Urban Financing for Jobs, Profits and Prosperity
Perry I. Prentice
[Reprinted from the American Journal of Economics
and Sociology,
Vol.35, No.3 (July, 1976)]
FOREWORD
SPECIALIZED COMPETENCE of many types must be combined for a
complete, accurate, and effective understanding of any major
issue of public policy. Mr. Prentice brings to the study of land
use, housing, urban affairs-the myriad aspects of problems of
great human significance - his long background in matters
involving real estate. He also brings a highly developed skill
in exposition to help our understanding.
For decades Mr. Prentice has been directly involved (1) in one
or another aspect of the analysis of the aesthetics, the
economics, and the politics of the subject matter of a
forthcoming book from which the three studies in this collection
are taken. His unique qualifications for his task include, as
other economists and I can testify, a determined effort to learn
what others offer from their specialized points of view.
The wisdom of the general direction of policy advocated here
seems overwhelmingly clear to me and to every other economist
with whom I can remember having discussed the issue. Very few,
of course, have had occasion to devote extensive time to this
one aspect of public policy. Had academic and other economists
done so they would doubtless have sensed some, but probably not
all, the many potential benefits which Mr. Prentice discusses.
He has put us in his debt by raising and discussing some three
dozen questions - questions which bear most directly upon the
quality of life ahead for us and our children and their
children. The reader has an exciting experience in now
encountering this stimulating discussion of vital questions.
C. LOWELL HARRISS
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1. The ABCs of Property Tax Reform
ALMOST NOBODY seems to understand the property tax - not one business
man in a hundred and not one taxpayer in a thousand. Even the
assessors charged with its administration are apt to confuse it with
an income tax. So too often they grossly underassess and undertax land
that is kept so underused or misused that it is earning little income.
And then they overassess and overtax land whose owners are making the
most of it.
What most taxpayers know about property taxation seems to stop with
just knowing that the tax bills on their own homes have been getting
quite a bit bigger. This lack of understanding may explain but
certainly does not justify their being more belligerent about rising
property taxes than about any other levy. For the truth is that
property taxes have gone up much less than any other major source of
government revenue.
From 1939 to 1973 property taxes climbed less than one-eighth as fast
as the federal income tax, less than half as fast as state income
taxes, less than a quarter as fast as sales taxes and only two-thirds
as fast as the cost of local government. And despite all the recent
talk of federal income tax reductions the inflation fed by huge
federal deficits has pushed so many families into higher tax brackets
that from 1965 to 1973 federal income tax collections actually kept on
climbing 10 percent faster than the property tax. Meanwhile, state
income tax collections have been increasing nearly three times as fast
as property taxes and state general sales taxes have been rising
nearly twice as fast.
What the lack of taxpayer understanding does explain is why the big
landowners have found it easy to sell the voters on so-called property
tax reforms that would be a lot better for land speculators than for
anyone else. Among these questionable reforms are:
- present use assessment
- farm value assessment
- temporary open space reserves
- salable development rights
- legalized underassessment of land
- farm buy-up and lease-back
- the British system of rates
- just cutting the property tax in half
Says Dr. Arthur Solomon, director of the Joint Harvard-MIT Center for
Urban Studies:
In state after state the principal leaders of the property tax "revolt"
prove to be substantial property owners and realtors rather than the
proverbial "little men". . . .We believe that it is these
relatively well-to-do people who would be the true beneficiaries of
the currently popular proposals for effecting massive property tax
reductions.
What too few tax officials and too few taxpayers understand is that
the property tax is not just one tax. On the contrary, said the urban
experts and tax authorities at a round table conference cosponsored by
the National League of Cities and the Council of State Governments:
The property tax combines and confuses on one tax bill
two completely different and conflicting taxes, and it would be hard
to imagine two taxes whose consequences would be more different.
One of the two conflicting taxes fused and confused in the property
tax is the tax on the improvement - the tax on what past, present, and
future owners of the property have spent or will spend of their own
money to improve it.
And, said the round table consensus:
It should be obvious to anyone that heavy taxes on
improvements are bound to discourage, inhibit, and often prevent
private investment in improvements.
The other levy confused in the property tax is the land tax - the
tax on the unimproved location value or the site, the tax on what
land in that location would be worth if its past and present owners
had never spent anything or done anything to improve it. And it
should be obvious to anyone that heavy taxes on the location cannot
discourage or inhibit improvements; on the contrary, heavy taxes on
locations could put effective pressure on the owners to put their
sites to better use so as to bring in enough income to earn a good
profit after paying the heavier tax.
So, concluded the round table:
All this is so obvious [repeat,obvious] that you
would think every city would try to tax land heavily and tax
improvements lightly if at all; but just the opposite is the case.
Almost every city collects two or three times as much money from
taxes on improvements as from taxes on land. In fact, many cities
tax improvements more heavily than the combined local, state, and
federal taxes on any other product of American industry except hard
liquor, cigarettes, and perhaps gasoline.
Conversely, millions of idle urban and suburban acres are so
underassessed and undertaxed that owners have been able to hold their
land off the market for a net yearly tax cost seldom exceeding 1
percent waiting for inflation and an enormous investment of other
people's money to double or triple its price [i.e., to increase its
price one or two hundred times as much as the net yearly tax cost].
