We Have Contractual, Not Natural Rights
Harry Pollard
[Reprinted from a Land-Theory online
discussion, June 2000]
I have long disagreed with the notion we have Natural Rights - Bret
likes them, even Chodorov said something to the effect that though we
can't prove them, we have to believe in them.
For an equally long time I've argued that the rights we possess are "contractual".
This is my emphasis in the InterStudent course. In society, we agree
what our rights shall be - using the gamut of contract - from written
forms (the Constitution?) to "understandings" or "implicit
contracts" between people.
But, how can we make contracts? Presumably, because we are
individuals. Do we get our right to make contracts from our
individuality?
Some libertarians say we own ourselves, which appears to be a
statement rather than a proof. How can we show we "own ourselves"?
I've concentrated on human exertion. This manifestation of individual
characteristics (manifest : "Clearly apparent or obvious to the
mind or senses.") seems to me to be at the heart of "Rights".
I should mention I use exertion as the entrance to Political Economy.
I also believe it provides an "anchor" for the Austrian
subjective value system, which at present kind of floats in
relativism.
I would argue from the basis of a fundamental Assumption of human
behavior that precedes all social sciences (or should precede them): "People
seek to satisfy their desires with the least exertion." In almost
50 years of teaching, I have never met an adequate denial of this
Assumption. It implies that we prefer less exertion to more exertion.
Value is another name for preference.
But, back to basic individuality.
I'm pursuing the line that a human being has no validity, unless he
exerts. He will simply die.
His contact with the outside world is through exertion. We are fond
of stressing "mental or physical exertion" in the HG School
courses - probably because we want to include scientists, and
entrepreneurs along with laborers and artisans.
Yet, mental exertion is nothing without some manifest physical
activity. The two exertions are inseparable - yet the demonstrable
indication of thought is through actual physical activity.
We can see physical exertion. We can only infer the mental.
So, I would argue that our individuality begins with our first
physical act, something no-one else can do
Continuing, we can argue that ownership begins with exertion.
"Whose exertion is it?" - which sounds like a TV show.
Who else can own our exertion, but us? Our exertion is ours. And by
extension, who else can own the results of our exertion but us? Those
results are a consequence of our exertion. No-one else is concerned in
those results but us. Without our exertion they wouldn't exist.
Essentially, it seems self-evident that the product of our exertion
belongs to us - to use, or not to use, to sell or give away, to
destroy.
Now we are unlikely all the time to move tortuously through this
argument. We simply say - I made it, so it's mine, which is called the
"Labor Theory of Ownership".
However, it is important to any discussion of rights. One of the
physical things we do is decide on "contractual rights". The
first such right will probably be survival rights "I won't harm
you, if you don't harm me." The rest follow.
I've been arguing that all "rights" are contractual. in
fact, I would argue that all human rights are contractual - none are "Natural".
However, from where do you get the authority to contract?
I suggest it arises from the foregoing analysis.
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