

were a youth on his way to his wedding. If in fact, then, this man is not a lunatic but a murderous conspirator, one of a band like himself sworn to assassinate royal personages, what protection could there possibly be in international outlawry, or in killing off "anarchists," unless the decree were as sweeping and indiscriminating as Herod's against the innocents? If not a lunatic, that man is affected with the kind of fanaticism that leads men joyfully to death in pursuit of their objects; and if there be in truth a society of such, neither outlawry nor fear of death will suppress them. If there be a society of such men, which we do not believe any more than we believe in the ogres of fairy lore, they will make it more dangerous to wear a crown than to go to battle; and the more they are "suppressed," the more dangerous they will become.

But be there such a society or not, be the assassination of the Empress of Austria the work of an "anarchist" or of a lunatic, the remedy is not the international outlawry of people accused of being "anarchists." Besides being futile, that would itself be anarchy; and it would degenerate into something akin to the old witchcraft persecutions. The remedy is to remove the cause of anarchy; it is, in the language of one astute American editor, to "stamp out the ignorance, stupidity, idleness, and moral obliquity from which modern anarchy is hatched." This ignorance, stupidity, idleness and moral obliquity, however, is not located where the astute editor supposes. It is the "ignorance" and "stupidity" of the titled fools who imagine that they can stop progress toward liberty by taking advantage of maniacal crimes to persecute political adversaries; it is the "idleness" of those who though they toil not, live in luxury upon the earnings of such as do; it is the "moral obliquity" of those who think of the world as their oyster and of their fellow men as menials designed by a plutocratic God to open it for them.

Stamp out these base things, and anarchy would indeed disappear. There would be then no more lunatics driven by what they see of undeserved hunger to insanely murder people whom they see revelling in unearned luxury.

The principal specification of the charge that the Cubans are incapable of self-government was to the effect that they fired upon Cervera and his surviving officers and men after they had surrendered. This was the especial ground of complaint of that industrious journal of plutocratic civilization, Harper's Weekly, which denounced the act as placing the Cuban republic "outside of the pale of civilization." It seemed to us at the time that this indicated a sad lack of real grounds of complaint against the Cubans, and implied that the plutocrats of this country were willing to seize upon the flimsiest kind of excuses to justify their purpose of wresting the Island of Cuba from its people. We were unable to see that this act charged against a few Cubans as putting the whole Cuban people outside the pale of civilization, was a whit worse than that of the Spanish sharpshooters who fired upon our wounded, our Red Cross and our surgeons, deliberately picking them off, a barbaric act which nobody thought of imputing to the whole Spanish nation. Moreover, there was no good reason for believing that the Cubans knew Cervera had surrendered. He appeared to be running away, and we could see as a matter of civilization no difference between the act of Cubans in firing upon him as he ran away, and the action of our own troops in firing upon Spanish soldiers at San Juan as they ran away. The indignation of our plutocrats impressed us as similar to that of the wolf when the lamb muddied the stream. And so it appears to have been. For now, and from Spanish sources at that, it is shown not only that Cervera had not surrendered but was running away to escape capture, when the Cubans fired upon him, but

also that as soon as he did surrender—and it was to the Cubans, mind you, that he surrendered—they treated him with civilized consideration and turned him over to the Americans. It begins to look as if proof of the incapacity of the Cubans for self-government would be at a premium at Washington before Mr. McKinley succeeds in "pacifying" their island sufficiently for the civilizing purposes of the American-Indies Company.

These are distracting times for Mark Hanna's White house protege. The management of the war was like a holiday to him in comparison with the troubles which its mismanagement has brought upon his administration. At first he was determined to ignore the universal complaints, to regard them as scandalous emanations from yellow journals; but his complacency was rudely disturbed by the election returns from Vermont. This green mountain state always goes republican, but the rise and fall of the republican majority there is as invariably an indication of the condition of the political weather elsewhere. So when Mr. McKinley heard that while the democrats of Vermont had polled as large a vote last Tuesday as they polled at the presidential election two years ago, the republican vote had fallen off 25 per cent., he hurried to set on foot the army investigation which the people had urgently demanded, but which until then he had regarded as quite unnecessary.

