is not due to the fact that they are intended for yellow fever districts.

It is the social objection to the negro, doubtless, that has fostered the contempt in official quarters for the Cuban republicans, many of whom are negroes, and given rise to the idea that they are incapable of selfgovernment and at the end of the war must be compelled to abandon the republic they have fought for years to establish, and let the Spanish landlords set up a government in its place in harmony with their idea of making the masses of the people their slaves in one form if not another. This contempt of the Cuban republicans has found expression in various ways. More recently it has taken the shape of sneering allusions to the non-appearance of Cuban troops to assist the invading army, and to their having endangered their allies as much as the enemy with their wild shooting when they did appear. But it is turning out that the Cubans have really been most efficient allies of the Americans, and that even now they are making our invasion of Cuba possible. We may find, as the war approaches an end, that the conduct of the Cuban patriots will have so impressed the American troops that a strong soldier sentiment will hold in check any attempt to make this war a war for the conquest of Cuba instead of one for the liberation of the Cuban republic. American soldiers who have seen the stars and stripes flying in battle side by side with the flag of free Cuba, and become accustomed to a life and death comradeship with the Cuban patriots in a common cause, can hardly contemplate with patience any proposition to treat those patriots and their island as American spoil of war.

A marked change in public opinion is taking place regarding the future of the Philippines. When those islands were supposed to be inhabited by a race of savages who had been kept in order by the bloody methods of the Spanish government,

it was not difficult to create a feeling that whatever else might be done the Philippines ought not to be turned over to the government of the people inhabiting them. But Aguinaldo's military genius and his statesmanship, together with the confidence which Dewey, Wildman and Pratt have reposed in him and his fellow countrymen, have made uphill work for the expansionists. The more the American people learn of the merits of the Philippine rebellion, of the bloody regime of the Spanish there, and of the character of the natives, the less disposed will they be to tolerate either the return of the Philippine islands to the Spanish, or their occupation in perpetuity by the United States. There is that in the American spirit which makes it easy to excite the people with visions of national expansion, but there is also that in the American spirit which makes it practically impossible to set this nation upon a career of subjugation and conquest. As soon as expansion is understood to mean indifference to the rights of well-disposed peoples, the song for expansion will cease to charm.

American writers and public speakers should carefully note that while the war lasts American warships always "move majestically," while Spanish warships invariably "prowl."

## FOR A GREAT NAVY.

The article on "Current Fallacies Upon Naval Subjects," by Capt. A. T. Mahan, of the United States navy, an authority of international reputation in his profession, which appears in Harper's for June, is a calm and impressive presentation of the best side of the argument for a powerful naval

Among the fallacies which Capt. Mahan discusses is the familiar one that if the United States acquire outlying territory, it will need for its protection a navy larger than the largest now in the world. Another is the equally familiar one that advances in naval science make warships obsolete

That these are fallacies, Capt. Mahan very clearly shows. To the first, he answers that a relatively small navy of tolerable strength, well placed, would be such a menace to the interests of even the most powerful nations that its mere existence would insure decent treatment without war; and to the second, that while naval improvement is continually going on, it is in the nature of modification rather than revolution, and the ships which it displaces from the first grades become effective reserves, relieving the newer ships from minor duties and often decisively reinforcing them in action.

But the most impressive as well as the most important point in Capt. Mahan's paper is his answer to the objections to a navy for any other purpose than defense.

He makes a distinction between defense in the political, and defense in the military sense. In the political sense a navy for defense only, means a navy that will not be used unless we are forced into a war to defend ourselves; but in the military sense it means one that even in the midst of war must await attack and only defend its own interests, leaving the enemy's interests free from danger and the enemy at liberty to choose his own time and manner of fighting. In the former sense, the political, Capt. Mahan regards the idea of a navy for defense alone as noble; in the latter, the military sense, he regards it as folly. "Among all the masters of the military art," he says, "it is a thoroughly accepted principle that mere defensive war means military ruin and therefore national disaster." He also notes argumentatively that the most beneficial use of a military. force is not to wage war, however successfully, but to prevent war.

It would be evidence of weakness to deny the strength of Capt. Mahan's position. So long as the distinction between defense in the political and defense in the military sense is kept clear, the argument for a military force capable of attacking the enemy in his own vital interests, is persuasive. after all, though we may in theory make this distinction clear, we cannot in practice maintain a powerful navy and prevent the military idea of dealmost before they can be launched. | fense from influencing the political idea. A navy such as Capt. Mahan advocates, though established for the purpose of being only militarily offensive in wars politically defensive, would breed politically offensive wars as certainly as the habit of carrying pistols turns casual disputes into deadly feuds.

