

assemblage, deliberating for their freedoms, vow to each other, and for their country 'their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor'?" Or if there be such, let us then ask, will they not yet wear the laurel that the world delights to place upon the brow of the devoted patriot? Are we, even we of this country, who now play in the role of foreign potentate—are we to adopt in all seriousness the sentiment to which the Manchester, N. H., Union gives this bitterly ironical expression: "Base indeed is the man who fights for the liberty of his people when America is the oppressors"?"

The river and harbor bill has passed the lower house of congress by a vote of 160 to 7. Though stuffed full of wild cat appropriations, and carrying \$30,000,000 in all, it was railroaded through without a roll call. Everybody, almost, voted for it, and those who did were determined not to go upon record as having done so. All this is easily explained. The river and harbor bill is the great local corruption bill. Congressmen who can't get into this bill an allowance from Uncle Sam for their constituents, are labeled "no good" at home. Consequently most congressmen log roll, one with another, each seeking public money for his constituents, until the bill grows into a large mosaic of larceny. That is the reason it passes by an overwhelming majority. It is the reason also that demands for the "ayes" and "noes" are voted down. One may vote for a public steal, but he doesn't like to "go to the country" upon it.

The minority report of the house committee on Mark Hannah's ship bounty bill is worth reading and thinking about. It was prepared by Congressman Handy, of Delaware. Here is the explanation of the reason why the bill is "satisfactory:"

This bill is one that was prepared and brought to congress by a voluntary committee of ship owners and ship-builders representing the gentlemen who will receive the bounty which the bill proposes to give from the public treasury. The bill as it is reported to

the house is in almost the exact form and grants to a penny the bounties demanded by the gentlemen who are to receive them. The bill is therefore naturally and entirely satisfactory to the "interests" which have organized this movement to secure the vast sums carried in the bill as a gratuity to be used in carrying on their private business and enlarging the profits thereof.

As estimated by the report, the bounties provided for would amount to \$165,000,000. The viciousness of the bill is thus summed up:

It is manifestly unequal and unjust to tax the farmers, carpenters, blacksmiths, masons, merchants, railroad men, miners and woodsmen of the country to pay a bounty to shipowners for every mile they sail upon the sea. The bill is the offspring of mere bounty beggars and should be repudiated by representatives of both political parties. It is vicious in principle.

Baltimore has the honor of having organized a "Future Voters' association." Its founder is F. C. Hall, 1005 North Stricker street, Baltimore, Md. The objects of the association are to inculcate a knowledge of the meaning of good government, to make clear the trade relations of countries, to study the subject of money, and generally to educate future voters into an understanding of the obligations of a citizen instead of leaving them to cast their votes at random or in mere obedience to family tradition. A thoroughly good association of that kind would soon make a much needed impression upon American politics.

Tom L. Johnson's recent public declaration that he had withdrawn from business and intended hereafter to devote his life and fortune to the promotion of the single tax movement, has created a general sensation. Yet he has been devoting his life and fortune to that movement largely for more than a dozen years. There is nothing new about his recent declaration except that his business—that of a monopolist—will no longer claim any of his attention. This will deprive hypercritical opponents of one of their little clubs. They can no longer talk about Johnson's inconsistency. But that was a very little club. It was much like a stuffed club. Monopoly is a social institution, and no

man is inconsistent who while benefiting by it tries to induce the people to abolish it.

In the midst of the satisfaction which Henry George's followers derive from the sensation that Johnson's announcement has created, they are saddened by news of the death of the Rev. Chas. E. Garst, another of their prominent men. Mr. Garst was a missionary of the Church of the Disciples (commonly called Campbellites), and was stationed at Japan, where he supplemented his religious work by making known to the Japanese, as he did widely, the philosophy of Henry George. He died at Tokio, on the 28th of December, of pneumonia. Wherever in the world the George agitation flourishes, Garst's name is known. He was a clear thinker and a man of sterling intellectual honesty, who was devoted to his calling and faithful to all his convictions.