Wisely applied, the property tax could be one of the wisest and
fairest of all taxes; but as most cities apply it today it may well be
the very worst - a weird combination of overtaxation and
undertaxation, an incentive tax for what we don't want and a
disincentive tax for what we do want. It harnesses the profit motive
backward instead of forward to both urban renewal and urban
development Too often it makes it more profitable to let buildings
decay than to improve them or replace them.
THE ENORMITY Of THE IMPROVEMENTS TAX
A 4 PERCENT-OF-TRUE-VALUE-A-YEAR property tax on new construction (as
in New York City) may not sound big compared with a federal income tax
that runs up to 70 percent. But it sounds small only because the 4
percent tax is 4 percent of the entire capital value of the
investment, whereas the income tax, as its name makes clear, applies
only to the income on that capital value.
The enormity of this 4 percent-a-year tax on the true value of new
improvements should become clear if we restate it in sales tax, in
income tax, and in consumption tax terms.
In sales tax terms: The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations has calculated that each 1 percent added to the tax on
improvements is the installment plan equivalent of a 19 percent sales
tax, i.e., it will cost the improver as much each year as a 19 percent
single payment sales tax would cost him if he could finance it at 5
percent interest spread over the 60-year life of the improvement. So,
for example, New York's 4 percent-a-year property tax on new
improvements is the installment-plan equivalent of a 76 percent sales
tax!
In income tax terms: New York's 4 percent-of-true-value tax on new
improvements is likely to cost the improver much more than 50 percent
of the income the improvement could otherwise earn on the equity
investment.
In consumption tax terms: New York City's 4
percent-of-true-value-a-year tax on new improvements is the equivalent
of at least a 25 percent consumption tax, i.e., it adds more than 25
percent to the rent or 25 percent to the carrying cost of a home.
Said the Douglas Commission's report: "It seems inconceivable
that we would knowingly place such a tax burden on such a necessity as
shelter,
but we have."
If improvements were taxed more lightly or (better still) untaxed,
our cities would have to find another tax source to make up the loss.
The cities can't very well raise the new revenue by multiplying the
city income tax. That would give everyone with an income one more
reason to move out of the city. And anyhow no good can come of piling
a heavy city income tax on top of a state income tax on top of the
federal individual income tax schedules. The income tax has already
passed the point of diminishing returns. Since 1939 it has been
multiplied 71 times over at the federal level and 52.8 times over at
the state level. Today the federal income levy alone taxes away a
quarter of anything a father can earn over $25,000 and roughly half of
anything he can earn over $40,000. Combined with the inflation caused
by the federal deficits, it has made getting-ahead such a rat-race
that a man must now earn well over $40,000 a year to be as well off as
on $15,000 40 years ago and well over $100,000 a year to be as well
off now as on $25,000 then.
Likewise, most cities dare not try to get the new revenue by
multiplying the city sales tax. That would make it too much cheaper to
shop outside the city line. And anyhow the sales tax is a bad tax
whose only advantage is that it is collected in so many small pieces
that the taxpayer is less likely to notice its cost. It comes down
hardest on the poor, and its end result is fewer jobs and less
production of real wealth, for each 1 percent it adds to the cost of
living translates into much less consumer purchasing power and
therefore less sales, less production, less jobs, and less Gross
National Product.
Likewise, the cities can hardly hope to raise the offsetting billions
by new or increased taxes on corporate income. For the state and
federal governments are already taxing away much more than half the
profits of corporate business. First, we subject firms to state
corporation income taxes that 45 states now apply at rates ranging up
to 10-l/2 percent. Then the federal government subjects the profits of
all but the smallest corporations to a 48 percent tax. Then die states
tax any profits paid out in dividends at rates running up to 15
percent, and the federal government taxes dividends at rates running
up to 70 percent. End result of this unique four-way tax is that our
country is socializing a far bigger share of business profits than any
other theoretically non-socialist country.
Likewise, cities would be foolish to hope they could get the federal
government to offset any part of the tax loss from untaxing
improvements by increased revenue sharing. For sooner or later the
federal government will have to face up to the fact that it is in much
worse money trouble than the cities. For years the federal deficit has
been running bigger than the total of all the deficits of all our
local governments combined!
LAND, THE IDEAL REVENUE SOURCE
LAND is THE ONLY TAXABLE that can't leave town to escape taxation. So
the only revenue source a city could tap to make up for the revenue
loss by untaxing improvements would be to increase the tax on the
unimproved location value of land in the city.
And very fortunately, the result of doubling or tripling the tax on
unimproved location values should be at least as good as the results
you could expect from untaxing improvements. Low taxes on land get
capitalized into high land prices, so some cities like St. Louis where
the property tax is too low are in even worse trouble than cities like
Buffalo and Boston where the property tax is too high.
Untaxing improvements would provide the carrot; uptaxing location
values would provide the stick needed to prod the owners of underused
and misused land to put it to better use in order to bring in enough
additional income to pay the higher tax. This carrot-and-stick
combination would be such strong medicine that in cities where the
property tax is now heavy it might have to be given in small doses
spread over five years or perhaps more. Otherwise, the tax shift might
create a temporary chaos in the local real estate market by starting
an overnight building boom that could send construction costs
skyrocketing and rush in new facilities faster than the market could
absorb them. A six-year study instigated by the Urban Land Institute
in Milwaukee found that it would so change the arithmetic of property
ownership that no subsidy at all would be needed to make it profitable
for the owners of all the valuable vacant land and obsolete or
inadequate buildings close to downtown to erect new buildings that
would make better use of the site.