A fighting navy wants to fight, and its personnel are always on the alert for a chance not to prevent war but to wage it. Our own navy during the past ten years has proved this. Though not the strongest in the world, it has been strong enough to be full of the fighting spirit, and if the medievalism of Spain had not brought upon us a just war for human liberty, that same navy might before long have involved us in some foolish or wicked war.

Unfortunately we do need, in the present stage of the world's development-or what amounts to the same thing in practice, we do seem to need -a navy. But as Capt. Mahan says, a relatively small navy, well placed, will hold hostile powers in check and prevent any wars that we ourselves do not provoke or declare. And this relatively small navy may be much smaller if we have not, than if we have, outlying territory to protect. Nor need we face the alternative of either taking such territory or allowing hostile nations to take it. We have only to do the just thing by the people of the outlying territory that we might be tempted to take. Let us establish independent governments there, and any nation that should attempt to overthrow those governments and grab the territory would instantly place itself in an attitude of hostility toward all other nations.

Switzerland retains her independence in spite of the covetousness of every adjacent nation, because any movement of one of these nations in hostility to the independence of Switzerland, would be hostile to all the others. It would be much the same if Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines were independent. The covetousness of every nation would be held in constant check by the covteousness of every other, even if higher motives did not develop. By maintaining the policy of promoting selfgovernment throughout the world, we make the necessity for a great lat large. This realization may stimu- l bring about.

navy less and less. It is only by turning ourselves into a nation of land grabbers, that we shall come to need a powerful navy either of offense or defense, whether in the political or the military sense.

## THE NEW COLLEGE GRADUATE.

When the American young man leaves college, it is with an expectation, which has been fostered through his college life, that though he may have a hard struggle in the world, he will conquer a place for himself if he has taken due advantage of what his college had to offer him, and shall lead an honorable and industrious life. While he may see wrecks from college commencements of the past, scattered all along the shores of business and professional life, he has been told and he believes, that these are attributable to individual defects. The idea that social conditions prevail which make what is called success utterly impossible for the mass of men who are as ambitious and capable as himself, never enters his mind. Intending to deserve success, he expects, as he has been taught to expect, that he will achieve it. But with only a few exceptions the army of graduates of 1898 who leave their colleges with this expectation are doomed to a terrible disappointment.

If disappointments of this kind were in the nature of things—if, for example, failure in life were like death in battle, an experience that must come to a certain proportion and may as likely come to one as to another, regardless of his personal merits or defects-it would be unwholesome pessimism to look forward to possible failure. The blind optimism of new-fledged graduates would then be something to encourage. Better for each of them in that case that he take his own success for granted and be inspired by the thought, than that he lose heart in expectation of failure. But these disappointments are not in the nature of things. Due to social conditions which are traceable to man-made laws, they may be avoided by altering these laws, and for that reason the sooner college graduates realize the sickening failure which is in store for most of them, the better for them and for the world

late them, while they are yet in their strength, to turn their attention to the causes of almost universal failure in a world in which there should be almost universal success.

We are far from saying that the very greatest success does not even under prevailing conditions lie before any one of the young men who during this month leaves his college for the last time. But if he secures that success, or a moderate measure of it, he will do so at the expense of bodily health and moral integrity. Let no one shrink at this assertion or resent it. Every successful man, and every man who has watched the successful career of others, knows that it is only at the cost of racked nerves, 'and either a racked or deadened conscience, that success is in these times secured. Would a man be successful in business, he must plot and plan by day and by night to obtain monopolies which will enable him to exact tribute from the sweat of his fellow men. Would he succeed at the bar, he must devote himself much less to the goddess of justice than to the interests of grasping monopolists. Even in the ministry he must wrap up the ashlar of gospel truth in soft cushions lest its squared corners hurt wealthy parishioners, or find himself a straggler from the ranks of successful clergymen. Or let him go into any of the other occupations, and from retail merchant to manufacturer, from mechanic to policeman, he will learn to regard the small degree of success he would reasonably look for, as something which he can get and keep only as it is lost by others as meritorious though possibly not so rapacious as himself. What sensitive college graduate can think of success at such a cost, without recoiling from the prospect?

But with ill-fitting laws got out of the way, and equal natural opportunities secured to all, with justice and freedom established in the place of restriction and monopoly, the optimistic dream of the college graduate would come true; and without nerve-strain or conscience-strain, all could succeed who wished to, and only those would fail who deserved to fail. Such a condition every college graduate has it in his power to help to