#### THE STREET CAR QUESTION.

Some weeks ago, at the Sunset club in Chicago, Charles T. Yerkes spoke upon the street railroad question from the standpoint of a street railroad monopolist. Mr. Yerkes controls the Chicago street car system, and is besides a man of great bravery, not to say effrontery, in asserting the claims of franchise grabbers. No better representative, therefore, of the private monopoly side of the street car question could have been chosen for a debate upon the subject.

And Mr. Yerkes certainly did not allow the interests he represented to suffer for lack of dialectic art. Supplementing agility in argument with impudence and skill in the prompt distortion of facts, he proved a formidable antagonist to more scrupulous debaters.

When in the course of his speech he had occasion to reply to a suggestion that street cars could be run profitably upon a three-cent fare, if stocked and bonded only at actual cost, so as not to be under pressure to pay dividends upon water, Mr. Yerkes said, as officially reported in print by the Sunset club:

No, nothing of the kind. And when the statement is made here that Detroit

runs for three cents, there was a three-cent company started there and it was merged into the other company. That is what became of it. It went into bankruptcy and then was merged into the other company.

One member of the Sunset club, George A. Schilling, formerly at the head of the Illinois labor bureau, took the liberty of politely doubting Mr. Yerkes's assertions regarding the Detroit company, whereupon, as reported by the Sunset club, the following colloquy occurred:

Mr. George A. Schilling: I would like to ask the question, whether it is absolutely true that the road that ran at three cents in Detroit has gone into liquidation; and second, whether, even if it has gone into liquidation, it does not yet run for three cents?

Mr. Yerkes: That road did fail and went into liquidation. It was afterwards bought by one of the other roads; that part of the road is run now for three cents, but it is run by the other company, in connection with its other line, and there is very little three-cent fare about it.

Mr. Schilling: Is it not true that the road was bought out by the other company before it busted?

Mr. Yerkes: No.

Though Mr. Schilling said no more at the time, his doubts of Yerkes's veracity were not allayed, and he wrote to Gov. Pingree for the facts. Gov. Pingree's reply has just been published in the Municipal Ownership Bulletin of Chicago. The Michigan governor does not, in terms, denounce what Yerkes said as false; but he does so impliedly by merely recounting the history of the Detroit three-cent road. From that history no other inference than that of prevarication on Mr. Yerkes's part is possible. Gov. Pingree says:

Some years ago, during the street car agitation in Detroit, an application was before the common council for a franchise for a cross-town line, and after the managers of the old company had produced volumes of proof to show that three-cent car fares were impracticable, certain capitalists, among whom were Mr. Henry A. Everett and Mr. Albert Pack, came forward and agreed to take a franchise on the basis of a three-cent fare. A franchise was granted to them under the name of the Detroit Railway company, covering many miles of road. The system was immediately constructed and equipped, and a fine service established. The principal thoroughfares of Detroit all radiate from the center of the city like the spokes of a wheel. In addition to the regular north and south and east and

west streets there are three main arteries running diagonally from the city hall far into the country. All these streets were occupied by the old company, and, in order to carry its passengers downtown the new company was obliged to lay more miles of track, and to place them upon back streets. Its whole system is full of crooks and turns. It is thus placed at an enormous disadvantage as compared with the old company. Mr. Everett told us that when he and his associates put their money into this enterprise they did not expect to more than pay expenses in the first three years; but he said that so far from this being the case, the system had made money from the beginning—and this in spite of its disadvantage in the way of location.

The other stockholders subsequently bought out Mr. Everett's interests, and about the same time the management of the road changed its policy. It pooled its interests with those of the old company. It inflated its capital and put a big issue of bonds on the market. It closed its power house, and its system has for some time been operated from the plant of the "competing" company. It certainly did not go into liquidation or bankruptcy; nor have its stockholders, so far as I am aware, sold out to the old company or to anyone else. I presume that its reports of late would not show a large dividend upon its capital, as it was absolutely to prevent such showing that its capital was watered. But that its system has paid a handsome profit upon the money actually invested I have no doubt whatever.

The statement of Mr. Yerkes that "it is run by the other company in connection with other lines" is true as far as I have indicated. But his next remark, that "there is very little three-cent car fare about it," is certainly not true. There is just as much three-cent car fare about it as there was when the road was started. There has been no change in the fare charged upon its lines, and the road is still in operation.

