

the Netawaka precinct he received 18-99 of 7 representative votes; and in Hoyt precinct 1-56 of 9 representative votes; and so on. While George N. Haas, the successful applicant and nominee, received only 4 votes at Whiting precinct, therefore only 4-109 of 8 representative votes; 20-99 of 7 representative votes at Netawaka, and 14-56 of 9 representative votes at Hoyt; and so on. The other applicants received votes, and each counted his just share of the representative vote of each precinct in the proportion of the number of votes cast for him to the whole number cast therein.

The result of this method, as Mr. Hopkins explains it, is that "the weakest applicant, all round, fails; the strongest applicant, all round, wins the nomination."

The advantages of such a method over the present delegate convention method are evident. Not the least important among them is the natural tendency to draw out a full vote at the primaries. This appears to have been done in a remarkable degree by the Kansas experiment. At the primary election in 1895, of which Mr. Hopkins gives the returns, it appears that the number of republican votes cast was 1,931—only 20 less than the party cast at the succeeding general election; and for 19 years, according to Mr. Hopkins, "at each and every primary election, the republican voters of this county have been turning out in about the same proportion of the increase or decrease of the republican electors."

Another advantage that might be reasonably expected is freedom from "bolting," and therefore a direct measuring of strength at the general election between the regular political parties. That is an advantage, because bolting is only a necessity of bad nominating methods; it is not a political virtue in itself. This advantage, too, seems to have been demonstrated by the Kansas experiment in Jackson county. There has been no republican bolting there since the Hopkins experiment has been in operation.

A still greater advantage would be the certainty with which the nominations of every party would be made by the people of the party. And this would be attended with an advantage the benefits of which would exceed all expectations. Our elections would become what Mr. Hopkins

aptly terms "the great common school of politics." Any member of a party who believed that some new policy was in harmony with the principles of his party, could represent that policy as a candidate at the primaries, if he could obtain the indorsement of a small percentage of his copartisans, and thus call upon the party itself to give its commands in the matter. In doing so he would help to educate the community in the most effective manner, not only in regard to the particular policy he represented, but in regard also to the application of fundamental party principles. Primaries under such a nominating method would be the forum for the discussion and decision of all vital questions affecting political parties and through them the municipality, the state and the nation. They would lift the people themselves to a higher political plane. By improving electoral methods they would actually foster democracy. Though they could not make the stream rise above the level of its source, they would elevate the source.

The election reform which Mr. Miller proposes, and the operation of which in a Kansas county Mr. Hopkins has described, would rescue political parties from the caucuses and bosses; and while going a long way toward accomplishing the objects of proportional representation and the initiative and referendum, would make those still more fundamental reforms easier of adoption.

NEWS

The operations in front of Santiago are still the center of interest in connection with the war. At the close of the account of these operations last week, the fierce battle of the 1st and the intermittent skirmishes of the 2d had been fought, and the Americans were strengthening their entrenchments, which commanded the beleaguered Cuban city. Gen. Shafter, according to his own reports, was then master of the situation. He had already demanded an unconditional surrender, accompanying the demand with a notification that if not complied with by 10 o'clock on the morning of the 4th he would begin a bombardment, but had postponed his threatened bombardment twice, for

24 hours each time, first at the solicitation of the foreign consuls at Santiago, and then on account of the new aspect which had been put upon the situation by the destruction of Cervera's fleet. This brought the armistice down to the 6th. At that time the distance from the American trenches to the advance works of the Spanish was only 200 yards.

But the bombardment did not begin yet for several days, though the Spanish commandant had positively refused on the 5th to consider the question of surrender. Meanwhile, the Spanish tried on the 6th to sink the *Reina Mercedes* in the channel, for the purpose of blockading Sampson's entrance into Santiago bay; but the Massachusetts and the Texas discovered the movement and sunk the *Mercedes* in one of the coves of the bay where she offers no obstruction. Also, during the delay of the American advance, refugees from Santiago poured by thousands over into the American lines. This exodus from the city began on the 5th, when the Spanish commandant refused to consider the question of surrender, and on the 7th it was estimated that 15,000 had come over. They were chiefly foreigners and women and children, and all were in extreme distress for want of food. Among the refugees were the civil governor, the mayor, and the president of the upper court of justice, who had been forbidden by the commandant to leave, but had managed to slip away.

Though the Spanish commandant had declined to surrender on the 5th he afterwards concluded to confer upon the subject with Gen. Blanco at Havana and his home government at Madrid. Being totally without telegraph operators, however,—the operators of the only open line, the English, having deserted,—he was obliged to apply to Gen. Shafter for assistance in that particular. Gen. Shafter responded by sending employes of the English cable company back within the Spanish lines, under the protection of the British consul, and upon the assurance of the Spanish commandant that they should be used only for the purpose of communicating regarding a surrender. He also granted an armistice until the 9th to afford an opportunity for the contemplated communication with Blanco and Madrid.

