. Of course the trains of sequence are already laid which will develop one sort of day or the other. But the causal paths are so manifold, a knowledge of them dependent on so many conflicting considerations, that I cannot follow them. Even the prophet of the newspapers finds them tangled to such a degree that there is much uncertainty about our getting the weather he promises. Yet in speaking so we do not mean that causal ties break over night. The agencies now working for a sunshiny morning will not cease during the darkness and allow uncaused clouds to appear. An accident is only a defect in knowledge. In short, all terms of chance indicate subjective conditions, not objective ones, point out a deficiency in the human mind and not in nature, an absence from our thought of something which might better have attended it.

III

Is this the only meaning of chance, or is chance also objective? I believe it is objective. This world is not altogether an orderly affair. I hold that, apart from our defective knowledge, there are uncertainties in the nature of

things. In offering a doctrine so unfashionable I had probably better state at once a case where chance can be seen to be present and then examine critically how far such chance conflicts with the reign of law.

Suppose I am throwing stones at a mark. Each stone I hurl as vigorously as possible and all in the same direction. As I throw the last one a bird flies across; and the stone, instead of moving unimpeded to its mark, collides with him. He is killed. What killed him? Chance; his death was due to accident. Of course this does not mean that there was no causal sequence attending the death and that his existence ceased of itself. Everybody knows it was the stone's blow that killed him and that it would kill any similar bird in similar circumstances. On that point there is no dispute. Sequential causes were at work and without them the bird would not have died. Where then is the chance? It is found in the concurrence of the flight of the bird and the flight of the stone. What induced that? The bird was propelled to that particular spot through a long series of sequential agencies. He is an instinctive creature, operated, we will suppose, entirely by reflex action, which inevit-

ably brought him to this place. In a similar fashion the stone was projected from me sequentially. It is true I was conscious of the process, even had in mind the ideal of reaching a certain mark. But, after all, I was obliged to use causal agencies, sequential agencies, to effect my purpose, and there stretched behind my action a long series of such agencies, inducing me at just that moment to think of throwing the stone. I threw, and it reached a certain point in the air at just the moment the bird also reached that point. But what, I repeat, caused that "also"? What brought about that coördination of the one sequential series with the other? The two lines of sequence intersect. For each of the two the causation is complete and evident: it is sequential causation, fixed, invariable, each line secured by its past and capable of only a single issue in the future. We do not inquire therefore what induced these lines of sequence. But there is a something more. What induced their intersection? Can any sequential cause explain that? I do not see how. Coördination enters into no successive line. Think out each one of these lines as elaborately as we may, we shall never detect collision in it, the coexistence

of two sets of motion at the same spot. Neither of these lines is premonitory of the other. Their coördination lies entirely outside each. When then I inquire what brought about the collision, one answer will be that nothing at all did, it was an affair of chance; the two sequential series, each absolutely blind, butted into each other at this special point and were in no wise prepared for the collision. The only other conceivable answer is that an ante-sequential cause intervened from outside either series. Seeing the bird flying and reckoning how long he would require to reach that spot, I guided my stone by anticipation; at a certain moment he will be in a certain position, and my stone shall be on hand to meet him there. In this second case one of the lines of sequence has some bearing on the other. There has been a genuine coördination, ante-sequence, or plan. In the former, there are merely two unseeing lines of sequence, neither regardful of anything in the other's course. Either, then, there was no cause for the collision and merely one for each set of two headlong motions, or else a coördinating cause came from some other source than they and was itself of a different type. I see no escape from this

dilemma. Only a thoughtless person could suppose the collision to be contained in either sequence.

Now what I call the field of chance is this field of coexistence; and this is also the field of freedom. The possibility of the one is staked on the possibility of the other. Before we can arrive at any intelligible doctrine of freedom, we must be convinced of the objective reality of chance. Not that I would assert that wherever there is coördination free action has occurred. Many a time we find no free action whatever, and yet there is coincidence. For such coincidences we do well, I believe, to say there is no proper cause, that they are affairs of chance, luck, or accident; for these terms by no means exclude sequential causation, moving in straight lines. They merely note the absence of those antesequential terms by which combinations are effected. Chance might be defined as planless concurrence; and when it is so defined, we discover it all around us, in great things and in small. It was an accident that the winter was exceptionally severe after the landing on our shore of the Pilgrim Fathers; that the tower of Siloam fell on those particular persons; that the partridge

flew past me when I did not have my gun. The liberties of England are largely due to chance in the storm which arose soon after the sailing of the Spanish Armada. For however minutely we might become acquainted with the sequence of conditions which led up to the storm, or to that other sequence which led up to the sailing, we should never discover the wreck among them. That was an accident, the coming together of two independent lines of causation which until that coinciding moment had no reference to one another.

A piece of chance shaped my life. As a young man I sought a place at a Western university. I was appointed, but the letter informing me was lost in the mail. After waiting through several disconsolate weeks, I accepted a position at Harvard. Every man's experience will furnish similar instances; for no day goes by, no hour, in which we are not met by some accident or other. The world is full of such things. Its parts straggle and conflict and ignore one another, and demonstrate how far it is from being a complete organic whole. Such unity we may conceive as its goal, but it is not its present condition. We were in error in speaking of the world as

ruled by law ; it is ruled by laws, each pretty regardless of its neighbor. Everywhere it is the business of mind to bring these laws into coöperation. The world's melodies, its ties of succession, are due to its own mechanism ; its harmonies are either ethical or accidental.

IV

To a universe so imperfectly organized some readers may object, remembering the saying of a singularly wise book that "not a sparrow falls to the ground without your Father." On religious grounds they may assert that the world contains no particle of chance. Lines of sequence pushing their blind way onward may be blind so far as they themselves are concerned, but they are all prompted by a mind behind. That mind behind foresees the issue to which each shall come and has already prepared for that issue the material with which it shall combine. Therefore all concurrent happenings are inwardly harmonious. A plan runs through them. And though we cannot always make out the details of that plan, and so in our ignorance must often attribute occurrences to luck and chance, yet whoever has convinced himself that the ultimate factor in

the universe is mind and not matter will not easily believe that mind can be taken at unawares. He will rather hold, even in those cases where the directing mind is least visible, that reason remains the lord of all, and is ever undisturbed through lines of sequence evolving its vast designs. In a rational world there are no casualties.

I would not deny such a faith. I, too, believe that an organizing intelligence elaborates the world. Indeed this belief is what I am contending for. I have pointed out that sequence introduces no coördinating bond. Wherever harmonious working is discoverable we are justified in saying that either chance is there or mind, human or divine.

Nor let any one imagine that if our minds are to intervene and freely influence the course of things they must do so by stopping some line of sequence. That would render freedom impossible; for lines of sequence are our only tools. As free agents we adopt these tools for our purposes, pitting off one line of them against others in order to bring about the results we seek. Nature is conquered by obeying her.

An illustration from architecture will show the process. As the walls of a building rise,

there is increasing danger of their toppling over. But it would be a silly architect who tried to devise means for stopping gravitation, vexed because it is always pulling down the structure into which he desires to coördinate material. No, that destroying gravitation or weight must be used for binding the building together. To accomplish this the Gothic builder hit on an ingenious scheme. Seeing his walls incline to topple from each side, he made use of their weight and drew them still more strongly toward the ground. But he drew them also into conflict so that as each pressed earthward it threw its weight against the other, the one preventing the other from arriving there. Through combination he turned his destroyer into a helper. One wall thrust in this direction, the other in that, and by a combination of their thrusts they were supported. Of course no sequential causation would hold a mass of stone in the air. It would soon hurry to the ground. Yet this was the problem, how to maintain a great body of stone a hundred feet from the earth, with open space beneath, and gravitation, that never-ceasing force, at work to pull it down. But coördinating mind intervened, providing every cathedral in Europe

with a secure stone roof. The gravitating sequences were forecast and so brought to bear one on another as to head each other off. The result is neither a miracle nor a mere product of natural law, but an expression of the controlling mind of man.

