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SCI LIBRARY

Militarism and Politics

Stuart Portner



[Chapter XIII from the book, Twentieth Century Political Thought,
edited by Joseph S. Roucek, 1946]


The history of the twentieth century has been that of a world at war. The first forty years of the century have produced armed conflict devastating in the destruction of life and property beyond the proportion of any war in history. During these four decades, and at no time in history, have nations so armed themselves in the contest to impose their will upon other nations. A new idea of a "nation in arms" has become a reality as the entire political, economic, and military structures of the nation have been welded into a single integrated pattern to better enable the nation to attain victory at war.

Economic nationalism, territorial ambitions, and the desire for power have been as fundamental causes of the war that broke out in 1939 as they were of the first World War. The forces motivating action in Germany during Hitler's ascendancy have been different only in outward manifestation and in language to that impelling Germany to seek a more significant portion of the world's territory in the days of William II. Mussolini's attempt to gain an empire for Italy has been but a modernization of the play inspired and produced by Crispi half a century previously, and has resulted in a disaster even worse than the Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896.

The problems of international relations remain what they have been from time immemorial, and fundamental among these problems is the desire to maintain what one possesses, or to gain what one does not possess but covets. Armed force is merely the instrument employed by nations to gain and maintain power. As Glausewitz has indicated, war is but an extension of politics, utterly disagreeable it is true, but a fact evidenced on innumerable occasions in the past and undoubtedly to be witnessed in the future. The democratic nations of the world have sought to avoid war during the last 25 years by not thinking of it. But it has been the pattern of things in the past that other nations will seek what we possess and will force us to return again and again to the realization that preparedness cannot be blithely waved aside.

It is absolutely fundamental for a nation to arrive at a clear conception of its place in the society of nations, to develop its international relations accordingly, and to augment its military establishment in order that it retain a respectable position in that society. It is further necessary that the people of the nation have a knowledge and an appreciation of the meaning of the nation's political and military position in order that they comprehend the significance of that position for them as individuals. Only by clear definition can one expect spirited support from the populace. The indecisive political and military philosophies of the democratic nations have twice brought them to the brink of disaster. The time is now more than passed when we must take active measures to protect our democratic institutions and prevent such catastrophes as occurred in France. It behooves us to maintain the armies we have created, for the military is the force protecting our institutions. We must not abdicate the responsibility handed us by our forebearers to preserve the democratic way of life.


THE MILITARY SITUATION, 1900-14


The nations of Europe at the turn of the twentieth century dominated the affairs of the world, notwithstanding the growing nationalistic movements and developing power of the. United States and Japan. 1 A spirited nationalism was evident throughout the continent as the new national states sought to expand territorial holdings and gain new markets and added prestige. By the beginning of the century, however, the entire habitable surface of the earth had been explored and partitioned and it seemed likely that henceforth any reorientation in colonial possession would be the result of armed conflict. Germany, in the full growth of its power, contested for international supremacy with a British Empire grown strong on decades of imperial domination. The Bismarckian opposition to overseas expansion had been dropped in Germany with the venerable prime minister, and the new imperial aspirations of the German people were well exemplified in the aggressive expansionist policies of William II. This expansionist zeal was reflected in governmental legislation for the building of a greater navy, in movements toward the obtaining of territory in Africa and the Far East, and was echoed in the exhortations of innumerable pan-German groups. Nationalism was a concomitant of the expansionist spirit in Germany, but was matched by an emotion similarly expressed throughout the greater part of the world.[2]

A most significant reflection of such developing nationalism was the rise of aggressive militarism in the major nations of the continent. Throughout all of Europe measures were adopted to secure defenses and make available all resources for a showdown struggle for domination. In Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, even in Turkey and the smaller Balkan countries military preparations were undertaken at a rapidly accelerated pace. During the thirteen years prior to the outbreak of the World War, Germany increased its regular army by close to two hundred thousand men. France made a similar increase of almost one hundred and fifty thousand men. Russia added four hundred, thousand; Austria-Hungary expanded by one hundred and thirty thousand, and Italy increased its standing army by forty thousand.[3] Similar increases were made in naval craft, with Britain and Germany engaging in a naval race such as the world had never witnessed.[4]

There were added changes in the administration and the structural organization of the military and naval forces during this period. The other countries of Europe looked toward Germany, victor in 1866 and 1871 in the most important wars on the continent in more than 50 years, and followed the German pattern of the administration of military forces.[5] Provision was made for universal conscription in all countries of Europe, except Great Britain which adhered to its program of a long service volunteer army. Short-service, however, was the accepted practice in most European armies, in emulation of the German system which had been so markedly successful in the Franco-Prussian war. Provision was made for rapid mobilization in order that troops be brought into action at the earliest possible moment. Staff planning, inter-allied military conversations, more intensive and more practical training, and other developments became the universal fact. Arms production was increased, but no clear definition was made of the utilization of the total resources of the nation in armed conflict. The concept of the totality of war was not to be recognized until well into the World War, when it became evident that all elements of the national life must henceforth be employed to wage war.[6] But in 1913 military men, almost without exception, conceived of the coming war as a short war of movement, and preparations were made accordingly.[7]

Counter-balancing such preparation for war were the proposals of various governments for a limitation on arms production. Proposals for disarmament and for arbitration of international difficulties were made on numerous occasions during each year of the year 1900-13, and the internal legislation of several of the governments during the period is further evidence of the desire to avoid armed conflict.[8] During this period elements of every nation opposed the expansionist-imperialist trend, but all too frequently however such proposals were a facade for the most cynical practices in power politics. The Russian proposal in 1899 for a disarmament conference that led to the meeting at The Hague in that year has been seriously questioned, especially since the first great increases in the Russian navy were made by that nation during the previous year. Subsequent declarations of pacificistic piety similarly were frequently covers for more dubious purposes.

