

request that the Oregon be sent to Manila at once, "for political reasons." The most plausible guesses, and they are not very plausible, are to the effect that Germany was indulging among the Filipinos in what American politicians call "mixing," and that Dewey wanted to impress her naval commander with the sight of a big American battleship. One report had it that Germany was planning the defeat of the American policy of expansion in the Philippines. For the honor—the real, and not the pinchbeck honor—of the United States, we should hope that this might prove to be true, and that Germany would succeed in that design. But it appears that whatever her original intentions may have been, Germany has concluded to leave the Filipinos to their fate.

Irrespective of the shame of our bloody attack upon Filipino liberties, of our sordid reaching out for real estate and "markets," the costliness of the enterprise is becoming apparent. There are now in the Philippines or on the way, nearly twice as many American troops as set foot in Cuba during the war; and with nearly 100 men killed and 300 wounded, besides suffering and death from disease, the campaign appears, nevertheless, to have only begun. Army officers say they expect a series of small battles throughout the summer, and believe that all the troops now in the Philippines will have to be relieved by fresh men before fall. On the mere question of profit, a "market" thus secured, after a first cost of \$20,000,000 purchase money, will be unprofitable enough. As William Lloyd Garrison says:

A gold brick swindle is economical in comparison. You can throw away a brick.

The recent lecture by Prof. David Starr Jordan, president of Stanford university, and a republican, in which he described the McKinley administration as conspicuous in its "inaptitude for divorcing politics from statesmanship," and characterized Mc-

Kinley himself as a president "with many virtues who never had an idea of his own," has been supplemented by the speech of Congressman Johnson, also a republican, upon the floor of the house, in which McKinley was condemned as no president ever was before officially by a member of his own party. Mr. Johnson denounced the president for having engaged in the prosecution of a bloody war against a poor and defenseless people in the Orient, engaged in the unsavory task of Christianizing them with the sword and civilizing them at the mouths of cannon.

He characterized the president's Boston speech as "the most disingenuous address that ever fell from the lips of an American president," an address which,

divested of its verbiage, considered apart from its platitudes and the ostentatious professions of virtue with which it was interlarded, was nothing more nor less than a carefully devised and studious misstatement of the issue between the chief executive and those of his own party who are opposed to his wretched policy in the Philippines. It was an effort to befog the subject, and to mislead the public judgment;

and which, "when read in cold print, in the light of the indefensible tragedy now being enacted near the shores of Asia," suggests

that creation of Charles Dickens, who was accustomed to roll his eyes piously to heaven and exclaim with great ostentation to those about him: "My friends, let us be moral," and who was the father of two daughters, one of whom he named Charity and the other Mercy.

Continuing, Mr. Johnson said:

I am determined that the president shall neither befog the issue between himself and those of the republican party who oppose his Philippine policy, nor mislead the public judgment, nor shirk the responsibility for the gross official blunders which he has committed in connection with this great problem. I insist that the whole policy is not simply an error, but that it is a crime, and that the chief executive of this nation is the one who has precipitated upon us the embarrassments and the difficulties by which we are now confronted. I insist that he did not simply hold the Philippines as commander-in-chief, leaving the question of the disposition and control of them to congress, but that he formulated and put into execution an affirmative and aggressive policy, that of their permanent annexation to this country, and

forced it through the senate with all the power and influence which his high office enabled him to employ.

The worst of this speech is not that it was made, as administration sycophants insist, but that it is true.

Chauncey M. Depew, whom Prof. Herron well describes as a "puerile mountebank," has been at Chicago speaking to a society of railroad employes which railroad bosses have organized to act as a buffer between railroad monopolies and anti-monopoly legislation. Mr. Depew took advantage of this opportunity to explain why he withdrew from the contest for the republican presidential nomination in 1888. It was

because the delegates from the so-called granger states told me that the feeling in their states against railway men in every branch of the service was so intense that a station agent or a locomotive engineer or a conductor could not be elected as trustee of any village on their line, and that the nomination of a railway official for president would disintegrate the party in their states.

Those delegates certainly understood the situation, and their constituents appreciated the power of railway monopoly. Nothing could be more dangerous to any community than to elect railroad employes to political office, and few things could be more disastrous to honest but dependent railroad employes than to accept such office. Railroad corporations expect their employes to be loyal to their interests, just or unjust, and in all relations, no matter what intervenes; and they make no exceptions of employes who also hold public office.