This adoption and coördination of natural forces, so that their concurrence shall be no chance affair, is man's daily work. When a physician enters a sick room and finds a fever patient lying there, he should not fatalistically say, "Fever germs are at work on this human tissue and will destroy it. That is a natural law. Its sequences are fixed and cannot be broken. Ongoing nature must have its way." No, it must not, for its ways are ways of chance: and the physician is here to abolish chance and make the concurrence of natural forces set forth human purpose. Accordingly by medicine a germ-destroying line of sequence is brought to bear on the tissue-destroying line and, while no law of nature is broken, the resulting recovery may well be called non-natural, antesequential, or expressive of an end. Left to itself, no line of sequence considers another. Each forces its way straight onward, heedless of what may occur. A few

years ago a man in Paris was pursuing investigations which have revolutionized our thoughts of nature. As M. Curie crossed the city one morning a wild horse dashed down the street, ran over him, and extinguished a life of incalculable worth. It would have trampled a drunkard with the same indifference. The lightning strikes a saint as quickly as a sinner. Nature knows no values. They are all imparted by man. And this lack of consideration by Nature for anything more than her single sectional movements makes man often cry out against her as harsh and brutal. She seems alien to ourselves, thwarting as she does with her senseless stolidity our best designs. We feel helpless and set aside. But it is precisely this heedless regularity of Nature which puts her in our power. Having no plans of her own, she can take on ours. Science removes our helplessness when it reveals lines of natural sequence. By combining these with reference to our antesequential ends we narrow the field of chance and impart to our world an organization which it does not in itself possess. The world is not at present a unit. We are engaged in making it one.

V

Very properly then does natural science confine itself to the study of sequence. When it presses beyond this, it easily becomes superstitious. The wise scientist wants merely to learn what follows what. Into the relation of one event to another, except so far as the two are members of the same series, he does not inquire. It may be that some disaster of my life is coupled with the ascendancy of a particular planet; but if so, the connection is no fit subject for science, unless the events can be made to stand in the same successive line. It is with the invariabilities of antecedence and succession that science deals. Or if occasionally a problem of coördination is touched, it is merely as a preliminary to the exploration of some sequence. A few such coördinative problems it may be well to mention.

When the great earthquake destroyed Messina, a furious storm was raging and at the same time a tidal wave swept through the little strait between Messina and Reggio. Three striking events occurred together. It is a legitimate question whether the concurrence of the three was due to chance or cause. It is

already clear that the tidal wave and earthquake were causally connected. Possibly hereafter some ingenious investigator may be able to prove that the storm too was not an affair of chance, as it must at present be reckoned. If so, he will show that either earthquake or wave was a necessary antecedent of the storm, or else that all three events came from a common antecedent. Cases of the latter sort are so common as to have acquired a special name—concomitant variations. As *A* changes, *B* also changes, though no direct influence of one over the other is discoverable. But the two may spring from the same root and each be induced by what induced the other. To investigate the common source of several sequences is a proper enough object for scientific research.

In another way, too, the scientific man must usually take coördination into account, and that is in analyzing his problem. For thus far I have unduly simplified our discussion by speaking of *the* cause of an event. Rarely is there any such thing. Almost always a group of causes coöperate to produce a complex result. A scientific investigation must usually start with combined effects and trace them

back to their many causes. But this does not oblige the investigator to ask why the many causes—*A*, *B* and *C*—came together to produce their common effect *X*. To connect different portions of that effect with each of those causes is sufficient for him. What occasioned their joint presence is no concern of his. The apple does not grow without a seed, without sun also, air, earth, and rain. Whether these will ever combine, it is not for the scientific man to say. Only *if* chance brings them together, such and such results will follow. The reasons for their favorable coexistence lie outside his province.

VI

It is not then the usual coördinations of the world with which science deals, though these impart to it most of its value, but its single lines of sequence, the coming together of things being referred either to chance or to design. Or will this conclusion still be doubted and I be told that most of the trouble I have been laboriously explaining comes from a too abstract view of causation? I have marked off certain parts of the world into one sequential line and certain parts into another, making

it our scientific charge to watch these single lines. Then I have spoken of them as blind. But can causation be confined within such narrow bounds? Might we not rather say that the cause of any event is the total condition of the universe at that moment? Single lines of sequence are not the entire cause of anything. All that now exists — yes all that ever has existed — is necessary before a pin can drop. To pick out a few conditions — my open fingers, the weight of this special pin, and so on — is to put an arbitrary limit on causation. What answer shall we make to an objection so fundamental?

I should say that this line of remark is so true as to be practically unimportant. If the total condition of the universe is the real cause of any event, then it is a cause which each moment operates on all events alike and so may safely be left out of account. What we wish to know is why a particular event occurs and how events differ from one another. No explanation of this can be found in an undifferentiated universal cause. A particular result must come about through special conditions being brought to bear on certain sections of that universe. Abstraction therefore is neces-

sary. The total condition of the universe divides itself up into varieties of working which we call natural laws, modes of causation or lines of sequence. To discover which of these has been at work, and under what circumstances, requires that delicate isolation of attention which we call scientific experiment. To conduct it with the greatest precision laboratories are employed. While nobody in them will deny that the total condition of the universe is the basis of all cause, it is agreed to disregard most of this as constant and to observe merely those elements of the grand whole which particularize the case in hand, i.e., to watch some special line or lines of sequence.

VII

Through this long and difficult chapter I have been trying to work out in detail the simple distinction which was set up two chapters ago. Sequential causation, governing a series of events is a different thing from antesequential, which is concerned with coexistences. The one is a natural affair and the sole subject of natural science. Coexistences come about either through rational plan, or, failing

this, are the accidental intersections of unregardful lines of sequence and hence are properly called chance. But when we allege that in a world of fixed sequences freedom finds room to work and the intervention of mind brings about results which would not otherwise occur, we do not imply that such intervention suspends in any wise the fixed sequences. It has been the glorious work of determinism to demonstrate the invariability of their order ; of libertarianism to show how that invariability provides trustworthy tools for the coördinating mind of man.

CHAPTER VIII

THE LIMITATIONS OF FREEDOM

I

IN declaring myself a libertarian, I by no means assert that everything I do is a free act and my freedom an affair altogether without bounds. Already I have said that, could it be proved that once since the universe began a single being had on some occasion brought another influence to bear upon his conduct besides sequential causation, he would have established libertarianism. Determinism maintains that nothing but sequential causation is possible. One instance to the contrary will destroy the doctrine as effectually as ten thousand. The questions of the possibility of freedom and of its scope are distinct. In championing freedom one need not allow it wide range. I believe that range to be extremely small. Indeed, when I have fully set forth its restrictions, some readers may perceive little difference in practical result between my libertarian doctrine and the deter-

ministic. Determinism, in my judgment, is not something that may be lightly cast aside as intellectual rubbish, meaningless or outgrown. It never can be outgrown. It brings before us a body of important truths which every open-minded man must respect and adopt.

We shall find it easiest to engraft that truth on libertarianism if now, after recognizing freedom as a power and one of another order than mechanical cause, we examine the varieties of limitation to which that power is exposed. I notice four. To each, for the sake of convenience in discussion, I give a name. They are the physical limitations, psychological limitations, voluntary limitations and rational limitations, the four arranged here in the order of complex intelligibility. The discussion of them, beginning with the simplest, will occupy this chapter and will carry us far toward the acceptance of a new species of necessity.

II

That there are physical limitations is obvious. A human being is not a pure spirit. With any such creature we have no acquaintance. Wherever we find personal power, it is attended

with physical accompaniments; and these, swayed by their own laws of causation, limit the scope of freedom. We inhabit a sequential world where every antecedent is attached to a regular consequent. Undertaking to act in such a world, we must take its sequences into account. Our work will inevitably be futile if it is not put in the keeping of established agencies.

As an architect, a new plan of construction strikes me. I have noticed that in lofty buildings the lower parts are usually of nearly solid stone or brick. As the building rises, more windows are introduced; and when it reaches the upper story, this is apt to be formed largely of glass. But this is to disregard convenience. My scheme shall follow exactly the opposite plan. Windows are made to look into, as well as out of. I will place them where people are. As we rise into the air, we do not need so many. Accordingly my lower story shall be almost wholly of glass. In the next I will have one third fewer windows; and so they shall gradually diminish, until at the top the wall may be nearly unbroken. That will be a thoroughly useful building. With this novel idea of structure I start my architectural career.