In Germany, as elsewhere throughout Europe during the first years of the century, systematic preparations were being made for war. The German Great General Staff, under the direction of the most highly competent students of the art of war, developed and trained an army and prepared military plans to carry out the politics of the Kaiser.[10] By the end of 1913, Germany had a regular army of 870,000 front line troops and could mobilize five and a half million men in the event of war. By that date, the foreign politics of the Kaiser having so bungled matters that Germany had only Austria-Hungary as a certain ally, it was obvious that Germany would be forced to fight a two-front war against Russia and France and would have to meet the challenge on the seas of the British fleet, the greatest in the world.[11] Schlieffen, the chief of the German Great General Staff, had anticipated hostilities against Russia and France and in his plans of 1905-06 laid the basis for this two-front war.[12] The major weight of the German army was to be concentrated on the western front against Holland and Belgium. It was hoped that France would be set in motion against such a threat and would violate Belgium's neutrality by taking aggressive action before the German forced moved. By an enveloping attack through Belgium and Holland, Schlieffen hoped to avoid an expensive attack against the French fortification in his center and win a rapid victory. Russia was to be given free rein in the east, but Schlieffen honed that the Russian forces might be sucked in precipitately and before completely mobilized and the German forces might be in a position to divide them at the Masurian Lakes and do battle there. Tannenberg was full justification of this plan.

Schlieffen was succeeded in 1907 by the younger Moltke, with whose adaptation of the plan for an offensive against France Schlieffen sharply disagreed.[13] The Schlieffen plan in adaptation was employed by the German forces at the opening of hostilities in 1914. In the west the Germans met with initial success, but failed to achieve the desired result of annihilating the French as the latter forces retreated in order. In the east the Germans were more successful in their efforts against the Russians, but the general strategy of quick action and an immediate victory was not successful clue to the inability to carry through in the west. The adoption of trench warfare put an end to the German hope for an annihilation of the French army. The new orientation to campaigns of long duration and against a determined opposition also was not successful, and Moltke was succeeded by others who similarly failed in their efforts to defeat the French-British combination.[14]


GREAT BRITAIN


Matching the developing aggressive spirit of Germany by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century was a British nation which had become thoroughly alarmed at the rising German power.[15] The new British political and military commitments were founded upon a reorientation of foreign policy which witnessed Germany taking the place of foremost rival of Britain, rather than France and Russia. When William II turned down the proposals of Joseph Chamberlain for a military agreement in 1899, Britain began to seek elsewhere for the military support necessary to maintain the balance of world power. With the turn of the century Great Britain embarked upon a series of international agreements which saw her and her allies in a strong united position by the outbreak of the World War. In 1902 a military alliance was formed with Japan; in 1904 an agreement was entered into with France establishing respective spheres of colonial interests, and in 1907, following the vigorous stand taken by William II in the Moroccan crisis, an alliance was made with Russia. Though no military commitments were made in the 1904 entente with France, a series of military conversations between the chiefs of the respective military staffs of the two countries led to integrated staff planning. Vigorous military preparations were undertaken especially in the reorganization of the structure of the military establishment and the rapid expansion of the naval force.

Notwithstanding the fact that its geographic position made it a military base of great natural strength, and that it possessed a navy capable of keeping its communication lines undisturbed, it became apparent to the British early in the century that the army needed renovation.[16] The Boer War, among other matters had revealed a definite lack of trained staff officers, and fundamental planning and measures were adopted to rectify these and other faults. In 1904 reorganization of the army was begun with the formation of a general staff. The control of the army was placed in the hands of a council consisting of the Secretary of State for War, the Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General, and the Master General of Ordnance. The War Office also was reconstructed and the Committee of Imperial Defense was established as an advisory aid to the cabinet. The numbers in the army were cut down and training made more effective. A reservist system was established that would permit the mobilization of a greater number of trained men, and through a program of territorialization such reservists could be mobilized rapidly and without great delay integrated into tactical units of the army. The staff colleges were enlarged, maneuvers expanded and made more practical, and the army became a small, but a cohesive and extremely hardstriking machine.

Equally significant were the advances made in the navy.[17] When it became apparent that there could be no equitable basis of negotiations with Germany on the limitation of naval construction, the British undertook a building program that easily kept it the leading naval power in the world by the outbreak of the World War. Under the direction of Sir John Fisher, ships carrying a greater burden of armor and having more devastating fire power than the ships of any other fleet were produced in number sufficient to maintain Britain's supremacy at sea. Following the crisis with Germany in 1911 the administration of the navy was likewise reorganized and Winston Churchill was named to head the naval staff.


FRANCE


France's international orientation throughout this century has been based upon the isolation of Germany. In the years prior to the first World War it was necessary to counter the position of the Triple Alliance; in the years following 1918 to hold Germany impotent. An alliance with Russia in 1893 was followed by agreements with Italy in 1900 and Great Britain in 1904 and resulted in the practical isolation of Germany.[18] Under the vigorous direction of Foreign Minister Delcasse, France initiated an aggressive foreign policy, one which continued even after Premier Rouvicr was forced to drop Delcasse following the Moroccan crisis of 1906.

A similar aggressiveness was to be found in French military thought and preparations of the period. Interest in the scientific aspects of the art of war had been awakened in France in the seventies after the disastrous defeat at the hands of the Germans, and that the interest was fanned to flame by the desire to avenge 1871.[19] The military establishment was increased so that by 1913 France had a regular army of 720,000 troops and could mobilize four million trained men. Officer training was made more thorough and more practical, armament production in- creased, the navy concentrated in the Mediterranean and geared for action in that theater, and integrated strategy was developed through conversations with the Russian and British military staffs. The new feeling of confidence was to be noted in the military literature and plans of the period. Nowhere is this expressed more thoroughly than in the philosophy of attack current in the instruction at the French staff schools and in the writings of the military. The defensive philosophy of the immediate post Franco- Prussian War years, evidenced in the rebuilding of a system of fortifications, gave way to the thesis maintained by Foch and his disciples that the enemy not be permitted to move first and set the plan of campaign. The French-Russian agreement of 1913 calling for a two-front offensive was founded upon such a philosophy, but the French plans were thrown into confusion in 1914 by indecision as to the violation of Belgian neutrality. The Germans made the first move, crossed the Belgian frontier, and set the pattern of action throwing the French onto the defensive.

