

there may be on this phase of the question there is universal agreement that the Philippines shall not be turned back to Spain. No true American will consent to that. . . . And yet, had we refused to accept the cession of them we should have had no power over them, even for their own good. We could not discharge the responsibilities resting upon us until these islands became ours, either by consent or treaty. There was but one alternative, and that was either Spain or the United States in the Philippines. The other suggestions—first, that they should be tossed into the arena for the strife of nations; or, second, be lost to the anarchy and chaos of no protectorate at all—were too shameful to be considered. . . . Our concern was not for territory or trade or empire, but for the people whose interests and destiny, without our willing it, had been put in our hands. It was with this feeling that from the first day to the last not one word or line went from the executive in Washington to our military and naval commanders at Manila or to our peace commissioners at Paris that did not put as the sole purpose to be kept in mind first, after the success of our arms and the maintenance of our own honor, the welfare and happiness and the rights of the inhabitants of the Philippine islands. Did we need their consent to perform a great act for humanity? We had it in every aspiration of their minds, in every hope of their hearts. Was it necessary to ask their consent to capture Manila, the capital of their islands? Did we ask their consent to liberate them from Spanish sovereignty or to enter Manila bay and destroy the Spanish sea power there? We did not ask these; we were obeying a higher moral obligation which rested on us and which did not require anybody's consent. We were doing our duty by them with the consent of our own consciences and with the approval of civilization. Every present obligation has been met and fulfilled in the expulsion of Spanish sovereignty from their islands, and while the war that destroyed it was in progress we could not ask their views. Nor can we now ask their consent.

Indeed, can anyone tell me in what form it could be marshaled and ascertained until peace and order, so necessary to a reign of reason, shall be secured and established? A reign of terror is not the kind of rule under which right action and deliberate judgment are possible. It is not a good time for the liberator to submit important questions concerning liberty and government to the liberated while they are engaged in shooting down their rescuers?

The future of the Philippine islands is now in the hands of the American people. Until the treaty was ratified or rejected the executive department of this government could only preserve the

peace and protect life and property. That treaty now commits the free and enfranchised Filipinos to the guiding hand and the liberalizing influences, the generous sympathies and the uplifting education, not of their American masters, but of their American emancipators. No one can tell to-day what is best for them or for us. I know no one at this hour who is wise enough or sufficiently informed to determine what form of government will best preserve their interests and our interests; their and our well-being. . . . Until congress shall direct otherwise it will be the duty of the executive to possess and hold the Philippines, giving to the people thereof peace and beneficent government, affording them every opportunity to prosecute their lawful pursuits, encouraging them in thrift and industry, making them feel and know we are their friends, not their enemies; that their good is our aim; that their welfare is our welfare, but that neither their aspirations nor ours can be realized until our authority is acknowledged and unquestioned.

That the inhabitants of the Philippines will be benefited by this republic is my unshaken belief; that they will have a kindlier government under our guidance and that they will be aided in every possible way to be self-respecting and self-governing people is as true as that the American people love liberty and have an abiding faith in their own government and their own institutions.

No imperial designs lurk in the American mind. They are alien to American sentiment, thought and purpose. Our priceless principles undergo no change under a tropical sun.

We now pass from the Philippine question to the personal issue between Sampson and Schley, which has been brought before the senate. It has long been asserted on the part of Sampson's friends, including the secretary of the navy, that Schley was not only entitled to no credit for the victory over Cervera, but that he merited condemnation for negligence in hovering about Cienfuegos in May, while Cervera was safely hidden in Santiago harbor, a negligence which but for good fortune and the vigilance of Sampson might have permitted Cervera to escape. Schley remained silent throughout the controversy, and a prejudice against him had begun to take root. But when the secretary of the navy submitted a report with documents, to the senate, in which both directly and through Sampson's reports to him, he reiterated the complaints against Schley, Schley was given an opportunity to answer. This he did through a communication to the senate committee

on naval affairs, which was made public on the 20th.

As to his delay off Cienfuegos Schley says that he was then acting under orders from Sampson to blockade that port. These orders of Sampson are not given in the secretary's report along with Sampson's other orders; so Schley quotes from them. They are dated May 20, and were received by Schley May 23. By them Sampson requires Schley to

hold his fleet off Cienfuegos. If the Spanish ships have put into Santiago they must come either to Havana or to Cienfuegos to deliver the munitions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. I am therefore of the opinion that the best chance to capture these ships will be to hold the two points, Cienfuegos and Havana, with all the force we can muster. If, later, it should develop that these vessels are at Santiago we can then assemble off that point the ships best suited for the purpose, and completely blockade it. Until we, then, receive more positive information we shall continue to hold Havana and Cienfuegos.

On the 24th of May Schley learned definitely that the Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos, and within two hours he started for Santiago where, after much difficulty, he succeeded in positively locating it on the 29th. His statement in this particular he verifies by a telegram of May 31st from Sampson, in which Sampson congratulates him upon his success in locating and blockading the enemy's fleet at Santiago. Schley takes occasion to contrast this compliment with Sampson's letter to the department of July 10—six weeks later—describing the same occurrence as "reprehensible conduct."

Turning then to the events of the battle with Cervera on July 3, Schley first shows that he and not Sampson, was by Sampson's own orders, in command of the fleet. At 8:45 on that morning, more than an hour before Cervera's ships emerged from the harbor, Sampson signaled his fleet to "disregard movements of the commander-in-chief," and steamed away eastward. This left Schley the senior officer present, and clothed him with the responsibility of command. That was the situation when the enemy appeared. Schley then directed the American fleet by signals from the Brooklyn, with which also he made a maneuver that he describes as "the crucial and deciding feature of the combat." It was not until after this

battle of July 3, Schley explains, that he heard any criticism, either from Sampson, the department, or anyone else, of his so-called "reprehensible conduct" prior to May 29.