There are at least 40 good reasons why this carrot-and-stick
combination would work wonders to cure many of our urban ills. They
were all spelled out in the Tax Institute Magazine by Professor Arthur
Becker, chairman of the Interuniversity Committee on Taxation,
Resources and Economic Development and past-chairman of the Property
Taxation Committee of the National Tax Association. Dr. Becker is
professor of economics of the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee,
and former chairman of its economics department.
Before we start discussing some of these forty reasons, let's make
sure we understand what "unimproved location value" means.
The unimproved value of non-farm land means what land in any given
urban or suburban location would be worth if its past and present
owners had never done anything or spent anything to improve it. In
other words, it means the value that land in that location derives
almost entirely from an often enormous investment of other people's
money and most notably other taxpayers' money to develop the community
around it, thus making land in that location accessible, livable and
richly salable. It is a value that is 99-44/100ths percent unearned
increment, and for the life of me I can't think of a fairer tax than a
tax on the unearned increment of other people's investment.
This unearned increment is why multimillionaire Marshall Field I, who
made most of the Field fortune speculating in urban and suburban land,
said: "I would not call owning land a good way to become wealthy.
I would not call owning land the best way to become wealthy. Owning
land is the only way to become wealthy." The word "only"
is an obvious overstatement, but it overstates a good point.
UNEARNED INCREMENT Of LAND VALUES IN NEW YORK
HERE ARE SOME SPECIFIC EXAMPLES of how this unearned increment works
in New York.
Example No. 1. Landowners on Staten Island got a windfall (estimated
all the way from $350 million to $700 million) they had done nothing
to .earn on other people's investment of $350 million to build the
Verrazano Bridge linking the island to Brooklyn. This doubled and
tripled the value of their land by making it twice as accessible from
the rest of the city.
Example No. 2. The owners of the three under-assessed half blocks on
the west side of the Avenue of the Americas (Sixth Avenue) between
47th and 50th Streets - landowners who had been letting their property
run down and decay ever since some time around 1900 - got a windfall
of some $75 million because: 1) the Transit Authority spent millions
of dollars to replace the Sixth Avenue El with a subway with a station
right there; and 2) the Rockefellers spent millions of dollars to
build Rockefeller Center across the street.
Of the 7 million people living in New York not more than 70,000
profit by the way New York now overtaxes the improvements and
under-taxes the unearned increment in land. The rest of the 7 million
New Yorkers lose by it, directly or indirectly.
The trouble is that the 70,000 think they have a very good thing
going for them and fight to keep it. The rest of the 7 million have no
understanding of how they are losing, so they make no move to correct
what is wrong. And the unimproved location value of New York's land
that the 7 million create continues to go to the 70,000.
Dr. Becker keeps this anomaly in mind in explaining why uptaxing land
and untaxing improvements would be good for the cities, good for the
suburbs, good for the countryside, and good for their people. Consider
just a few of his reasons.
Says Dr. Becker:
If improvements were untaxed and the whole weight of the
realty tax were shifted to location values:
- More new homes would be built in the city to take advantage
of the tax exemption of improvements.
- Building more new homes would give slum dwellers a better
chance to escape from the slums.
- Rents would come down as new construction eased the housing
shortage.
- Urban redevelopment would be accelerated at no cost to the
tax-foyers. Over the years the heavier land tax would tax the
slums and their almost worthless buildings out of existence.
- Commercial and industrial construction would likewise be
stimulated.
- This would create more commercial and industrial jobs.
- New buildings would be built better and existing buildings
would be improved if we stop penalizing quality by taxing good
buildings more heavily than cheaper buildings.
- The building boom would create many more jobs in the
construction trades.
- The construction boom would give city planners a better
chance to get their plans off the drawing board and translated
into reality.
- Less close-in land would be wasted. This would save city
governments billions of dollars now wasted by sprawl, for all
municipal costs are multiplied by distance.
- Premature subdivision would no longer be profitable, and this
change should make ecologists and other lovers of open space
much happier.
- Subsidies would no longer be needed to make it profitable for
private enterprise to take on most of the job of rebuilding and
revitalizing our cities.
- The new construction and all the resulting increase in
in-city business activity would strengthen the local tax base
and make our cities less dependent on state and federal aid.
And so on for 27 more good reasons.
So, says Professor Lowell Harriss, economist for the Tax Foundation
and former president of the National Tax Association:
Almost all competent economists are now agreed that the
community-created value of urban and suburban locations should be
taxed much more heavily and the owner-paid-for value of improvements
should be taxed much more lightly.
