

for work and the penalty for failure—an empty stomach, a chilled body and a thoroughly despondent mind—made this sight an urgent temptation. “It was so short a step,” Wyckoff confesses, “by which I could emerge from the submerged, and the temptation to take it was so strong and inviting.” But he resisted. Later in the day his equally unsuccessful and hungry partner by his side, in front of a restaurant window where a cook in immaculate white was turning well browned griddle cakes, he was startled by the despairing suggestion of his partner that “we’d get all we want to eat if we’d heave a rock through this window.”

It would not be easy to convince Wyckoff, after that experience, that there is work enough for all. Or if he, who was only making an inquiry into social conditions, and at any moment could change his status if he chose, might in the comfortable surroundings of his normal life be convinced that this was only the experience of a single individual, his partner would not be so easily convinced. Those workers—and they count up into the millions—whose necessity compels them to hunt for work, and who, whether they are successful or not, learn from the saddest of experience that opportunity to work is indeed a boon, would scout the notion that there is work enough for all. If there is work enough for all, why should any seeker for work fail to find it? Why should those who get it have such a deadening dread of losing it?

Yet William T. Harris, the United States commissioner of education, undertakes in the April Forum to prove that there is work enough for all. And, what is much more to the point, he makes out his case. He does prove that there is work enough for all notwithstanding the tremendous strides in labor-saving invention which apparently lessen opportunities for work. The line of Mr. Harris’ demonstration is that though machinery lessens the work required to satisfy old wants it creates new wants and arouses new desires in a much greater degree. He proves, in other words, that machinery, instead of lessening the total demand for work, increases it.

Apart from his demonstration, which is complete, this is obviously true. There is no limit to human wants short of human power of making things to satisfy those wants. Even if it were possible to satisfy the

wants of the whole race as to quantity, wants would still expand as to quality, and opportunities for work would increase in proportion. In spite of the experience of Mr. Wyckoff and his “partner,” in spite of the vast army of the unemployed, in spite of the fear—founded upon observation or experience or both—from which few are free, however profitable their employment, the fear of losing the work they have and being unable to get other work, in spite of the dread that mechanics have of the introduction of machinery, which, as in the case of the type-setting machine, for example, may throw 75 per cent. of a craft out of work—in spite of all this, and of the general understanding that we have too little work to go around, there is, as Mr. Harris argues, and there always will be, work enough for all.

How, then, are we to explain the condition of which Mr. Wyckoff gives us a luminous account, the condition of the unemployed? If there were work enough for all, would anyone seek work in vain? Would anyone dread the loss of his job as he would a pestilence? Would not the millions who are workless be able to find their billets, and the actual workers have no fear of losing the billets they had got?

The explanation is simple, though Mr. Harris fails to make or even to attempt it. Work is difficult to get, though there is work for all, because by subtle methods, under color of law, opportunities to work are monopolized and withheld. Not that those who want work done deliberately refuse to employ those who want to do it, but that by means of certain special privileges, created by law, some control the avenues to work and prevent the great mass from exchanging work with one another. For work is not something which a few have to give out, and which the rest have to do if they can get a chance. Work is a matter of trade. In the absence of special privilege every one would give out work and every one would do work. That being so, it is evident that if workers could profitably be prevented from meeting and exchanging work, there would be an army of unemployed even with work enough for all. And that is what happens.

Two things besides labor are needed to enable every one to get his share of the work of which there is enough for all. These two things, however, are not machinery and money. Labor makes machinery, and at the worst

it could provide a substitute for money. They are, first, land—soil, space, standing room—in desirable locations; and second, freedom of trade. With these, everybody can work as he wishes to, exchanging his work with his fellows. Without these, everyone is dependent for an opportunity to work, though there be work enough for all, upon the privileged persons who monopolize the desirable land and the avenues of trade.