But however good the idea, it will not work. Nature is against it. Her mandate on this subject was issued long ago. She decided that in order to support weight there must be appropriate props beneath, and that glass is not an appropriate prop. I can neither disregard this decision nor make it fit my plans. "Unless the Lord build the house, they labor in vain that build it." Of course in deflecting myself to accommodate Nature my architectural range is restricted. Yet only Nature can execute my plans. Into her hands I commit them, to be destroyed if she disapproves, to become solid if harmonious with her habits. Every free person, then, who will become strong must study elaborately the physical world and minutely adapt his schemes to its methods. It will be useless to reflect that mind is more powerful than matter, ideas of greater consequence than physical motions. Ideas cannot play as they will. We find ourselves in an already ordered universe and are bidden to respect its order. By ourselves we are impotent, while leagued with the powers of nature we have great allies.

Such are our limitations when we attempt to carry our desires into the outer world. But there are certain other limitations of a physi-

cal sort which press us even more closely. This body of mine, the means of conveying my ideals to the world beyond, is also subject to sequences which will not bend to right or left. It is for me to understand these laws of the body and to see that my ideals are fit for bodily coöperation. On the whole, then, so far from having an open and extensive territory throughout which my freedom may disport itself, the scope of my conduct is rigidly restricted. Only such acts may go forth from me as will not jar against those which already have the right of way.

III

But we are hemmed in still further by what I have called psychological limitations. These point to conditions within our minds which have become fixed in the past and so bar our way to variety of conduct in the future. Such barriers appear early. When I first knew myself I found myself equipped with many preferred aptitudes. In a child's first year, even in his first months, we see that he possesses a character, i.e., a disposition to feel and act in regular ways. Where these pre-inclinations come from it is not necessary to examine here.

Possibly they are reminiscences of ancestral conduct, possibly they attend on peculiarities of physical structure. At any rate, there they are. We start our individual lives with a body of established habits. The determinist is not in error when he warns us that lines of fixed sequence similar to those we observe in the material world turn up in the mental also. And while habits may usually to a certain degree be changed, they do not give way easily. This is what makes a habit advantageous, that it runs like a machine, independent of conscious guidance, and always brings out one and the same single issue.

When to these congenital habits we add the large number formed during conscious life, it becomes plain that to a large extent we are bound by our past. This binding may be helpful or injurious; but whether the one or the other, it cuts into those dual possibilities which we found essential for freedom. Our future is less ambiguous than it would otherwise be, and through these habits our fellows are able to foretell our conduct much as they foretell the happenings of nature. When then we bestir ourselves for creative action, desirous of larger life, we often encounter an inner hampering

character. The habits we accepted as our servants have become our masters, and their power can be broken only by a long campaign during which we must sacrifice much which we would gladly gain. It is not necessary for me to dwell on this inner bondage to the past. For better or worse, all my readers have experienced it.

IV

Hitherto I have been speaking as if freedom were a blessing never to be limited voluntarily, the reduction of it a calamity which must seriously impoverish us. This language I have used because I know it represents the mode of thinking of most of my readers, and I have wished to keep in their kind company as long as possible. But it does not state my own belief. On the contrary, I think the man unwise who is not continually cutting off sections of his freedom. The general discussion about freedom has been much confused by the popular fancy that freedom is something precious to which we must stoutly hold, resisting attempts of the thievish determinist to carry portions of it away. Such views of the value of freedom I do not share. While I cannot accept the

deterministic belief that as a fact our conduct has from the beginning been controlled by our past, I come near to accepting that doctrine as a goal, as something in large measure desirable, as stated in an earlier chapter. I think it an important part of the business of life to reduce the range of freedom, which is confusingly broad in youth. This I have already urged, pointing out that the mature and powerful person is not he who stands deliberating long. Far from it. Deliberation, ambiguity in regard to the future, usually indicates lack of acquaintance with the world in which we act. Through inexperience we are often forced to hesitate and, instead of acting, to try to discover what circumstances signify. Or we are capriciously irresolute, turning to consider now this, now that, as if the situation were not familiar, as if a wise decision had never been reached before, or as if what formerly proved wise was so no longer. How much of life goes to waste through double-mindedness!

The wise man does not multiply occasions for deliberation. He studies a situation once or twice, tries the course which on the whole seems best and afterwards, perceiving at a glance whether the new circumstances suffi-

ciently resemble the old, lets the old action take its appropriate course. Each of us attains his full strength only by mechanizing a large range of decisions. We establish sequential trains, see that they are adapted, even when unobserved, to further our ideals, and then leave them to themselves. Thus we voluntarily narrow our field of freedom in the interest of carrying out large ideals. Why should we worry ourselves with the guidance of conduct when purposes can be accomplished far more swiftly, accurately and with greater ease by turning them over to tested lines of automatism? Accordingly I make up my mind once for all whether alcohol is a good thing or a bad, and do not every morning before going to breakfast examine the reasons for and against drinking it. That is settled; and whichever way it is settled, my troublesome freedom of decision is thenceforward at an end. Possibly a majority of the situations of life may be thus surveyed, turned over to keepers, and removed from freedom's charge. Nothing of value is lost. Such a procedure may even widen in some directions the field of freedom by opening new tracts for conscious control, but it certainly also closes large tracts which were open before. Yet this is

inevitable. It is the distinctive peculiarity of human action that it is continually adjusting a fixed and calculable past to a possible future. The broader that calculable past of ourselves becomes, the surer may be our command of the future.

I insist on these voluntarily formed habits because they are among the most frequent and useful of all the restrictions put on freedom. By them the experiences we have had are swiftly applied to present needs. In chapter III we have seen how maturity is reached through their formation. Very properly we are offended when our conduct cannot be predicted and a friend does not know whether we shall tell the truth, be courteous to strangers, sagacious in business, or steadfast in political allegiance. Yet all this certitude indicates that what I have called single issues are counted more desirable than ambiguous futures. To gain efficient character we have given over certain sides of ourself to sequential causation, and this fact we wish to be understood and reckoned on as if it were a matter of nature's ordinance. The loss of freedom here we do not think disparaging but honorable. Indeed each of the three sets of limitations thus far dis-

cussed, while cutting off something of that freedom with which we imagine ourselves at first endowed, still opens a door to larger possibilities of conduct and enables us to co-ordinate it more widely than if such fixities did not exist.

V

The fourth class of limitations, the moral ones, are more subtle and more open to doubt. If accepted, they will close most of the scanty room left to freedom. I have come so slowly to allow them a place that I will not require my reader to admit them rapidly. Let him use whatever freedom he supposes himself to possess in rejecting them, the rest of my libertarian doctrine will still stand secure.

Can we choose among ideals? According as we answer this question we accept or reject moral limitations. At first thought the answer would seem absurdly plain. Half an hour hence I may sleep, dine, play golf or make a call. Each of these ideal futures appears possible and no one of them to be brought upon me as a sequent of past events. By all four I am invited, by none forced. But is my future quite so open as it looks? In deciding on a

course, if we are wise, we take account of circumstances and inquire what the situation itself demands. Especially is this the case where a moral principle is involved. If the person on whom I might call is my sick mother, I do not feel quite free to sleep, dine, or play golf, to her neglect. We live encompassed by duties, each closing paths in otherwise attractive directions and making it untrue to say that many courses are in the same sense open. Duty restricts. Probably if we were altogether clear-sighted, we should see in each situation of life a single course to which duty summons and should understand that freedom is not equally distributed over the entire field. Once becoming for example the treasurer of a corporation, I am obliged to ask myself before every act, "What under present circumstances should the treasurer do?" and that fit course is so authoritative as to cut off the fullness of freedom elsewhere.