SOME AUTHORITATIVE OPINIONS
HERE IS A SAMPLING of what authorities past and present have said
about the need of uptaxing land and downtaxing improvements:
A powerful tool for rebuilding urban
centers through private initiative lies in reforming the
property tax. Higher taxation of location values and lower
taxation of improvements would help push land into more
effective use. [CARL H. MADDEN, chief economist, United
States Chamber of Commerce]
Higher taxes on land [and] lower taxation of improvements would
help stimulate development and redevelopment. Holders of sites
in and around the center would be induced to develop their land
or sell it to those who will, so there would be less
leapfrogging out beyond the fringes. Reduced fringe development
would reduce the cost of providing public services and increase
die conservation of green areas and open space surrounding the
city. [CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 1971 Report]
The states should vigorously explore the desirability and
feasibility of placing new or differentially higher taxes upon
land values. [NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS (The Douglas
Commission)]
The increase in the value of land,
arising as it does from the efforts of an entire community,
should belong to the community and not to the individual who
might hold title. [JOHN STUART MILL]
We need property tax reform with better assessments, better
administration and more stress on taxing land. [BREVARD
CRIHFIELD, executive director, Council of State Governments]
The burden of property taxation should be so shifted as to put
the burden on the unearned rise in the value of land rather than
the improvement. [THEODORE ROOSEVELT]
Land should be taxed at a higher rate than improvements so that
there will be encouragement to put land to its most productive
use. The land tax is the only tax that is anti-hoarding - and
hoarding, I submit, is the basic sin in a productive economy.
[THOMAS B. CURTIS, when chairman, Joint Economic Committee of
Congress]
Putting the tax on improvements rather than on land favors old
buildings whose aging is an intimate part of the urban decline
process. [JAY W. FORRESTER, professor of economics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and author, "Urban
Dynamics"]
Land values rise mostly because of other peoples' and other
taxpayers' investment, community development, and population
growth - not because of any actions by the owner. The community
creates the unearned value-increments and has every right to
recapture them by taxation. [DICK NETZER, dean, Graduate School
of Business, New York University]
Lower taxes on improvements encourage new construction and
rejuvenation. Lower taxes on site values have the opposite
effect because they invite land speculation, raise land prices,
and discourage construction. [ROBERT C WOOD, president,
University of Massachusetts, and former secretary, Housing &
Urban Development]
The tax assessor rather than the planner is today determining
the use and development of land. Until we get our tax and
planning policies running in parallel instead of opposite
directions, we will accomplish little in the planning field.
[MAX WEHRLY, when director, Urban Land Institute]
The value of land (in contrast to the value of improvements) is
created by society, not by the owner. [NEW YORK REGIONAL PLAN
ASSOCIATION]
Our staff agrees that today's property tax with its weight on
improvements discourages new construction and impedes the
rehabilitation and maintenance of existing buildings; it
constitutes a force to promote urban sprawl and leapfrogging
development and fosters speculative land holding. A change-over
to site value taxation should give private enterprise an
incentive to improve and build and make fuller use of the land.
[WILLIAM R. MACDOUGALL when executive director, Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations]
Tax manufactures and you check production. Tax buildings and
improvements and you slow development. Tax trade and you hinder
or prevent exchange. Tax capital and you raise the cost of
production. Tax wages and you lessen incentive. But you may take
the whole value of land in taxation and the land will not
diminish or be any less productive. On the contrary, land-value
taxation will reduce the price of land and make more land
available, stimulate trade and open up new opportunities to
labor and capital for the production of wealth. [R. R. STOKES,
M.P.]
We tax unimproved land very low; we tax improvements very high,
and the result is simply to inflate the price of land and force
taxpayers and employers to go farther and farther out. This
makes it unprofitable to locate enough plants near enough to a
city so that you can get jobs and job needers related. [ANDREW
HEISKELL, chairman, Time, Inc., and co-chairman, Urban
Coalition]
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2. Self-Interest Questions About Property Tax Reform
THE FIRST QUESTION almost everybody asks about property tax reform
is: "Just how would property tax reform affect my own pocketbook?
Would it cost me more or cost me less? And why?"
The short answer is that property tax reform would be good for almost
everybody except land speculators. But we can get some more precise
and helpful answers by breaking up the question into its implicit
elements. Why would taxing land more and improvements less be good for
people who work for a living? Why would it be good for investors, good
for the unemployed, good for homeowners, good for home buyers as well
as slum dwellers, good for farmers, good for Blacks, homebuilders,
architects, mortgage lenders, and so on. Last but not least, would it
be good for landowners and if so why?
Question No. 1 - Would taxing land much more heavily be good for wage
earners and everyone else who works to earn a living?
Answer - Indeed it would.
That is the truth Henry George dramatized nearly a hundred years ago
in
Progress and Poverty, a study of why vastly increasing wealth
had failed to wipe out poverty. He dramatized his message with such
simple clarity and sympathy that overnight his masterwork became a
worldwide best seller. Translated into fourteen languages, it sold
well over 4,000,000 copies - far more than any other economic
treatise. Wrote William E. Leuchtenburg 90 years later in his history
of the growth of the American Republic:
On the dusty plains of Kansas, in the slums of Liverpool
and Moscow, on the banks of the Ganges and the Yangtze, poor men
painfully spelled out the message of Progress and Poverty to grasp a
new vision of human society.
Henry George devoted 565 pages of type to detailing his message and
documenting a truth so simple that it can be restated here in less
than 565 words.
All the wealth, all the goods and services we produce each year (what
we now call the gross national product or G.N.P. for short) has to be
divided between:
- the workers who actually create the G.N.P.