With such monopolies, an army of unemployed would be inevitable, though there were a thousand times more work than enough to go around. When any body, any class, or any interest, has the power of restricting opportunities for work, the fact that there is enough work to go around is an unimportant consideration. Though there were seats enough in a circus to go around, what difference would it make to men who couldn’t get into the tent?

The contrast between Mr. Wyckoff and his friend, whose luxurious comforts almost tempted the former to abandon his experiment, was due to the fact that the friend was privileged by law to control opportunities to work, and could therefore live in luxury upon the tribute he was able to exact from bidders for a job; whereas Mr. Wyckoff was realistically playing the part of a victim of the system of which his friend was a beneficiary. There was plenty of work in Chicago—more than enough for all; and Mr. Wyckoff would have got what he desired, had it not been that men like his friend had the work cornered.

JUSTIFIABLENESS OF THE WAR.

In considering the question of the justifiableness of our war with Spain, four different points of view must be taken into account. There is, in the first place, the point of view of the peace man absolute, the man who is opposed to war under all circumstances. Then there is that of the ideal anarchist, whose opposition to every form of governmental force leads him, while conceding and defending the right of anyone to fight who wishes to, to oppose all formal warfare under the sanction and compulsion of government. The third point of view is that of the “patriot,” who is for his country right or wrong. Finally, there is the point of view of the man who believes in government, who believes that the war-making

power is a function of government, and who, though his horror of war is equal to that of the peace man absolute, has still greater horror of some things which cannot be put aside without war. There are other points of view, but these four probably include all the honest ones.

The position of the peace man absolute is of the utmost importance in times of peace. Those are times when men can rationally discuss the possibility and advisability of agreeing upon measures for settling international disputes without bloodshed. But in the midst of war, or upon the threshold of war, when the question is not whether some plan for peaceably and justly settling the controversy can be devised, but whether the cause of the war is just, the peace man absolute cannot be argued with. The only question for argument at such a time being the rightfulness or wrongfulness of war over a particular controversy, his denial of the rightfulness of war over any controversy whatever excludes him from the discussion.

This is also true of the ideal anarchist. If there were no compulsory governments, and no international law enjoining upon these governments, under penalty of war, an obligation to compel their citizens to keep the international peace, we might say with the ideal anarchists: "Let us allow everybody who wishes to go to war upon his own account to do so, and abandon compulsory warfare." But so long as we actually have governments and international law, we should involve ourselves in more wars by adopting the ideal anarchist's substitute for compulsory war than we should escape by now and then making war. While the theory of ideal anarchism, like that of the peace man absolute, is important and by no means without merit, it is not a theory which can be beneficially discussed when the only question under discussion, or that can possibly be brought under discussion, is the justice of the cause of an inevitable war.

The "patriot" also, as well as the peace man absolute and the ideal anarchist, must be excluded from this discussion, and for essentially the same reason. While his point of view is abhorrent, and rightly so, to both the peace man and the anarchist, it is like theirs in this, that it ignores a vital question—the justice of the cause of a war. The man who is for his country right or wrong can neither contribute nor receive any

benefit in discussing that question. It is of necessity restricted to those who believe that a just war is justifiable, and that an unjust one is not.

But what constitutes a just war? If a nation unjustly repudiates pecuniary obligations to another nation or its citizens, would a war for the enforcement of those obligations be just? Certainly not. It were better, if the repudiating nation would not submit to arbitration in such a case, to publish the facts and let neighbor nations know the character of this one of the international family. To shed blood for the collection of a debt, however just the debt, is unjust, whether on the part of a nation or of an individual. So would it be unjust to go to war over a mere boundary dispute. When farmers go to law over boundary quarrels, their neighbors think them fools, as they are; but how much greater the folly, and how great the wickedness, of a nation which, over the same kind of quarrel, causes the slaughter of thousands of men. A war with Spain, for having destroyed one of our battleships and murdering her crew, would likewise be unjust. The wrongfulness of Spain's aggression in that case would be over with the single act. No war could restore the lives of the murdered men. It could only sacrifice thousands of other men. But if Spain had imprisoned these men and refused to release them, or, having killed them, had threatened to keep on killing our seamen in the same way at every opportunity, then a different question would have been presented. That would have amounted to a continuous denial of liberty—a wrong which war might remedy. And to remedy that wrong, war would have been just. In other words, the one just cause for war is a continuous denial of liberty; and wars honestly fought to achieve or defend liberty, provided the end cannot be secured without war, are just.