Nor let it be replied that duty does not diminish freedom, since its laws differ from those of the physical world in that they may be disobeyed. Disobeyed they may be, but at a loss no less considerable than when we dash ourselves against nature's ordinances. If I

violate laws of nutrition, I incur pangs of indigestion. Violating a law of duty, I do not so directly expose myself to the contrariety of nature, but I assault that network of human relations on which I myself depend and so deal a savage blow to my own being. Sin is self-contradictory, a mode of action disorganizing to all human life which it touches. So long as honesty is the expression of those human understandings through which each man is least hampered, can calculate best on his neighbor's conduct, and most securely direct his own, he who seeks the largest freedom compatible with human society will seek to maintain it. But in doing so he must abandon ambiguous futures and accept at each step of action a prescribed single issue. Moral choices therefore do not present a multiplicity of ideals among which I am equally free to follow which I will. They are hedged about with obstacles restricting freedom in all directions but one. While it is true I am not compelled to choose as duty bids, my only alternative is some sort of disruption of myself. We state the matter epigrammatically by saying that in cases of moral conduct there remains to us only the freedom of suicide. One clear course,

could I but find it, will keep me harmonious with myself and society. Other courses, and they are undoubtedly open to me, will lead to some form of self-destruction. To whatever extent then we turn from the one fixed path of duty, we abandon rational causation and let ourselves be driven by the sequent forces of nature. There are not, we have seen, alternative rational ideals. No reasoner has many sound conclusions among which to choose; he either hits the valid one or falls into error.

But if this view is correct, and in moral matters the right is always single while self-conflicting error is manifold, the principle will also have a certain application in provinces not usually reckoned moral. In undertakings requiring skill we regularly assume that there is a best way and many haphazard ways. The child adopts whichever comes to hand; the man of sagacity searches long to find what the situation rather than his own whim requires. To this he feels himself confined and understands that anything else will lead to the destruction of his ideals. A narrow freedom therefore usually attends wide vision. A great statesman, merchant, inventor or chess-player sees but one thing to do where the amateur

sees a dozen. Especially in the Fine Arts what is done by the master appears to us beholders, as to himself, inevitable. Its inevitability makes it resemble a thing of nature and we cannot think how it could be other than it is. Sharp moral limitations ever attend freedom, and these we cannot disregard without exposing our conduct to whatever bit of non-purposive causation happens to be in our neighborhood.

These teleologic linkages, too, are held by many, and I agree with them, to be no less closely knit than are the mechanical, different though the two types of connection are. The formula of the one is "in order to," of the other "because of"; yet the latter, or antesequential connections, are not on that account looser than the sequential. I go home to go to bed; to bed in order to sleep; to sleep for vigor; I seek vigor for writing; and I write in order to express myself and to make my special contribution to the welfare of mankind. Purpose flows from purpose as inevitably as force from force, though in reverse order, until all find ultimate justification in the twofold aim of benefit to ourself and our neighbor. This is the summum bonum. All

else becomes good through relation to this. Either this directs our course throughout the entire line, or nature takes us in charge. Committing ourselves to the mechanical order, each further step is sequentially necessitated. But it is no less necessitated in the teleological order. The determinist is right. In either order, no freedom is discoverable. But he is wrong in supposing that freedom therefore ceases. We are free to choose between the two necessities, we have the liberty of suicide. Following the antesequential order, where present purpose is induced by future purpose, we enter on a course where personal life continually enlarges. Adopting any act not prompted by this forward-looking causal tie, we fall into the order of things and are determined by the same laws as they. Because we can choose between these two necessities, we are free.

VI

Summing up now the results of this chapter, we have seen that libertarians distinguish sharply between the fact of freedom and its extent. That fact remains assured even when reduced to the slender proportions in which I

figure it, confined to a mere alternative between life and death, all on each side being thenceforth determined. Even then a dual possibility is ever before us and the single issue of the determinist is banished. But such libertarians as deny moral limitations, and who would count me half a determinist, still acknowledge the reality and importance of those voluntary and psychological restrictions which through habits, formed consciously or found directing our minds as soon as consciousness begins, cut off large tracts of freedom in the interest of efficiency. All see, too, that the habits of the world around us, which we call laws of nature, are negative conditions of whatever we do. There is much common ground therefore between libertarians and determinists, and the amount of it steadily increases. Only libertarians do not, like their opponents, put this restrictive matter in the foreground. That, however, is its proper place. Accordingly every age has been deeply indebted to those calling themselves now necessarians, now determinists, for forcing these limitations on its attention. More important is it to remember them than to dwell on the empty fact of freedom. Yet that freedom,

however meagre, still remains. Not to take it into account renders human life incomprehensible. To take it alone into account leaves human life trivial.

CHAPTER IX

THE MYSTERIES OF FREEDOM

I

THE last half of this book has been devoted to examining difficulties. In the first half a positive doctrine of freedom was laid down, at least in outline. Determinism and libertarianism were compared, with the result that the latter appeared to be the more largely inclusive. With it, therefore, lay the presumption of truth. But to establish that truth it became necessary to search out objections, enter into them sympathetically, and see whether they most naturally admit a libertarian answer. Thus far I believe they do. In my judgment the difficulties hitherto discussed, so threatening as to lead many candid minds to reject the doctrine of freedom altogether, owe their seeming gravity to a hasty and erroneous understanding of what freedom involves.

But that is not the case with two which remain. For them I do not find explanation.

Real difficulties they are, affecting the very foundation of our doctrine; yet when I try to remove them, I cannot. My knowledge falls short before they disappear. Darkness lies over their neighborhood, and I have to acknowledge myself face to face with mysteries. Mysteries are disagreeable things, though probably unavoidable for the limited mind of man. When we approach one of these puzzling matters, which has bewildered the ages, our proper course is first entire frankness and then a serious effort to mark out precisely where the center of the difficulty lies. A mystery reconnoitered, hedged in, and confined to a single spot, loses much of its power to harm.

II

In the preceding chapter we saw that the scope of freedom is probably confined to a choice between two necessities. Throughout our world of time and space runs one necessity, sequential, impersonal, binding each successive event to fixed antecedents and allowing it to contain nothing more than it has thus received. But there emerges also a personal antesequential necessity in which, no less tightly, purpose hinges on purpose, each subordinate

ideal deriving its existence and value from an ideal superior to itself. The least departure from this ideal order throws us over into the contrasted type. Accordingly, it is open to us to guide our conduct as personal beings or, partially abandoning that personality, to fall off into a condition of *thinghood*, there to be moved by impersonal forces. But why should we ever do so? Why commit suicide? If personal life is open to me and what occurs may bear the impress of my purpose, what should induce me to abandon purpose and allow myself to float upon circumstance. Why let environment overrun me when I can rule it by laying hold on a possible future good, tightly ordered though this is? Why, in short, does one ever sin, assaulting the law of his own nature and submitting himself to alien lordship?

That is a question I cannot answer, though it is one which presses libertarianism hard. The facts are plain. I notice it myself, and hear it reported by others, that when we might have guided our lives toward approved ideals, thus enlarging our powers, we grew slack and let ourselves be swept along by impulse, environment, the happenings of the hour, and

so became more and more creatures of nature. But why? I do not know and, worse still, I do not see how anybody can know, increase knowledge as we may. Probably on reflection we shall see that we are asking a question insusceptible of answer. For this is the situation: two lines of operation open before us, one moving in rational order, directed by ideals of future worth, the other irrational, impelled by the adhesive forces of the past. We can ally ourselves with either. To ask why we take the irrational is then obviously absurd. No reason can be given for irrationality. Could one be given, unreason would be turned into reason and the seemingly suicidal act become life-giving. Sin cannot then be intelligently stated. It springs from an unintelligent side of our nature. We can merely acknowledge the miserable fact. Here we are denizens of two worlds, in either of which we may abide. In the lower we do not realize our prerogative as persons. And why stop short? Because suicide is possible; because every rational being is capable of irrationality. But this conveys no explanation. Even to demand explanation is itself irrational.

While then there is unquestionable mystery

here, I do not see that it has a more adverse bearing on my theory than on any other. Unless we altogether deny the reality of sin, that mystery remains. It is true denial has been attempted, but I believe it has not satisfied mankind. All are too distinctly aware of having done avoidable wrong. Every one of us recalls occasions when he acted unworthily and, perceiving what was the reasonable thing to do, did not do it. Explanation through denial has therefore never been widely accepted. I certainly cannot accept it. I think we recognize more truth by confessing the possibility of self-contradiction, though this is not possible everywhere. If, as we have suspected, brutes act only through sequential impulse, then they are never irrational because they never are rational. They do not come into the region of ends, purposes, antesequential causation, and accordingly cannot sin. Only he who possesses reason can disregard it. Acknowledging this first difficulty, then, I merely mark out the field where it lies, without attempting explanation. Sin, I believe, does occur; yet to look for further light upon it would involve us in the absurdity of seeking a reason for unreason.