- the investors who put up the money needed to pay for the
facilities and tools the workers need to multiply their
productivity and their production (in our time somebody has to
invest an average of more than $30,000 to provide the facilities
needed for one more job in industry or farming);
- the owners of the land and natural resources on and under the
land on which and from which the G.N.P. is produced. For short,
Henry George said the G.N.P. has to be shared between labor,
capital and land.
LANDOWNERS VS. LABORERS AND INVESTORS
THE LANDOWNER gets his cut, not for doing anything, but just for
letting his land be used by the doers. In other words, the landowner's
share of the "take is almost 100 percent unearned. Said famed
economist John Stuart Mill:. "Landowners get rich in their sleep,
without working, risking, or economizing." The richer the
landowners get in their sleep, the less there is for the workers and
investors to split. That's why economist David Ricardo said "The
interests of the landowner are directly opposed to the interest of
every other element in the economy."
Conversely, the less the landowner gets for just letting the
producers use his land the more G.N.P. would be left for the producers
to share.
So Henry George (who was much more interested in helping the poor
than in making better use of the land) blamed the tragedy of poverty
in midst of plenty on the undertaxation of land which has let the
landowners pocket a bigger and bigger share of the G.N.P. without
doing anything to earn it. That is why he urged shifting the full
weight of a heavy property tax off improvements onto land. He went so
far as to question both the landowner's right to keep any of the
community-created unearned increment on his land and the government's
right to take away through taxation any of the money workers and
enterprisers earn by their labor and investors earn by their savings.
Without going to this extreme, there can be no doubt that the reform
Henry George urged would make it that much more profitable for
investors to create more jobs on which more workers could earn more
money.
If Henry George were writing today he would have to add a fourth
sharer, the tax collector. The more the tax collector takes away, the
less is left for labor, capital and land to share. Right now taxes are
taking nearly 40 percent of the national income, leaving only 60
percent for labor, capital and land, and, if taxes keep growing at the
1970-75 rate, taxes may soon be taking 60 percent.
Question No. 2 - Would taxing land more heavily be good for business
investors ?
Answer - Yes, for all the reasons spelled out in answering Question
No. 1. They would, in fact, have to be the first to benefit from
getting the bigger share of the G.N.P. that would then make it more
profitable for them to make the investments needed to create more jobs
at which more workers could make more money.
Question No. 3 - Would taxing land more heavily be good for the
unemployed ?
Answer - Yes, as explained in the answer to Question No. 2.
WHY MOST HOMEOWNERS WOULD BENEFIT
QUESTION No. 4 - Would the tax shift raise or lower the tax on homes?
Answer - Except for the owners of aging homes preempting, valuable
close-in locations that are now needed for more intensive use, most
home-owners should get lower property tax bills. They should pay less
because on good homes the correct improvement-value-to-land-value
ratio is usually well above the prevailing 2-to-l or 3-to-l area-wide
average (for new homes the stipulated Federal Housing -Administration
(FHA) ratio was 9-to-l until land price inflation ran wild, i.e., FHA
would not include in its appraisals a land cost more than 10 percent
of the total).
The prospective cut in homeowner taxes has been confirmed by many
local studies at home and abroad. It was detailed most clearly by a
computer study in Wellington, New Zealand. The Wellington study showed
that although aging homes built prior to 1920 would average somewhat
heavier taxes because their location value had been increasing while
their improvement value shrank with age and obsolescence, homes built
between 1920 and 1930 would average little or no tax change and homes
built in each decade since 1930 would be taxed progressively less and
less.
A computer study of every property in Washington by the District of
Columbia assessor's office found that raising the same revenue by site
value taxation on present assessments would reduce the tax on row
houses an average of 14 percent, detached dwellings 18.8 percent,
two-family homes 20.9 percent, walkup apartments 38.9 percent, and
elevator apartments 22.5 percent.
A computer study of every property in Port Credit, Ontario, found
that if land assessments were corrected to conform with current sales
data, a shift to land value taxation would cut the average homeowner's
property tax by $137 a year Or 22.5 percent.
A San Diego study by the California Statewide Home Owners Association
found that homes inside the city limits would be taxed slightly more
because their average age is greater and their location closer to the
high-land-value center. But outside the city homes in La Mesa would
pay 34 percent less; in San Marcos 29 percent less, in Chula Vista 28
percent less, in Del Mar 28 percent less, in- Oceanside 37 percent
less, in Escondido 23 percent less.
That's one big reason why the Home Owners Association led the fight
to untax improvements and uptax land. And that's one big reason why
most homeowners everywhere have a pocketbook reason to favor such a
tax shift.
Caution: One man's guess is as good as the next man's about what
property tax reform would do to or for homeowners: 1) in places where
homes are now grossly underassessed for political purposes, as they
are, for example, in large sections of New York City; or 2) in places
where (as too often happens) the assessors have made no serious effort
to use a ratio between improvement values and land values that
accurately reflects market conditions. So, for example, a $50,000
study financed by the Schalkenbach and Lincoln Foundations for the New
York City government found that shifting the whole weight of the
property tax to land would reduce the average homeowner's tax bill
only 2 percent. In Milwaukee, where land is grossly underassessed, a
computer study by Dr. Arthur Becker of the University of Wisconsin
found that the tax shift would actually cause a slight increase in the
average homeowner's tax bill.