In a postscript to his letter to Schilling, Gov. Pingree added:

The Pack and Everett line, as a result of the campaign which we waged, now sells eight tickets for 25 cents, with transfers over 68 miles of street railway. The other line, the old line, as a result of the same campaign, now sells six tickets for 25 cents day and night; and, during one hour in the morning and one hour in the evening, it sells eight workmen's tickets for 25 cents.

Thus Mr. Yerkes's assertion that the attempt to run street cars in Detroit upon a three-cent fare failed to yield a profit upon the basis of actual cost, falls to the ground, and with it his arguments, equally mendacious, that street car systems cannot be main-

tained profitably upon three-cent fares.

Upon another point, Mr. Yerkes at the same Sunset club debate, took advantage of his audience's lack of specific information, to distort inconvenient facts. One of the speakers, a Mr. Jones, referring to some strictures that had been made upon the municipal ownership policy said:

In Glasgow, Scotland, they have municipal ownership, and they give the people there a rate of fare which is less than two cents, and in addition to that they pay higher wages to the employes than they did under private ownership.

Asked what dividend they pay, and how much is charged up to loss, Mr. Jones replied:

They pay a dividend of \$250,000 every year into the city treasury; they have no losses, they pay all the expenses.

Mr. Yerkes retorted that Mr. Jones was "entirely mistaken about Glasgow," and then went on to say, upon the alleged authority of the superintendent of the Glasgow system, that their fare is on an average a cent, that is to say a halfpenny, a mile, running for the distance traversed, from one cent up to six cents per passenger; and that the city has lost over \$50,000 in two years in the operation of street cars.

The evident intention and unmistakable effect of Mr. Yerkes's remarks were to convey the idea that the municipalization of street cars in Glasgow has proved a financial failure. But this idea is controverted by excellent Glasgow authority. Without intending to refute Mr. Yerkes's assertion, without so much as knowing that it had ever been made, Mr. John Paul, editor of the Glasgow Single Tax, makes the following conclusive statement in a private letter:

Our Corporation tramways are a decided success. We have finer cars, a better service of cars, cheaper fares, and shorter hours and better pay for the men who work for them.

Moreover, they are a great financial success. In fact they are so great a financial success that the Corporation have made many extensions during the past two years, and are applying to parliament now for powers to open up a dozen new routes through the city and out into the suburbs.

The Glasgow people know so well how successful the cars are, that the carping criticism with which the venture was first assailed, even by our

most influential newspaper, has entirely ceased.

To corroborate Mr. Paul as to the financial success of the Glasgow system, we need only refer to the Massachusetts report of 1898 on street railways, prepared by Charles Francis Adams. This report gives the results of the Glasgow system for the year ending May 31, 1897. It may be tabulated as follows:

Total receipts .....	\$1,804,800
Expense of operation.....	1,393,100
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Nominal surplus.....	\$ 411,700
Interest, sinking fund, depreciation and payment to the Common Good.....	241,400
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	\$170,300
Accumulation for renewals of permanent way.....	73,000
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Accumulation for general purposes .....	\$97,300

Municipal ownership of municipal monopolies, such as street car lines, is fast proving its superiority over the prevailing system of ownership by private monopolists. Upon that issue the private monopolists are fighting a losing fight. Even the audacious prevarications of Mr. Yerkes cannot long be of any use to them.

But let no one be misled as to the general advantages of municipal ownership. Superior as that policy is to the policy of private ownership, it will not improve the condition of the masses of the people. This conclusion might be inferred from general economic principles, but the experience of Glasgow goes far to prove it as a fact.

Continuing his explanation of the street car system in Glasgow, in the letter already quoted from, Mr. Paul supplies the following interesting and valuable information:

These tramways have also proved a great success financially to many ground landlords, the value of whose land has gone up and is going up just as the car system is extended.

Some people have said that—now that the cars are going out into the country—the land along the new routes may be used for better and cheaper house accommodation, and the people will leave the congested districts to enjoy the pure country air. But, alas for their expectations, the ground landlords have also realized this advantage and have crystallized it into a monopoly price, which is prohibitive, so far at

least as the working classes who dwell in the city slums are concerned. In this experience we recognize the truth of Henry George's words, that unless you lift the lowest class you cannot touch the fringe of the social problem.