The military gave added fuel to the aggressive spirit by a splendid demonstration of ability in the colonies. By the turn of the century Gallieni and Lyautey were deep in their work of perfecting the French colonial military system which played so great a part in the concretizing and stabilizing of colonial administration,[20] In Indo-China and Madagascar, Gallieni and Lyautey combined force and politics in achieving pacification and successful administration. Later in the century, in his thirteen years in Morocco, from 1912-25, Lyautey added further to the prestige and power of an army which already had attained eminence through its success in the World War.


RUSSIA


Russia, formerly a member of the Triple Alliance, was a partner of France in international affairs by 1900 and had turned its ambitions from the Far East to the Near East after its defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1905.[21] Fundamental in the new pattern of Russian activity became its interest in the Balkans and the Black Sea and Persian areas. Bungling diplomacy displayed in inept attempts to play Germany, Britain, France, and Italy simultaneously resulted however in but little success in the advance toward domination of the Straits and the Balkans. The defeat of 1905 in a conflict against which such prominent and able statesmen as Baron Rosen and Count Witte had warned, revealed the full ineptitude of the Russian military leadership and forced changes in its administration and direction.[22] Under the direction of Minister of War, Sukhomlinoff, the administration of the war office was reorganized and staff conversations with the French brought definite plans and a series of mobilization tests. In 1913 Russia had a regular army of over 1,200,000 and could mobilize four and a half million men. It was obvious that in material and in its system of service and supply, Russia was deficient; that fact early became apparent during the course of the ensuing conflict.


ITALY


Notwithstanding the failure of its territorial ambitions in Ethiopia in 1896, Italy continued its quest for territory.[23] That desire forced Italy out of the orbit of the Triple Alliance and agreements were made with France in 1900 and 1902 and with Russia in 1909. The military establishment was put on a war footing under the premiership of Giolloti, and in 1911 using disorders in Tripolitania as an excuse for aggressive action, Italy went to war against Turkey and won Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Italy's action against Turkey was further indication that it could not be counted as an ally in the Triple Alliance. The success in this war, however, did not lull the Italians into the false belief that they possessed sufficient strength to enter the World War. General Pirro refused to take over the war office in 1914 when insufficient funds were proposed for military preparations. Cadorna who took over as chief of stuff in July, 1914 was amazed to discover that staff plans for war with Austria were almost uniformly defensive in character, and that little had been done to plan an offensive.[24] Caporetto for Cadorna was but a reflection of the fact that Italy was in no way capable of participation in a major conflict, even though more than a million and one-half trained men could be mobilized.


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY


Austria-Hungary in the decade and a half before the outbreak of the World War could mobilize close to two million men.

With the substitution of Aahrenthal for Goluchowski, Austria- Hungary embarked upon a vigorous foreign policy.[25] Even more aggressive than the policy of the civilian chiefs of state was that maintained by Conrad von Hotzendorf, chief of staff and later inspector of the Army. Von Hotzendorf, a typical nationalistic fire-eater, called for aggressive action against Russia and Serbia in 1908 and 1909, and became so obnoxious in his opposition to the more tempered opinions of Aehrenthal that the Emperor was forced to remove him from office. Hotzendorf was not stilled, however, for he called for a war against Italy in 1912, and action by Austria-Hungary during the Balkan wars. The seeming passivity of the Germans during 1912-13 aroused his opposition, but this was not the first, nor was it to be the last time that these allies differed in their approach to international affairs.


UNITED STATES


The United States entered the World War with the smallest regular army of any of the major nations of the world. Essentially a naval power, it had maintained isolation while the European nations aligned themselves for the coming struggle for domination.[26] The isolationist character of the international policy of the nation was reflected in the belief that no nation could do battle against the United States, because of its insular position. That its position had changed somewhat with the acquisition of the Philippines was recognized, but no basic strategy was devised to meet the new contingencies. There were appropriations leading to an increase in our naval strength, but funds for the Army were limited. By 1913 there were less than one hundred thousand regulars in the American Army, a force considerably less than half the size of the second-rate Italian Army of that year. A realization of the inadequacy of the military force had been apparent during the war with Spain, but measures taken to correct the faults evident in that campaign were nowhere comparable to those adopted in Great Britain as a result of the performance of the British Army in the Boer War. Provisions were made for the integration of staff planning with the establishment of a General Staff in 1903, but internal administrative changes did not alter the fact that Congress, and the nation at large, was not disposed to support an adequate army, let alone one of consequence. 27 The War Department and the army proved its ability to perform during the World War, but in 1922 the army was reduced to a total of 146,000 volunteers on a 3-year service basis. In the years before the World War, as in the period 1919-40, the United States failed to appreciate the need for a policy of adequate military protection.


JAPAN


Japan emerged as a nation of power in international affairs during the first decade of the century with its success against the Russian forces. An army of 87,000 in 1900 was built to more than 250,000 before the outbreak of the World War. By diplomatic and by military demonstration it indicated that henceforth it would be a power to contend with.[28] Through successful alliances during the World War it was able to obtain island holdings in the Pacific which set the stage for the development of military and naval bases throughout the central and western expanses of that ocean. Increases in the army and navy, competent instruction, and heavy shipbuilding and armament production provided the facilities by which Japan could make its play for power in the thirties.


THE WAR OF 1914-18


The war that broke out in 1914 seemed inevitable then, and today, after thirty years, seems to have been even more emphatically so.[29] The forces in play for more than a decade could not be stayed, even though men in all the contesting countries tried desperately to prevent actual hostilities. The lightning victory sought by Germany was not obtained, and for four years of dreary position warfare the contesting powers failed to attain decision. The German High Command continued to play for the complete annihilation of the enemy, but were forced to a stalemate by the Allies. The latter effected unified command in the spring of 1918 after four years of ineffective staff relations. In the summer of 1918, the Allies met a last German offensive, then sent about on counteroffensive and won the war.