This investigation was requested by the secretary of war, it is true, but that detracts nothing from the inference that it was really set on foot by the president. It must be remembered that the secretary of war plumply opposed any investigation. He was proud of his department. The charges of ill-treatment of soldiers he denounced as silly. There had been but one complaint, he said, and that was without foundation. The truth was, so he asseverated, that the soldiers had had too much to eat, too much of fruit and harmful food;

they bought things that were not good for them, and against orders drank unboiled water. He deprecated the sensational attacks upon the department as malicious, and stood upon his record. He would have no investigation. That was his attitude until the president had heard from the Vermont election, whereupon the secretary of war asked for an investigation, and the president promptly appointed investigators. So promptly did the president act that Vermont election returns, Secretary Alger's unexpected request for an investigation, and the president's action upon it, were all mixed up. It requires a close examination into the order of the events to tell which came first, but there is no doubt that it was the Vermont election. Some lively telephoning must have been done between the White house and the war office after the closing of the polls in Vermont.

Be that as it may, however, the president was right in ordering an investigation, and we need not inquire too closely into his motives. The important thing is that he has started an investigation, and except in one particular seems to have done so with the object of securing an impartial report. The exception is his appointment upon the investigating commission of a close personal friend of Alger's, whose department is to be investigated. The president appears to have thought that the accused ought to have an advocate on the jury. Still, enough able men were selected for the commission, men presumably above personal influence, to be a guarantee against white-washing, and the public will wait patiently to learn from them upon whom rests the blame for the mismanagement which has already so completely proved itself.

For the purpose of ascertaining the fact of mismanagement, no investigation is needed. One is needed only for the purpose of fixing the blame. The fact of mismanagement is proved in a thousand ways to the apprehension and satisfaction of every impartial

man. It is proved by the great number of deaths from disease since the war, deaths caused mostly by typhoid fever and not by fevers to which the troops were necessarily exposed in Cuba. It is proved by the experience of regiments in home camps, regiments that never reached Cuba yet suffered death losses far in excess of the battle casualties of any regiment at the front. It is proved by the condition in which the troops from the front reached Montauk, a worse condition than that in which they left Cuba. It is proved by the unanimous testimony of disinterested witnesses who visited Montauk. It is proved by the notorious fact that weak and invalid soldiers were forced to go to New York by the Long Island railroad, suffering all the miseries of railroad travel in summer on the most exasperating line north of Florida, when they could have been transported more comfortably, and often more directly to their destinations, by water. It is proved by the unvarying testimony of the soldiers themselves, when among friends at home they feel that they can speak freely without incurring the penalties of military discipline. It is proved by the ineffectually suppressed official inquiry into the sanitary conditions at Chickamauga. It is proved by the fact that the whole press of the United States, regardless of party, and without other exceptions than a few thick and thin administration supporters of the Hanna breed, agree in their reports that the mismanagement was scandalous. There is no denial of the mismanagement outside of the war department and its environs. The only point of disagreement, and the only point upon which investigation is needed, except as a basis for further inquiry, is as to where the blame should rest.

There has been a strong tendency to lay the blame upon the regimental officers of volunteer regiments. That these regiments had among their officers a full complement of incompetents, martinets, and sluggards, is

doubtless true. But the war department cannot shift responsibility for that. The national guard regiments were not accepted as regiments. They were not allowed the right to select their own officers. The government asserted absolute control in that particular. And though national guard regiments did in great degree retain their own officers, it was at all times within the power of the war department to displace them. If then the volunteer officers were incapable of caring for their men, and the department knew it as it professes, then the department itself is responsible for not putting competent officers in their places. From some of the war department reports, however, we are inclined to believe that the department is responsible in a more reprehensible way for the inefficiency of officers of national guard regiments. These officers are charged by the department with not understanding the red tape of supply-getting. If that charge be well founded, why did not the department furnish them with specific instructions? If supplies are kept in secret places, like the goat of a masonic lodge, it was the duty of the war department to see that inexperienced officers promptly learned the mystery of getting at them. Could no worse complaint be brought against the national guard officers than that they did not know how to untie department tape so as to get supplies for their men, their record would be good enough. When the department endeavors to shift responsibility to them on that score, it only adds to its own condemnation.

But the weakest position in this matter is that of the fellows who attempt to throw the blame upon congress. Congress has many faults to answer for, but this is none of its sins. It voted money abundantly for the prosecution of the war. While in session it made no effort to direct the war, and of course it made none after it adjourned. The whole matter was left to the management of the commander-in-chief. He appointed offi-

cers; he had the power to remove them. He was as absolute as Napoleon in all that related to the management of the war, and his supplies were practically without limit. Even when he appointed sons and nephews, at the solicitation of congressmen, it was upon his own responsibility. To attempt then to shoulder the responsibility for mismanagement upon congress is utterly without justification. That responsibility, no matter who may be immediately to blame, must rest upon the president himself.