Question No. 5 - Is today's undertaxation-subsidized inflation in
land prices good for homeowners?
Answer - Most homeowners seem to think so; in fact most homeowners
seem almost slaphappy over all the paper profit they have made on
houses-and-lots they bought for much less than today's prices.
Alas, that paper profit will vanish when they have to pay it all out
to somebody else to cover the similarly inflated price of the next
house-and-lot they buy. When that time comes they can only console
themselves with the thought that as second-time buyers they had the
paper profit to lose, whereas today's first time buyers must go deeply
into debt for a similar purchase.
Wrote
Fortune in a very thought-provoking 1973 report headlined "Land:
The Boom That Really Hurts":
Even those who own modest panels of land (like the plot
under their homes) suffer more from the indirect effects of the land
boom than they benefit from the inflated value of their property,
for directly or indirectly the inflated price of land enters into
the cost of everything they buy today.
Time has been still more explicit that today's land price
inflation is bad for everybody except, of course, big landowners and
smart land speculators. Wrote Time:
For most Americans land price inflation costs more than
it is worth. For the homeowner a rise in the price of his home is
just a theoretical profit until he sells it. Meanwhile the land
price spiral is raising the price of everything the homeowner buys.
Packing plants, bakeries, supermarkets, movie theatres, filling
stations, widget makers all pass on to their customers the rising
price of the land on which they set up shop. The rising price of
farm land is reflected directly in the cost of crops and the price
of food.
Question No. 6 - What about homebuyers?
Answer-Today's misapplication of the property tax hits them twice
over - once before they buy and then again (like all homeowners) after
they buy. It hits them before they buy as part of purchase price, for
the crazy price inflation in land made possible by its undertaxation
is the biggest single reason housing prices have more than doubled
since 1960.
PROPERTY TAX REFORM WOVLD ABOLISH SLUMS
QUESTION No. 7 - What would property tax reform do for slum dwellers?
Answer - Over not-too-many years it would build the slums out of
business by making it much more profitable for private enterprise to
create without subsidy enough more good new or renovated homes so
nobody would have to live in bad housing or put up with slum
conditions. Nobody in his right mind would willingly live in the kind
of shelter that now disgraces most slums, so you can be pretty sure
almost everybody would abandon them and move out as soon as enough
better housing at an attractive price is made available for them to
move to. In many cities you can see this abandonment process already
well advanced as a result of the 10-million-odd new homes brought onto
the market by the 1969-73 splurge of housing subsidies.
Some of this better housing for slum dwellers might be created right
in the present decay areas as the tax shift simultaneously relieves
slum owners of today's tax penalty on improvements and pressures them
to renovate their properties or abandon them. Most of the good new
housing would probably be built in a higher price class somewhere
else. In that case it would help build the slums out of business by
pouring enough more decent housing into the trickle-down market to
make trickle-down flow faster and more freely and so enable millions
now trapped in the slums to escape to better neighborhoods.
In brief, shifting the tax off improvements to land could make
today's slums almost self-eradicating or self-renewing by this
three-way process of: 1) speeding the renovation of slum housing that
is worth renovating; 2) speeding the abandonment and demolition of
slum housing that is hopelessly bad; and 3) making the land now
preempted by junkers available for more desirable and more profitable
re-use.
This should go far towards ending the clamor for pouring millions of
tax dollars into slum demolition, land writedowns, and subsidized
housing. More important, let's hope it would obviate the destruction
of whole neighborhoods by the kind of catastrophic slum clearance that
so often ruins the owners of slum area businesses, leaves block after
block of cleared land bare and unused for years, and forces the mass
relocation of yesterday's slum dwellers without first providing good
housing where they could afford to relocate.
No one should expect this self-renewal miracle to happen overnight.
No one would or should rush out to start erecting good new housing in
the middle of the slums. The renewal process would have to start at
the edge of the slums and spread inward as the tax change tips the
economic scales and makes it more profitable for edge-of-the-slums
property owners to replace or improve the present buildings and less
profitable to let them continue to decay.
GOOD FOR MOST FARMERS
QUESTION No. 8 - Wouldn't the tax shift be bad for farmers who need
so much land?
Answer - Most farmers think so and it may be a waste of time to try
to make them see they are wrong.
The shift would be good for farmers because it would give them an
added incentive to improve their farms and thereby make them more
profitable. It would be bad only for farmers who let their farms run
down. A farm-by-farm study in Pennsylvania's rural Indiana County by
Professor Steven Cord of Indiana University found that it would lower
the tax on all the better farms. Perhaps significantly, the farms in
North Dakota and the nearby Canadian province of Alberta offer the
only North American example of a complete shift to land value
taxation. Farm buildings and farm equipment are not taxed at all
there; the entire weight of each farmer's property tax falls on the
value of his land alone. This would have been politically impossible
if the farmers had opposed it.
"Tree farms" (i.e., forest areas whose owners have spent
millions of dollars for access roads, increased fertility, fire
protection, replanting, etc., etc.) could also expect lower property
taxes under land or site value taxation. Says Dr. Ellis T. Williams,
who was financial economist for the Forest Service in Washington: "The
application of site value taxation to forest land is not only feasible
but (in conjunction with land use controls) desirable."