After eleven years' experience with the great railroad octopus, the interstate commerce commission virtually "gives it up." It reports that "the present law is wholly inadequate to deal with the situation." Yet the commission offers no specific remedy. It does not even suggest one, because none occurs to it that "would not involve resort to measures of so radical a nature as would doubtless preclude their adoption." This is an allusion, probably, to public ownership. Not courageous enough to propose the

only remedy it can conceive, the commission proposes "leaving the roads to regulate their own rates and their own competition, subject to some assurances that the rates would not be forced too high!"

We sympathize with the commission. It was invested by government with governmental functions, for the purpose of controlling an institution which had been invested by government with still more powerful governmental functions. The failure might have been predicted. "Let me control the highways of a country," the railroad magnate may well sing, "and I care not what commission you appoint to control me." To properly understand and effectually solve the railroad question, we must first realize that it is at bottom a highway question. When that is done, all the rest follows. It can then be seen plainly that government cannot turn over public highways to private corporations, and at the same time protect the people from the depredations of the modern type of what was once known as "road agents." Public ownership of all highways is the only solution of the railroad problem.

In connection with the railroad problem, J. Sterling Morton's outspoken Conservative wants to know why "homesteaders" should not be treated as they try to treat railroads. It asks—

If it is right to prescribe the limit of the income of a railroad because the government has done so much for it, why is it not equally proper to fix the price of corn, wheat, oats, cattle and hogs grown by homesteaders upon land donated to them by the general government?

The question is framed a little carelessly. To "limit the income of a railroad" is not at all analogous to fixing "the price of corn, wheat" and so on. But fixing the price of transportation would be, and it is that doubtless that Mr. Morton had in mind. The answer is that it is neither right nor practicable to fix by law the prices either of corn and wheat or of railroad transportation. But it is right and would be practicable to "limit the income"

of railroads; and it would be right and practicable to "limit the income" of homesteaders. So much of the railroads' income as is due to the value of its monopoly right of way—the "water" in its stock, that is to say—and nothing more, should be taken from the railroad company. That could be done by making railway lines, as distinguished from rolling stock, public property, and allowing competition to regulate prices of transportation. Likewise, so much of the income of the homesteader as is due to his superior location—the "water" in his deed, so to speak—and nothing more, should be taken from him. That could be done by substituting for his present taxes a tax not to exceed the value of his location.

There is a trick to which plutocratic editorial writers, and economic professors in colleges endowed by robber barons of the period, are addicted, regarding which the general reader must be on the alert or his common sense will be taken captive. These writers defend corporations, production on a large scale, and so on, propositions that are quite defensible, and then rush the reader, with a literary hop-skip-and-jump, to the conclusion that the attacks upon railroad, telegraph, gas, street car and similar corporations are answered. The trick may with a little thought be readily detected. Its secret lies in the assumption that all corporations are alike, and that trusts are a method of production on a large scale. But in truth, trusts are combinations to prevent production, and some corporations are monopolies. A corporation to work a farm would be unobjectionable and might be desirable. But a corporation to run street cars is something more than a corporation; it is the owner of an exclusive right of way through the public streets. The evil is not in the charter of incorporation, but in the street franchise. With a clear understanding of the principle of this distinction, any reader can for himself detect in the editorial and

magazine writings of plutocratic hirelings the place where their trick comes in.

Questioning our approval of Tolstoi's criticisms of the czar's disarmament conference, Charles T. Dole, of Massachusetts, asks if all who love peace ought not, even though there be reason for distrusting the czar's proposal, to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the conference to promote the cause. Doubtless they ought. But they should be wise about it. War is not the worst of evils. It is one of the worst; but liberty-suppressing governments are worse still. Now, Russia is under the domination of such a government, which is reaching out to grasp more territory and subjugate other peoples. Autocratic dominion over Europe and Asia is its aim. And to accomplish its ends the Russian government now proposes to the other European powers that the armaments of all stop where they are. If that were agreed to, Russia could and doubtless would go on perfecting her armaments in secret. For Russia muzzles the press. Let the czar's government abolish press censorship, and every lover of peace, who loves liberty even more than peace, will gladly promote the czar's peace proposals. As matters now stand, those proposals are like the request of Esop's wolves to the sheep, that they discharge the dogs.

Some idea of the plans of the Russian government may be derived from the plight of Finland. Though Finland adjoins Russia and has for nearly a century been a Russian dependency, it nevertheless in great measure preserves its autonomy. It retains a language and literature of its own, and comprises an educated, intelligent and thriving people; and withal is a sort of protection to Norway and Sweden against encroachments by Russia upon them. But now Russia, with evident designs upon Norway and Sweden, is about to deprive poor Finland of all autonomy, and to extend the absolute powers of the czar to the Scandinavian borders. Fin-