Such a war we believe the war between the United States and Spain to be. It is true that we are not fighting this war either to achieve or to defend our own liberty, yet we are fighting for liberty under circumstances which have made it impossible for us not to fight without proving ourselves indifferent to liberty.

That the Cuban insurrection is a struggle for liberty no one can deny. That the insurgents have a moral right to fight, none but peace men absolute, and natural born slavery lovers will dispute. Under Spanish

rule they have not been free, and under Spanish rule they never would be free. To Spain, Cuba has been simply a source of revenue. The island has been literally mortgaged to the great money lenders of the world, and the proceeds of the loan applied to Spanish uses. The pretense of a republican provincial government and of representation in the cortes is a sham. Until recently chattel slavery was maintained upon the island by Spanish power, as it would have been to this day but for the ten years' war of the 60's and 70's. If the American revolution was a just war, then the Cuban rebellion is just. If the former was a war for liberty, so is the latter. And we have been drawn into it not by the machinations of syndicates nor by politicians seeking to silence agitation for greater freedom at home, but in spite of these machinations, by the sentiment of the common people of our country. This is a war which democracy has incited, and one which will strengthen instead of smothering democratic agitation at home. It is a war to guarantee national independence to a neighbor whose people have fought with a devotion and success paralleled only by the conflict which our own fathers waged a century ago under similar circumstances against a parent government which then bore to them, minus the cruelty, much the same relation that Spain now bears to the Cubans.

It may be freely acknowledged that a political revolution in Cuba will not make Cubans free. Neither did political revolutions in this country make Americans free. But as political revolutions here did lay the foundations of American freedom, on which we have been steadily building ever since, so political revolution in Cuba would lay the foundations for Cuban freedom. Freedom is not secured at once. It is a structure built layer upon layer, and political freedom is the first layer. The war in which we have engaged is to enable the Cubans to lay this foundation securely. We have not sought the war. Our position is not that of an international Don Quixote. Circumstances beyond our control have drawn us into the conflict. But now that we are in it, we find we are fighting for liberty, for the only cause which can justify war.

While peace man absolute, then, may condemn the war, and, from their point of view, ought to condemn it;

while ideal anarchists also may condemn it, as they also from their point of view ought to do, the man who believes that a war for liberty is less horrible than the persistent, not to say barbaric, denial of liberty, cannot withhold his approval. If we as a nation believe in liberty, and in the justice of wars waged in behalf of liberty, then we were bound, under the conditions which had been forced upon us, to order Spain to withdraw from Cuba and to enforce the order if need be by our army and navy.

DULUTH TAX DODGERS.

Some of the shrewder owners of vacant lots in Duluth have invented and are making the most of a new method of evading local taxes without losing the power which their ownership of the lots gives them of appropriating to themselves in increased land values the pecuniary benefits of Duluth's growth. It must be understood that three kinds of taxes rest upon these lots—state taxes, city taxes and county taxes. State taxes have priority of lien upon the property, so that a sale for delinquent state taxes effects a transfer of the property to the buyer entirely freed from all city and county taxes down to that time. Taking advantage of this fact, the shrewd proprietors in question allow their state taxes to become delinquent; whereupon their property is sold for state taxes, and they buy it for the amount of the state tax for which it is sold. Thus they pay no more to the state as a purchase price at the tax sale than they would have to pay in state taxes if they did not become delinquents; but they thereby free themselves from all accumulated city and county taxes which they would still have to pay, if instead of submitting to the tax sale and buying in they paid their state tax as a tax.

