especially interested in ticket scalpers, we are interested in the right of all people to be served fairly by railroads. That right is denied so long as railroads sell tickets at one price to some people and at a lower price for the same service to others. It is here that the scalper comes in. He buys up the under-priced tickets, and selling them at a slight advance, thereby gives to all comers equally the benefit which the railroads intend for special persons. The method is a bad one, but it is better than none. We hope, therefore, to see scalping flourish as long as railroads charge more for tickets sold to the general public than they charge to specially favored passengers. When the railroads sell to all at the cheapest rate for a given service, there will be no demand for scalpers, and the business will disappear. Meanwhile, the unused railroad ticket, like unused sugar, is merchandize into whosoever's hands it honestly comes; and anti-scalping laws are unwarranted invasions of the rights of scalpers as merchants and of the public as their customers.

A correspondent criticises H. L. Bliss's article of two weeks ago, for neglecting to reckon the price of board in the statistics of farm wages. The criticism is unfounded. Mr. Bliss's quotations as to farm wages were from the statistics of the department of agriculture, which give wages without board. What may have misled Mr. Bliss's critic is the fact that farm wages in Illinois are higher than the average. Mr. Bliss was dealing with the average for the whole country.

The dignified exploit of ex-Judge Blandin, of Cleveland, in publicly denouncing the bench before which he is accustomed to practice, charging the judges with tearing down and degrading the general administration of justice and dragging it in the mire, is probably without a parallel in the history of the American judiciary. Blandin's standing in the community, his position as the unquestioned leader of the Cleveland bar, the circumstances under which and the spirit in which, he made his accusation, all conspire to prove him a man of extraordinary moral courage. It is more than doubtful if in the same circumstances any leader of the bar in any other important community of the United States would have been brave enough to do what ex-Judge Blandin did. The reason is not far to seek. There is probably no other man who combines in himself as Blandin does the best qualities of a mature lawyer with the virtues of a good citizen and the sense of elemental justice of a genuine democrat.

So refreshing is this Blandin episode, that it will interest readers everywhere who are democratic in the primary as distinguished from the mere partisan meaning of that term. To appreciate it, the character of the Cleveland bench must be understood. The reputation of this bench has been such for years that certain Cleveland lawyers, better known for wire-pulling skill than for professional ability, have flourished at the expense of the good name of judges. Litigants who could afford to pay handsome fees sought out these lawyers in preference to better ones, because they cared less for having their cases well tried than for winning them. It was not this stigma upon the Cleveland bench, however, that called forth ex-Judge Blandin's cold, calm, scathing arraignment. His righteous wrath was aroused by the result of an investigation into which, as their leader, he had been forced by the bar.

One of the members of the Cleveland bar had circulated a story to the effect that one of the judges had divided fees with him. This story having come to the ear of the judge in question, he demanded action on the part of the bar. Action was accordingly taken, and ex-Judge Blandin was appointed by the bar to conserve the interests of both bench and bar. He accepted the responsibility reluctantly, and simply because, as he himself explained, he did not think it proper in him to shrink from any duty the bar might impose. When all the testimony had been produced before the investigating committee of the bar, Blandin was so stirred by the incidental developments that in summing up he declared that the particular question involved was of little consequence as compared with the evidence of unjudicial indifference which judges had shown at that hearing and preceding it, to degrading conduct of their associates of which they were cognizant. It was then that he spoke as no leader of an important bar ever spoke before.

Judge Blandin said:

That the general administration of justice should be torn down and degraded and dragged in the mire is of the utmost and last importance to every man, woman and child in the county, and I may say to unborn generations, because when once you have degraded the courts of this country, the last sheet anchor to which we can hang for the preservation of our rights and liberties, you have assailed the roots and foundation of all that is important and sacred to men who have liberty and property to be preserved. In vain will you write constitutions and laws and rules of procedure unless high character, integrity, freedom and prudence can clothe the judge who sits upon the bench. Contracts may be written in vain as well, and anarchy will ensue. . . .

I was told not long ago by a respectable attorney that a book entitled "Law, as She Is Practiced in Cleveland," if it told the truth, would be one of the most startling books that could be written. And I believe that you can never tone up the bar properly until you begin at the top and tone up the bench. You cannot work from below upwards, but you must work from above downwards. And the character of the bar will never rise higher than the general character of the bench. It will never rise unless men upon the bench have a due and proper appreciation of the dignity and importance of their position, and unless they are accustomed to the use of respectful language, and unless they are entitled to enjoy the confidence and respect of each other. If, on the contrary, they are abusive of each other in their language; if they have no confidence in each other; and if facts exist warrant-

ing such lack of confidence in each other, so long as that condition exists you may struggle and strive in vain to tone up the bar of Cuyahoga county. It can't be done. . . .