The war proved almost all the experts wrong in their belief that it would be short, that actions would be highly mobile, that the offensive would be applied unremittingly and in many another military matter that had been held as rule since the successes of the German armies in the sixties and the seventies. The war brought with it the introduction of new arms, new services, new facilities that had not been conceived of by military staffs prior to the war, but most significant was the realization that henceforth all resources of the nation, in manpower, industry, government and otherwise must be employed in a total effort to gain victory.


THE MILITARY SITUATION, 1919-44


The conclusion of hostilities brought a peace that satisfied no nation. 30 The United States government reverted to its traditional isolationism, and the victorious powers in Europe sought by passive defensive strategy to retain the gains of the war. No dynamic policy was formulated to cover the obviously growing resentment in Germany and Italy. Instead of military preparations, both Great Britain and France lost themselves in the attempt to hold what they had won with the least expenditure of funds and manpower. The entire history of continental Europe for the twenty years between wars became the story of the steady retreat of the victorious allies before the rising dynamism of the totalitarian powers. In the demilitarization of the Rhine, the return of the Saar, the recreation of the German army, in the Ethiopian affair, in Austria, Spain, Czechoslovakia, did the allies seek to placate Hitler and Mussolini. Military preparations in Great Britain and France followed the political developments and left both nations sorely unprepared for the war that broke out in 1939.


FRANCE 1919-44


From the peace table and the insistence that Germany be completely subjugated, France sought to establish a cordon sanitaire about Germany and to force that nation to remain a subservient position. Armament control, the limitation on the size of the army, the provisions against short service and a reservist system, the prohibitions against the development of military aviation, and other devices written into the peace treaty were adopted as a means of keeping Germany from attaining the military primacy which it had held at the outbreak of the World War.[31]

The attempts at isolating Germany were furthered by a series of agreements with Great Britain, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. The French military machine was maintained at a relatively high figure, so that the regular army had 666,000 in its ranks in 1928, 692,000 in 1937, and France could put more than five and one-half million men into the field in the event of war. A series of fortifications, the Maginot Line, was constructed with the intent of preventing German penetration into France. But the size of the army and the vaunted fortifications were false facades. A shortening in the term of service, the departure from the army of many of the most competent officers, failure to maintain armament production, inability to perceive the changing nature of modern warfare, and the terrific political wrangling between the parties of the right and the left over the size of the army, its equipment, and the nature of strategy and tactics, was such as to prevent the French army from becoming a truly effective force.[32]

In its final analysis the failure of the French military was founded upon the inability of the French to control their own domestic economy. The task of domestic reconstruction following the end of the war and the seeming inability of the nation to attain a new dynamic meant formal abdication of her foremost position in Europe. The paralysis gripping France during the late twenties and thirties was as evident in the nature of its military preparedness as in its confused political leadership. The assurance of power was evident directly following the war, so confident a power that the French did not hesitate to send an armed force into the Ruhr in 1923 over the question of reparations, gave way in the thirties to the belief that stationary defenses, formidable artillery, and good luck would hold off the Germans. The spring of 1940 proved otherwise.


GREAT BRITAIN


The conclusion of hostilities brought relief to the British. Domestic disturbances created by the inability of private industry to take care of returning veterans were so severe that Lloyd George was forced out of power in 1921. The conservative ad- ministrations of Bonar Law and Baldwin succeeded George, and were in turn succeeded by MacDonald's first Labor government, but in none of these administrations nor in any that succeeded them for the next fifteen years did there seem to be any full appreciation of the need for a proper military policy.[33] It was the fashionable belief that Britain did not need to fear military aggression and that the British navy and French army were sufficient to maintain for them dominant power in the European theater.[34] The naval strategy of the British continued to be the control of sea communications, but the German navy no longer being a menace, Great Britain entered into agreements with the United States and other powers whereby her fleet strength was reduced. The army abandoned the reforms of Haldane during the period of 1904-10 and returned to the old Cardwell system, with the British army at home being only for the purpose of replacements for the overseas garrisons. By 1936 the British army stood at 197,000 men, twenty-five percent less than it had been in 1900. Arms production was sharply curtailed as the burden of domestic relief cut deeply into the revenue of the nation, and the British retreated as vigorously from the thought of war as did the French. During the thirties the idea became widely cur- rent that Britain should engage only in defensive actions in the event of a war, in order that Britain not suffer such a loss in manpower as she had during World War I.

Britain, like France, attempted in ostrich-fashion to avoid recognizing that the expansionist policies being advocated by Italy, and Japan could lead to war. Appeasement, the desire to temporize, to avoid armed conflict was almost as fatal for Britain as it was for France. Only by superlative, dogged resistance was Britain able to come back after the disasters of May-June, 1940 to do contest with Germany.


ITALY


Diametrically opposed to the defensive, dispirited position taken by France and Britain during the two decades after the conclusion of World War I was the display of aggressiveness by the Axis powers.[35] Coming into power through a virtual coup d'etat, Mussolini, by the subjugation of all elements of the Italian populace to his will, effected a degree of unity not attained previously in the century by Italy. Designating himself as a new Caesar, he sought the establishment of a modern Italian Empire. The armed forces of the nation were developed to a strength they had never possessed and by 1937 there were 400,000 men in the regular army. Armament production was accelerated, the air force built to such proportions that it was recognized as outstanding in Europe for some time, and innovations made in naval craft so that the Italian fleet became in effect a latter-day version of the jeune ecole school of small, fast ships capable of commerce and coast raiding in the Mediterranean.[36]

Italian military strategy was founded upon an expansionist political philosophy, and its orientation was according to that political bent. In 1934, by a show of strength against the rising Hitler, Mussolini indicated his pretensions to domination of Mitteleuropa as well as the Mediterranean. In the next year, he opened a successful campaign to avenge Adowa. He was temporarily successful in unseating Haile Selassie and further strengthened his position in developing his colonial enterprises in northern Africa. France and Britain stood by during the Ethiopian campaign. The revelations of the Hoare-Laval conversations, by which both countries were revealed as being not unsympathetic to the Italian aggression, presented in bold relief the abject poverty of their position. The full significance of that renunciation was to be seen in the utter resignation at German-Italian participation in the Spanish civil war, in the overpowering of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the inability to contest the rising Japanese threat in fashion other than to strengthen the British base at Singapore.