The only farmers who stand to lose by a shift to land value taxation
are farmers on the urban fringe whose land price is now being
multiplied by the prospect of early and lucrative sale for
urbanization. These fringe-farm owners do have reason as land
speculators, to fear that high taxes on land might dash their hopes of
selling out to a developer for many times their purchase price and
retiring on the proceeds.
Soaring land prices for undertaxed land have been fine for farmers
turned speculators who want to get out of farming, but very bad indeed
for anyone who wants to buy or enlarge a farm instead of selling. They
are particularly bad for farmers who want to go on farming on the
fringe of suburbanization, for the too-high price of close-in land
made possible by its undertaxation is forcing developers to leapfrog
far out into the boondocks of premature subdivision and scatter their
tracts over land that should be left free for farming for many years
to come. These scatterations need many costly urban and suburban
services that require much heavier local taxes than outer-fringe
farmers can afford to pay.
Perhaps the best way to neutralize farm and lumber industry
opposition to uptaxing land would be to give all land a basic
exemption of $200 or perhaps even $300 an acre. This would make little
tax difference in $10,000-an-acre suburbia or up-to-$l million-an-acre
cities, but it would spare most farmers the risk of a tax increase
from higher land taxes. It would also give farmers out in farm country
a bigger tax saving than they would get from the proposed stipulation
that all farms should be assessed at their farm value rather than
market value (since the only value at which farm-country farms can now
be assessed anyhow is their value as farms).
NOT UNFAIR TO LANDOWNERS
QUESTION No. 9 - Wouldn't the tax shift be very unfair to landowners?
Answer - Contrary to common belief, even tripling the tax on land
could be good instead of bad for most landowners if it is offset by a
simultaneous reduction or elimination of the tax on improvements.
The three-times-as-heavy land tax would indeed be capitalized into a
lower land price, but the chance to use the site for a tax-free or
almost tax-free improvement instead of an overtaxed improvement would
be capitalized into a higher land price.
Landowners who put their land to a use fully commensurate with its
value could expect to pay a substantially lower total tax than they
would now pay and this lower tax on the land-and-improvement package
should make their land more valuable. So, provided the tax shift is
staggered over enough years to give landowners time to adjust to it,
the only landowners who would stand to lose by the change are ...
- the owners of unused, underused, or misused land who persist in
keeping it that way instead of taking advantage of the lowered tax
on improvements; and
- the owners of outer fringe land that now enjoys a completely
fictitious shortage value because the present undertaxation of so
much closer-in land that should be urbanized first makes it cheap
and easy for its owners to hold it off the market waiting for
still higher prices.
Perhaps surprisingly, the first to benefit from the tax shift
uptaxing land and downtaxing improvements might be the owners of idle
or almost idle land close to the city center, for they could be first
to take advantage of the lowered tax on improvements.
For the long pull urban landowners have as much if not more, than
anyone else to gain from correcting today's misapplication of the
property tax. The value of their land derives 99-44/100 percent, not
from anything they themselves have done or can do to make it more
valuable but from what others do to make the location more desirable.
The present tax with its heavy penalty on improvements gives each
property owner in the neighborhood an incentive for letting his
property run down instead of spending good money for improvements that
would help upgrade the neighborhood. When all the property owners on
the block let their property deteriorate to save taxes all of them are
bound to lose.
Land is the only investment that cannot move away when the city, the
neighborhood, or the block decays, so landowners have more to lose
than anybody else by a tax whose present incidence penalizes
betterment and seems to reward decay.
Question No. 10 - How would the tax shift affect downtown?
Answer - In all but the newest cities it would make downtown pay a
much bigger share of the property tax total. In Washington, for
example, the assessor's computer study showed that it would increase
property tax collections in the central business district by 31.6
percent, from J32.359.669 to $42,624,598.
Surprising as it may seem, such a tax increase would be just about
the best thing that could possibly happen to downtown, where decay has
too long been subsidized by both federal and local undertaxation. The
tax shift would reduce the tax on downtown buildings that make good
use of their site just as it would reduce the tax on good buildings
elsewhere in the city. The only reason it would increase the downtown
tax total is that downtown is the oldest part of most cities, so in
too many cities (says Fortune) downtown is "leprous with
dilapidated old buildings and pockmarked with parking lots" where
the old buildings have been demolished and not replaced.
Around the center of Detroit, for example, the Downtown Association
says 70 percent of the land is abandoned to one-level parking; in
downtown Milwaukee 95 percent of the buildings are more than 50 years
old and will soon be overdue for replacement. These old buildings do
not necessarily offer even the advantage of cheap rents, for the
overtaxation of new improvements protects them from strong-enough rent
competition from new construction.
How can anyone expect such a huddle of undertaxed old buildings to
provide a strong enough magnet to hold the city together? Concluded
Dr. Gaffney on the basis of the Milwaukee tax study he made while a
member of the economics department of the University of Wisconsin: "Today's
tax system is delaying downtown renewal by at least thirty years."
What downtown needs most of all is a tax shift that would, at one and
the same time, 1) put heavy tax pressure on downtown landowners to put
their prime locations to good use; and 2) stop penalizing downtown
rebuilding by overtaxing improvements.