III

But another trouble remains, about as mysterious. Let us feel its full stress. We have seen that the physical world, and to a large extent the mental, is tightly locked together in sequential causation. A personal form of causation has also appeared in which we are not bound by a fixed past, but have access partially at least to a possible future. Out into what is not yet actual my thought travels and from it derives strength to change the past. Mind, therefore, through forecast and imagination is able to guide the material order.

But how is this guiding accomplished? Through coördination, we said. It is the office of mind to bring together lines of natural sequence and to adjust coincidence among them. This is antesequential causation. An object moves past me. Desiring to examine it, I picture my hand grasping it. Holding attention on this ideal act, I immediately see my hand go forth and precisely hit the object. And what are the steps in the marvelous process? How did I cross from the ideal, a purely mental affair, to that physical tug of the muscle? What is the bridge between the two? Or

using our former technical terms, at what point does antesequential causation connect with sequential? The two cannot run in altogether independent lines, for it is in supposed deference to antesequential ideals that the sequential diverges from what would otherwise occur. And when does the latter bend to that intelligent bidding, and how and why? That is what we would all most like to know. We are puzzled to see how anything so unlike material conditions as a thought can influence them. Contemplating the great gulf between the contrasted sides of the world we must wonder whether it ever can be crossed. Yet if it cannot, what is freedom or what the function of ideals?

Here is a second problem which I cannot solve. I do not know how these ideals of ours get their clutch on events. I cannot trace their exit, observing them go forth to mingle first with bodily conditions and then with those of the material world beyond. The point of contact escapes me. I must acknowledge then a large defect in my doctrine of freedom. How a person, even if free, ever does anything, passes my comprehension.

Yet here once more the immensity of the

problem saves me from despair; for the difficulty besets all theories alike, is as puzzling to the determinist as to the libertarian, and no more so to either than to him who despises both. What we here encounter is the general problem of the relation of mind and body — an unescapable fact, an insoluble enigma. Whether we approach mind from the side of matter, or matter from the side of mind, we pass into equal darkness. I hold the watch before me. The light reflected from its dial agitates the nerves of my eye. Through still more inward nerves the agitation penetrates to the brain, producing its small motions there, and then I think of the dial. But what is that “then”? Physical motions, light-waves, changes in nerves, in brain fibres, become at a certain point transformed into thought. What was the bridge connecting incoming motion with representing idea? Nobody knows, nor knows any better if we reverse the process. I form a purpose of removing my watch from the table. To effect it my hand must be engaged. On that outstretching hand I fix attention, and the hand begins to move, the watch with it. But, here again we are unable to mark the connecting bridge between initiating idea and

subsequent motion. Over this bridge we are crossing every instant of our lives, yet no man has ever caught sight of it.

How do the psychologists manage the matter which embarrasses their descriptive work as badly as it does our ethical? They give it a name and pass it by, as we too must do. For that is what the doctrine of parallelism amounts to. It is a neat label pasted over human ignorance, stating the little that we know and declining to state more. There is perfect parallel action, it asserts, between mind and body. Whenever a change occurs in bodily conditions, one occurs in mental; and whenever one occurs in mental, in the bodily also there is change. But this does not oblige us to hold that the mind influences the body, or the body the mind. The notion of interactive causality may be omitted. That falls outside our knowledge. We detect no power passing from one side to the other. Concomitant change is all we observe, and the scientific man wisely confines himself within the field of his experience. Parallelism he can perceive, mutual influence he cannot; he therefore makes continual use of the former and leaves the latter undetermined. Whether bodily changes

in any way affect the mind he neither asserts nor denies. Of course in popular phraseology there is no harm in saying that the stab of a pin produced pain, or that I held my hand still intentionally. It greatly abbreviates conversation to speak in terms of mutual influence, and interaction rather than parallelism will always shape the language of the street. But we must not assume that these conveniences of speech represent verified knowledge. A fundamental ignorance attends us, and the doctrine of parallelism is the best mode of holding the problem in suspense.

If, then, no one is at present in condition to say how body and mind communicate, it surely cannot be urged against libertarianism that it leaves the point unexplained. Of course it does, but its failure brings no more reproach on itself than on science in general. Nor is this state of ignorance practically embarrassing. It does not prevent the determinist from saying that our ideals are largely controlled by circumstance, nor need it prevent the libertarian from saying that circumstance is largely controlled by our ideals. Whatever meaning attaches to "control" in the one case attaches to it in the other. For complete understanding

no doubt libertarianism and determinism alike require proof that things and persons interact. But since such proof is lacking, both may tolerably content themselves by noticing that events happen precisely as they would were such interaction present. As a libertarian I find my ideals followed by appropriate changes, however these are induced, and that is all that is necessary to insure my freedom. Gladly would I understand what makes things so curiously attend on my commands; but after all, the important matter is that they do thus attend. Parallelism no less than interaction assures me that what I intend will come to pass.

But a word of warning is needed here: whoever accepts parallelism should take the doctrine whole-heartedly. Pretty commonly naturalists work it only from a single side. We are told that mental changes wait on physical changes and that, therefore, we persons are subject to the material world. Undoubtedly. But that is only half the story. The thoroughgoing parallelist must recognize a not inferior correspondence in the opposite direction. Every ideal has its appropriate bodily change. This psychologists are apt to overlook and easily

slip into determinism through taking it for granted that a start must always be made from the physical side. But that is to beg the entire question. Parallelism itself suggests nothing of the sort. So long as men play fair with the doctrine of parallelism, it will contain no terrors for libertarians.

IV

So much then needed to be said about the strange perversity of men in destroying themselves and about their equally strange invasion of a non-personal world. These two deeds are the standing mysteries of freedom. That libertarianism admits acts so inexplicable has always made it obnoxious to minds that love lucidity. I would not conceal or attenuate either difficulty. Both are real and serious. Nobody can approach libertarianism without soon encountering them and at the last he will not succeed in setting them aside. Yet that they do not prevent our accepting the doctrine, I firmly hold. For though they are mysteries, they are mysteries of universal human nature and hence unavoidable. They always attend us openly or covertly, no matter what philosophical creed we adopt. Persons, we must own,

are mysterious creatures. To attempt to be altogether lucid in regard to them is generally equivalent to refusing to see in their acts more than we find in the motions of material things. Indeed our whole controversy about freedom runs down in the last analysis to the question already discussed of what constitutes a person. Socrates held that ethics is only an expansion of the precept "know thyself," and most students of the subject since have agreed that on the question of the self all else turns. The determinist sees in each self or person just what he sees in any other receptive object, a centre where many forces cross, checking, intensifying, neutralizing or transforming one another without loss or addition. The libertarian detects in that coördinating centre a fresh creative power contrasted in kind with the other agencies which meet together there. To trace these more ultimate metaphysical implications of the two creeds would, however, carry us far afield. I can merely indicate here how wide a parting of the ways is made by the adoption of the one or the other mental attitude.

CHAPTER X

VARIETIES OF DOCTRINE

I

A FEW qualifications remain. To secure clearness I have unduly simplified certain contrasted types of belief. The course of a necessarily complicated argument could best be followed by having a clean-cut naturalistic doctrine arrayed against an equally clean-cut humanistic. I have accordingly set up two figures of "the determinist" and "the libertarian," and allowed them to fight the matter out between them. But these figures are largely fictitious; at least in gaining precision by their means I have obscured existing varieties of belief. There is no one doctrine of either freedom or determinism. Each presents diversities. Over and above those which spring from the nature of the subject are those grounded in the multiplicity of human temperaments. Coleridge imagined that every man is born a Platonist or an Aristotelian. But there are cross divisions. Some Platonize

in Aristotelic fashion, and some who follow Aristotle in general prefer Plato as their guide in certain exalted regions.