A double purpose can be readily discerned in the first effort to pick a quarrel with the Philippine natives. The war was over so quickly that there was embarrassment in finding excuses for keeping under arms a considerable number of volunteers, who might be insensibly transformed into that increase of the standing army which has so long been conspired for; and the fight in the streets of Manila, which was unquestionably started by the Americans, afforded a splendid excuse for sending out there a large body of troops whose disbandment might otherwise have been demanded by public opinion. So the quarrel helped on the large standing army scheme. But a still more important inducement to foment trouble is the excuse it would offer for establishing a military protectorate, under which the pirates that surround and to no inconsiderable extent make up the administration might find a free field for plunder.

One would suppose that the exposures already made in connection with the management of the war might warn these delinquents to be cautious; but it must be remembered that they have every reason to suspect that public indignation will not leave them long in possession of their present opportunities, or at any rate that the simple confidence which might have allowed McKinley to go on unquestioningly parcelling out the Philippines among his favorites has been destroyed. The necessity with them

is therefore strong to make a bold stroke, and what could be bolder or more likely to succeed than to stir up native hostility? Nothing. Nothing, that is to say, unless our own people awake to the fact that it is no impertinence on the part of Aguinaldo and his followers to seek to manage their own affairs without foreign interference.

Treasury officials are cautiously putting out an intimation that it will be necessary to continue the present stamp taxes until the Dingley tariff law can be so revised as to be more productive of revenue. Is it so, then, that the Dingley law is such a failure as a revenue raiser that even treasury officials admit it? What a blessing the war has been to Mr. Dingley! If there had been no stamp taxes to eke out the customs revenues how would he have made even himself believe that his bill is what he claimed it to be? With opportunities for employment as scarce as ever and wages as low as ever, while customs revenues are too small to meet public expenses more than a year after the Dingley bill went into operation, the Dingley promises of McKinleyism look more than ever like a grand bunco game.

American editors who indulge in sneers at Aguinaldo, the Philippine president, for making "an innocent demand for a share of the booty captured by the Americans at Manila," need to be reminded that the making of war an opportunity to get booty is still a civilized proceeding. Let us not sneer at Aguinaldo for having an appetite for sharing booty, until the episode of our army and navy officers quarreling over the captured ships at Santiago shall have been quite forgotten.

In his letter of acceptance as the populist candidate for member of the board of county assessors of Cook county, Ill., Clarence Moeller makes a remarkable statement. He says that more than 90 per cent. of the land values of Cook county is owned

by less than 10 per cent. of the voters. Is this true? If not, it can be easily refuted. If it is true, it is evidence of a concentration of wealth which should make every thoughtful man pause. If 90 per cent. of the area of a county like Cook were owned by ten per cent. of the voters—90 acres in every 100 by only 10 voters in every 100—we should be appalled. But really it is much more appalling to consider that 90 per cent. of the land values are so owned. For land values are the pecuniary measure of the social advantages which a locality has to offer. The meaning, therefore, of Mr. Moeller's statement is that 10 per cent. of the voters of Cook county own 90 per cent. of the social advantages. It means that here is an instance of the universal tendency of social progress to enrich the few. To counteract that tendency Mr. Moeller proposes the abolition of taxes on the kinds of property which men earn by their labor, and the concentration of all taxes upon land values. Even the simplest mind should be able to see that if that reform did nothing else, it would produce a more equitable distribution of social benefits. Under such a system of taxation the profits of merely owning land would fall and the profits of using it would rise.

The Southern Pacific railroad republicans of California could have rendered Congressman Maguire no greater service in his campaign for governor than by adopting the plank in their platform in which, referring to the fact that he is a follower of Henry George, they "oppose the doctrine of the single tax, of which the democratic nominee is the apostle, as being socialistic and anarchistic, and the practical workings of which will be to release stocks, bonds, corporations and usurers from taxation and place all its burdens on the farmers and owners of homesteads." The foregoing plank shows how low in demagoguery the republican party has fallen, since it drifted away from the traditions of Abraham Lincoln and