GERMANY


An even more spectacular success in overcoming internal resistance to his authority and then attaining position in international affairs was scored by Hitler after his ascension to power in Germany in 1933.[37] Liquidating opposition, Hitler coordinated the military and civil life of the nation by the most ruthless and undemocratic means, and went on to the domination and control of Europe. Hitler turned away from the expansionist colonial policies of William II and concentrated on a nazified version of the Bismarckian ideal of control of central Europe and preeminence on the continent. Such preeminence was to be followed by domination of the world.

Utilizing the military ideas of an attaque brusquee set forth by von Seeckt, coordinating industry and the military on the basis of plans formulated by Walter Rathenau during the World War, employing propaganda techniques laid down by Ludendorff, Hitler was able to develop in Germany a unity of purpose and spirit that stood the army in good stead during the course of military campaigns such as no army had ever attempted in the history of the world.[38]

The German military forces, directed by Junkers, tended to its professional affairs and displayed its customary ability. The military strategy employed by Hitler and his military advisers utilized the time honored practice of disposing of one foe at a time. The strategy was successful in Austria and Czechoslovakia without the necessity of armed conflict. In Poland the German forces were able to annihilate the Polish army by powerfully combined air-ground operations, and in Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, and Norway, similar power pushes won him quick victories. The initial successes gave way in the third to the fifth years of war to campaigns on the ground in Africa and Russia, and to a similar campaign in the air with the British and American forces. In 1943 Germany went on the defensive; in the spring of 1944 it was still in Russia and holding all her gains on the European continent except portions of Italy below Rome and sections of northern Esthonia, Poland and Rumania to which the Red army had penetrated. By this time the Germany army had lost heavily on the Russian and African fronts, but these losses were not decisive. 39 Through the utilization of industrial labor enslaved from all the conquered countries of Europe and through the employment of the forces of allies in military operations, Germany still retained great strength.


SOVIET UNION


For the Soviet Union throughout the period between wars, the basic political and military consideration was to remain at peace in order that the nation might develop its resources.[40] Having conquered the white forces in Russia, and concluded hostilities against the allied powers, Poland, and Finland, the Soviet Union set itself to the problem of industrialization and the realization of its natural potentialities. In international affairs throughout this period the Soviet Union became the arch-exponent of collective security. At the sessions of the League of Nations, and in diplomatic negotiations the Soviet Union sought such assurances from the nations of Europe, but they were not forthcoming.[41] The military orientation of the nation was founded upon its alliances with France and the Little Entente, and military preparations were prosecuted with a spirit seemingly equal to that in Italy and Germany. Conscription was maintained, armament production greatly accelerated, staff schools were established, and the army completely democratized in keeping with the general principles of the October revolution. Innovations in tactics and the use of special troops and material gave further evidence of the Soviet Union's intention of developing a first- rate army. Border clashes with the Japanese and a full-dress war with Finland gave Russian military leaders the opportunities to test men and material. By 1928, Russia had a regular army of close to 700,000 men, and could mobilize more than six million trained troops. In the next decade this number of men in the regular army was doubled and almost eight million trained men could be mobilized in the event of war.

In the summer of 1939 the Soviet Union broke with its allies to make terms with Germany, in what seemed to be an effort to gain time for further military preparation. When the Soviet Union did come into action in the summer of 1941, it displayed a military competence that few had expected of it. The generalship, quality of equipment and supplies, and ability and courage of the individual soldier were impressively demonstrated in the next three years of war.


UNITED STATES


The United States returned to a foreign policy of isolation after the conclusion of the World War.[42] The internal administration of the military establishment was defined in the passage of the National Defense of 1920, but the temper of the country was pacifistic and anti-military and the defense forces suffered accordingly. By 1922 the regular army had been reduced to 146,000 men, and by 1928 it was down to 136,000. Within the next decade it rose to 167,000. Peacetime naval production aspired to before the entrance of the United States into the World War was curtailed as this country took part in the program of naval disarmament started at the Washington Conference in 1921. Armament production declined to a fraction of wartime totals, and there were few advances in development and utilization of new equipment. It was not until the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in 1939 that the United States would take vigorous measures, for notwithstanding the growing power of Germany and Italy in Europe and the even more definite menace of Japan to the Pacific holdings of the United States, this country maintained a general policy of neutrality and isolation. These were decades of indecision for the United States, of eminent satisfaction with our position in the twenties and of concentration upon the domestic problems which beset the country in the depression of the thirties. The nation had sought to turn its back upon the world, and remain secure behind two great oceans a desire proven impossible in 1939 and for the future.[43]


JAPAN


In the two decades after the World War Japan embarked upon a program of imperial expansion as extensive as that ever undertaken by the most ambitious of European powers.[44] Throughout the twenties the army was developed and modernized, the navy perfected, and nationalism spread by spirited groups of young officers and ambitious industrialists.[45] In 1931 Japan struck in Manchuria and in short order was able to place that country under its domination. Six years later hostilities were opened against China and the Japanese army gradually forced the poorly equipped Chinese forces and the Chinese populace to retreat to the interior in order to continue the defense of their country.[46] In 1941 Japan entered the second World War and within one year had control of major British, Dutch, and American possessions in the western Pacific.[47] The display of might by the Japanese army, navy, and air force came as a shocking surprise to the great majority of thinking people the world over. It was not until late in 1942 that the Allies were able to begin offensive action against the Japanese with an attack by American marines on Guadalcanal Island in the Solomons. By spring of 1944, the Solomons had been cleared of the Japanese, the Gilberts and Marshalls had been taken, and the United States Pacific Fleet had been able to shell Paramushiro in the Kuriles and Truk in the Carolines, but the Japanese still held the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Burma, the Malay Peninsula and many of the islands of the Pacific formerly under Allied control.


