

made, has the effect not only of depriving production of its natural and voluntary markets, and of creating the false impression that the resources of America and the energies of Americans have been exhausted, but it enables foreign countries to conquer this country and subjugate its inhabitants. This they do without force of arms, but the process is all the more dangerous on that account. For instance, an English syndicate has secured an option for the purchase of 33,000 acres of coal land in Tennessee and Kentucky, in the region known as the Jellico district. In a few weeks that syndicate will own the land. Since this can be done with 33,000 acres of coal land in the south, it can be done as to all the land in the United States. To an astonishing extent it has been already done. The amount of wealth that goes out of this country every year, figuring in the official statistics as excessive exports, but being in reality so much tribute to absentees, is enormous. What difference could it make to us if this same wealth were sent to a foreign government, which, having conquered us, required the tribute both to fill its exchequer and as a confession of acquiescence in its suzerainty? None at all. To the extent that foreigners own the land of this country they own the country. That, however, is no reason for forbidding foreigners to buy American land. If America is to be owned at all, it might as well be owned by a few foreigners as by a few Americans. But little difference can it make to those who are governed by lords of the land, whether the lords be foreign or domestic. The real thing is the fact that ownership of the land is essentially ownership of the landless men who must live upon and out of it.

A wholesome decision has been made by the supreme court of Louisiana, in a murder case which had been pushed to trial with undue haste. Owing to notorious miscarriages of justice through the law's delay, a sentiment has been stirred up in favor of summary punishment for crime. So

strong has this sentiment been at times that lynchings have been gravely justified, in the name of good order—God save the mark—and trials so speedy and disregarding of the prisoner's rights as to amount to lynchings, have been demanded by some of the most conservative organs of conservative opinion. It is to be hoped that this lawless sentiment may hereafter be held in check by the very sensible and just decision of the Louisiana court. The crime in that case had been committed on a Sunday, some ten miles from the courthouse. The accused was on his way to the sheriff to surrender, when he was arrested and placed in jail. He was indicted during the week, and four days afterward, one of the intervening days being the Sunday following the crime, he had been tried, convicted, and sentenced to hang. Meanwhile he had been closely confined and his counsel had been occupied during most of the time in the trial of other important criminal cases, in consequence of which there had been no opportunity for conference and preparation to meet the charge or for discovering evidence that might have told in the prisoner's favor. For these reasons the appellate court held that the conviction had been unduly precipitate, and granted a new trial. In doing so the judges explicitly and soundly declared that the constitutional guaranty that a prisoner shall have the right to defend himself and to have the assistance of counsel, is not an empty and meaningless formality.

Somebody has been digging up the pedigree of Lieut. Hobson, and the Albany Law Journal, which has most excellent judgment in its own field, has proved the wisdom of the saw about cobblers sticking to their last, by concluding that Hobson's heroism is due to his ancestry. There are really no grounds for this conclusion, even upon the assumption that heroism, like real estate, is inheritable; for Hobson's ancestors appear to have been lawyers, judges, senators, and such—very good in their line, but

their line was not heroic. Yet if it had been, the Albany Law Journal could hardly justify its remark that the more Hobson's pedigree is studied "the more apparent does it become that true heroes are not mere accidents," and that "noblesse oblige is just as true now as it was 'in days of old, when knights were bold.'" Though Hobson was mentally better equipped than his crew for leadership in the work they jointly undertook, he was no more heroic. Until the lineage of those seven less notable but not less daring men shall have been traced to noble ancestry, Hobson's heroic act cannot be attributed to "noblesse oblige."

It was a significant message which Congressman Hull sent to a company of colored volunteers raised in Des Moines, Ia. The company had elected a colored man for its captain and applied to be mustered into the United States service; and in reply to its application Mr. Hull in his message said: "The war department declares that the captain must be a white man. Settle the matter at once and the company can be mustered in immediately." Why this objection to a colored captain? Was it because the colored captain was incompetent? That may have been, but if so, why object to him on account of color? And why offer to muster in the company immediately provided it would follow a white captain whether competent or not? The objection could not have been for incompetency. It was not a military objection at all, but a social one. Commissioned officers have certain social privileges which they shrink from sharing with men whose color testifies to the enslavement of their ancestors. That this feeling exists is a fact, but why should the war department be governed by it? A better spirit has since been shown with reference to the organization of a body of negro yellow fever immunes in Indiana. Negro officers have been granted to these volunteers. It is to be hoped that this

is not due to the fact that they are intended for yellow fever districts.