So it has happened with those who think on freedom. They think in widely different and not always consistent fashions. Of any given opponent of freedom it can usually be said merely that he is more or less deterministic or that his determinism is more or less extreme. Opinions about freedom are difficult to detach from other interests. Whatever doctrine is announced will be sure to bear marks of the individual mind of him who offers it. I have heartily accepted this state of things for myself, defending my belief against all comers, assured that in doing so I should also incidentally give their beliefs a hearing. But since on each side of the question the varieties of opinion converge toward several fairly marked types, I have thought it well to assemble these systematically in this concluding chapter, to pass them successively in review, explaining what in each prevents me from accepting it in place of the theory I have advocated.

II

The varieties of determinism need not detain us long. I have already indicated them in my second chapter. The extreme form among them is necessarianism, fatalism, or, in theological language, predestination, where all conduct is conceived as regulated from without, directed by that which pays no attention to character or desire. This ancient belief we have seen to be at present universally repudiated. Even in a law-abiding world character counts. Through it law moves as readily as through other material. A reckoning of the factors in any action would need, therefore, to notice not merely circumstances but the human beings whom these encircle. Environment and the person environed are so related that it is folly to represent the former as having a constant nature apart from the latter. The two factors interact, so that what looks like the same situation discloses diversity if occupied by diverse persons. Of two men meeting a bear, one finds him terrific, inducing flight, the other inspiring, inducing attack. Neither then should be said to be directed by circumstances, but by circumstances

plus character. So at least the modern doctrine asserts, though wide differences arise among determinists as they attach greater or less consequence to the two contrasted factors.

Whether the modified formula relieves conduct of the mechanical rigidity obnoxious in necessarianism I have doubted. If my present desire and purpose are altogether controlled by those which preceded, the inner life is as inevitable as the outer and the operations of my character no less fated than those of planetary motion. If we understand character to include future possibilities together with past realities, we speak the language of libertarianism. The point of interest in the whole controversy is whether a new event ever occurs, whether divergence is conceivable from lines already laid down, whether man has any true creative power. A consistent determinist should deny all this as stoutly as ever a necessarian did. What has been will be, he should say, and that alone. If seeming change occurs, it is only in seeming. Forms alter, but the promise and potency of all that can happen is already provided at the beginning. What this means it is not easy to understand. If what has been controls what

shall be, one would think it would control its seemings and its form no less than its other features. But evidently within the general compass of determinism there is room for a considerable range of opinions, and writers of this type are no more consistent or thoroughgoing than those of contrasted tendencies.

III

The varieties of libertarianism are harder to trace, not merely as being more numerous but because they generally turn on subtler distinctions. Those of a quantitative sort are simple enough however. While all libertarians recognize that freedom is in some degree restricted by conditions of the past, they naturally differ much as regards the scope of that restriction. Few set the limit where I do, confining choice to an alternative between two organized necessities. Most writers allow a larger element of caprice. Extreme libertarianism, in the form known as the freedom of indifference, makes caprice its essential principle. We are free only when there is nothing to induce us to take one course rather than another. If act *A* seems in any respect more attractive than act *B*, then to that extent I

am not free in choosing it. I am under some compulsion, impulsion at least. Complete freedom involves complete detachment. Causation of every kind must be absent. Course *A* I might take ; yes, but I equally well might take *B*. Dual possibilities are before me, one precisely as devoid of inducement as the other. To stand in absolute freedom, my future should be ambiguous through and through. It has been maintained that we possess such freedom and find ourselves from time to time in situations where our choice is dictated by nothing but arbitrary will. It would be nonsensical to ask why in such a case we did the deed. There was no "why." We simply did it, were altogether creative, might just as well have done anything else.

Such is libertarianism at its extreme, the so-called liberty of indifference. It would be difficult to find an advocate of it to-day, though determinists often put it forward as the only alternative to their doctrine. Indeed uninstructed and partisan determinists are apt enough to speak of the whole doctrine of libertarianism as indeterminism, showing how little acquaintance they have with any other form than that which denies motivation to

action. No doubt, too, in the vague mind of the community fancies like this, uncriticized, unstated even, play a considerable part; while often a hot advocate of freedom, heedless of the boundaries of his doctrine, takes no pains to guard it on this its foolish side. But it should be the first duty of every believer in freedom to see that he is relying on nothing so fantastic and contradictory as this.

How unlike it my own doctrine is will readily be recalled. I have pointed out that while the kinds of causation are twofold, reasons and forces, human actions are no more destitute of causes than are physical motions. Wherever reason has not prompted my taking a given course, a force has. Reasons, or antesequential causes, are linked in a determined order. Whenever I do not adhere to them, or in any wise distort that order, natural forces invade me with their sequential tide. Agencies out of the past take then the place which might have been occupied by previsions of the future. There is accordingly no room for a freedom of indifference. Indeed when that extravagant faith is scrutinized I believe it will be found to be practically identical with its extreme opponent, necessarian-

ism. It is no accident that the two have disappeared from ethical controversy together. Let us consider their relationship.

According to the doctrine of necessity every one of us is under the entire control of circumstance, while, if we possess the freedom of indifference, we are entirely cut loose from circumstance, dwelling apart where nothing can influence us. No two doctrines could at first sight appear more contrasted. Yet on reflection it will be seen that there is only a difference of emphasis between them. Under the view of necessity the will or person amounts to nothing. It is not a true factor. We go through the motions of willing, imagine we are managing something, but are in reality ourselves managed by outward fate. The little inner strivings which we call will make a pretty show, but are merely collateral phenomena attending that which would have been precisely the same had they never occurred. Necessarianism presents us with a will that *wills* nothing, while the liberty of indifference offers one that wills *nothing*. That is the only distinction. Under the liberty of indifference I may just as well will *B* as *A*. I have no more interest in the one than in the

other. To my mind they are equally good, or equally bad. Neither has any distinctive worth. Each is but a zero. The will therefore wills nothing at all. But that was precisely what, with a difference of emphasis, necessarianism asserted. Both then must be right or neither, and I have said that no sincere writer to-day advocates either. Real progress is made in the ancient controversy when it is once perceived that there is no longer matter for disputation in necessarianism or in the liberty of indifference. Each of these may unconsciously sway our thinking, and each will always retain a value as the ultimate goal to which humanistic or naturalistic thought might conceivably be carried. But as approved and combative beliefs both have disappeared.

IV

Another frequent notion of freedom which seems to me largely fictitious is that which goes under the name of the liberty of self-determination. It makes a sharp distinction between persons and things in this respect, that persons are autonomous or self-directed, things heteronomous or directed by something else. Of course this does not mean that free

persons do not traffic with things, that they hold aloof and work each his private enginery. Anything like this would be plainly impossible. It is merely meant that for persons the spring of action is within themselves and that they need not borrow prompting power from the world around. They are individuals in a sense that nothing else is. To their own purposes they may be true and they possess the ability to detach themselves from whatever is incongruous with these.

In all this I see a certain truth, and even a practical usefulness. Yet I believe it obscures, if it does not omit, the essential elements of freedom. At best it indicates merely that negative freedom, or absence of alien interference, which I mentioned in my illustration of the pendulum in chapter 1. The serious problem of freedom is not concerned with the question whether causation comes from within or without, but what is its character and whether it expresses a closed past or an open future. Kant well marks the illusory nature of this freedom of inner motivation by his illustration of the roasting-jack. This consists of a spit with a spring attached through whose gradual pressure meat may turn before the

fire without the care of an attendant. Because all the moving power of the roasting-jack is contained within it, it does not become free, nor would it be free even if its spring were of some magic sort which never ran down. At every moment only a single issue is open to it. Its inner established nature restricts it as closely as any outer dictation. In order to be free, something more is needed than an unimpeded internal constitution. That constitution must be incomplete, possessing unrealized possibilities, by whose aid it is capable of modifying its own past. No such power is involved in the absence of alien interference, nor can the notion of self-determination ever be an adequate statement of freedom. Freedom certainly is this, but it is more than this.

