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The protectionists of Germany, commonly known as agrarians, boldly give away the real character of protection. Their representative body has demanded a law of the German reichstag, forbidding peasants to leave their places of birth before 20 years of age. Such a law, these German protectionists argue, would settle the farmhand question. Labor would no longer be scarce, and wages could be kept down. This is the essence of protection, not alone in Germany, but also in the United States. Our protectionists, however, are more subtle in their methods than are the simple German landlords.

Chicago public school teachers have discovered that John D. Rockefeller contemplates drawing them into his educational net. His college president, Mr. Harper, has prepared a bill, now before the Illinois legislature, which would put the public school teachers of Chicago under the control of the Rockefeller university. Another measure originating from the same source would prevent the organization of any new college without an endowment of at least \$100,000. It looks as if an educational trust would soon figure among Mr. Rockefeller's assets.

It is gratifying to find our own view of the Russian peace proposal borne out by Tolstoi, whose devotion to the cause of universal peace is not open to question. In the London Chronicle he writes of the proposal as "only worthy of contempt and derision;" and sensibly says "it will be impossible to reduce armaments

while nations not only persist in acquiring new possessions, like the Philippines, Port Arthur, and the rest, but also keep what they have acquired, like Poland, India, Alsace-Lorraine and the rest."

With the thermometer at zero, nine men were exposed for an hour in a pillory, and then with bared backs were lashed with a cat-o'-nine-tails. The punishment was brutalizing alike to the miserable convicts who endured it and to the unfortunate man who administered it; and we should all so regard it, if the tragedy had occurred in the last century or in a barbarous country. But it occurred last Saturday in the city of Wilmington and state of Delaware. Let us not be too severe, however, in our thoughts upon the lawmakers of Delaware. Their instincts are no more brutal than those of the average lawmaker. They differ only in having the courage of their brutality.

It is a significant fact that only criminals of the poorer sort are pilloried and lashed in Delaware. On the occasion referred to above, one of the victims had stolen a pair of opera glasses, another had stolen a harness, another had taken money from his father, one had committed forgery, and two had been convicted of burglary. These are the kind of cases that are always reported—crimes which are peculiarly those of the poor. The pillory and the whipping post in Delaware are the poor man's punishment. The penalties for crimes to which the rich are addicted are of a different sort.

Publication has been made of the report of Mr. McKinley's committee on the mismanagement of the war. This report is of little importance. It is the unofficial opinion of a few friends of the president, based upon

such testimony as was voluntarily offered and they chose to consider. The committee possessed no more legal authority in the premises than the Grid-iron or the Beefsteak club would have had, if in one of its frolics it had undertaken to inquire into the conduct of the war. This presidential committee had no legal power to compel the attendance of witnesses, to order the production of papers, to enforce answers to question, or even to administer oaths. False testimony before it could not be punished as perjury nor punished at all.

The censorship which President McKinley has established over cable messages from the Philippines, continues to make it impossible to obtain reliable information regarding the war he is waging against the Philippine republic. The only uncensored report we have yet received comes through the Filipino junta at Hong-Kong from Filipino sources, and is doubtless colored in favor of the Filipinos much as reports from American sources are colored in favor of the Americans. But by considering the Filipino and the American reports together, in the light of known circumstances, it is possible to draw inferences that would seem fairly to describe the situation.

It is reasonably certain that the fighting at Manila began at about 8:30 on the night of the 4th. All American reports agree as to that. It is also certain that this fighting was precipitated by the attempt of three Filipinos to pass the American sentry, and the killing by the sentry of one of them and his wounding of another. The American reports agree that this first fighting was brief, and that hostilities were resumed about midnight and became general during the early morning of the 5th and through the fore part of that day, the fleet partici-

pating with deadly effect. In the Filipino report nothing is said of the first brief fight, but it is asserted that the American fleet unexpectedly and without provocation opened fire. A comparison of these apparently conflicting reports, with due allowance for coloring and censorship, leads with reasonable certainty to the conclusion that the first outbreak occurred as the American reports have it, but was local as well as brief, and that the Filipinos generally were unaware of hostilities until fired upon near midnight by the fleet. We believe that uncensored reports will substantially confirm this conclusion.