Owners of vacant lots are already sufficiently favored by tax laws without being allowed in this or any other way to defraud those laws. They do nothing whatever for the community in which their property lies in return for the increased value which the lots acquire solely in consequence of the growth of the community. If they were in another land or in the penitentiary their lots would grow in value just the same. Lot values are not in the slightest degree produced by the owners. How absurd, then, not to say dishonest, on the part of the officials of a community to allow the owners of vacant lots to avoid the ut-

most taxes that can be lawfully exacted from them. Especially is this so when escape from the enforcement of such taxes can be prevented.

In the case of the Duluth tax dodgers it probably could be avoided. The city of Duluth would be well paid if at these tax sales it were to overbid the shrewd delinquents, to the extent of their city taxes. If that were done, the delinquents would be obliged either to pay the city its taxes or to let the city buy the property. Should they bid high enough at the sale to cover the city tax, the city would at least recover its due; and if they did not, and the city were obliged to take the property, it could lease it to advantage on ground rent as Chicago leases her school lands.

Possibly the laws of Minnesota would make this plan impracticable; but if they would, some plan should suggest itself to the Duluth authorities by which they could save to the people of that city somewhat at least of the value which those people as a community give without consideration to the owners of vacant lots.

NEWS

The rebellion against the authority of Spain in the Philippine islands, noted on page 12 of our first number, on page 11 of the second number and on page 11 of the third, promises to make those islands an important battleground of the war between Spain and the United States.

On the 23d the English governor at Hong-Kong, who administers that colony under the cession to Great Britain of 1841, notified the American consul that the American fleet must depart by the afternoon of Monday, the 25th, and ship no warlike stores or coal beyond what might be necessary to carry it to the nearest port. This fleet is under the command of Commodore Dewey. It consists of the cruisers Olympia, Baltimore, Raleigh, Concord and Boston; the gunboat Petrel, and a dispatch boat, a store ship, and a collier. On the day of the British notification, cable dispatches from Hong-Kong reported that the rebels were in control of the Philippines outside of Manilla, the capital, which is situated on Luzon island, and that they had chosen a president and cabinet and hoped to maintain a government after the manner of the Cubans. Two days later the dispatches from the same source told of the expected

departure of the president, whose name is Aguinaldo, from Singapore, on the Malay peninsula to the Philippines, to lead a land attack upon the Spanish at Manilla with 30,000 rebel troops. Meanwhile, Commodore Dewey's fleet had left Hong-Kong for Mirs Bay, about 30 miles to the northeast, whence it sailed on the 27th for Manilla. The ships were at that time cleared for action. On the same day a dispatch to Madrid from the Spanish naval station at Manila announced that the Spanish squadron at the Philippines was moving into position to meet the United States squadron. A battle is expected on the 29th or 30th. The Spanish fleet which defends Manilla is made up of four cruisers—one of wood, two of iron and one of steel—and five small gunboats and a transport.

The president transmitted to congress on the 25th copies of the Spanish correspondence, together with an explanation of the present relations between that country and this; and in view of his having proclaimed a blockade and called out troops, he recommended the adoption of a joint resolution declaring the existence of a state of war. Both houses immediately adopted and the president signed a bill which, first, declared that war exists and "has existed since the 21st day of April, A. D., 1898, including said day, between the United States and the kingdom of Spain;" and, second, directed and empowered the president to use the land and naval forces and to call out the militia to the extent necessary to prosecute that war.

The events of the week culminating thus in a formal declaration of war, began with the president's ultimatum, mentioned on page 7 last week as having been conveyed to Spain. Its text was officially published on the 21st. It advised Minister Woodford of the signing by the president of the congressional resolution printed in full last week on page 7, and directed him to communicate the resolution to the government of Spain, and to make a formal demand from our government that "the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters." The document concluded as follows: "If by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23d day of April instant, there is not communicated to this