CONCLUSION


The past four decades have brought clearly to the mind of America the need for definite foreign and military policies. No longer are we able to isolate ourselves from the rest of the world and conceive of the oceans to our East and West as being adequate protection for all aggressors. Nor can we blithely accept events of political consequence anywhere, be it in deepest Africa or Asia, as outside the sphere of our interest. Modern transportation and communication, and an evolving economy that knows no national bounds, make it imperative that our diplomatic and military policies be reoriented in the light of the most recent developments. The second half of the twentieth century should witness the United States fully attaining its position of preeminence among the world powers.

NOTES


  1. Of value for a general review of the background of the European international situation at the turn of the century see E. Brandenburg, From Bismarck to the World War (London: Oxford University Press, 1927); S. B. Fay, The Origins of the World War (2 vols., New York: Macmillan Company, 1938); G. P. Gooch, History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919 (London: Cassell and Company, 1923); R. J. Mowat, Concert of Europe (Lc '^n : Macmillan Company, 1930); B. E. Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 1914 (2 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930) ; J. W. Swain, Beginning of the Twentieth Century (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1933).
  2. See Mildred S. Wertheimer, Pan-German League, 1890-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924) for a study of German nationalism. For a general treatment of the nationalist trend see C. J. H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: R. R. Smith and Company, 1931); Edward Krehbiel, Nationalism, War and Society (New York: Macmillan Company, 1916) ; Parker T. Moon, Imperialism and World Politics (New York: Macmillan Company, 1926) ; Ramsay Muir, Nationalism and Internationalism (London: Constable and Company, 1917).
  3. See Armaments Year-Book, 1928 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1928).
  4. For a discussion of the Anglo-German naval race A. R. Coloquhoun, 1912 Germany and Sea-Power (London: Sir I. Pitman Company, 1909) ; Henry B. Hanna, Can Germany Invade England (London: Methuen Company, 1912); A. S. Hurd, The Command of the Sea (London: Chapman Hall, 1912); A. S. Hurd and H. Castle, German Sea-Power (London: J. Murray, 1913). See also Percival A. Hislam, The Admiralty of the Atlantic (London: Longmans, Green, 1908) ; Captain J. Eardley-Wilmot, Our Fleet Tbday (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900); O. E. Schiiddekopf, Die Britische Marinepolitik, 1880 bis 1918 (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1938); H. F. Wyatt, Britain's Imminent Danger (London: Imperial Maritime League, 1912).
  5. See Hoffman Nickerson, The Armed Horde (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940).
  6. See especially the contribution of Walter Rathennu in H. Kessler, Writer Rathcnuu, sein Leben und sein \Y 7 erk (Berlin: H. Kleman, 1928).
  7. T H. A. DeWeerd, "Churchill, Lloyd George, Clemcncau: The Emergence of the Civilian," in Edward M. Earle, editor, Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943).
  8. On pacifism and the attempts at disarmament and arbitration see Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London: W. Heinemann, 1910) ; A. P. Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences and Other International Conferences (London: Stevens and Sons, 1904); J. B. Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1909).
  9. Harry Elmer Barnes, Genesis of the World War (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926).
  10. For a study of the 19th century German Army see General C. von der Goltz, Kriegfgescbichte Deutschlands im 19. Jabtihundett (2 vols. Berlin: G. Bnndi, 1910). See also P. Camena d' Almeida, L'Armee Allemande avant et pendant la Guerre de 1914-18 (Nancy: Bergen- Levrau It, 1919) ; A. F. Kovacs, Nation in Arms and Balance of Power (Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1937) ; H. G. Treitschke, The Organization of the Army (London: Gowans and Gray, 1914) ; L. R. G. Riidt von CoJlenberg, Die Deutsche Armee von 1871 his 1914 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1922); J. Poiricr, L Evolution de I' Armee Allemande de 1888 a 1913 (Paris: L. Fournier, 1914).
  11. On German diplomatic history during this period see E. Brandenburg, op. cit. \ O. Hammann, Deutsche Welt Politik, 1890-1912 (Berlin: R. Robbing, 1925); W. L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-90 (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1932) ; K. Nowak, Germany's Road to Ruin (New York: Macmillan Company, 1932); Veit Valentin, Bismarck's Aussenpolitik von 1871-1890 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlaggcsellschaft fur politik, 1922); Veit Valentin, Deutschlands Aussenpolitik von Bismarcks Abgang bis zum Ende des Weltkrieges (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgtsellschaft fiir Politik, 1921).
  12. On the Schlieffen plan see Eugcn Bircher, Schlieffen, Mann und Idee (Zurich: 1937) ; W. Foerster, Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg (Berlin: E. J. Mittler, 1925), and Aus der Gedankenwerkstatt des Deutschen Generstabes (Berlin: E. J. Mittler, 1931).
  13. See General W. Groener, Der Feldherr wider Willen (Berlin: E. J Mittler, 1931) on the younger von Moltke.
  14. On the World War see the official histories of the belligerents, including the British, History of the Great War, Military Operations, Naval Operations \ the French, Les Armees Francaiset dans la Grande Guerre ; and the German, Der Weltkrieg. The memoirs and diaries of leading military and civil leaders, like Churchill, Lloyd George, Ludendorff, Foch, Hindenburg, Falkenhayn, and others will give added color to the official studies.
  15. On British foreign policy see Volume HI of the Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy (Cambridge: University Press, 1923) ; G. P. Gooch, A Century of British Foreign Policy (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1917) ; A. L. Kennedy, Old Diplomacy and New (London: J. Murray, 1922); Max Montgales, British Foreign Policy and Sir Edward Grey (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1928); A. F. Pilram, England and the International Policy of the European Great Powers, 1871-1914 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1931); Spencer Wilkinson, Britain at Bay (London: Constable and Company, 1909).