A still more trivial kind of freedom, closely allied to the preceding, is that which I will call the freedom of action. Its adherents hold that all we mean by freedom is an ability to act or not to act according as we choose or will. Here freedom refers entirely to the going forth of purpose and not at all to its formation. Unless a clear distinction is drawn between what I please and what I would do, the statement becomes circular ; and it certainly

puts forward as the point of importance the obscurest feature of volition, the connection between the inner and the outer world. All inquiry about the origin of that which is to be sent forth is omitted, though this is generally assumed to be sequentially induced. The doctrine then is only nominally libertarian. It was introduced into English thought by Locke, but is too insignificant to call for extended remark.

V

A doctrine deserving more careful attention is that of rational freedom. It has had a long and useful career, first under the ancient Stoics and recently among the followers of Kant and Hegel. These idealistic writers acknowledge a natural order everywhere, just as I have maintained, a natural order of sequence. But they point out that man is not a creature of nature, that his actions may be regulated in a different way, a special type of causation being open to him as a person. This is that which I have spoken of as ante-sequential causation. They call it rational causation, an excellent descriptive term. Rational causation is distinctive of persons,

natural causation of things. Freedom indicates our personal detachment. When we call a man free, we emphasize his personality, declaring that he is no longer subject to blind forces but is capable of coördinating values, of adjusting the inferior in deference to demands of the superior. That sort of antesequential necessity, in which I expressed my belief in the last chapter, where each little end gets its character and cogency from its service to a more inclusive end, is what these writers and I understand by rational causation; and this is what they mean by freedom too. Freedom and the rational life are identical.

“ He is the freeman whom the truth makes free
And none is free beside.”

Rationality then being what constitutes persons, these writers have little to say about sin. If it exists, it is a mistake, an error of judgment. My range of knowledge being limited, again and again when seeking a good I do not notice that what I accept as such is in reality not related to that larger whole which erroneously made it desirable in my eyes. The cure then for sin is knowledge, a broader contact with total reality. In us reason is partial. In

the world at large it works on a great scale. Behind all things and lending them their worth there is personal life appealing to our personal life. Reason calls to reason, and every one of us maintains himself as a person through loyalty to that reason which he accepts but does not make.

Is not this the very doctrine which I have been urging? No, there is an important difference. This theory identifies that rational action, on which I too have laid stress, with freedom itself. Here freedom applies to the matter chosen; not, as with me, to the manner of choosing. Accordingly in this freedom dual possibility disappears. These writers eliminate that. They do not recognize what I have called the freedom of suicide. They assume that because rationality is necessary for a person, he cannot cease to be rational. But he can, through ceasing to be a person. To an antesequential mode of action he is unfortunately not confined. Though reason is his prerogative, irrationality is open to him. And precisely in settling this dual possibility, of personality or irrationality, does freedom consist. To connect it with one side alone, refusing it to the other, strips it of meaning.

Yet though these writers are as rigidly deterministic as the materialists themselves — on opposite grounds — and understand by freedom nothing like what it means in the mouth of ordinary men, the term becomes with them a peculiarly sacred and frequent one. They use it continually to mark the presence of intelligence everywhere. With them sin, evil, mechanism, blind force, individual existence even, are temporary and provisional aspects of a universe whose reality is freedom or rational order. To call any being spiritual and to call it free are one and the same thing; and at bottom all being is spiritual. In the view of the absolute, disorder is impossible. In spite then of their brandishing the term freedom somewhat conspicuously, I cannot see how these writers can be reckoned libertarians. Yet if determinists, they are such in so peculiar a sense that they need a special designation. I shall call them Idealistic Determinists.

VI

Perhaps a brief consideration should be given here to Henry Sidgwick's contention that the issues between libertarianism and determinism are insoluble and unimportant. In his

Method of Ethics he has maintained that each of these beliefs can furnish demonstrable evidence for itself and finds its only weakness in the equally strong though incompatible proof of the opposing doctrine. He also holds that the acceptance or rejection of either will make no practical difference in our lives. To the first point this book, so far as it convinces, will be a sufficient answer. Its theory of freedom provides room I believe for every rational factor of determinism. All that remains then is to learn whether the subject of freedom stands so aloof from the rest of existence that changing our belief about it would change nothing else. I cannot think so. Each of the two beliefs seems to me to bear large consequences in its train. A man's whole outlook must vary as he takes his stand at one or the other point of view. Of course nobody is altogether consistent. Without noticing our use of incongruous material, most of us do in practice mingle conceptions of the two opposing types, still imagining ourselves libertarians or determinists as the one or the other name has for us the more honorable associations. Between such hazy thinkers there may indeed be little perceptible difference. But that is be-

cause the thinkers are negligible, not that the subject is so. What we wish to learn is whether certain consequences affecting life attach themselves logically to one of these doctrines and do not belong to the other. I notice several such.

Already it has been pointed out that where only a single issue is open regret loses its significance and shrinks to a sense of misfortune. To most of us the belief that something else was possible is the distinctive mark of regret. Perhaps this belief is erroneous, as determinism declares. But it certainly is erroneous to say that its presence or absence makes no difference in the complexion of our lives. Already a changing belief in the libertarian notions of regret has worked a great, and in many respects a beneficent, change in the public estimate of crime.

So too in responsibility, another special form of praise and blame, some divergent effects are observable. Libertarians are always insisting that responsibility disappears when dual possibilities cease. How can I, they ask, be held responsible for what under the circumstances I could not fail to do? The act was not mine. It really belonged to whatever restrictive influence brought it about. If my

father trained me to steal and carefully secluded me from hearing any condemnation of such practices, then he is responsible for what look like my misdeeds. They are not mine but are really, no matter what the law may say, derived from him. Through me they simply pass, as does sound through a telegraph wire. A piece of conduct cannot be called mine till among many courses open to me I give it the stamp of my preference. All this is denied by determinists, who hold on the contrary that freedom conceived in the libertarian sense quite abolishes responsibility. Continuity between past and present is gone. Yesterday I chose *A*; to-day under similar circumstances, its opposite, *B*. Between the two there is no connection. In what sense, then, can it be said that it was I, the same being, who performed the two acts? The very notion of a responsible selfhood implies some sort of connecting bond uniting the actor of to-day with him of yesterday. And such a connecting bond determinism has in that body of compulsive experience which each of us receives from his past. So long as the new springs directly from the old, it may well be chargeable with acts that have gone before. But introduce a will able at any

minute to break its allegiance to the past, and all hold for responsibility is gone. Evidently determinists and libertarians, if they take their beliefs seriously, must, in spite of Mr. Sidgwick, arrive at pretty different treatments of responsibility.

Naturally in this matter I go with the libertarians. The deterministic basis of responsibility, the continuity of past forces, has no moral interest for me. Continuity there certainly must be before responsibility can arise, and I see that the liberty of indifference destroys it. But continuity is not all. The planet Mars has continuity in plenty, but is not a responsible being, not even though we should imagine it to be the shaper of our destinies. The kind of continuity requisite for morality is an antesequential continuity of interest and purpose. We become blamable not because certain constant forces have been operating on us, but because we might have held steadfastly to an approved end. A man who has so fully accepted a drunkard's character that he is now cut off from choosing any other we rightly call irresponsible. Yet only then, according to determinism, would his responsibility have reached its height.

Under determinism a new meaning would need to be found for "ought." That stately term has generally appeared in cases of conflict between the instinctive, passionate, habitual sides of our nature and standards of approved conduct at present unrealized. But if unrealized possibilities are to disappear and the future is to be only the past in a new guise, it would be well to abolish the word "ought," as Bentham advised. In the natural sciences, where only a single event is conceived as possible, we describe it carefully but do not set up standards to which it should conform. Deterministic text-books of ethics should, in my judgment, be confined to the same descriptive work.