Meanwhile the federal government subsidizes downtown decay by letting
the owners of decayed or obsolete old buildings redepreciate them over
and over again for tax purposes as often as they are sold.
On buildings old enough or run-down enough to rate taking their
re-depreciation in ten years this tax deduction could double the
potential profit for a corporate purchaser or a private buyer in the
50 percent tax bracket, and doubling the potential profit could double
the resale value. For example, on a building bought for $100,000 with
two-thirds of the $100,000 arbitrarily assigned to the improvement
under the standard I.R.S. practice of conforming to the usual 2-to-l
improvement-to-land assessment ratio the annual 10-year redepreciation
deduction would be two-thirds of one-tenth of $100,000, or $6,666.67 a
year. On a million-dollar purchase it would be $66,666.67!
This redepreciation allowance may well be costing the federal
government much more than a billion dollars a year, but nobody at the
Treasury seems to know how much.
WHAT INDUSTRY COULD GAIN
QUESTION No. 11 - What industry has most to gain by property tax
reform?
Answer - The building industry and its customers (including
home-owners), for the building industry's product is now taxed more
heavily than the product of any other major industry except hard
liquor, cigarettes, and perhaps gasoline while the cost of its biggest
purchase (land) has been inflated by undertaxation 6.19 times as fast
as the rest of the wholesale price level (so said the Douglas
Commission).
The high price of land which has been so profitable for land
speculators is bad for land developers. They are, in fact, its first
victims, and often its biggest losers, for the more they have to pay
for raw acreage the bigger their risk, the bigger their cost for
interest paid or interest foregone, the less money they have left to
pay their development costs, and the less their chance of making a
good profit on their investment.
The high price of land is bad for architects because the more money
their clients must pay for the site the less they have left for
creative quality design, quality features, and quality construction.
Today's land costs are the No. 1 reason we could afford a far richer
architecture when America was much poorer than we can afford now that
America is rich. And that, in turn, helps explain why architects in
both Chicago and Los Angeles are actively urging that most of the
local property tax should be shifted off the improvements they design
onto the land that is now so overpriced. It also helps explain why a
1974 study showed unemployment was almost as bad among architects as
among poor blacks.
The high price of land that has been so good for acreage owners is
bad for homebuilders because the more the builder has to pay for his
lots the less money he has left to build more sales appeal into his
houses, the greater his risk of having to price his product out of the
market, and the less his chance of selling his houses at a good
profit. Thirteen years ago the Home Builders voted 4-to-l that land
was already their No. 1 problem and Nat Rogg, later executive vice
president of the National Association of Home Builders, said: "Land
is a real killer to the builder. The cost of land has gone up more
than all other housing costs combined."
The high price of land has been equally bad for subcontractors,
building material dealers, and building product manufacturers. When a
builder has had to pay thousands of dollars too much for his land he
has to take that money out of his house somewhere or go broke, so he
passes 21 the squeeze on to his subs, he passes the squeeze on to his
dealers (or tries to eliminate the dealer and the dealer's mark-up
entirely), and he passes the squeeze on to the building products
manufacturer, too often by buying the cheapest products he thinks he
can get by with.
The high price of land is bad for real estate brokers because they
live by making sales and today's crazy land prices are pricing
millions of both new homes and used homes clear out of the market. And
let's not forget that when a family that could afford to trade up to a
better new home elects to stay put instead, the real estate brokers
don't lost just one sale; they lose up to a dozen sales they could
have made to families playing musical chairs, each trading up to a
better used home, with each of the trade-up sales offering brokers the
chance for a trade-up commission.
And finally the high price of land that has been so good for acreage
owners is bad for the mortgage lenders and mortgage holders, because
the more water there is in the land price the less real value the
mortgage will represent and the less the mortgage holder's security.
As for the homebuilding industry's customers, they are the final
victims of the high price of land, for they end up paying the entire
bill. They are also the first victims of the way the product of the
building industry is now overtaxed.
Question No. 12 - What people have most to gain from property tax
reform ?
Answer - The Blacks, especially poor Blacks.
Poor Blacks are two-time losers by today's misapplication of the tax.
- They lose on the home front because the overtaxation of
improvements has discouraged private investment in enough new
homes to end the housing shortage while the undertaxation of land
has been a major cause of the land price inflation that has been
the biggest single factor pricing good unsubsidized housing beyond
the reach of the poor. So most poor Blacks, being low men on the
totem pole, are trapped in slum housing because there is not other
housing they could afford.
- They lose on the job front because the overtaxation of
improvements is driving too many employers out of the cities to
places outside where job-needing Blacks find it difficult if not
impossible to follow-places where land is cheaper and taxes are
lower.
Middle-class Blacks now trapped by prejudice and covert segregation
on the edge of the slums would find homesellers in better
neighborhoods much readier to welcome them if ending the housing
shortage should make their homes harder to sell for their asking
price. 1. [Perry Prentice for 25 years irai vice president of Time
Inc., including service as publisher of Time Magazine and as editor
and publisher of Time Inc.'s housing and architectural journals. He
has been Time Inc.'i principal officer concerned with the problems of
housing and urban development. He is active in professional and
business organizations interested in providing and improving America's
housing, cities and urban life. Eorro*.]
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