I say this because I feel it all, and I feel it sincerely and deeply, and I know that the public shares in this feeling, and I do know that the facts which have been detailed in this investigation are such as ought to make the community consider how we can reform the judiciary of the county, how we can restore confidence between the members of the bench, how we can get rid of those slanderous things that are said (slanderous if they are not true), from day to day in the newspapers, how we can tone up the bar to a fitness to practice law before judges who are fit to sit in judgment and to administer the law.

That Judge Blandin's speech was to him no light bit of rhetoric, but a serious matter, is evident from the words with which he preceded it:

I know what risk and jeopardy and hazard I take in making these statements. I have been cautioned and warned by other members of the county bar, and I say it for them, when they don't dare to say it for themselves. They are afraid to say what they know. They are afraid to speak the truth with respect to even so important a matter as the purity of the judiciary, and the high character of our judiciary, for fear, forsooth, that the interests of their clients from time to time might be jeopardized in trials before these men. I will not be deterred from it in the discharge of a duty which is put upon me. I say I didn't select it or choose it, but being here, I am not going to mince matters. I am going to speak what I think in respect to them. And I do say that the circumstances and facts that are detailed here beyond any question and beyond any controversy in this hearing are such as may well fill the public mind with apprehension and alarm.

And that there was reason for the caution which Judge Blandin ignored was made manifest soon after he had spoken. One of the worst of the judges to whom Blandin had referred, and the most notoriously impudent, endeavored to secure the joint action of his fellow judges in proceedings to arraign Blandin for contempt of court. But at that the bar and the people laughed. By the strength of his position and by his courage, Judge Blandin had secured their unanimous support. If his example were imitated in the same spirit by leading lawyers elsewhere throughout the United States, a long stride would be made in the direction of purifying the local judiciary.

Workingmen who have been looking forward to the possibilities of employment and consequent easing up of the labor market, which the annexation of Hawaii would offer, will be interested in a letter from J. B. Atherton, president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' association, which has just been published. Mr. Atherton says that the only opportunity for those seeking work in Hawaii is "for a limited number of farmers to do plantation work at $18 or $20 a month"—a limited number! The more we learn about expansion the clearer we shall see that it is not for the benefit of workingmen, but for the benefit of workingmen's parasites, that it is advocated.

Great Britain is being commiserated upon the falling off of her exports during the present year; and from the same protection sources Mr. Dingley receives high commendation, because his tariff bill is credited with having caused the decrease. But Great Britain may notwithstanding be better off than ever. Though her exports have decreased, her imports may have increased. The wealth of a nation is determined, not by the amount of wealth it gets rid of in exporting, but by the amount it acquires by importing.

By the way in which plutocratic magazines and newspapers exploit W. H. Mallock, the English essayist, one might suppose Mallock to be something more than a verbal prestidigitateur. Mallock himself, so very clever are some of his tricks, appears at times to make the same mistake. Some one has wittily described his method in this wise: He argues with clearness and force to prove that twice one is two, following with a similarly clear and forcible argument to show that twice two is four. He may even go the length of elaborately demonstrating that twice four is eight. But he then supposes you to have become thoroughly impressed with the opinion that his conclusions are irrefutable; whereupon, assuming an air of superior intelligence, he assures you that if you have really followed him thus far you will perceive that twice eight is forty-three and a quarter.

It would appear to be by some such process that Mr. Mallock has by his recent book, "Aristocracy and Evolution," satisfied confiding readers that material progress has been effected by exceptional men, and that the human mass has contributed little or nothing. As he himself puts it, "ability" has contributed nearly everything, and "labor" hardly anything. It is upon this theory that Mr. Mallock justifies the principle of human slavery. His differentiation of "ability" from "labor," is one of his choicest bits of legerdemain. It is really nothing more than a differentiation of "leadership" from "following." But if those terms, or any of their familiar equivalents were used, Mr. Mallock could not so easily befog his readers. To say that material progress is effected almost wholly by leaders, and hardly at all by followers, would be absurd. It would be incontinently scouted by anyone with sense enough to see that "leadership" and "following" are terms which merely describe two elements of the same force, neither of which could be effective without the other.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE AND THE LAW

Harold Frederic's death under the ministrations of a Christian Science healer in London, and the consequent criminal proceedings against the healer, have attracted widespread attention to the relations of Christian Science to the law.

The subject appears to have been