  16. On the British Army see Major D. H. Cole and Major E. C. Preistley, An Outline of British Military History (London: Sifton Praed and Company, 1936); Colonel J. K. Dunlop, Development of the British Army, 1899-1914 (London: Methen, 1938) ; Sir J. W. Fortescue, History of the British Army (14 vols., London: Macmillan Company, 1899-1930).
  17. See the autobiographical writings of Lord Fisher, Records and Memoirs.
  18. See W. L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-94 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) ; Graham Stuart, French Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (New York: Century Company, 1921) ; Raymond Recouly, De Bismarck a PoJncar&(Patis: Les Editions de France, 1932) ; R. P. Millet, Notre Politique Exterieur de 1898 a 1905 (Paris: F. Juven, 1905) ; Christian Scheften, D'une Guerre a I'Autre (Paris: F. Alcan, 1920) ; F. L. Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the French Republic (New York: Whittlesey House, 1931).
  19. See Joseph Monteilhet, Les Institutions Militaires de France, 1814-1932 (Paris F. Alcan, 1932). See also D. D. Irvine, "The French Discovery of Clauscwitz and Napoleon," Journal of the American Military Institute, IV (Fall, 1941), pp. 143-161; Stefan T. Possony and Etienne Mantou, "Du Picq and Foch: The French School," in Earle, editor, op. cit., pp206-33.
  20. See Jean Gottman, "Bugcaud, Gallieni, Lyantey: The Development of French Colonial Welfare," in Earle, editor, op. cit., pp. 234-59. Both Lyautey and Gallieni wrote extensively. See Gallieni, Rapport d'Ensemble sur la Pacification, I'Or- ganisation, et la Colonisation ie Madagascar (Paris: Lavauzelle, 1900) ; Lyautey, Paroles d' Action (Paris: A. Colin, 1927).
  21. On Russian foreign relations and military preparations see Langer, Franco- Russian Alliance-, Gregory Alcscnsky, Russia and the Great War (New York: Charles Scnbner's Sons, 1915); E. J. Dillon, The Eclipse of Russia (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1918) ; S. Dobrovolsky, Die Mohmlechhtchung der Russisem Armee (Berlin: 1922): A. von Drygalski and Count von Zeppelin, Russland, das heer\ die jlotte (Berlin: A. Scholl, 1898) ; M. T. Florinsky, The End of Russia Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931); Lt. General N. Golovin, Russian Army in the World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931); S. A. KorfT, Russia's Foreign Relations during the Last Half Century (New York: Macmillan Company, 1922); Rene Marchand, Un Livrc Noir (Paris: Libraire du Travail, 1922); S. D. Sazonov, Les Annces Fatales (Paris: Payot, 1927); F .Stieve, Izvolsky and the World War (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1926); G. S. C. Sydenham, Russia's Sea-Power (London: J. Murray, 1898).
  22. Baron R. R. Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy (2 vols., New York: A. A. Knopf, 1922).
  23. On Italian foreign policy and military establishment see Jean Alazard, L'ltalie et le conflict Europeen, 1914-16 (Paris: F. Alcan, 1916); Lucien Dupain, L' Administration Militaire Italienne (Paris: Lavausclle, 1892); J. L. Glanville, Italy's Relations With England, 1896-1905 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1934) ; R. Michels, L'lmperialisrno Italtano (Milano: Socicta Editrice Libraria, 1914) ; Pietro Silva, L'ltalia fra le Grande Potenza, 1882-1914 (Roma: P. Cremonere, 1931); A. N. Stieglitz, L'ltalie et la Triple Alliance (Paris: Dujarric, 1906); A. I. Sulliotti, La Triplice Alleanza, 1882-1915 (Milano: Fratelli Treves, 1915).
  24. General L. Cadorna, La Guerra alia Fronte Italiana (Milano: Fratelli Treves, 1921), and Altre Pagine sulla Grande Guerra (Milano: A. Mondori, 1925).
  25. For the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary see especially A. P. Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-18 (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1923); and Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1910 (2 vols/, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920-22). See also Berthold Molden, Afair Graf Aehrenthal (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1917). On the military see F. Conrad von Hotzendorf, Aus mciner Dienstzett (5 vols., Wicn: Rikola Vcrlag, 1921-25); L. Dupain, L' Administration Milttairc Austro-Hongroise (Pnris: Lavauzclle, 1394) ; E. Kahlig, Osterretch Ungatn: d*.n Heer; dL> Flotte (Berlin: A. Schull, 1899); R. Kriegcr, Die Enivicklung des Conrad' when OfJMSivgLdankens (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1934). 26. See Brig. General John McA. Palmer, America in Arms: The Experience of the U. S. Military Organization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941).
  26. F. L. Huidekoper, Military Unpreparedness of the United States (New York: Macmillan Company, 1915).
  27. On the foreign and military policies of Japan see A. L. P. Dennis, The Anglo- Japanese Alliance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1923) ; J. C. Balet, Le Japan Militaire (Yokahoma: Kelly and Walsh, 1910) ; Captain J. Dubois de Saligny, Kssais sur la Guerre Russo-Japonaise (Paris: Bergen-Levrault, 1913); Henry Dyer, Japan in World Politics (London: Blackie and Son, 1909); J. H. Gubbins, The Making of Modern Japan (London: Seeley, Service, 1921); Karl Haushofcr, Dai Ntpou (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1913); H. Labroue, L' Imperialism? japonais (Paris: Dclagrave, 1911).
  28. See footnote 14.
  29. On the peace treaty see H. W. V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris.
  30. See Arnold Wolfers, Britain and Prance Between Wars (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941).
  31. See S. C. Davis, French War Machine (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1937); General M. E. Debeney, La Guerre et les Hommes (Paris: Plon, 1937) ; Monteilhet, op. cit. t General A. J. H. Mordacq, Faut-il Changer, le Regime (Paris: A. Michel, 1935), and Les Lemons de 1914 et la Prochaine Guerre (Paris: Flammarian, 1934); Pertinax, Les Fossoyeurs (2 vols., New York: 1943); A. F. Kovacs, "Military Origins of the Fall of France," Military Affairs, VII (Spring, 1943), pp. 25-40.
  32. See Sir Guy C. Williams, "Changes in British Strategy," Military Affairs, VIII (Spring, 1944), pp. 7-14.
