

from his patriotism and substitutes brilliant bunting. It is the patriotic pagan who calls upon his fellow citizens to follow the flag, though pirates send it forth upon a mission of destruction to all the good and true that it symbolizes. Real patriots will follow no flag upon such an errand. No truly patriotic American will cheer on his country's flag in a piratical crusade against his country's ideals.

NEWS

War in the Philippines continues. Last week we were able to present the substance of the press reports down to the 15th, when the Americans were in possession of Iloilo and the outlying town of Jaro, on the Island of Panay, and were holding a battle line 23 miles long in front of Manila on the Island of Luzon. Since then no fighting has been reported from Iloilo, though Molo, another outlying town, and Santa Barbara, an important neighboring town, are now occupied by the Americans. But in front of Manila the Americans have had fighting to do, and have suffered one repulse, besides being obliged to contract their lines. They have also had to do street fighting within the city itself.

The engagement of the 16th at San Pedro Macate, about 10 miles southeast of Manila, which we mentioned last week, proves to have been brought on by an attack upon a large body of Filipinos supposed to be reconnoitering. The attack was made by Gen. King's brigade to the right of which the Filipino force was first seen. The whole brigade turned out, but after an exchange of volleys the Filipinos disappeared in the jungle. No casualties are reported. On the next day, the 17th, a considerable Filipino force attacked the American outposts near the Manila water works. The Americans were soon reinforced and after a hot fight drove the Filipinos back towards Caloocan. American reports give the Filipino casualties as 50 killed, and the American as eight severely wounded and none killed. One of the wounded, however, died during the night. No engagements are reported for the 18th, but on the 19th another skirmish occurred near San Pedro Macate. In this affair the Filipinos attacked a church at Guadalupe which was oc-

cupied by an American regiment, and drove the regiment out. They then set fire to the church and retired. No reports of casualties have been given. The Associated Press account of this engagement states that the Filipinos "still hold the country in the vicinity of Guadalupe, Pasig and Patero, despite the efforts of the gunboats to dislodge them from the jungle on both sides of the river," and it adds that "the heat is intense and is increasing perceptibly daily." The same report tells of other fighting farther to the south, in which a gunboat opened fire at night upon Filipino trenches, drawing a few volleys in reply, but without other effect. During the night of the same day the Filipinos poured volley after volley into San Pedro Macate from a neighboring ridge, though without doing any reported damage. On the next day the American line was drawn in, it having become too difficult—because of the great heat, the limited forces, and the activity of the swarms of Filipinos—to protect so long a line. No movements are reported for the 21st. But on the night of the 22d, an outbreak occurred in the city of Manila, accompanied by an attempt to destroy the city by fire. There was severe street fighting, and the fire did great damage. At least 700 buildings are said to have been destroyed. Loss of life was suffered, but to what extent is not yet reported. The night is described as "one of terror."

Gen. Otis was interviewed on the 18th by a New York Journal representative, to whom, in reply to questions, he said:

The idea of the natives participating in the future American government of the islands has not been considered. Friendly natives will not be used as allies. No one understands the native character. The natives do not understand the American idea of liberty. They are blinded by unscrupulous leaders, the riff-raff of wandering Americans and foreign scamps of every kind, dumped down in Manila, while the Asiatic coast cities have aided the insurgents to secure arms, and agitate the idea of independence. The natives only fight when they are told to do so. They do not understand what they are fighting for.

Asked, "How many natives are bearing arms to-day?" Gen. Otis replied:

Too many, and they are not confined to the Island of Luzon alone. The Iloilo fight showed that. We must stop the unscrupulous rascals who furnished arms, and are sliding along the Asiatic coast from Hongkong, Sangapore, and

Shanghai. The outbreak of the Filipinos was brought about by the machinations of corrupt Filipinos who control affairs. They did everything to inflame the natives and make them believe that American rule would be worse than the oppression of the Spaniards. The insurgent papers of Manila advocated independence and inflamed the natives with a desire for gain and plunder. They did everything to prejudice the people against the Americans. Aguinaldo is not so bad as he is painted. He does not control nor represent the Filipinos. His name is used simply as a blind. The people of the islands are skeptical of all things; and the leaders, for their own advantage, used him as a demigod. Shrewd, unscrupulous Filipinos used the name of Aguinaldo to influence the natives. He lost personal control and was forced to act by the men who surrounded him.

When asked how long it would take to subdue the Philippines, Gen. Otis is described as turning around in his chair, hesitating, and finally saying:

I can talk no more to-day.

Approximately 8,000 more troops are now on their way to reinforce Gen. Otis. There are five separate expeditions. Gen. Lawton, with 1,728 men, has passed the Suez canal. Gen. Wheaton with 1,268 men left San Francisco January 27; and Col. Egbert with one regiment left there early in February. Besides these, 2,000 men on board the Sherman left Gibraltar for the Suez canal on the 17th; and on the 19th the Sheridan with 2,100 men sailed from New York for Manila by way of Suez. One gunboat arrived on the 22d to reinforce Dewey, and another has just passed through the Suez canal.