Another inference from the colored and censored reports of both sides is that most of the Filipino killed and wounded were either unarmed, or armed only with primitive weapons; and that these casualties were due almost wholly to the fleet which, according to our own reports, swept away whole villages and slaughtered natives by the hundred. In other words, it is a reasonable inference that the well equipped Filipino army withdrew before the American advance, and that the destruction of Filipino life was suffered in greatest proportion by the villagers whose homes were swept away.

This is asserted by the Filipino reports to be the case, and circumstances corroborate them. In the first place it is well known to be the Filipino mode of warfare to recede before the enemy's advance and draw him into marshes where he will be exposed to disease, into jungles where his men may be picked off, and before natural fortifications that are impregnable. All reports indicate that this is what the Filipino army did at Manila. In the second place, though Gen. Otis has reported enormous Filipino casualties, even specifying their extent with some approach to detail, he reports no capture of arms except in the vaguest manner. Two Krupp guns are all the heavy pieces he claims to have captured, though it is well

known that the Filipinos were much better equipped in this particular. And as to small arms, he tells of having captured "a great many rifles," but gives no indication of what he regards as constituting "a great many," nor as to whether or not they are the Mauser rifles, with which the Filipino army is known to be well supplied. The vagueness of this statement, along with the positive assertions of the Filipinos that aside from two obsolete Krupp guns which they had abandoned, no capture of arms had been made up to the 7th, is no slight evidence in confirmation of the inference that a real victory over the Filipinos had not then been achieved, and that their killed and wounded were largely civilian villagers.

Further confirmation of the same inference is found in the later reports from Iloilo, upon which the Americans have advanced and which they have taken. There was no resistance. The Americans did not suffer loss, and unless official reports have been emasculated for publication, neither did the Filipinos. What the Filipino troops did at Iloilo was what they evidently had done at Manila, and what they always did in their wars with Spain; they retired from the city and took up a position from which they can harass their enemy, but to which he cannot penetrate without getting into natural difficulties and dangers where his men who escape sharpshooters become a prey to disease.

That this is the kind of entertainment to which the American people have been invited by President McKinley's imperialistic land-grabbing policy, is at last coming to be realized by the imperialists themselves. An Associated Press dispatch of the 12th from Manila intimates that despite all the jubilant reports of the preceding week, discouragement among the men at Manila has set in. Says this dispatch—

A week ago those who took an optimistic view predicted that the terrible lesson just administered to the rebels would settle the question of Filipino independence in short order. But

this prediction has not been fulfilled. As a matter of fact, the rebels are now scattered throughout the country, bushwhacking, except at Malabon, where they are gathered in force. Even there their methods savor more of guerrilla than civilized warfare, every bush and clump of trees furnishing a cover for their sharpshooters.

It is to be regretted, of course, that the Filipinos adopt methods that savor of guerrilla warfare, instead of standing up before civilized killing machines to be shot down by hundreds and thousands in a reputable manner. Their conduct in this particular is extremely reprehensible. But there is no reason to expect them to reform. For, as the Associated Press dispatch continues—

Unfortunately, for miles around the land is studded with bamboo jungle, and open spaces are few and far between. This affords the natives, who fight better under cover, a distinct advantage. In many places the jungle is so dense that the eye cannot penetrate it, and only by the flashes of their rifles is the whereabouts of the enemy indicated.

That ought to be enough to suggest the kind of man-trap Mr. McKinley has prepared for American soldiers.

In confirmation of the pessimistic dispatch from which we have just quoted, we are authorized to publish an extract from a private letter of an American military officer at Manila. For obvious reasons his name is withheld. The letter was written about a month ago. So much of it as is pertinent to the Filipinos reads:

I believe we could drive back their whole line in a day, without much loss; but the country is such that they could fall back into the mountains beyond the possibility of danger, to reappear at any time when circumstances warranted, and the same condition be forced upon the United States that Spain has had to endure—the necessity of keeping an army of occupation to hold the large and important points, and the frittering away by disease of thousands of our men annually, without advancing the interest of our government.

That officer's judgment is being verified. Since he wrote, the Filipino line has been driven back in a day without much loss, as he thought it could be; but ever since, just as he predicted, the Filipinos have forced upon the Americans daily repetitions

of harassing and deadly guerrilla warfare. Our troops are winning daily victories—decisive victories, the reports have it—yet each succeeding day they have to win another “decisive victory” not far from where they had won a “decisive victory” the day before. Truly we have entered upon a career of national shame, which promises also to be for our soldiers a long drawn out career of inglorious suffering and death.

