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 On The Distinction BetweenLand Value and Rent
Harry Pollard
 [Reprinted from a Land-Theory online
          discussion, 11 February, 2002]
 
 I announced to a startled 1970 Georgist National Conference in Miami
          that taxes came out of Rent. Wow! What a reaction! I found myself
          instantly beyond the Pale.
 
 ("You mean you no longer believe in LVT?")
 
 I think [Mason] Gaffney said it before I came up with it, but he's
          about 2 months older than I am, so he had a start.
 
 George Collins eventually changed "came out of" to "at
          the expense of" -- which of course I stole, but must now give him
          credit. Baah!
 
 To illustrate, I used a county line. On one side there was every kind
          of tax -- sales, income, death duties, the lot. On the other side of
          the county line there were no taxes. No LVT on either side.
 
 I suggested that on the no tax side, Rent would be higher than on the
          side which was taxed. That is, more would be paid for the "no tax"
          land than the taxed land (ceteris paribus). So the tax
          willy-nilly must come out of Rent.
 
 I think most of the Georgist movement now goes along with this.
 
 The only problem is -- I was wrong. There are different values that
          attach to land. We tend to use them indiscriminately.
 
 There is Rent.
 
 Then, there is Rack-Rent.
 
 Next, there is an imaginary figure which is found by backward
          capitalization from a land price.
 
 Finally there is Land Price.
 
 We really have to be careful how we use these "values".
 
 At the bottom there is Rent. This is the name I give to the "externally
          created community created value that attaches to a location". We
          can call it Location Rent, or Economic Rent, but that's the Rent that
          I write with a capital. When I write Rent, that's what I mean.
 
 Rent tends to change in smooth curves rather than in jumps and "spikes".
          So adjacent lots are likely to have the same Rent. This is the basis
          of the Danish system of street valuation that Ted tells me is now used
          "everywhere". This characteristic of Rent also makes for
          easy change on the computer. If Rents increase, the assessor simply
          adds (say) $5 to every lot in an area.
 
 When Ted took his first job as Assessor in Michigan, all the local
          communities were about 10 years behind with their assessments. So, Ted
          computerized and before too long his assessments were up-to-date. (The
          rest were still 10 years behind.)
 
 Currently, nobody measures Rent. They measure land-value (see below).
          I don't think it would be easy to find Rent in today's conditions.
 
 Let's say the Rent of a location is $1,000 a week. Someone is lucky
          to be there. If he pays Rent of $1,000 a week, he is in good shape. He
          pays a $1,000, he gets a $1,000.
 
 (We have fallen into the habit of talking about Rent as if it is
          something one pays to a landholder, or a community, and therefore
          undesirable. Rent is a value that attaches to land. It's there whether
          or not it is collected in some way.
 
 Rent is good.
 
 This is so, whether or not the user of a site pays it to a
          landholder, or back to the community. Should the money go back to the
          community, it will pay for infrastructure. He will have to pay for
          infrastructure himself if the landholder collects the Rent.
 
 But say the landholder ups his demand. We have all seen "End of
          lease, must sell everything". Say the Rent is still $1,000, but
          the landholder demands $2,000 and the tenant cannot go elsewhere. On
          this site he has built up tremendous goodwill (Wages). It would be
          lost if he went elsewhere.
 
 In any event, when he checks around, he finds that every possible
          place is also charging more than Rent, so he signs on to pay $2,000
          for the right to collect $1,000 Rent. This $2,000 a week is "rack-rent".
 
 One might imagine that rack-rent would be the income that is
          capitalized into a sales price for land. However, that's not the case.
 
 There is a kind of imaginary land income higher than rack-rent. I
          call it imaginary for it is a calculation downward from the sales
          price. Let's do a capitalization of that $2,000 a week rack-rent. It's
          a bit over $2 million. Let's say the landholder might well consider
          $2.2 million to be a price to think about. Then he hears a similar
          site went for $3 million.
 
