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All that is old to free traders. Mr. Evarts called attention to it when he was secretary of state, and Henry George made much of it in his work on "Protection or Free Trade." Since then it has been widely used in the free trade press and upon the free trade rostrum in answer to the false pretense of protected manufacturers that they must have protection against foreign goods to enable them to pay American wages. To that pretense it is a complete answer. If, as the Journal truly says, the total cost of production, and especially the labor item in the cost of production, for nearly everything we produce, is lower here than it is anywhere else in the world, and this is especially noticeable in the case of the products of our highest-priced labor, why should any American employer need a protective tariff to enable him to pay American wages?

In a letter to the Mobile Daily Item, E. Q. Norton concisely expresses the insincerity of those who advocate educational qualifications for the suffrage upon pretense that they want better government. He says that those who would deny the ballot to uneducated men, do not propose to give the ballot to the educated women; and yet, if they are really sincere in their demands that intelligence shall rule, they cannot refuse the franchise to such women.

The truth is that in this so-called democratic country of ours, democracy is still in its infancy. Each of us has learned that he is entitled to the same rights as everybody else; but that everybody else is entitled to equal rights with him, is a lesson which as yet but few have learned. It is that ignorance, and not so much a desire for the best government for all the governed, that prompts all the measures for suffrage restriction.

The 55th congress, which went out of office on the 4th, has appropriated the sum of \$1,566,890,016. This is \$522,309,743 in excess of the largest appropriation ever made before. The country was indignant with what was

called "the billion dollar congress," which went out of office only six years ago; but here is a congress that not only equals the enormous billion appropriations of its predecessor, but piles half a billion more on top of it, and twenty-two millions on top of that.

Of course the cost of the war must be deducted from the above mentioned appropriations, as being extraordinary expenses which any congress must have incurred. These are computed by Congressman Cannon, chairman of the house committee on appropriations, at \$482,562,083. If that computation were right, the appropriations by the retiring congress would still be, in round numbers, \$39,700,000 more than those of the billion dollar congress. But Cannon's computation is not right; it is grossly excessive. He includes in war expenses the \$20,000,000 purchase money for the Philippines, and the increased cost of our standing army, besides other expenses which are incurred not in prosecution of the war, but in prosecution of McKinley's imperial policy.

The total expenditures for war and navy for the entire year from January 1, 1898, to December 31, 1898, as reported by the treasury department, are only \$281,347,267; and this amount exceeds the ordinary expenses of army and navy, as indicated by the report for the year 1897, by only \$190,553,749. As the war is now over, the latter sum covers all its legitimate cost, except for unpaid bills. Is it possible that unpaid war bills amount to \$292,000,000? Unless they do, Mr. Cannon's computation of war expenses is excessive, and the congressional appropriations for other than war purposes are much more in excess of all previous appropriations than Mr. Cannon admits. The appropriations of the retiring congress, over and above the legitimate cost of the war, are probably about \$1,300,000,000—a good \$300,000,000 more than was ever before appropriated by one congress.

FURTHER LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION.

Last week we considered one branch of the legal relations of the United States to the Philippine islands. We purpose now to consider another. The relations to which our attention was then devoted were those growing out of the protocol exclusively; we now consider the effect of the treaty.

I.

Our former article, mentioned above, showed that the Philippine republic, at the time of the signing of the protocol last summer, was what is known to international law as a "de facto" government, its resistance to Spain having passed beyond simple or temporary acts of treason, mutiny or sedition, and assumed the character and proportions of civil war. In the prosecution of this war, the Philippine republic had expelled the "de jure" Spanish government from all the archipelago, except Manila, Iloilo, and a few other coast cities, where the Filipinos had the Spanish garrisons penned in. Not only was it a "de facto" government, therefore, but, with the exceptions noted, it was in possession of all the territory over which it claimed jurisdiction.

After the protocol, continuing its civil war with Spain, the Philippine republic so far completed the expulsion of the Spanish government that, at the beginning of the present year Spain occupied but little territory in all the Philippine archipelago, and governed none. Manila was governed by the United States, under the protocol, and all other important places were subject to the "de facto" government of the Philippine republic.

Any title, then, which the United States might thereafter acquire to the Philippines outside of Manila, must be derived from the Philippine republic, the "de facto" government in actual possession, and not from Spain, the "de jure" government, which had been expelled.

This conclusion rests securely upon the familiar principle of international law that when one government acquires territory from another by conquest, the deposed government cannot give title to a third government. Nor is it necessary, in order to divest a