Senator Mason's complaint that he was “buncoed” by the imperialistic party in the senate appears to have more back of it than he has revealed. The gist of his complaint is that promises were made that upon the ratification of the treaty, one of the resolutions declaring against imperialism should be voted upon. But the promises appear to have been much more to the point. On the day before the treaty vote, Senator Perkins, in an interview sent to the Chicago Record, used this language:

I have been assured by republican leaders in the senate and by republicans who stand high in administration circles that it is the intention after the treaty has been ratified to urge the passage of a resolution declaring that the United States will deal with the Philippines exactly as it is now dealing with Cuba, and that the Filipinos will be assured of a stable independent government as soon as they are prepared for it, the United States to reserve a coaling and naval station in the islands, with a commercial arrangement advantageous to our trade. This statement has been made to me positively and directly by several gentlemen in whom I have the utmost confidence and who are high in the councils of the administration. With this understanding several senators who have been opposed to ratification of the peace treaty will vote for it to-morrow.

How honorably meant were those assurances, the proceedings in the senate on the 14th disclosed. The McEnery resolution was then taken up. Unless this resolution is designed to satisfy the Louisiana sugar planters with assurances of a protective tariff between our own country and our outlying provinces, it is meaningless, as an examination of its text in our news department will demonstrate. An

amendment was offered, however, which would have put this nation right before the world and its own conscience. The amendment disclaimed any imperialistic purpose. But upon that amendment there was a tie, which the vice president decided in favor of imperialism. That is the way Mr. Perkins's “republicans who stand high in administration circles,” kept their faith.

Congressman Cannon, chairman of the committee on appropriations of the lower house of congress, has startled the country with his estimates of the treasury deficiency we are soon to face. Secretary Gage had placed the deficiency for the year ending next June at \$112,000,000; but on the 9th, in warning his party in the house against improvident appropriations, Mr. Cannon said that Secretary Gage's figure was too low. By Mr. Cannon's estimate, the deficiency next June will not be less than \$179,000,000 inclusive of the \$20,000,000 to be paid to Spain pursuant to the treaty. Exclusive of that item, the deficit will be \$159,000,000.

Judged by these deficiency estimates, the Dingley law has been a total failure as a revenue raiser, or else imperialism has already begun to cost us dear. To be sure, we became involved in a war which was not contemplated by the Dingley law; but the expenses of the war will not much exceed the amount realized from war bonds. War expenses and war bonds may therefore offset each other. So it appears that the tax receipts under the Dingley law, though supplemented by tax receipts under the war revenue law, will fall short of meeting ordinary government expenses up to June 30, 1899, by \$112,000,000 according to Secretary Gage's estimate, and by \$159,000,000 according to Mr. Cannon's estimate. Whether the fault for this is chargeable wholly to Mr. Dingley's tariff law, or partly to Mr. McKinley's imperialistic policy, it is chargeable altogether to the plutocratic regime which now controls the federal government.

All other objections aside, this condition of the treasury would not encourage men of genuine public spirit to increase the standing army to 50,000 and empower a thriftless administration to increase it in discretion by 50,000 more. Yet the lower house has passed with a hurrah a bill of precisely that character, and through administration channels it is announced that the president's clique in the senate intends to jam it through. For that purpose a special session is to be called if necessary. But the people are not to be allowed to suspect that the special session is for the purpose of establishing a large standing army. To mislead them the appropriation bills at the present session are to be held back. Senatorial opponents of the standing army measure have been warned that unless they allow the standing army bill to go through, no appropriation bills will be allowed to pass. Thus the president will have an apparently legitimate excuse for calling a special session, in which the standing army measure may figure nominally as an incident but in truth as the prime object.

Advocates of a standing army play upon the national desire for a drilled military force for defense. But what we need for defense is not a standing army. Standing armies oppress; they do not defend. The people defend. For that reason it is important not that we have a standing army, but that all the people have the benefit of military education and drill.

Chancellor McCracken, of the New York University, when speaking last week at the national military convention, indicated the true military principle for a republic. He said that we do not want a large standing army, but we do want the 80,000 men that every year leave the high schools of this country competent to drill companies. That is precisely what we want. And if imperialism continues to advance, and a standing army begins to menace popular liberty, we shall want it for nothing more urgently than to furnish drilled citizens to fight the standing army itself.