

all the news we have had from the Philippines since the outbreak of the 4th of February. Mr. Creelman had his experience in connection with the fight of March 13th, which the American press exploited as a hard won victory. Referring to this fight Creelman cables four days later:

The movement of Gen. Wheaton's flying brigade on Monday was grossly exaggerated. The censor refused to allow correspondents to cable the truth, that the insurgents ran away. He insisted that the dispatches represent a serious battle with the enemy resisting furiously, and allowed complaisant writers to represent the insurgent loss as enormous. Otis's advances simply consist of elaborate skirmishes, and few losses. He is making no vigorous or determined advance. As in the case of Weyler at Havana, correspondents are forced to represent the facts to suit Otis or be denied use of the cable.

Creelman himself was obliged in his Manila account of the fight to please the censor or say nothing. This censorship, let it be remembered, is not to conceal American military movements from the Filipinos. It would be useless for that purpose. Its sole object is to deceive the American public.

Owing to the Manila censorship, it is impossible even to conjecture the actual situation in the Philippines. The dispatches have all along told us that an aggressive American movement was to be made as soon as reinforcements arrived. And when reinforcements did arrive, such a movement was reported with many flourishes of patriotic rhetoric. Yet Gen. Otis now says that he was ordered not to be aggressive while the treaty remained unsigned. Then we were told that the Filipinos were on the verge of collapse, and that hostilities would soon end. But now comes word that the American troops have fallen back five miles from a town which they had captured after a hard fight. It is explained that they returned for ammunition; but as ammunition could have been sent to them easier than they could come after it, that explanation has a censorship flavor. We are also told that a large

detachment of American troops drove the Filipinos before them for 15 miles, over hard ground and under a hot sun, and then returned exhausted to the starting point. At the same time the authorities at Washington, as reticent as ever, have begun to show evident signs of concern. And meanwhile, the president's advisory commission is reported as preparing a conciliatory address to the Filipinos. What it all means is a mystery and will remain more or less a mystery until trustworthy correspondents are heard from through non-Russianized channels of communication.

Down to the close of February, the casualties in the American army from the beginning of the war, as officially reported, were as follows:

Killed in action.....	329
Died of wounds.....	125
Died of disease.....	5,277

Total 5,731

This report goes far to show how much more deadly than Spanish or Filipino ammunition, was American army management. Out of 5,731 deaths, 5,277 were caused by disease!

Early in the course of the bad beef investigation now being made by a board of inquiry of the army, it was widely reported in the press, as if from some inspired source, that the board was already prepared to report that Gen. Miles's chief charges were unfounded. Three inferences as to the origin of that report are now available. It may have originated from high quarters in a knowledge, prematurely divulged, of what the board of inquiry had been appointed to do. Or it may have been manufactured by newspaper correspondents, out of whole cloth. Or, again, it may have leaked out from the counsels of the board itself. Whatever the origin of the report, however, it is not likely to be confirmed by the event. Whether the board of inquiry, like the president's informal whitewashing committee which made a notoriously false report, was appointed for whitewashing purposes, or had actual-

ly decided on its own account to make a whitewashing job of the affair, it must now take a different course. A clean job of whitewashing is no longer possible. Thanks to Maj. Lee, and apparently to him alone, a little daylight has been let into the darkness of the army beef supply. Some proof has been drawn out which shows that "embalmed" beef did go to the army. Much proof has been laid bare of the bad quality of the canned beef. And altogether this proof points to moral corruption.

Doubtless there is much more available proof of corruption in furnishing beef to the army than what has thus far been disclosed. Ugly rumors are afloat in the neighborhood of the Chicago stock yards. It is said that when the war broke out, orders were given to unload unmarketable stock upon the government; and there are men with long memories, and possibly some inside information, who conjecture that a poor quality of canned beef sent to Europe a decade and a half ago in expectation of a European war, was brought back last spring and supplied to the American army. In connection with these rumors, there are shrewd suspicions, too, that the acceptance by army contractors of bad beef from the Chicago packers is not wholly unrelated to the large contributions which the packers made to the presidential campaign fund in 1896. For the truth of these rumors we cannot vouch. We only know they are afloat. But that the packers did contribute heavily, not for love but for business, to the Hanna campaign fund; that bad beef was furnished to the army; and that desperate efforts have been made by administration dependents to conceal the notorious fact that it was bad,—these things are matters of common knowledge.

A cowardly massacre of negroes by a white mob occurred last week at Palmetto, Ga. The negroes were under arrest, awaiting preliminary hearings upon suspicion—mere suspicion—of having caused incendiary fires,