

in Henry George's single tax the Episcopal church also contributes. Bishop Huntington, of the diocese of Central New York, is one. His son, Father Huntington, is another. Still another is Dean Williams, of Trinity cathedral, Cleveland, Ohio, whose graphic paper on the right to the use of the earth, read before the Boston single tax society last winter, and published in pamphlet form by the National Single Taxer, of Minneapolis, identifies him most distinctly with the George movement. Dean Williams is a man of extraordinary eloquence and force. In the Church of the Disciples, Rev. Harris R. Cooley, also of Cleveland, is a notable follower of George; and among the Presbyterians Rev. S. S. Craig, the Canadian, may be said to lead the list. The Methodists also contribute a strong Canadian in Rev. Salem Bland. Among the Swedenborgians, clergymen of pronounced single tax views are numerous, while the Congregationalists and the Jews are well represented. Rabbi Sale, of St. Louis, is a leading single taxer. To give the names of even a small proportion of the ministers of all denominations who have found inspiration in George's writings and volunteered to propagate the truths he taught, would require an alphabetical index for convenient reference. One name, however, that of a man who to the general religious and educational public of America is perhaps best known of all, must not be omitted. We refer to Prof. George D. Herron, D. D., of Iowa College, Grinnell, Iowa. Prof. Herron's tendencies at first were regarded as socialistic; but of his complete acceptance of Henry George's doctrines there is now from his writings no room for doubt. Among the later acquisitions to the single tax movement is Rev. Alexander Kent, of the People's church, Washington, D. C., whose sermon on the subject, which appears in the May number of "Why?" published at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, is an exceptionally discriminating and forceful presentation of the substance of George's teachings.

A recent discussion of the theory of an Austrian professor of embryology who holds that the sex of children is determined wholly by the mother, has brought out some arguments which go to show the shallowness of much that is said for pre-natal influences, including the influences of heredity, upon the minds and morals of children. One well-known physician, arguing that while the mother has a potent influence hers is not the only one, is quoted as saying: "A clever father having five children and a dull wife will be lucky if more than one rises above mediocrity intellectually; but, per contra, if a clever woman is married to a dull husband and has five children, probably four will be bright. Even here, however, we see the male has still some influence, for history shows us that the finest intellects come from the union of a bright father and mother." This observation is especially valuable because it admirably illustrates the tendency of heredity theorists to ignore an influence which is certainly not less potent than pre-natal conditions, namely, the influence of environment. The ordinary man of common sense, if he stopped to think when told that a clever father having five children and a dull wife would be lucky if more than one of the children rose above mediocrity intellectually, would suspect the reason to be that during the impressionable years of the children their mental development had been influenced chiefly by the mother, through her maternal relationship, which during that period is as a rule closer and more impressive than the relationship of the father. If then this ordinary man of common sense were told that on the other hand, if a clever woman is married to a dull husband and has five children probably four will be bright, he would regard his suspicion as fairly well verified. And if after that he were told that history shows that the finest intellects come from a bright father and mother, he would conclude that the child's future intellectually is

determined not at all by heredity, but wholly by his bringing up. In so concluding, he might be in error. Heredity doubtless plays a part in the physical qualities of men, and it may play a part also in their mental qualities. But he would not be so grossly in error as is the speculative scientist or faddist who turns to heredity for an explanation of all mental and moral peculiarities, while leaving environment wholly out of consideration.

When the supreme court of Washington was about to pass upon the constitutionality of a law of that state prohibiting the specific enforcement of contracts for payments in gold coin, it introduced a method of reaching sound conclusions which might well be imitated by appellate courts generally, whenever questions affecting the public at large are before them. It invited the leading lawyers of the state, though not interested in the case, to submit briefs supplementary to those of the regularly retained counsel. The only objection to this innovation is that it does not go far enough. It ought to be the privilege of every lawyer to submit a brief on questions of law in any case, without being either retained by one of the parties directly in interest or personally invited by the court. Since decisions become precedents affecting interests far beyond those immediately involved, there should be an orderly method by which all persons who are to be affected by the decision as a precedent may be heard. In the Washington case, the innovation does not appear to have worked very well. The court decided that the law in controversy was unconstitutional because it undertook to regulate a subject over which congress has exclusive control. When it is considered that the law did not assume to determine what is legal tender, nor to interfere with contracts already made, but only to provide that future contracts made payable in gold coin may be satisfied with "any kind of lawful money or currency of

the United States," it is not easy to see how the exclusive province of federal legislation was invaded. But this miscarriage does not prove that the idea of inviting arguments from the bar in general upon important questions of law about to be decided by a court of last resort is not a good one.