President McKinley was the guest of the "Home Market Club" at its banquet in Boston on the 15th, and in his speech he discussed chiefly the Philippine question. It was the first time he had publicly referred to the subject since his trip to Atlanta, reported in No. 38 of *The Public*. The important parts of Mr. McKinley's speech were as follows:

The Philippines, like Cuba and Porto Rico, were intrusted to our hands by the war, and to that great trust, under the Providence of God and in the name of human progress and civilization, we are committed. It is a trust which we will not flinch. . . . We hear no complaint of the relation created by the war between this government and the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. There are some, however, who regard the Philippines as in a different relation; but whatever variety of views

there may be on this phase of the question there is universal agreement that the Philippines shall not be turned back to Spain. No true American will consent to that. . . . And yet, had we refused to accept the cession of them we should have had no power over them, even for their own good. We could not discharge the responsibilities resting upon us until these islands became ours, either by consent or treaty. There was but one alternative, and that was either Spain or the United States in the Philippines. The other suggestions—first, that they should be tossed into the arena for the strife of nations; or, second, be lost to the anarchy and chaos of no protectorate at all—were too shameful to be considered. . . . Our concern was not for territory or trade or empire, but for the people whose interests and destiny, without our willing it, had been put in our hands. It was with this feeling that from the first day to the last not one word or line went from the executive in Washington to our military and naval commanders at Manila or to our peace commissioners at Paris that did not put as the sole purpose to be kept in mind first, after the success of our arms and the maintenance of our own honor, the welfare and happiness and the rights of the inhabitants of the Philippine islands. Did we need their consent to perform a great act for humanity? We had it in every aspiration of their minds, in every hope of their hearts. Was it necessary to ask their consent to capture Manila, the capital of their islands? Did we ask their consent to liberate them from Spanish sovereignty or to enter Manila bay and destroy the Spanish sea power there? We did not ask these; we were obeying a higher moral obligation which rested on us and which did not require anybody's consent. We were doing our duty by them with the consent of our own consciences and with the approval of civilization. Every present obligation has been met and fulfilled in the expulsion of Spanish sovereignty from their islands, and while the war that destroyed it was in progress we could not ask their views. Nor can we now ask their consent.

Indeed, can anyone tell me in what form it could be marshaled and ascertained until peace and order, so necessary to a reign of reason, shall be secured and established? A reign of terror is not the kind of rule under which right action and deliberate judgment are possible. It is not a good time for the liberator to submit important questions concerning liberty and government to the liberated while they are engaged in shooting down their rescuers? . . .

The future of the Philippine islands is now in the hands of the American people. Until the treaty was ratified or rejected the executive department of this government could only preserve the

peace and protect life and property. That treaty now commits the free and enfranchised Filipinos to the guiding hand and the liberalizing influences, the generous sympathies and the uplifting education, not of their American masters, but of their American emancipators. No one can tell to-day what is best for them or for us. I know no one at this hour who is wise enough or sufficiently informed to determine what form of government will best preserve their interests and our interests; their and our well-being. . . . Until congress shall direct otherwise it will be the duty of the executive to possess and hold the Philippines, giving to the people thereof peace and beneficent government, affording them every opportunity to prosecute their lawful pursuits, encouraging them in thrift and industry, making them feel and know we are their friends, not their enemies; that their good is our aim; that their welfare is our welfare, but that neither their aspirations nor ours can be realized until our authority is acknowledged and unquestioned.

That the inhabitants of the Philippines will be benefited by this republic is my unshaken belief; that they will have a kindlier government under our guidance and that they will be aided in every possible way to be self-respecting and self-governing people is as true as that the American people love liberty and have an abiding faith in their own government and their own institutions.

No imperial designs lurk in the American mind. They are alien to American sentiment, thought and purpose. Our priceless principles undergo no change under a tropical sun.

We now pass from the Philippine question to the personal issue between Sampson and Schley, which has been brought before the senate. It has long been asserted on the part of Sampson's friends, including the secretary of the navy, that Schley was not only entitled to no credit for the victory over Cervera, but that he merited condemnation for negligence in hovering about Cienfuegos in May, while Cervera was safely hidden in Santiago harbor, a negligence which but for good fortune and the vigilance of Sampson might have permitted Cervera to escape. Schley remained silent throughout the controversy, and a prejudice against him had begun to take root. But when the secretary of the navy submitted a report with documents, to the senate, in which both directly and through Sampson's reports to him, he reiterated the complaints against Schley, Schley was given an opportunity to answer. This he did through a communication to the senate committee

on naval affairs, which was made public on the 20th.

As to his delay off Cienfuegos Schley says that he was then acting under orders from Sampson to blockade that port. These orders of Sampson are not given in the secretary's report along with Sampson's other orders; so Schley quotes from them. They are dated May 20, and were received by Schley May 23. By them Sampson requires Schley to

hold his fleet off Cienfuegos. If the Spanish ships have put into Santiago they must come either to Havana or to Cienfuegos to deliver the munitions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. I am therefore of the opinion that the best chance to capture these ships will be to hold the two points, Cienfuegos and Havana, with all the force we can muster. If, later, it should develop that these vessels are at Santiago we can then assemble off that point the ships best suited for the purpose, and completely blockade it. Until we, then, receive more positive information we shall continue to hold Havana and Cienfuegos.

On the 24th of May Schley learned definitely that the Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos, and within two hours he started for Santiago where, after much difficulty, he succeeded in positively locating it on the 29th. His statement in this particular he verifies by a telegram of May 31st from Sampson, in which Sampson congratulates him upon his success in locating and blockading the enemy's fleet at Santiago. Schley takes occasion to contrast this compliment with Sampson's letter to the department of July 10—six weeks later—describing the same occurrence as "reprehensible conduct."

Turning then to the events of the battle with Cervera on July 3, Schley first shows that he and not Sampson, was by Sampson's own orders, in command of the fleet. At 8:45 on that morning, more than an hour before Cervera's ships emerged from the harbor, Sampson signaled his fleet to "disregard movements of the commander-in-chief," and steamed away eastward. This left Schley the senior officer present, and clothed him with the responsibility of command. That was the situation when the enemy appeared. Schley then directed the American fleet by signals from the Brooklyn, with which also he made a maneuver that he describes as "the crucial and deciding feature of the combat." It was not until after this