 Immediately, he raises his price to $3 million, but then thinks: "If
          these sites can rise from $2 million to $3 million, they could then
          rise to $4 million, or even $5 million!
 
 In both Adult and High School courses we call this figure the "future
          anticipated price." It's a little tautological but emphasizes an
          important value. An imaginary price stimulated by the land's
          collectibility.
 
 In the collectible market, people care nothing about income. Price is
          everything. Even if a "rent" could be obtained for the
          collectible, the collectible speculator won't go for it, for fear the
          collectible might be harmed in some way, thus diminishing its value as
          a collectible. Mint condition is everything in the collectible world.
 
 This behavior is echoed with landholding, where a speculator will not
          invest much in a piece of vacant ripe land, for the investment would
          be lost if the land was sold at the high price. Rather, they put up a
          billboard, or a gas station, that provides a "taxpaying income"
          until the land is sold, whereupon they can be torn down at minimum
          cost. "Mint condition" is presumably vacant, cleared, land
          ripe and ready.
 
 And why should a speculator with a blighted building invest anything
          but the barest minimum in a property when it is destined to be torn
          down? He doesn't, hence the downtown look of large empty buildings.
          But, we know all that. Collectors hang on, and hang on, and hang on,
          awaiting the ultimate price. I've heard people wonder why an empty
          building with broken boarded up windows isn't developed. I suggest
          it's the normal collector mentality, looking always toward the "future
          anticipated price".
 
 So, the land "collector" sits on his collectible watching
          prices rise. Although in a price mechanism controlled free market the
          first to arrive in response to a price rise gets the highest price, in
          the collectible market the last to come to market gets the highest
          price.
 
 A market where everyone is sitting around trying to be the last to
          sell is not a very good market. Indeed, it bears no resemblance to the
          price mechanism controlled free market we espouse.
 
 As land prices soar, any attempt to capitalize down to an income
          produces the imaginary figure mentioned above.
 
 Yet, from these collectible land prices, Georgists tend to measure "land
          value" (although we usually call it Rent). And boy! Don't we get
          some great figures to run the economy in place of existing taxes.
 
 Or, perhaps we cut government and have a great Citizen's Dividend to
          give to people. Some of our friends say we wouldn't need to work. We
          could live on our Citizen's Dividend!
 
 I suggest all this is illusory.
 
 What our friends had forgotten was that although capitalization holds
          true in a free market, it doesn't in a collectible market. If you work
          with a capitalized price, it has a relationship to income. In the land
          market the price bears no meaningful relationship to income. Indeed
          there may be no income.
 
 So, why was I wrong to help convert the Georgist movement to the idea
          that taxes were paid at the expense of Rent? Simply because they
          aren't. They are paid at the expense of land prices.
 
 Perhaps this is why a heavy tax increase can severely harm an
          economy. Land prices are not exactly inelastic, but they are very
          reluctant to change.
 
 So, producers and consumers have to pay the same land prices, but
          also the increased taxes. It will be a while before land prices adjust
          downward in response to the extra load - and many won't even if land
          is simply not selling.
 
 This brings me to a final point. If land prices continually rise, why
          should a landholder sell? Particularly with the probability that
          capital gains will be repealed in the future?
 
 Certainly the real estate professional wants to sell. That's how he
          makes his living. However, I do suspect that much of his time is spent
          trying to persuade collectors to part with their collectibles.
 
 I've come to the conclusion that perhaps a majority of land changes
          hands for reasons other than the actual desire to sell land.
 
 Perhaps someone dies and the disinterested inheritor wants to cash in
          assets. Or, a business reverse means cash is needed. The Wall Street
          Journal had a front page article on firms going through a hard
          recession some years ago.
 
 The heading said something like: "Many firms find themselves
          making more money from their real estate departments than from their
          production lines."
 
 And so it goes!
 
 
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