In this survey of the influence of the two doctrines I may be expected to utter a warning against the enfeebling effects of determinism. Will not he who supposes he is no creative self capable of directing the course of the oncoming past find that his manly powers decay? The evidence is conflicting. Fatalism was first formulated for the Western world by the Stoics, the most strenuous moralists of Greece, and opposed by the light-minded Epicureans. It was the faith of the conquering

followers of Mohammed. It fashioned Calvin, Cromwell's Puritans, Jonathan Edwards. We catch suggestion of it in Luther's "Ich kann nicht anders," in Emerson's smile, in the wan faces of John Brown and Abraham Lincoln. All these men were strong through having no will of their own. But it must be added that they held fast to a will of God. Determinism has a natural affiliation with religion, and the merging of the two has often brought men vigor. But it is also the usual creed of the weak, the despairing, the vicious. Most of Shakespere's rascals put off their crimes on the stars, as our modern ne'er-do-weels complain that their luck is down on them. Perhaps we can best sum up the matter by saying that he who will go on to power must lean on an intelligent and righteous will, his own or God's, or better still — both. A world without a steadfast will is a shaky affair. Drifting with casual circumstance and uncriticized habit has always brought weakness. But whether a serious determinist is more liable to these dangers than a capricious libertarian, I am not prepared to say.

VII

Two cautions against possible misunderstanding seem in place before I close. This book has throughout accepted a two-world theory and has spoken as if mind and matter were independent affairs, each having its own laws and contributing its peculiar type of causation toward shaping the compound creature man. Such language does not express my full belief. I doubt if there is any sequential causation without antesequential, and am sure there is no antesequential without sequential. Teleology and mechanism are probably much more closely allied than I have thought it necessary to assert. Laws of nature I believe to be ideal constructions formulated by man for his convenience and with little reality if parted from intelligent ends. For me, a moderate idealist, mind is no accident, projected into an alien world at a comparatively late period and fashioned out of already existing material. I regard it rather as the originating and explanatory factor conditioning all. But I see no need of exacting such beliefs from my readers, beliefs which would require a volume as long as the present to substantiate. On such ideal-

istic faith the doctrine of freedom which I have urged is not dependent. It may equally well be held by a natural realist. In expounding it I have found the language of common life economical. That language, though in my view inadequate, is not untrue. So genuine and important is the dualistic distinction which it marks that human intercourse could hardly proceed without it. The world certainly does present a twofold aspect, and we adjust our conduct with reference now to one phase of it, now to the other. That is all that my argument requires. Ulterior questions about which of the two aspects is more fundamental lie outside my present inquiry; and if my words have seemed to commit me to a certain philosophic belief, I here disclaim it.

Again, as a pedagogue prizing definiteness, I have undoubtedly made consciousness too prominent. Such terms as choice, decision, grounds for action, depicted future possibility, represent the one who acts as clearly aware of what he is doing and might even suggest that without that vividness of thought conduct would cease to be moral. But nothing like this is the case. Conduct is never excellent till it has become unconsciously habitual. Con-

scious criticism is needed for the formation of habit and from time to time subsequently for correction. But the general work of the day is best managed in partial blindness. The only essential is that an end be sought, an end expressive of the interests of the seeker. Precisely how much conscious attention shall be given to that end at the moment of seeking is a subordinate matter. In explaining the process I have found it necessary to bring all its details fully before the mind, but that is not the method of swift nature. In the last chapter of my little book, *The Nature of Goodness*, I have discussed the office of consciousness at length. Here I will only say that no feature of modern philosophy strikes me as more sane or helpful than the increased importance it attaches to the unconsciousness side of life.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I

To give here anything approaching a full bibliography of Freedom is impossible and far from my purpose. The papers, chapters, and volumes relating to it would fill a library. Each age produces a new crop and the soil of all countries seems about equally favorable to their growth. I must make a selection. I make it for popular use and entirely on grounds of ease, convenience and interest. Whoever has followed this discussion is open to solicitation to explore the subject farther, provided an attractive piece is offered him, in a book easily accessible, and with an aim not too scientific. I name therefore only a few titles, all of them English, and am careful that the pieces have an interesting style and are contained in volumes to be had from any public library, or indeed from many private ones. What strikes me as important is that my readers should become acquainted with some other doctrine than the one advanced here, or at least some other than the doctrine to which their mind at present inclines. Until we understand the objections to any line of thought we do not understand that thought; nor can we feel the full force of such objections until we have them urged upon us by

one who believes them. Probably I shall make the literature of freedom most inviting if I exhibit it in two lists, libertarian and deterministic, and briefly characterize the book or article named. Of course it will be understood how inexact such groups must be, including as they do widely diverse thinkers who are united rather by general tendency than by allegiance to any specified doctrine. Possibly in some cases the writers themselves would not accept my classification.

II

Modern English determinism has its classic expression in the writings of John Stuart Mill, in his *Logic*, bk. VI, chap. II, and his *Examination of the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton*, chap. XXVI. His coadjutor, Alexander Bain, goes over the same ground more dryly in his *Emotions and the Will*, pt. II, chap. XI. Herbert Spencer's brief discussion is in his *Psychology*, § 219. His American disciple, John Fiske, has stated the case with extraordinary enthusiasm and charm in his *Cosmic Philosophy*, pt. II, chap. 17. Leslie Stephen's discussion in his *Science of Ethics*, chap. VII, § 15, is brief but pungent. H. P. Buckle shows his usual hard clearness in his *History of Civilization*, chap. I. A massive and square-cut presentation, offering much substance in small compass, but somewhat formal, wooden, and lacking in half-shades, is that of J. M. E. McTaggart in

Some Dogmas of Religion, chap. v. Richer, subtler, with closer relations to life, yet not less exact and earnest, are the arguments of A. O. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, bk. iv, chap. 4; of T. Fowler, *Principles of Morals*, chap. ix; of G. S. Fullerton, *A System of Metaphysics*, chap. xxxiii; of F. Thilly, *Introduction to Ethics*, chap. xi; F. Paulsen, *System of Ethics*, bk. ii, chap. 9. An exceptionally comprehensive and attractive paper is that by Eliza Ritchie, on "Ethical Implications of Determinism," in the *Philosophical Review* for September, 1893. Of the older English writers, three deserve emphatic mention, David Hume, *Essay on Liberty and Necessity*; Joseph Priestley, *Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity*; Jonathan Edwards, *On the Will*.

III

Those whom I have ventured to call Idealistic Determinists may be represented by J. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, Essay I; T. H. Green, *Philosophical Works*, II, 308-33; E. Caird's *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, bk. II, chap. III. But all these writers, having lived long with German metaphysics, employ a difficult style. A simpler presentation of their doctrine will be found in J. S. Mackenzie's *Manual of Ethics*, chap. VIII.

IV

Professor William James's essay on "The Dilemma of Determinism," now published in his volume of papers entitled *The Will to Believe*, has drawn much public attention to the libertarian cause. Though it deals with only a few aspects of the controversy, its brilliant style, candor, and personal charm have given it wide currency. The most elaborate, careful, and at the same time engaging defence of freedom is that by James Martineau in his *Study of Religion*, bk. III, chap. II. A fresh and searching paper was published by W. R. Boyce Gibson in the volume entitled *Personal Idealism*. P. Janet, *Theory of Morals*, bk. III, chaps. VI and VII, is strikingly neat and persuasive. So is James Seth, *Study of Ethical Principles*, pt. III, chap. I. Strong presentations not altogether easy are given by H. Lotze, *Microcosmos*, bk. II, chap. V, § 5, and his *Practical Philosophy*, chap. III. H. Münsterberg has important though brief remarks in his *Eternal Values*, p. 145. J. Ward's two volumes on *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, are throughout an elaborate commentary on the inadequacies of mechanism, but they require close attention. The same may be said of H. Bergson's *Time and Free Will*. Well instructed and readable chapters will be found in B. P. Bowne's *Introduction to Psychological Theory*, G. P. Ladd's *Philosophy of Conduct*, J. Hyslop's *Elements of Ethics*. E. Kelley in

his little book, *Evolution and Effort*, chaps. III-V, gives a stirring popular account of the practical effects which he believes attend the two doctrines. Of a widely different style are the series of letters written by R. G. Hazard to J. S. Mill under the title *Causation and Freedom in Willing*, and a similar volume, subsequently written, entitled *Man as a Creative First Cause*.

V

There have been several attempts to survey the whole controversy from the beginning and to state the beliefs of all philosophers on this particular point. Alexander Bain has such a sketch in the appendix to his *Mental Science*. It is comprehensive and shows a strong purpose to be fair minded. But it is brief, and Bain's ability to comprehend opinions different from his own is not considerable. A longer, more recent and more satisfactory summary is the little volume by A. Alexander, *Theories of the Will*.

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