Gen. Shafter, therefore, delayed a

direct advance upon Santiago, but he continued to strengthen his line and to extend it to the north and west around the city. On the 9th the Spanish commandant, doubtless acting under orders, offered to surrender upon condition that his army be permitted to leave the city under arms and with colors flying. Shafter refused the offer, but agreed to further delay his long-threatened bombardment until the 10th, and meantime to communicate the Spanish offer to the president. The president was notified accordingly, but he replied at once requiring the surrender to be unconditional.

After again conferring with his superiors at Havana and Madrid, the Spanish commandant refused, on the 10th, to surrender unconditionally; and at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of that day the American bombardment began. It continued until dark, both the land artillery and the fleet participating.

The operations of the fleet on the 10th were under the command of Com. Schley. He brought the Brooklyn, the Indiana and the Texas within 500 yards of the shore at a point about four miles and a half south of Santiago, and, with the help of army signalling, threw shells over the high cliffs and into the city. On the following day the New York, the Brooklyn, the Newark and the Indiana were the bombarding ships. One of their shots struck a church where powder was stored and blew it up. But early in the afternoon Shafter ordered all firing to cease, to enable him to make a third and last demand for surrender before storming the city. The Spanish commandant asked time to receive instructions from Madrid, which was granted, and on the 12th the demand for unconditional surrender was again refused.

When Gen. Shafter made his third demand for the surrender of the city he had the city completely surrounded. His right wing had been extended almost to the road from Santiago to Caimanes, a town to the northwest of Santiago, along which road the Spanish would have to move if they retreated; and Garcia with his Cubans had taken Caimanes. This made a complete line, extending from the west shore of the bay opposite Santiago, in northerly, easterly and southerly directions, to the coast. No

opportunity for the escape of the Spanish was left, except by a dash through the American line; and though that line was thin, it was being rapidly strengthened with reinforcements. On the 13th Gen. Shafter's available force numbered 21,873 men.

Though the Spanish commandant refused on the 12th to surrender unconditionally, the bombardment was not resumed on that day. Shafter was still in communication with Washington with reference to the Spanish demand for a modification of the terms of surrender. On the 13th he was positively and finally instructed by the president that no modification would be made. He then brought about a personal interview, under a flag of truce between the lines, with Gen. Toral, the Spanish commandant, who has acted in the place of Gen. Linares since the latter was wounded in the battle of the 1st and 2d, at which interview Gen. Shafter explained the situation to Gen. Toral, telling him that he was without hope of escape, that his surrender only would be considered, and that under the circumstances he had no right to waste human lives by continuing to fight. Gen. Toral claimed that without further authority from his government, all he was authorized to do was to surrender the harbor, forts and munitions of war, and the eastern portion of Cuba, upon being allowed to withdraw. Permission to withdraw was refused, but the United States offered to send his forces to Spain, allowing the officers to wear their side arms. Upon Gen. Toral's urgent request for time to receive from his home government an answer to this offer Gen. Shafter gave him until 12 o'clock noon, of the 14th, but notified him that at the expiration of that time, unless the American terms were accepted, he would attack with every gun in the fleet and the army. This is the situation as we go to press.

Shortly after the cessation of the bombardment on the 11th, Gen. Nelson A. Miles, the general in command of the United States armies, arrived off Santiago bay on board the Yale. He had left Washington on the 7th and embarked on the Yale at Charleston on the 8th. His purpose in appearing at the front is not known, but he insists that it involves no displacement of Gen. Shafter or interference with his plans.

The destruction of Cervera's fleet

by Com. Schley, which was reported last week, was followed by an official survey of the wrecks. It was thought at first that three of the Spanish ships might be saved, but the board of survey reported on the 11th that it would be impossible to save any but the Infanta Maria Teresa, formerly Admiral Cervera's flagship. An important fact was incidentally disclosed by the survey. The interior explosions had bulged the injured parts of the hulks outward, a fact which strengthens the conclusion that the Maine, whose injured parts bulged inward, was sunk by an exterior explosion.

While the survey of the Spanish wrecks was in progress, their former commander, Admiral Cervera, was on his way, on board the St. Louis, along with 746 other Spanish prisoners, to their quarters in the United States. They arrived at Portsmouth, N. H., on the 10th, whence they go to Annapolis, Md., where they are to be detained. Before leaving the West Indies, Cervera cabled his official report to Gen. Blanco. This was on the 4th. He reported that in obedience to Blanco's orders he had gone out of Santiago harbor on the 3d, and after an unequal combat with forces more than triple his own, had lost his squadron. The number of men he had lost he did not know, but was sure it would exceed 600 killed and as many wounded, Villanil, the commander of the torpedo flotilla, being among the killed. Admiral Cervera also reported the gratitude of himself and his fellow prisoners for the "noble generosity" with which they were treated by their captors.

Another immediate result of Cervera's misfortune, was the release of Lieut. Hobson and his associates, of the Merrimac fame. They were exchanged on the 6th, and on the same night Hobson returned to his ship, the New York. He said that he had known all along that the Merrimac was not sunk where it would close the channel. He was unable to get her in place as he intended, because the Spaniards had shot her rudder away, and at the last moment she would not obey the helm. Submarine mines were exploded all about his party, he said, and he did not know whether the Merrimac was blown up by her own explosive or by Spanish torpedoes. He and his men were in the water for an hour before they were picked up by a Spanish boat. They