The Philadelphia Single Tax society has voted down a series of resolutions in condemnation of the war. These resolutions denounced war as in itself a great evil, which brings in its train many other evils, and asserted that no war can be justified except when clearly the only means of defense. They justified the Cuban revolt, and the efforts of Americans to help the Cuban cause, and condemned the government of the United States for its interference; a wrong, said the resolutions, which "cannot be atoned for by committing other wrongs," such as the declaration of war to make Cuba independent. In so declaring, the resolutions proceeded, the government "exceeds its functions and violates its traditions; it commits robbery not alone by the seizure at sea of the property of inoffensive Spaniards, but also by the misuse of public funds which cannot rightfully be used in a war unnecessary for the defense of the owners of those funds." Among the other grounds of condemnation, the war was charged with shedding innocent blood, generating international hatred, and reviving militarism and thereby retarding the advance of freedom and public virtue; and the government was accused of giving the lie to its professions of desire for justice by ignoring Spain's offer to arbitrate the dispute over the destruction of the Maine. These resolutions having been voted down by the single tax society, 17 prominent members have signed and published them as their individual protest.

What may have been the motive of the Philadelphia single tax society in thus defeating the resolutions

outlined above, can be known of course only to the members respectively who voted against them; but several reasons might be inferred, any of which would have justified the action. It will be sufficient here to name only one. The resolutions rest upon the anarchistic principle—which is not at all the single tax principle—that the community or nation is a loose aggregation, having no individuality of its own, and owing no obligations as a whole to other nations. In other words, that there is no such thing as international law which we as a community ought to respect. It is only upon this basis that it can be maintained that our citizens should have been permitted to make unlicensed war upon Spain in behalf of Cuba. If the principle of responsible government be admitted, the right of individuals to make war upon their own account must be denied. The protest, made as it is in the spirit of peace, is entitled to all respect; but the single tax man militant—and most single tax men are militant when questions of liberty, political as well as economic, are at stake—will, we take it, be glad that the Philadelphia single tax society did not give it their sanction. To paraphrase a famous utterance, conditions as well as theories confront the single tax movement.

One of the signs of a disposition among what Gladstone called "the classes" in contradistinction to what he called "the masses," to govern the masses without their consent, appears in a growing tendency to revert to the old plan, abandoned because it was undemocratic, of making state constitutions against the interests and the will of the people as a whole. The latest instance of this species of usurpation is furnished by "the classes" of Louisiana. A constitutional convention of that state, which has just completed its official labors, has not only virtually disfranchised the negroes, who comprise half the population of the state, but has proclaimed the instrument in operation without submis-

sion to the voters. In disfranchising the negro population, these constitution makers have violated their obligation to propose an instrument for the good of all the people, and not of a class merely; but in declaring it the constitution of the state without confirmation by popular suffrage, they have gone much further in the direction of usurpation. A constitution is the charter by which the people themselves establish their state. To assume, then, to make such an instrument valid without the consent of the people, is the baldest kind of usurpation. If one constitutional convention can do this, and in doing it can disfranchise one class in the community, another can do the same thing, disfranchising another class. Let the white people of Louisiana beware how they tolerate usurpation, even though they think it excusable for the purpose of taking the suffrage from the blacks. An act like that of their recent constitutional convention is a menace to their own liberties. The price of liberty is eternal vigilance. People who acquiesce in acts of usurpation like these, fail to pay that price and must expect in consequence to find themselves divested of the goods. The despoilers of liberty never sleep.

At the instance of the Interstate Commerce Commission, a bill is now pending in the United States senate for largely increasing the power of that commission over interstate commerce by railway. The bill was introduced by Senator Cullom, and is known as Senate Bill 3,354. Should this bill become a law, interstate railroads would fall completely under the control of the Interstate Commission. It is a bad bill. But not for the reasons given by the railroads in their opposition to it. They make a great deal about giving "a political body the practical control of property which in the aggregate represents nearly one-fifth of the total assets of the United States," as if a fifth of the wealth of the country were any more sacred than a twenty-fifth or a millionth! The sanctity of property rights is to