It is the social objection to the negro, doubtless, that has fostered the contempt in official quarters for the Cuban republicans, many of whom are negroes, and given rise to the idea that they are incapable of self-government and at the end of the war must be compelled to abandon the republic they have fought for years to establish, and let the Spanish landlords set up a government in its place in harmony with their idea of making the masses of the people their slaves in one form if not another. This contempt of the Cuban republicans has found expression in various ways. More recently it has taken the shape of sneering allusions to the non-appearance of Cuban troops to assist the invading army, and to their having endangered their allies as much as the enemy with their wild shooting when they did appear. But it is turning out that the Cubans have really been most efficient allies of the Americans, and that even now they are making our invasion of Cuba possible. We may find, as the war approaches an end, that the conduct of the Cuban patriots will have so impressed the American troops that a strong soldier sentiment will hold in check any attempt to make this war a war for the conquest of Cuba instead of one for the liberation of the Cuban republic. American soldiers who have seen the stars and stripes flying in battle side by side with the flag of free Cuba, and become accustomed to a life and death comradeship with the Cuban patriots in a common cause, can hardly contemplate with patience any proposition to treat those patriots and their island as American spoil of war.

A marked change in public opinion is taking place regarding the future of the Philippines. When those islands were supposed to be inhabited by a race of savages who had been kept in order by the bloody methods of the Spanish government,

it was not difficult to create a feeling that whatever else might be done the Philippines ought not to be turned over to the government of the people inhabiting them. But Aguinaldo's military genius and his statesmanship, together with the confidence which Dewey, Wildman and Pratt have reposed in him and his fellow countrymen, have made uphill work for the expansionists. The more the American people learn of the merits of the Philippine rebellion, of the bloody regime of the Spanish there, and of the character of the natives, the less disposed will they be to tolerate either the return of the Philippine islands to the Spanish, or their occupation in perpetuity by the United States. There is that in the American spirit which makes it easy to excite the people with visions of national expansion, but there is also that in the American spirit which makes it practically impossible to set this nation upon a career of subjugation and conquest. As soon as expansion is understood to mean indifference to the rights of well-disposed peoples, the song for expansion will cease to charm.

American writers and public speakers should carefully note that while the war lasts American warships always "move majestically," while Spanish warships invariably "prowl."

#### FOR A GREAT NAVY.

The article on "Current Fallacies Upon Naval Subjects," by Capt. A. T. Mahan, of the United States navy, an authority of international reputation in his profession, which appears in Harper's for June, is a calm and impressive presentation of the best side of the argument for a powerful naval arm.

Among the fallacies which Capt. Mahan discusses is the familiar one that if the United States acquire outlying territory, it will need for its protection a navy larger than the largest now in the world. Another is the equally familiar one that advances in naval science make warships obsolete almost before they can be launched.

That these are fallacies, Capt. Mahan very clearly shows. To the first, he answers that a relatively small navy of tolerable strength, well placed, would be such a menace to the interests of even the most powerful nations that its mere existence would insure decent treatment without war; and to the second, that while naval improvement is continually going on, it is in the nature of modification rather than revolution, and the ships which it displaces from the first grades become effective reserves, relieving the newer ships from minor duties and often decisively reinforcing them in action.

But the most impressive as well as the most important point in Capt. Mahan's paper is his answer to the objections to a navy for any other purpose than defense.

He makes a distinction between defense in the political, and defense in the military sense. In the political sense a navy for defense only, means a navy that will not be used unless we are forced into a war to defend ourselves; but in the military sense it means one that even in the midst of war must await attack and only defend its own interests, leaving the enemy's interests free from danger and the enemy at liberty to choose his own time and manner of fighting. In the former sense, the political, Capt. Mahan regards the idea of a navy for defense alone as noble; in the latter, the military sense, he regards it as folly. "Among all the masters of the military art," he says, "it is a thoroughly accepted principle that mere defensive war means military ruin and therefore national disaster." He also notes argumentatively that the most beneficial use of a military force is not to wage war, however successfully, but to prevent war.

It would be evidence of weakness to deny the strength of Capt. Mahan's position. So long as the distinction between defense in the political and defense in the military sense is kept clear, the argument for a military force capable of attacking the enemy in his own vital interests, is persuasive. But after all, though we may in theory make this distinction clear, we cannot in practice maintain a powerful navy and prevent the military idea of defense from influencing the political