As a matter of fact, if what is commonly known as municipal socialism could better the social condition of the people, the problem of poverty in Glasgow would have been nearly solved by this time. We have control of our splendid water supply. We have municipal gas and municipal tramways. Our river Clyde is in the hands of public trustees. We have municipal baths and washing houses. We have public parks, with music supplied in the summer evenings, and throughout the winter we have penny concerts in our public halls. We have provided a family home for widows and orphans. A people's palace, after the pattern of Sir Walter Besant's in "All Sorts and Conditions of Men," has also been set up; and we have opened common lodging houses where the "dosser" can secure a lodging for three pence a night. Besides all this, it is reckoned that a million pounds a year is given in charity in Glasgow. Yet in this same city you will find the poor huddled together in dense masses. Living in 30,000 hovels of one room, there are 110,000 persons, many of them so polluted and vicious that the school board officer hesitates to visit them; and in our fashionable streets you will encounter every day in the year, and every hour in the day, the most hideous evidences of poverty.

Do not misunderstand me. We all appreciate these municipal social conveniences, and feel sorry for the towns and cities throughout the world whose water supplies, tramways, gas, etc., are in the hands of companies whose concern is to secure as much money as they can and give as little service as possible in return. In London last summer, for example, the people in one of the most populous districts came through a severe water famine, causing terrible hardships, to say nothing of disease and death. The supply of the water there is in the hands of a syndicate. Here in Glasgow, where our water supply is in the hands of the Corporation, we have magnificent reservoirs containing several weeks' supplies and can cope with any probable spell of drought.

In the first instance, Glasgow had to pay the landlords, or water lords, for access to our beautiful natural reservoir, Loch Katrine. We turned the purchase to such good account that the proprietors, through their agent, afterward confessed that had they known the people of Glasgow would have made such profitable use of the loch, they would have charged a higher price for it. Having neglected to do this, they resorted to the meanest conduct. They threatened to build villas on the banks, the sewage from which would have pol-

luted the loch. So the Corporation, to protect the purity of the loch, had to buy off these proprietors for \$50,000 more. Landlordism is the very essence of meanness. Conduct like this only brings it out in bold relief.

But after all, how does the great advantage of freedom thus secured by Glasgow from the "bloated capitalist" work out? The result is easily stated. The people of Glasgow have good water and cheap; but the less they pay in rates for water, the more they pay in rent for land. It means good water and better health to the people, to be sure; but the economic advantage goes to the "last robber" labor has to deal with—the ground lord.

We have killed the water capitalist and the tramway capitalist; we have weakened the power of the house capitalist by erecting suitable house accommodations for the poor; and incidentally we have damaged a few other more or less important capitalistic classes. But all this progress, so-called, in the direction of emancipating labor, has been in that direction but so much humbug. The price of the ground where it is urgently wanted has stiffened, and labor is rendered more helpless than ever.

To summarize the street car question, in the light both of general principles and of actual experience, we should consider municipal ownership of street car systems, not so much a general social reform as a civic reform. Essentially it is a resumption by the municipality of a public function of which municipalities are divested.

It is this that distinguishes municipal ownership of monopolies like street car lines, from the programme of socialism. Such municipal ownership is not socialistic. That socialists advocate it, is quite true. That it is part of the socialistic programme is also true. But socialists likewise advocate, and of necessity it would be part of the socialistic programme, that the police force shall be a government institution. Yet no one would pretend that a government police is socialistic in any distinctive sense. It is one thing to advocate the exercise by government of governmental functions; but quite another to advocate the exercise by government of private functions.

The management of factories, banks, stores, and the like, is a private function. Anyone may engage in these businesses without the aid or permission of government, except as government may have previously in-

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terposed obstacles. An example of such obstacles is a license tax. When licenses are arbitrarily required, government permission must be obtained before individuals can engage in these occupations. But the requirement of licenses is arbitrary. It is in itself a governmental interference. In the absence of that, these businesses are open to all who choose to engage in them. That is the natural test of a private function, and such businesses are therefore in their nature private.