Other aftermath of the Spanish war relates to charges made by Gen. Miles for the investigation of which, as reported last week, the president has convened a court of inquiry. The court met on the 17th at Washington, and on the 20th Gen. Miles appeared before it as the first witness. Since then several witnesses have testified as to the quality of the beef furnished the troops in the field.

In Europe the center of interest for the week has been in France. At our last report, a week ago, that country was in a state of great excitement over the bill which had just passed the chamber of deputies, to regulate the revision of the Dreyfus case; and in the midst of this turmoil, on the 16th, the president of France—Felix Faure—suddenly died. The cause of his death was apoplexy. It was feared at the time that this event might under the circumstances precipitate a revolution. But the fear was not realized. In two days a new president had been quietly elected. The election took place at Versailles. Emile Loubet, president of the senate, presided over the two houses. On the first ballot Loubet was elected. He received 483 votes out of 817 cast. The total number of members is 883.

The new president of France has been exceptionally noncommittal on the subject of the Dreyfus case. But as his election was due to the almost unanimous support of the senate, in which there is believed to be an overwhelming Dreyfus majority, and also because his election was bitterly opposed by the anti-Dreyfusites, it is assumed that he is rather favorable than unfavorable to Dreyfus. After the election, attempts were made in Paris to get up a demonstration against Loubet, but they failed. As we write, however, there is great nervousness lest a revolutionary outbreak may occur on the occasion of the late president's funeral. In his message to the chambers, delivered on the 21st, President Loubet spoke in general terms giving no indication of specific policies.

The Spanish cortes met on the 20th. This occasion has been looked forward to with peculiar interest on

account of the pending questions relating to the war with the United States, including that of the ratification of the Paris treaty. The first meeting was very disorderly. A general uproar being provoked by random discussions of different phases of the war; and Premier Sagasta was compelled to withdraw his proposition to refer the bill for ceding the Philippines to the United States, on account of conservative opposition. Bitter accusations were made regarding the "shameful capitulation of Santiago." One deputy complained that although five months had elapsed no Spanish general had yet been shot. Similar scenes were enacted at the session on the 21st; and they were repeated on the 22d. The treaty has not yet been acted upon.

Greek politics are not so boisterous as those of France and Spain. The election, the approach of which we noted in No. 41, page 11, passed off quietly on the 20th. The ministry in power at the time of the dissolution of the chamber on the 9th of last January, which was led by Alexander Zaimis, appealed to the constituencies. The opposition was led by the former premier, Theodore Delyannis. Delyannis was badly beaten. He carried only 22 seats out of 207. Elections in Greece are by manhood suffrage, 21 years being the minimum age limit.

Friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States were supposed to have been disturbed by the sudden and long adjournment on the 20th of the Canadian high joint commission. The adjournment was taken until August 2. This commission was created pursuant to an agreement made May 30, 1897, by the British ambassador, the Canadian minister of marine, and two American special commissioners, its function being to frame a treaty between Great Britain and the United States for the complete adjustment of all controversies affecting the United States and Canada. Among the questions contemplated are those of North Pacific sealing, of Atlantic fisheries, of the Alaska and other indefinite boundary lines, of the transit of merchandise across boundaries, of alien labor laws, of mining rights, of customs duties, of war vessels on the great lakes, of the transportation of prisoners by either country through the other, of the use of currency, of trade reciprocity, and of wreckage and salvage rights. The joint commission met in Quebec on

the 23d of August last, from which place, after a few meetings, it adjourned to Washington, where the decision to take the long adjournment until next August has just been made.

Several reasons for the long adjournment were surmised, chief among which was the supposed inability of the commission to come to an agreement as to the Alaska boundary. This dispute arises out of the treaty between England and Russia, made in 1825, when Russia owned Alaska. Having acquired Russian rights under that treaty, the United States claims 30 miles in width of territory along the Pacific coast from the point where the boundary line leaves the 141st meridian to the point where it touches the 130th, being the territory which has been generally indicated on the maps as part of Alaska. Canada's claim, on the other hand, based upon her interpretation of the same treaty, would carry the line within much less than 30 miles of the coast, and give to her valuable harbors from which she is now excluded. The crucial question is whether in describing the line as 30 miles back from the coast, the treaty alluded to the main coast or to the outlying islands. If to the islands the Canadian claim holds good; if to the main coast it fails.

There was in fact, however, no real reason for supposing that the commission had encountered serious obstacles to an agreement, and this was made plain on the day of the adjournment by the publication of the following statement, signed by Senator Fairbanks, chairman of the American commission, for the United States, and by Sir Wilfrid Laurin, acting chairman of the British commission, in behalf of Canada:

The commission adjourned to meet at Quebec August 2 unless the chairmen of the respective commissions shall agree upon another date.

The commission has made very substantial progress in the settlement and adjustment of many of the questions upon which it has been earnestly engaged. But it has been unable to agree upon the settlement of the Alaskan boundary. This problem has been a complicated and difficult one, but the commissioners, acting in the utmost friendliness and cordiality, have been unable to agree upon a satisfactory adjustment.

The difficulties, apart from the immediate delimitation of this boundary by the commission itself, arise from the conditions under which it might be referred to arbitration. The British com-