  33. On British foreign policy see G. P. Gooch, British Foreign Policy since the War (London: G. Bell, 1936). For an insight into the prevailing military philosophy of the period see especially the works of Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (London: Faber and Fa her, 1935).
  34. For studies of Italian foreign policy during Mussolini's dictatorship see J. Ancel, Les Balkans face a Vltalie (Paris: Delagrove, 1928); G. A. Borgese, Goliath, the March of Fascism (New York: Viking Press, 1937) ; R. Cantalupo, Fatti Europei e Politica Italiana, 1922-24 (Milano: Imperia, 1924) ; M. I. Currey, Italian Foreign Policy, 1918-32 (London: I. Nicholson and Watson, 1932); Dino Grandi, Lit alia Fascista nella Politica Internazionale (Roma: Libreria del Littorio, 1930) ; M. H. H. Macartney, Italy's Foreign Colonial Policy, 1914-37 (London: Oxford University Press, 1938) ; P. Agostino Orsini, L 'Italia nella Politica Africana (Bologna: L. Cappelli, 1926) ; G. Salvemini, Mussolini Diplomate (Paris: B. Grasset, 1932).
  35. For a statement on the defense problem in the early twenties see Aldo Valori, Probleme Militori delta Nuova Italia (Milano: Imperia, 1923). For an estimate of the Italian forces just prior to the outbreak of the Second World War see the League of Nations, Armaments Year-Book.
  36. On the growth of National Socialism see A. Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston: Hough ton-Mifflin, 1943); K. Heiden, A History of National Socialism (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1935) ; H. Lichtenberg, The Third Reich (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1937) ; F. L. Schuman, The Nazi Dictatorship (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1936) ; Hermann Ranschnigg, The Voice of Destruction (New York: G. P. Putnam's Son, 1940) ; Rohan d'O. Butler, The Roots of National Socialism (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1942).
  37. For an appraisal of the new German Army see H. Rosinski, The German Army (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940); Albert Miiller, Germany's War Machine (London: J. M. Dent Sons, 1936). See also a fine summary on Hitlerian strategy by E. M. Earle, "Hitler: The Nazi Concept of War," in Earle, op. cit., pp. 505-16; General H. von Seeckt, Die Reichswehr (Berlin: R. Kittler, 1933). On strategy and techniques see Karl Justrow, Der Tecbniscbe Krieg im Spiegtlbild tier Knegierjjbrungen und der \Y'eltpresse (Berlin: R. Claassen, 1938) ; General li. Ludcndorff, The Coming \\ r ar (London: Faber and Faber, 1938) ; E. Banse, \\'ehiwnwn\cha\t (Leipzig: Armeen-Verlag, 1933); H. Foertsch, An of Modern War] are (New York: Veritas Press, 1940).
  38. For a statement of Germany on the defensive see H. A. DeWeerd, "Germany on the Defensive," Yale Review. Winter, 1943.
  39. See Fedetoff White, The Red Army (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943) ; Erich Wollenberg, The Red Army (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1940).
  40. On Soviet foreign policy see Maxim Litvinov, Against Aggression (New York: International, 1939) ; M. T. Florinsky, Towards an Understanding of the U. S. S. R. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1939) ; D. J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-13 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942); F. R. Dulles, Road to Teheran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944).
  41. See Pcndleton Herring, The Impact of War (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941 ) for a discussion of the effect of foreign policy upon military preparation. On recent U. S. foreign policy see C. P. Rowland, editor, Survey of American Foreign Relations, 1928-31 (4 vols., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928-31); U. S. Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942) ; A. W. Griswold, The Par Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938) ; R. L. Buell, Isolated America (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1940) ; A. W. Dulles and H. F. Armstrong, Can We Be Neutral? (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1936).
  42. See Major G. F. Eliot, Ramparts We Watch (New York: Reynal Hitchcock, 1938) ; George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 19-10) ; Johnson Hagood, We Can Defend America (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1937) ; N. J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942) ; H. Agar, A Time for Greatness (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1942) ; Hallett Abend, Ramparts of the Pacific (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1942); Seymour Harris, The Economics of American Defense (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1941).
  43. See J. F. Abbott, Japanese Expansion and American Policies (New York: Macmillan Company, 1916) ; Gregory Bienstock, Struggle for the Pacific (New York: Macmillan Company, 1937) ; G. Gothein, Japans Expansionsdrang (Zurich: Raschcr Verlag, 1936) ; Nathaniel PefFer, Japan and the Pacific (London: H. Hamilton, 1935) ; A. M. Young, Imperial Japan, 1926-38 (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1938).
  44. K. W. Colegrove, Militarism in Japan (New York: World Peace Foundation, 1936) ; E. E. N. Causton, Militarism and Foreign Policy in Japan (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1936) ; M. D. Kennedy, Some Aspects of Japan and Her Defence Forces (London: K. Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1928) ; Ushisaburo Kobayashi, Military Industries of Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1922); Tsunekichi Kono, Japanese Army (Tokyo: 1929) ; Guchi Ono, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1922); Gotaro Ogawa, Conscription System in Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921) : O. Tanin, Militarism and Fascism in Japan (London: M. Lawrence, 1934).
  45. Seiji G. Hishida, The Manchoukuo Question (Tokyo: Maruzen Company, 1934).
  46. On Japan and World War II, see Hugh Byas, The Japanese Enemy (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1942); J. C. Grew, Report from Tokyo (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942); Wilfrid Fleisher, Our Enemy Japan (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1942); O. D. Tolischus, Tokyo Record (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1943).

BIBLIOGRAPHY


See original online text for the author's bibliography.