But no one can go into the street car business without the active cooperation of government. It is not a question of taking out an arbitrarily required license; it is a question of the nature of the business itself. No one can engage in it unless he obtains from government permission to prevent other people from doing the same business. He must, in other words, obtain from government the authority to exercise a governmental function—the function, in this case, of regulating the use of the highway.

The question, therefore, of municipalizing street car systems, is not a question of socialism. It does not call upon us to say whether government shall assume new functions, but whether it shall resume old ones. It is not a question of having government go into private business; but one of ending the custom of enabling private corporations to go into the government business.

To argue, as is often done, that American municipalities are too corrupt to resume these functions, is to argue in a circle. In what does municipal corruption chiefly consist? Is it not in accepting bribes from the beneficiaries of our street railway systems? Abolish the briber, and the public corruption would go with him.

Would the corruption then take on the new form of spoils in the appointment of municipal street car employees? A simple civil service system would be a protection against that, as in great degree—in as complete a degree as the application of the system—it has been in the post office, which at one time was among the most viciously corrupt of all our spoils institutions.

But even without a civil service system, politicians would find street

car employment under municipal ownership no better field for spoils than it is at present under private ownership. Any alderman, any mayor, who favors street car corporations unduly, can now appoint and discharge street car employes at will. Where could you find a worse example of spoils than that?

It is no answer to the arguments for municipal ownership of street car systems that a tax on gross receipts, or even a reduction of fares, would accomplish the beneficial objects as well.

A tax on gross receipts is but a method of levying taxes upon street car passengers. It would tend to benefit real estate tax payers, by shifting part of their taxes upon great masses of people, usually on the poorer classes, in such manner as to keep them in ignorance of the fact that they were paying taxes, and so make it possible to refer slightly to them as "non-taxpayers."

To reduce fares would directly benefit street car passengers. But the question would always be debatable as to how low the fares ought to be; and over that question the private companies, in their efforts to get as high fares as possible, would continue to demoralize local politics.

It is only by means of municipal ownership that passengers can be served at reasonable fares, without indirect taxation, and the most corrupting element of modern local politics be stamped out. So long as municipal functions are performed by private corporations, just so long will those corporations debauch municipal politics.

But even municipal ownership will not ultimately better the condition of the masses of the people. As soon as it begins to work smoothly, the money that the passengers save in reduced fares they will have to pay their landlords in augmented rents. Land values will rise as car fares fall, and as in a great transformation scene, the landed interest will take visible shape as the street car interest dissolves.

That is what has happened in Glasgow. It is what under similar circumstances, must in the very nature of things happen everywhere.

The treaty of peace between Spain and the United States, signed at Paris December 10, by the commissioners for the two countries, and of which a full abstract is given in No. 41 of The Public, was ratified on the 6th of February by the United States senate. There were 57 affirmative and 27 negative votes. Six absentees were paired—two negatives against four affirmatives. As the constitution requires a two-thirds vote of the senate for the ratification of treaties, the treaty here in dispute was carried with three votes to spare. The opposition to it hinged entirely upon the clauses ceding Porto Rico and the Philippine archipelago to the United States. It was insisted, either that the treaty should be so amended as to place these countries on the same footing as Cuba, as to which Spain merely relinquishes sovereignty, or that congress should make a declaration disclaiming any intention of forcible annexation. Neither was done. The opposition in the American senate having been defeated by the vote summarized above, nothing now remains to make the treaty operative but ratification by the Spanish cortes, which are summoned to convene at Madrid on the 20th.

On the eve of the ratification of the treaty at Washington a bloody conflict was started between American and Filipino troops at Manila. Of the origin, extent and result of this conflict it is as yet impossible to give an entirely trustworthy account. Press reports come under the censorship of cable messages which our government has recently established at Manila, and official reports from army and naval officers are not divulged completely. We offer, however, as full and intelligible an account of the affair as the circumstances permit.

The first news of the fight with the Filipinos came to the American public through the New York Sun, in a dispatch purporting to have originated in Manila on Sunday, the 5th. According to this dispatch the Filipinos had attacked Manila at 8:30 o'clock Saturday evening, and had fired upon the American outposts Sunday morning. Immediately upon the making of the attack, Gen. Otis had conveyed many of the women and children to vessels in the harbor. The attack was general and stubborn, but